Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
EDWIN JAVIER CASTRO RAMIREZ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-cv-00530-JRO-MJD
)
BRISON SWEARINGEN Sheriff, Clay
County Jail, in his official capacity, et al.,
)
)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Edwin Castro Ramirez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks release
from the Clay County Jail, where he is detained on behalf of U.S. immigration
authorities. For the following reasons, his petition is DENIED.
I. FACTS
Castro Ramirez is a Colombian citizen and national. Dkt. 1-3 at 5. He
presented for inspection at the San Ysidro Port of Entry on April 30, 2024. Dkt.
8-1 at 3. Immigration officials deemed him inadmissible and initiated a removal
proceeding. Id. at 3, 5. However, the government granted him humanitarian
parole and permitted him to enter the United States during the pendency of his
removal proceeding. Dkt. 1-3 at 4.
In June 2026, Castro Ramirez and his attorney notified U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials that his ankle monitor was broken. Dkt.
1-3 	at 	8–11. 	An 	immigration 	official 	determined 	that 	Castro 	Ramirez 	had
tampered with the monitor. Dkt. 8-1 at 3. On July 7, 2026, ICE officials
terminated 	Castro 	Ramirez's 	parole 	and 	issued 	an 	administrative 	warrant
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"command[ing]" that he be arrested pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Dkt. 8-1 at 8,
10. ICE officers arrested Castro Ramirez on July 7. Dkt. 8-1. He has been in ICE
custody since then. He has not received a bond hearing.
II. ANALYSIS
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner "is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Castro Ramirez argues that his detention without
consideration of bond violates the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. As a threshold matter, he also
argues that the government did not lawfully revoke his parole.
A. 	Parole Revocation
Immigration regulations authorize the government to terminate an alien's
humanitarian parole upon written notice and "upon accomplishment of the
purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of" a designated
official, "neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued
presence of the alien in the United States . . . ." 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). Castro
Ramirez asserts that the government "made no finding that the purpose of" his
"parole had been satisfied" and "made no individualized determination that" his
"parole is no longer justified by humanitarian reasons or public benefit." Dkt. 1-
2 ¶¶ 88–89. The Court disagrees.
As Respondents argue, the government properly revoked Castro Ramirez's
parole through the written notice of July 7, 2026. Dkt. 8-1 at 10. In that notice,
an Acting Deputy Field Office Director wrote:
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Neither urgent humanitarian reasons nor significant
public benefit warrant your continued parole at this
time. As an authorized delegated official [. . .], your
parole is hereby terminated, effective the date of this
letter.
Id. 	Although 	not 	word 	for 	word, 	this 	notice 	closely 	tracks 	the 	regulatory
language, see 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), and reflects that, in the terminating
official's 	opinion, 	neither 	continued 	parole 	nor 	Castro 	Ramirez's 	continued
presence in the United States were warranted.
In reply, Castro Ramirez does not dispute that the revocation made the
necessary finding or that it was issued by an authorized official. Rather, he
asserts that the terminating official reached the wrong conclusion and that he
has a due process right to challenge that determination. The Court addresses
the due process argument below. At this stage, the Court finds no basis for
determining that Castro Ramirez's parole was revoked in a manner contrary to
the governing regulation.
B. 	Mandatory Detention
Castro Ramirez next argues that Respondents violate the INA by detaining
him without consideration of bond. Respondents insist that Castro Ramirez is
subject to mandatory detention for the duration of his removal proceeding
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Castro Ramirez argues instead that the
government's authority to detain him comes from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which
makes him eligible for discretionary release on bond.
It is undisputed that at the time Castro Ramirez presented at a port of
entry and was paroled he was an "applicant for admission" under the INA. As
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this Court has explained elsewhere, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) "defines an 'applicant
for admission' as an alien 'who arrives in the United States' or who is 'present in'
the country but 'has not been admitted.'" Vallejos- Hernandez v. Olson, No. 2:26-
cv-00398-JRO-MG, 2026 WL 1840067, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2026). "The
Supreme Court has explained that 'applicants for admission fall into one of two
categories'—'those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).'"
Id. (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018)). Castro Ramirez
was not covered by Section 1225(b)(1) because he was not subject to "expedited
removal." See id. Instead, he was subject to Section 1225(b)(2), which "serves as
a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by
Section 1225(b)(1)." Id. (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) generally requires mandatory detention for aliens
who are "applicants for admission":
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that "in the case of an
alien 	who 	is 	an 	applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title." 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) 	(emphasis 	added). 	In 	other 	words,
detention is mandatory pending "the 	usual removal
process," which "involves an evidentiary hearing before
an immigration judge" where "an alien may attempt to
show that he or she should not be removed."
Id. (quoting Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020)).
However, 	the 	Seventh 	Circuit 	determined 	that 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A)'s
mandatory detention requirement applies only to aliens who are also "seeking
admission" to the United States and not all aliens who merely fit the statutory
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definition of "applicants for admission." As the Seventh Circuit said, "Aliens
present in the country without admission and not 'seeking admission' fall under
Section 1226, not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and are eligible for bond hearings
subject to the INA's other requirements." Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, 183 F.4th 909,
915 (7th Cir. 2026). "Admission means 'lawful entry . . . into the United States
after inspection and authorization.'" Id. at 918 (quoting Sanchez v. Mayorkas,
593 U.S. 409, 411 (2021)). The Seventh Circuit further held that the ordinary
meaning of "seeking admission" cannot, as a factual matter, describe aliens who
"entered 	the 	United 	States 	without 	admission 	or 	parole" 	and 	are 	thus
categorically "inadmissible," because "no amount of legal maneuvering allows
them to go back in time and make [their] initial entry lawful." Id. at 920 (quoting
Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 2026)).
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Cirrus Rojas does not apply to Castro
Ramirez because he entered the United States as a humanitarian parolee after
presenting himself at a port of entry. Accordingly, he is not excluded from the
Seventh Circuit's definition of "seeking admission" at the time of his entry.
Instead, as Respondents argue, Castro Ramirez remains an applicant for
admission who is seeking admission under the terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
Dkt. 8 at 3–8. That statute says the Secretary of Homeland Security may permit
an alien—specifically, an "alien applying for admission"—to enter the United
States on parole. "[W]hen the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return
or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
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(emphasis added). Additionally, the former parolee "shall continue to be dealt
with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the
United States." Id. (emphasis added).
Castro Ramirez argues that he is no longer "seeking admission" and
therefore is not subject to Section 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory detention scheme
as interpreted by Cirrus Rojas. But this argument neglects Section 1182(d)(5)(A)'s
directive that a parolee "return or be returned to the custody from which he was
paroled" upon revocation. Castro Ramirez was granted parole after he presented
for inspection and sought admission at a port of entry. Indeed, his parole was
statutorily authorized because he was an "alien applying for admission." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added). The INA directs that, upon revocation of his
parole, he must "be returned to the custody from which he was paroled" (namely,
an alien applying for admission) and "continue to be dealt with" as an applicant
for admission. Due to the termination of his parole, and by operation of law,
Castro Ramirez is subject to mandatory detention without bond pursuant to
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) as an applicant for admission who is seeking admission.
C. 	Due Process
Finally, Castro Ramirez argues that his detention without a bond hearing
and 	the 	revocation 	of 	his 	parole 	violate 	the 	substantive 	and 	procedural
components of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.
1. 	Substantive Due Process
The 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	applies 	to 	aliens 	within 	the 	United 	States
"whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."
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Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). As the Seventh Circuit recently
said, 	"[a]rticulating 	a 	substantive 	due 	process 	right 	requires 	'a 	careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest' claimed to be violated."
Doe 	v. 	Sloan, 	172 	F.4th 	955, 	958 	(7th 	Cir. 	2026) 	(cleaned 	up) 	(quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) and Christensen v. Cnty. of
Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2007)). The "specific interest must be
grounded in '[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.'" Id. (quoting
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721). The Seventh Circuit cautioned that "the 'scope of
substantive due process is very limited,' and that judges should be 'reluctant to
expand the concept.'" Id. (quoting Campos v. Cook Cnty., 932 F.3d 972, 975 (7th
Cir. 2019)).
Castro Ramirez does not carefully describe a fundamental liberty interest.
Rather, he states only that he "has a fundamental interest in liberty and being
free from official restraint." Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 98.
Even 	assuming 	(without 	deciding) 	that 	Castro 	Ramirez 	has 	correctly
articulated a fundamental liberty interest, that interest is not violated here. In
fact, Castro Ramirez is free to live at liberty without detention, just not in this
country. Under similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit has held that the
operative liberty interest "is not liberty in the abstract, but liberty in the United
States by someone no longer entitled to remain in this country but eligible to live
at liberty in his native land." Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir.
1999); cf. Bolante v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2007) (denying Eighth
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Amendment bail to alien subject to removal because he was not lawfully admitted
to the United States).
Accordingly, 	Castro 	Ramirez's 	liberty 	interest 	is 	constitutionally
circumscribed by the procedures mandated by the INA, "[g]iven the sweeping
powers Congress possesses to prescribe the treatment of aliens." Parra, 172 F.3d
at 958 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)); accord Rodriguez v. Olson,
814 F. Supp. 3d 945, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2026) ("Under Parra, because petitioner does
not attempt to argue that he is 'entitled to remain in' the United States, his
private 	interest 	in 	release 	pending 	his 	removal 	proceedings 	is 	relatively
minimal."). The Seventh Circuit's narrower view of Castro Ramirez's liberty
interest as an alien who is not lawfully present was upheld by the Supreme Court
in Demore v. Kim. 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003) (favorably citing Parra). Castro
Ramirez's detention therefore does not violate substantive due process. E.g.,
Sebastian v. Olson, No. 2:26-cv-00324-JRO-MKK, 2026 WL 1683618, at *10
(S.D. Ind. June 10, 2026).
2. 	Procedural Due Process
Castro Ramirez also asserts a procedural claim, arguing that the Due
Process Clause entitles him to an opportunity to challenge his detention (on
grounds that he is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community) and the
revocation of his parole was irrational. Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 104; Dkt. 12 at 5. The Supreme
Court has held that "[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally
permissible part of that process." Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. That holding settles
the issue.
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Petitioner 	argues 	that 	due 	process 	requires 	an 	"individualized
determination of whether he poses a flight risk or danger to the community."
Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 104. But the Supreme Court already anticipated this objection and
rejected it: "[W]hen the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due
Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to
accomplish its goal." Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. Applied to Castro Ramirez, this
means that Respondents do not have to justify mandatory detention on a case-
by-case basis. Respondents may enforce the policy Congress already adopted
when it enacted the mandatory detention provision in Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
without an individualized bond hearing.
Petitioner cites Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, see dkt. 12 at 10, but that case
is distinguishable. There, the Supreme Court addressed whether a post-removal-
period 	detention 	statute 	authorized 	potentially 	indefinite 	detention. 	In
construing the statute to reject that conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically
distinguished the due process issues inherent in the petitioner's indefinite
detention from "detention pending a determination of removability," which has
an "obvious termination point." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697. Castro Ramirez's
detention here is a detention pending removal proceedings. Thus, it does not
implicate the due process concerns addressed in Zadvydas.
And even in cases like Zadvydas—where the Supreme Court held that
removal is "no longer practically attainable," id. at 690, thereby eliminating the
premise for detention pending removal—detention for up to six months was
presumptively constitutional, id. at 701. Castro Ramirez has been detained by
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ICE 	pending 	his 	removal 	proceedings 	for 	approximately 	three 	months.
Accordingly, Petitioner's current detention by ICE does not violate his due
process rights. E.g., Sebastian, 2026 WL 1683618, at *10.
III. CONCLUSION
Castro Ramirez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk
is directed to enter final judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 10/9/2026
Distribution:
Angelika Delilah Charczuk
ADC Immigration Law
ang@adcimmigration.com
Liberty L. Roberts
Church Church Hittle & Antrim
lroberts@cchalaw.com
Paul Umbaugh, IV
DOJ-USAO
paul.umbaugh@usdoj.gov
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