CLAY et al v. THORUP et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LUCRETIA CLAY, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB
)
ANDREW THORUP in his individual and
official capacity,
)
)
KHALID BROOKS in his individual and
official capacity,
)
)
CITY OF LAWRENCE, 	)
LAWRENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Lucretia Clay is pursuing civil-rights claims arising out of an altercation
with City of Lawrence police officers and her subsequent arrest. 	Ms. Clay has
filed four objections under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) to Magistrate
Judge Baker's orders. 	Dkt. [217]; dkt. [251]; dkt. [271]; dkt. [272]. 	For the
reasons below, those objections are OVERRULED.
I.
Rule 72(a) Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) allows parties to object to
magistrate judges' non-dispositive orders "within 14 days after being served
with a copy." 	The district judge "must consider timely objections and modify or
set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to
law." 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 	"Clear error is an
extremely deferential standard of review." 	Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879,
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888 (7th Cir. 2006). 	An order is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is
"left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
Id.; see Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 943–44 (7th Cir.
1997) (discussing Rule 72(a) objections). 	"A conclusion of law is 'contrary to
law' where the magistrate judge 'fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes,
case law, or rules of procedure.'" 	Pain Ctr. of SE Indiana, LLC v. Origin
Healthcare Sols. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-133-RLY-DKL, 2014 WL 958464 at *3 (S.D.
Ind. Mar. 12, 2014).
II.
Objection to Order Denying Omnibus Motion
In April 2026, Ms. Clay filed an "emergency omnibus motion" alleging
that Defendants conspired to turn off their body-worn cameras during her
arrest, tampered with video evidence by removing logos and timestamps, and
did not preserve all bodycam videos. 	Dkt. 174. 	Ms. Clay requested sanctions
and "a total restoration of the discovery timeline and a striking of the
Defendants' previous procedural advantages gained through this deception."
Id. at 19–20.
Magistrate Judge Baker denied Ms. Clay's motion, finding that her
allegations of conspiracy and evidence tampering were speculative and
unsupported by evidence. 	Dkt. 214 at 3–4. 	He also denied Ms. Clay's request
for sanctions for Defendants' failure to preserve two bodycam videos because
no evidence showed prejudice or improper intent. 	Id. at 4–6. 	Finally,
Magistrate Judge Baker struck Ms. Clay's reply brief for non-compliance with
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the Local Rules' length requirements and struck evidence filed with the reply
brief because it could have been filed with her opening brief. 	Id. at 6–7. 	Ms.
Clay objects to Magistrate Judge Baker's order. 	Dkt. 217.
A. Striking of reply brief and evidence
Ms. Clay argues that Magistrate Judge Baker clearly erred by striking
her reply brief and evidence filed with it. 	Dkt. 217 at 1–3. 	She does not
contest, however, that her reply brief violated the Local Rules' requirement that
"[r]eply briefs may not exceed 15 pages." 	S.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(e)(1). 	"[D]istrict
courts may require strict compliance with their local rules—a point [the
Seventh Circuit has] recognized time and again." 	Hinterberger v. City of
Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020) 	And Magistrate Judge Baker
had already cautioned Ms. Clay about violating the local rules. 	See dkt. 169 at
2; dkt. 190 at 1. 	While Ms. Clay contends that the standard practice is
"disregard the extra pages" instead of striking the brief, she cites no authority
in support, dkt. 217 at 2, and the Local Rules allow the Court to "strike from
the record any document that does not comply with the rules governing the
form of documents filed with the court, such as rules that regulate document
size," S.D. Ind. L.R. 1-3; accord Abner v. Scott Mem. Hosp., 934 F.3d 962, 963
(7th Cir. 2011).
Similarly, for the stricken evidence, Ms. Clay does not challenge
Magistrate Judge Baker's conclusion that it could have been filed with her
initial motion instead of with the reply brief. 	Dkt. 217 at 2–3; see United States
v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1296 n.23 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Although Balzano
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purported to provide examples of such evidence in his reply brief, it is well
settled that a matter may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief.").
Instead, Ms. Clay argues that Magistrate Judge Baker improperly prevented
that evidence from being accessed in further judicial review. 	Stricken evidence,
however, remains accessible if necessary for review of Magistrate Judge Baker's
decision1, and he did not commit clear error in striking it from consideration
for the merits of Ms. Clay's motion.
B. Bodycam video evidence
Ms. Clay contends that officers conspired to cause a "blackout" in
bodycam footage that left an "unrecorded 'void' while Plaintiff was still held in
custody, visibly injured, and crying for help in the back of the patrol car." 	Dkt.
217 at 8, 19–21. 	She has presented no evidence supporting a conspiracy to
stop recording and has not explained why officers would conspire to turn off
body cameras after she was in custody in the patrol car. 	See id. 	Ms. Clay
instead speculates that there was a conspiracy because several officers turned
off their cameras within ten minutes of each other. 	Id. at 19. 	But she does not
explain why their decision to stop recording at similar times after Ms. Clay was
in custody would be illegitimate or even suspicious. 	See id. There was
therefore no clear error in Magistrate Judge Baker's finding that this allegation
was "speculative and unpersuasive." 	Dkt. 214 at 4.
1 While Ms. Clay's notice of manual filing lists several exhibits, the flash drive she
provided includes only a video compilation labeled Exhibit 174A.1. See dkt. 203.
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Ms. Clay next argues that Magistrate Judge Baker clearly erred in ruling
that sanctions were not warranted for Defendants' failure to preserve two
bodycam videos. 	Dkt. 217 at 3–8.2 Defendants produced bodycam video from
six officers who were present at the scene of Ms. Clay's arrest, including from
Defendants Andrew Thorup and Khalid Brooks. 	Dkt. 214 at 5 (citing dkt. 193
at 7–8). 	Bodycam video from a non-defendant officer, Brandon Raftery, was
deleted, as was video from an initial interaction between Officer Thorup and
Ms. Clay. 	Id. at 5–6.
Ms. Clay has not alleged any prejudice from the deletion of Officer
Raftery's video footage. 	See dkt. 217 at 8–9. 	While she contends that the
deletion must have been intentional, she does not contest Magistrate Judge
Baker's finding that the video would be redundant to the extensive video that
was preserved and produced in discovery. 	See id.; dkt. 214 at 6. 	Ms. Clay
therefore has not shown clear error in Magistrate Judge Baker's decision that
discovery sanctions were not warranted. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1); David v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2003).
For Officer Thorup's bodycam from his initial encounter with Ms. Clay,
Magistrate Judge Baker found that sanctions were not warranted because the
failure to preserve was unintentional and any prejudice could be mitigated.
2 Ms. Clay also argues in her objection that video evidence from Officer Gustavo Canas
"was missing or withheld." Dkt. 217 at 14. While Ms. Clay briefly mentioned Officer
Canas in her omnibus motion, she offered no explanation for her belief that his video
footage has not been turned over and cited no evidence in support. Dkt. 174 at 4, 19.
This argument is therefore waived. See Brockett v. Effingham County, Ill., 116 F.4th
680 686 (7th Cir. 2024) ("[A]rguments that are underdeveloped, cursory, and lack
supporting authority are waived.").
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Dkt. 214 at 6. 	Ms. Clay contends that the video deletion was intentional and
part of a broader conspiracy, but she does not explain how the video would
meaningfully affect her Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Thorup for
his actions during the subsequent encounter. 	See dkt. 217 at 6–8. 	Nor does
she respond to Magistrate Judge Baker's conclusion that she could mitigate
any prejudice by deposing Officer Thorup. 	See id.; dkt. 214 at 6. 	Ms. Clay
therefore has not shown clear error here either. 	See Bracey v. Grondin, 712
F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013) (showing a duty to preserve evidence is not
enough; a party seeking a spoliation finding "must also show destruction in
bad faith").
Finally, Ms. Clay appears to argue that Magistrate Judge Baker
committed clear error in finding that Defendants did not improperly alter video
evidence produced in discovery. 	Dkt. 217 at 16–18. 	Magistrate Judge Baker
credited the affidavit from Travis Cline, the Lawrence Police Department's
Deputy Chief of Operations, stating that the Lawrence Police Department "can
export video from its evidence management system with or without various
overlays, including timestamps, but '[t]he presence or absence of overlays does
not alter underlying video content.'" 	Dkt. 214 at 3–4; dkt. 193-1 at 3. 	While
Ms. Clay argues that Deputy Chief Cline was not qualified as an expert, dkt.
217 at 16, the affidavit was based on his personal knowledge without offering
impermissible expert opinions. 	See dkt. 193-1 at 1–3; United States v. Fung,
183 F.4th 566, 574–75 (7th Cir. 2026) ("[A] witness who may be considered an
expert for certain purposes or in certain areas may still offer lay opinions based
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on her personal knowledge."). 	Magistrate Judge Baker also rejected Ms. Clay's
allegations of altered videos as "speculative and unpersuasive," dkt. 214 at 4,
and Ms. Clay continues to offer only speculation in her objection, see dkt. 217
at 16–18. 	As Magistrate Judge Baker explained, Ms. Clay could have filed a
request for production if she wanted the video files in another format, dkt. 214
at 2, but she does not contend that she did so, dkt. 217 at 15.
Ms. Clay's objection to Magistrate Judge Baker's order denying her
"omnibus motion" is therefore OVERRULED.3 Dkt. [217]. 	Ms. Clay's motion
for expedited ruling is GRANTED to the extent that the Court has ruled on her
objection. 	Dkt. [269].
III.
Objection to August 6, 2025 Discovery Order
On August 6, 2026—the day after holding a discovery conference—
Magistrate Judge Baker denied as moot Ms. Clay's motions to vacate or
reschedule that conference. 	Dkt. 246. 	He also found that Defendants had
responded to Ms. Clay's discovery requests and authorized Ms. Clay to file a
motion to compel "[t]o the extent [she] believes [the responses] are incomplete
or inadequate." 	Id.
Ms. Clay first argues that Defendants' discovery responses are deficient,
so Magistrate Judge Baker committed clear error by finding that they "have
responded" to discovery. 	Dkt. 251 at 5. 	But Magistrate Judge Baker did not
3 In their response to Ms. Clay's Rule 72 objection, Defendants argue that they "should
be entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees" because Ms. Clay "continued to pursue
a Rule 37 motion without substantial justification." 	Dkt. 236 at 4. Defendants may
file a motion for fees within two weeks of service of this order.
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find that Defendants' responses were or were not deficient—instead, he
authorized Ms. Clay to file a motion to compel to address any inadequacies.
Dkt. 246. 	There was therefore no clear error.
Ms. Clay also argues that her motions "were unjustly mooted," but she
appeared and represented herself at the status conference, so there was no
clear error in denying as moot her motions to vacate or reschedule that
conference. See dkt. 246 (denying as moot dkt. 244 and dkt. 245). 	Similarly,
there was no clear error in denying as moot Ms. Clay's motion to strike
regarding the dispositive motion deadline after that deadline had been
extended. 	See id. (denying as moot dkt. 235 because the order at dkt. 230
extended the deadline to file dispositive motions).
Ms. Clay's objection to Magistrate Judge Baker's August 6, 2026
discovery order is therefore OVERRULED. 	Dkt. [251]. 	Ms. Clay's motion to
strike Defendants' response brief is DENIED because the Court did not rely on
the arguments that Ms. Clay alleges are "unrelated, off-topic, and prejudicial."
Dkt. [274].
IV.
Objections to Order Denying Extension of Time
In August 2026, Ms. Clay filed a motion for extension of time to permit
her to file a motion for reconsideration regarding her "omnibus motion" after
the Court ruled on her Rule 72 objection regarding that motion. 	Dkt. 252.
Magistrate Judge Baker denied the motion, finding it was "not supported by
good cause." 	Dkt. 256.
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Ms. Clay filed a Rule 72 objection to that denial. 	Dkt. 271. 	But she has
provided no explanation or authority why it was clear error to deny an
extension of time to file a reconsideration motion when Ms. Clay has already
sought review of the denial under Rule 72(a). 	See Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator
Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 896–97 (7th Cir. 2000). 	This objection
is therefore OVERRULED. 	Dkt. [271].
V.
Objection to Order Denying Deadline Stay
In August 2026, Ms. Clay filed a motion to stay the dispositive motion
deadline because of a family member's medical emergency. 	Dkt. 264.
Magistrate Judge Baker denied the motion because "an indefinite stay" was not
required, but allowed Ms. Clay "to file a renewed request for a brief extension of
deadlines as may be supported by good cause." 	Dkt. 267.
Ms. Clay objects to that ruling under Rule 72, arguing that Magistrate
Judge Baker's "denial of scheduling relief under these extraordinary,
catastrophic circumstances is an unimaginable abuse of power." 	Dkt. 272. 	It
was not clear error, however, for Magistrate Judge Baker to require Ms. Clay to
seek deadline extensions rather than an indefinite stay of the dispositive
motion deadline. 	See Jovanovic, 201 F.3d at 896–97. 	This objection is
therefore OVERRULED. 	Dkt. [272].
VI.
Conclusion
Ms. Clay's objections are OVERRULED. 	Dkt. [217]; dkt. [251]; dkt. [271];
dkt. [272]. 	Ms. Clay's motion for expedited ruling is GRANTED to the extent
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that the Court has issued this order. 	Dkt. [269]. 	Ms. Clay's motion to strike is
DENIED. 	Dkt. [274].
On August 27, 2026, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
Dkt. 258. 	Ms. Clay's motion to respond to that motion IS EXTENDED
THROUGH November 9, 2026. 	See dkt. 281 (Defendants' filing indicating
that they do not object to a 30-day extension of time for Ms. Clay to respond).
Ms. Clay should not anticipate that any further extensions of this deadline will
be granted. 	Any reply brief SHALL BE FILED by November 23, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
LUCRETIA CLAY
10242 John Jay Drive
Indianapolis, IN 46235
All electronically registered counsel
Date: 10/8/2026
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