Stuart et al v. Topeka, Kansas, City of et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:23-cv-02021-TC Document 156
Filed 02/17/26 Page 1 of 22
In the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
Case No. 23-cv-02021-TC
COLLEEN STUART, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs V. TOPEKA, KANSAS, CITY OF, ET AL.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Following a jury verdict finding that the City of Topeka, Kansas, discriminated against Colleen Stuart and Jana Harden, Doc. 113, Stuart and Harden move for an award of attorney fees under Title VII. Doc. 128. The City opposes the motion, disputing both the number of hours claimed and the rates requested. Doc. 139. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Stuart and Harden are awarded $279,852.50 in attorney fees.
I A
Under the American Rule, parties ordinarily bear their own attor- ney fees. Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 192 (2025). Congress has cre- ated limited statutory exceptions to that rule, including in Title VII, which authorizes an award of a "reasonable attorney's fee" to a pre- vailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
Determining a reasonable fee follows a two-step inquiry. First, the fee applicant must establish prevailing-party status. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). Second, the applicant must demonstrate that the amount requested is reasonable. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984). The "most useful starting point" for determining a reasonable
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AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

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fee is the lodestar calculation, which is the product of multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable
hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortg.,
Inc., 614 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 2010). The fee applicant bears the
burden of proof at each step. Flitton, 614 F.3d at 1178. A lodestar fee
calculation is presumed reasonable. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d
1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998). But that presumption does not end the
inquiry: In certain circumstances, the lodestar may be adjusted upward
or downward to account for the particularities of the suit and its out-
come. Zinna v. Congrove, 680 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2012).
When evaluating potential adjustments, courts consider the twelve
factors identified in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87 (1989). In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th
1126, 1193 (10th Cir. 2023). These factors include: (1) the time and
labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the
skill required; (4) the preclusion of other employment; (5) the custom-
ary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations;
(8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, rep-
utation, and ability of counsel; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11)
the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship; and (12)
awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.
The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that many of these considera-
tions overlap with the lodestar calculation process. Robinson, 160 F.3d
at 1281. Indeed, many Johnson factors may be absorbed in the lodestar
calculation such that the Tenth Circuit has declined to find error when
a district court does not explicitly invoke the factors or when it con-
siders only those factors “most applicable to [a given] case.” In re Syn-
genta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th at 1196 n.44; see also Anchondo v.
Crenshaw & Assocs., LLC, 616 F.3d 1098, at 1103–04 (“[I]t has only
become clearer that the lodestar determination is primary and that the
propriety of such a determination is not automatically called into doubt
merely because the trial court did not expressly discuss the Johnson fac-
tors.”).
B
Familiarity with the factual background of this dispute is pre-
sumed. See generally Docs. 77 & 140. Relevant to this motion, Colleen
Stuart, Jana Harden, and Jennifer Cross sued the City of Topeka and
former Police Chief Bryan Wheeles in 2023. Doc. 1. They alleged that
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the City denied them promotions within the police department be-
cause of their gender, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Doc. 1.1 The Complaint included claims under Section 1983 against
Wheeles in his individual capacity and sought to impose liability on the
City pursuant to Monell for Wheeles’s acts and omissions. Id. During
summary judgment, a Memorandum and Order dismissed all of
Cross’s claims and all of the Section 1983 theories, leaving only Stuart
and Harden’s Title VII failure-to-promote claims for trial. Doc. 77.
The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial. The jury found that the
City discriminated against Stuart and Harden when it failed to promote
them in 2021. Doc. 113. It awarded each of them $200,000 in compen-
satory damages. The jury also returned an advisory verdict on equitable
relief, recommending back pay and front pay for Stuart and back pay
for Harden. Id. The verdict was adopted in part, reducing equitable
relief to reflect that only one promotion was available in 2021. Doc.
140. After trial, the City moved for judgment as a matter of law and
sought a new trial, but both requests were denied. Id.
Stuart and Harden now move for attorney fees, seeking
$915,162.50 for 1,379.35 hours billed by four attorneys. Doc. 128. The
parties have met pursuant to Local Rule 54.2 and Stuart and Harden
filed a statement of consultation after failing to reach an agreement
with the City regarding the fee award. Doc. 127. Stuart and Harden
timely filed their motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(2). In support of their motion, Stuart and Harden submitted bill-
ing records, affidavits from their counsel, and affidavits from other
lawyers in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Docs. 128-1–128-5. The
City filed a response opposing the motion, asserting many deficiencies
in the requests. Doc 139. In support of its response, the City submitted
affidavits from its counsel and from other lawyers in Shawnee County,
Kansas. Docs. 139-1–139-9. Stuart and Harden did not file a reply.
II
Stuart and Harden qualify as a prevailing party. But a reduction is
necessary given their billing entries, their requested rates, and the
1 All references to the parties’ briefs are to the page numbers assigned by
CM/ECF.
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success they obtained. Accordingly, their motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
A
Substantively, Title VII authorizes courts, in their discretion, to
award “a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the
costs” to prevailing parties. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). A party qualifies as
prevailing by securing relief that materially alters the legal relationship
between the parties and carries the necessary judicial imprimatur. Far-
rar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992) (prevailing status exists where
a judgment “materially alters the legal relationship between the parties
by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits
the plaintiff”); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th
Cir. 1998) (explaining that the plaintiff prevails by obtaining “an en-
forceable judgment on the merits” that materially alters the relation-
ship).
Stuart and Harden qualify as prevailing parties. They obtained a
jury verdict against the City on their Title VII claims, resulting in en-
forceable money judgments and equitable relief. Doc. 113. That out-
come materially altered the parties’ legal relationship, provided con-
crete relief that directly advanced the purposes of Title VII, and satis-
fied the prevailing party requirement. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111–12
(concluding that judgment that provides actual, enforceable relief qual-
ifies as prevailing); see also Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1280 (holding that judg-
ment on the merits materially altering relationship establishes prevail-
ing party status). This satisfies the first element of obtaining an attor-
ney fee pursuant to Title VII.
B
Once a party qualifies as prevailing, the inquiry shifts to whether
the requested amount represents a reasonable fee. For the reasonable-
ness analysis, the Supreme Court instructs courts to begin with the
lodestar calculation, which entails multiplying the hours reasonably ex-
pended by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983); Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010).
The party seeking fees bears the burden of proving the reasonableness
of the hours worked and the rates charged. Flitton v. Primary Residential
Mortg., Inc., 614 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2010). The following sub-
sections consider those two variables in turn.
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Fees may be awarded only for the number of hours reasonably ex-
pended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Counsel must exer-
cise billing judgment and exclude any time that is excessive, redundant,
or unnecessary. Id. at 434. “In the private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is
an important component in fee setting. It is no less important here.
Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly
billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Id. (quoting
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)) (em-
phasis in original). The Tenth Circuit enforces this rule by requiring
proof that each hour was necessary and by cutting time that does not
meet that standard. Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1203
(10th Cir. 1986). The City argues that several factors weigh against
crediting Stuart and Harden’s counsel for the 1,379.35 hours they re-
quest. In large measure, the City is correct.
a
For one, the City argues that the fee application from Stuart and
Harden reflects redundant staffing and duplicative work. Doc. 139 at
7. Courts “should examine [the potential duplication of services] in de-
termining the reasonableness of hours expended.” Ramos v. Lamm, 713
F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1983). Under such analysis, courts scrutinize
whether multiple lawyers performed distinct roles or merely duplicated
one another’s work. Id.; see also Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d
1275, 1285 (10th Cir. 1998) (defining “duplicative work” as instances
where “more than the necessary number of lawyers are present for a
hearing or proceeding or when multiple lawyers do the same task”). If
multiple attorneys bill for an activity, such as attending a hearing,
“when one would suffice,” compensation should be denied for the
“excess time.” Ramos, 713 F.2d at 554–55
Stuart and Harden’s attorneys frequently engaged in this type of
excessive and duplicative staffing. Multiple attorneys, for example,
billed to attend and participate in the same depositions. See, e.g., Doc.
128-1 at 17; Doc. 128-2 at 9, 10; Doc. 128-4 at 8. They likewise billed
to attend the same scheduling conferences, see, e.g., Doc. 128-1 at 13;
Doc. 128-2 at 6, and meetings with clients, see, e.g., Doc. 128-3 at 12;
Doc. 128-4 at 6. Attorneys also often billed in parallel to review the
same email traffic. See, e.g., Doc. 128-1 at 12; Doc. 128-2 at 6; Doc.
128-3 at 12. All attorneys billed to attend the trial, with three of them
billing at attorney rates for the activity. See, e.g., Doc. 128-1 at 11; Doc.
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128-2 at 17; Doc. 128-3 at 21–22; Doc. 128-4 at 11–12. And there are
more entries just like that without any indication, explanation, or justi-
fication for what necessitated the participation of several attorneys or
what distinct contributions each made. That is problematic, as the
Tenth Circuit has recognized that “the presence of more than two law-
yers during trial or the presence of more than one lawyer at depositions
and hearings must be justified to the court.” Ramos, 713 F.2d at 554
n.4. That Stuart and Harden fail to justify these redundancies suggests
a reduction is appropriate. Id. at 554–55.
Notably, the City’s attorneys billed for more total hours than Stuart
and Harden’s attorneys are seeking. Stuart and Harden seek compen-
sation for 1,379.35 hours of legal services. Doc. 128 at 3. The City
contends that is an unreasonable number of hours, but concedes its
attorneys billed more hours than Stuart and Harden are seeking. Doc.
139 at 7. Generally, that would undermine the persuasiveness of the
City’s claim that the staffing decisions made by Stuart and Harden’s
attorneys were per se excessive. Courts may look at how many lawyers
the other side used in similar situations as an indication of the effort
required, Case, 157 F.3d at 1250 (internal citations omitted), and courts
should consider “the responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the
other side.” Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281 (quoting Ramos, 713 F.2d at
554). Although the City’s lawyers claim to have been paid for working
more hours than Stuart and Harden are seeking, this does not eliminate
Stuart and Harden’s burden of proving the reasonableness of their re-
quested hours, Flitton, 614 F.3d at 1178. As noted below, the numerous
other defects identified in Stuart and Harden’s billing records cast into
doubt the reliability of the total hours they have requested.
b
The City argues that poor record-keeping practices by Stuart and
Harden’s counsel also warrant an hour reduction. Doc. 139 at 9–10.
Fee requests require “meticulous, contemporaneous time records.” Ra-
mos, 713 F.2d at 553. Submitted “records must reveal, for each lawyer
for whom fees are sought, all hours for which compensation is re-
quested and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks—for ex-
ample, how many hours were spent researching, how many interview-
ing the client, how many drafting the complaint, and so on.” Id.
Stuart and Harden’s records frequently fall short of this standard.
Consider, for example, that Stuart and Harden seek $915,162.50 in at-
torney fees, but the underlying billing records they offer to justify their
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request total only $900,617.50 without any discernable explanation for
this discrepancy. Doc. 139-1 at 7. This unexplained difference raises
suspicion as to the accuracy of the request.
In addition, there are indications that the records were not con-
temporaneously kept for each attorney. There are numerous time en-
tries that appear to have been copied verbatim between Mark and
Christie Jess, including instances where Mark Jess’s records refer to
himself in the third person, suggesting that these are post-hoc descrip-
tions instead of contemporaneous records of events. See, e.g., Doc. 139-
1 at 2 ¶ 9 (noting the verbatim copying issue); Docs. 128-1 at 22 &
128-2 at 13 (showing identical “Review MJ [Mark Jess] email to Cli-
ents”).
And, the application is riddled with block billing. Many of the en-
tries frequently combine multiple tasks attributable to an attorney in a
single entry for entire days or occasionally weeks. See generally Doc. 139
at 9–10; see also Docs. 128-1–128-5. This practice is commonly referred
to as block billing. Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1284 n. 9. Block-billing “cam-
ouflage[s] the work a lawyer does naturally and quite correctly raise[s]
suspicions about whether all the work claimed was actually accom-
plished or whether it was necessary. This concern is particularly im-
portant in a situation where a party is seeking to have his opponent pay
for his own lawyer’s work.” See Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1284; see also Flying
J. Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., 322 F. App’x 610, 617 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1284) (noting that block billing can provide
“strong evidence that a claimed amount of fees is excessive”). The City
cataloged 192 block-billed entries by Stuart and Harden’s counsel that
account for nearly half the hours submitted (661.8 of 1,379.35). Doc.
139 at 10; Doc. 139-1 at 20–114. Stuart and Harden neither rebut nor
contest this assertion.
Individually, the deficient billing practices are concerning, but
many of these failures occur simultaneously, such as block billing en-
tries that are so vague they conceal the nature of the underlying activity.
For example, Mark Jess’s entry spanning September 1, 2023, to No-
vember 8, 2023, reads “Prepare for depositions of B. Wheeles,
Monasmith, Haltom, Purney, Cochran, Mudrick, Wade, J. Wheeles”
and bills a total of 14 hours without identifying what that preparation
involved or how much time preparation for each deponent required.
Doc. 128-1 at 17. Another entry reads “Prepare examinations of B.
Wheeles, W. Cochran, J. Haltom, J. Monasmith,” claiming to have
spent 19 hours in the same day. Doc. 128-1 at 18.
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Finally, there is reason to believe counsel did not consistently keep
contemporaneous records. For one, Christie Jess stated that she alleg-
edly had to review her and Mark Jess’s calendars to reconstruct hours
for the final bills. Doc. 139-3 at 2 ¶14. Likewise, the fact that different
attorneys have identical, verbatim time entries for the same tasks
strongly suggests some of them created the records retroactively.
These practices create serious concerns about record accuracy. Ramos,
713 F.2d at 553 n.2 (“[R]econstructed records generally represent an
overstatement or understatement of time actually expended.”).
* * *
These issues, especially in combination, suggest a reduction is nec-
essary. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has held that a similar lack of preci-
sion and contemporaneousness in situations similar to those identified
in this case warrants an hour reduction. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d
1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding 35 percent reduction justified
where “sloppy and imprecise time records failed to document ade-
quately how plaintiffs’ attorneys utilized large blocks of time”); Mallin-
son-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding
33 percent reduction justified with “lumping of tasks into large blocks
of time, with its concomitant lack of specificity and possibility of over-
lap with the work of other attorneys, and the failure to maintain the
time records contemporaneously”).
c
The City also highlights the fact that several entries reflect tasks
not reasonably compensable at attorney rates. Doc. 139 at 10. It is plain
that attorneys should not bill at an attorney rate for “purely clerical or
secretarial tasks.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9; see also Fox v. Pittsburg
State Univ., 258 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1256 (D. Kan. 2017). Courts must
consider the nature of services provided. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at
895 n.11. The “dollar value [of a task that requires no legal expertise] is
not enhanced just because a lawyer does it.” Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei,
491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989).
Stuart and Harden’s counsel repeatedly billed for tasks that are not
generally compensable at attorney rates. For example, they seek attor-
ney fees for undertaking administrative tasks such as gathering files,
downloading files, saving files, printing files, and bringing files to the
court clerk. See e.g., Doc. 128-1 at 17, 19; Doc. 128-2 at 5, 10; Doc. 128-
4 at 8. These are tasks that courts in this district have recognized do
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not merit attorney-rate compensation. Fox, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 1256
(“[T]he court must deduct tasks that amount to filing, organizing files,
making copies, printing, ordering file folders, organizing boxes, updat-
ing files with correspondence and pleadings, and preparing files for
storage.”).
The scope and magnitude of this issue is difficult to estimate on
the current record. The reason for this difficulty is because the time
records often block billed for these administrative tasks along with
other, substantive legal work. Christopher Playter’s entries are a good
example of this problem: He records 10.5 hours of time to “[r]eview
all of Defendants documents and pull for exhibits; highlight and notate
questions; draft depo outlines for Russell, Maisberger, and Eubanks;
print all additional exhibit copies.” Doc. 128-4 at 8. Similar tasks were
often lumped in the same entry as substantive legal tasks like reading
and reviewing legal documents or discussing legal documents with cli-
ents or cocounsel. See, e.g., Doc. 128-2 at 15–16.
The request for travel time also merits discussion. The Tenth Cir-
cuit has held that an attorney’s travel time should be compensated at a
reduced hourly rate. Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th Cir.
1990) (affirming decision to reduce fees based on the “determination
that an attorney’s driving time, while necessary, is essentially unpro-
ductive and, therefore, compensable at a reduced hourly rate”). Yet
Stuart and Harden frequently billed at attorney rates for travel and seek
full compensation for the entirety of the time. See, e.g., Doc. 139-1 at
3–7. Moreover, the scope of this improper request is difficult to calcu-
late because their records almost exclusively block billed travel along
with other, substantive legal work. One of many such entries for Mark
Jess, for example, spans September 16 through September 19 and bills
38 hours ($32,300) to “[a]ttend Court for jury trial incl travel.” Doc.
128-1 at 18. Stuart and Harden’s attorneys also repeatedly lumped
travel with depositions, client meetings, attorney meetings, document
review, writing, reading emails, and many other tasks. See, e.g., Doc.
128-2 at 10; Doc. 128-3 at 12; Doc. 128-3 at 22. There is a need to
reduce their requests to reflect the “unproductive” nature of the activ-
ity. Smith, 921 F.2d at 1122. How much of a reduction is unclear. The
City’s best attempts to disentangle the records suggests that Stuart and
Harden’s counsel billed 69 hours and $44,485 for time spent traveling
in the case, Doc. 139-1 at 7, which does not appear to be an unreason-
able estimate albeit based on incomplete information.
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Finally, many of Stuart and Harden’s time entries seek compensa-
tion for ancillary activities. These include multiple entries for reviewing
and responding to news media requests involving the case, which do
not advance the litigation. See, e.g., Doc 128-1 at 12. Notably, all courts
of appeal that have considered the question of billing for media inter-
actions have disallowed billing for the activity unless it materially con-
tributes to litigation goals. See, e.g., Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353
F.3d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31
F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 1994); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v.
Cmty. Television of S. Cal., 813 F.2d 217, 221 (9th Cir. 1987); Hart v. Bour-
que, 798 F.2d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1986). District courts in the Tenth Cir-
cuit have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Utah Int’l, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810, 831 n.41 (D. Utah 1986) (concluding that
hours spent on the “public relations aspect of [a] case, i.e., time spent
by counsel communicating with the press and other news media” is
not compensable); David C. v. Leavitt, 900 F. Supp. 1547, 1557 (D. Utah
1995) (finding that billing for communications directed to a class in a
class action lawsuit via the media was appropriate given “the difficulty
of communicating with such a widely-spread group”). More generally,
hours billed must reflect substantive legal work, Blum, 465 U.S. at 895
n.11, be “reasonably expended in the litigation,” Ramos, 713 F.2d at
553; and be “necessary to achieve the results obtained,” Hensley, 461
U.S. at 441. On its face, correspondence with the press does not count
as any of the above. Even if this and other ancillary activities did ad-
vance the litigation result, Stuart and Harden’s filings include nothing
to establish that reasonableness of the hours billed for them. Thus,
they fail to meet their burden of demonstrating it is compensable. Hens-
ley, 461 U.S. at 433–34; United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc.,
205 F.3d 1219, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000).
* * *
The foregoing three categories apply to a substantial portion of the
hours claimed. A minimum of 100 hours reflect clear duplication of
work, and the true figure is almost certainly higher because vague de-
scriptions prevent precise itemization.2 Block-billed entries account for
2 While discussing every redundant staffing decision is not practical here,
consider the number of lawyers billing at attorney rates to attend the trial and
the same depositions and hearings. Three of Stuart and Harden’s lawyers
billed at attorney rates to attend the trial: Mark Jess billed 38 hours, Eric Play-
ter Billed 45.9 hours, and Christopher Playter billed 32 hours. Doc. 128-3 at
21–22; Doc. 128-3 at 21–22; Doc. 128-4 at 11–12. As for hearings, Eric
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nearly half the hours submitted (661.8 of 1,379.35). See Doc. 139-1 at
20–114. As noted above, the records also raise concerns about con-
temporaneous tracking: Counsel repeated identical descriptions across
timekeepers and allegedly acknowledged reconstructing time from cal-
endars, which limits confidence in the accuracy of the submissions.
The entries likewise do not separate compensable attorney time from
clerical work, travel time, or other nonlegal tasks. Based on the descrip-
tions and the City’s estimates, Stuart and Harden’s counsel likely billed
between 100 and 200 hours for such nonlegal work at attorney rates.
See Doc. 139-1 at 20–114.
Given the volume, pervasiveness of the errors, and structure of the
entries submitted, it is not feasible to extract only the unreasonable
time and leave the remainder intact. But even if such extraction were
possible, it would not be prudent. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)
(“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eye-
shade accountants.”). Rather, across-the-board reductions are appro-
priate. See, e.g., Hensley 461 U.S. at 438 n.13 (finding to be proper a
general 30 percent reduction of attorney’s hours); Mares, 801 F.2d at
1203 (finding district court did not err by generally reducing hours by
77 percent and refusing to isolate and analyze every hour assigned to
different tasks by counsel).
In light of the aforementioned deficiencies, a 25 percent across-
the-board reduction in hours claimed is both reasonable and conserva-
tive. As noted above, the defects affect over half the hours billed and
are structured in a way that prevents verification even though Stuart
and Harden have the burden of establishing their entitlement to a
Playter billed 12.9 hours to attend the same pretrial hearing that Christopher
Playter billed to attend. Doc. 128-3 at 20; Doc. 128-4 at 10. Likewise, Mark
Jess billed 1.7 hours in connection with a similar hearing for which Christie
Jess also billed. Doc. 128-1 at 21; Doc. 128-2 at 13. Concerning depositions,
one entry for Christie Jess billed 28 hours to “Attend deposition of Bryan
Wheeler, Monasmith, Hanika,” Doc. 128-2 at 10, which were all depositions
attended by other attorneys. Doc. 128-1 at 17; Doc. 128-4 at 8. Christie Jess
billed 6.7 hours for a deposition with Jeralyn Wheeles that Mark Jess also
billed to attend. 128-2 at 10; Doc. 128-1 at 17. Christy Jess also billed 8.4
hours to attend a deposition of Plaintiff Harden and 8.1 hours to attend a
deposition of Plaintiff Stuart. Doc. 128-2 at 9. Christoper Playter billed to
attend the same depositions. Doc. 128-4 at 8. Given Ramos’s rule of thumb
that two attorneys at trial and one attorney at a deposition or hearing are
adequate, Ramos, 713 F.2d at 554 n.4, these decisions alone amount to roughly
100 hours of duplication of work.
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reasonable fee. As a result, the total hours claimed are reduced pro rata
by one-fourth before calculating the lodestar. Carter v. Sedgwick Cnty.,
Kan., 36 F.3d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he court may make a gen-
eral reduction in hours claimed to achieve what the court perceives to
be a reasonable number.”).
2
The lodestar calculation requires determining a reasonable hourly
rate for each attorney. A reasonable rate reflects the prevailing market
rate in the local community for similar services by lawyers of reasona-
bly comparable skill and experience. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; Malloy
v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996). Courts apply this
standard by examining rates charged in the community where the liti-
gation occurs. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555. A court’s job is “to determine
what the lawyer would receive if he were selling his services in the mar-
ket rather than being paid by court order.” Case, 157 F.3d at 1257
(quoting Steinlauf v. Continental Ill. Corp. (In re Continental Ill. Sec.
Litig.), 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir.1992)). The moving parties bear the
burden of demonstrating that their requested rates align with those
prevailing in the market. United Phosphorus, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 1234.
Both parties here attempt to establish different prevailing market
rates. Generally speaking, the prevailing market rate is a function of
market standards in the specific community where the litigation occurs
regarding the price for similar services performed by attorneys of rea-
sonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. See Blum, 465
U.S. at 895 n.11; Case, 157 F.3d at 1256; Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555.
a
Before discussing the parties’ differing views on applicable rates, it
is helpful to summarize the professional pedigrees to contextualize the
basis for their requested rates. Mark Jess has practiced law since ap-
proximately 1990, giving him 34 years of experience at the time of trial.
Doc. 128-1 at 1–2. For roughly 31 of those years, his practice has fo-
cused on employment litigation. Id. at 1. Before opening Employee
Rights Law Firm in 2003, he was a partner at Bryan Cave LLP, where
he headed the firm’s Labor and Employment Department in its Kansas
City office. Id.
Christie Jess graduated from Oklahoma City University School of
Law in 1993 and has practiced law since then, giving her 31 years of
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13
experience at the time of the trial. Doc 128-2. She has been a partner
at Employee Rights Law Firm since 2009, and states that her practice
is devoted primarily to representing plaintiffs in employment discrim-
ination, retaliation, and whistleblower matters. Id. at 1–2. She explains
that due to a hearing impairment, she does not examine witnesses at
trial and instead performs support functions during trial at a reduced
rate. Id. at 3.
Eric Playter graduated from the University of Missouri–Kansas
City School of Law in 2005, giving him 19 years of experience at the
time of the trial. Doc. 128-3 at 1. He states that after several years prac-
ticing insurance defense, his practice shifted to representing individuals
in personal-injury and employment-discrimination matters, and that
since September 2013 the vast majority of his practice has been de-
voted to preparing for and trying civil litigation matters in state and
federal court. Id.
Christopher Playter graduated from the University of Missouri–
Kansas City School of Law in 2012, giving him 12 years of experience
at the time of the trial. Doc. 128-4 at 1. He states that his employment-
law experience began during law school as a clerk at a firm devoted to
employment discrimination litigation and that he continued that work
after graduation. Id. at 1–2. Since forming Playter & Playter, LLC in
September 2013, he states that more than ninety percent of his practice
has been devoted to civil litigation in state and federal court. Id. at 2.
b
Stuart and Harden’s counsel seek rates they contend are consistent
with their Kansas City, Missouri practice. They request an $850 hourly
rate for Mark Jess, $760 rate for Eric Playter, $600 rate for Christie
Jess, and a $550 rate for Christopher Playter. For Christie Jess’s work
as paralegal, they request a $150 hourly rate. In support of their argu-
ment that these requested rates are reasonable, Stuart and Harden prin-
cipally rely on affidavits from their own counsel describing their expe-
rience, prior fee awards in Missouri state courts, and anecdotal asser-
tions that similarly experienced employment litigators charge rates
ranging from $250 to $950 per hour. See generally Doc. 128-1; Doc. 128-
2; Doc. 128-3; Doc. 128-4; Doc. 128-5; Doc. 128-6. They also attach
materials from the Missouri Lawyers Media survey and related compila-
tions to support their arguments. Doc. 128-1 at 27; Doc. 128-3 at 23.
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14
The City has a different view. It contends that the requested rates
are unreasonable because they are inconsistent with the prevailing rates
in Topeka, Kansas, where the dispute arose and trial occurred. They
provide affidavits from Topeka practitioners and their own billing rec-
ords to show that Topeka rates are materially lower than those Stuart
and Harden request. See Doc. 139-1; Doc. 139-2; Doc. 139-3; Doc.
139-4; Doc. 139-5; Doc. 139-6; Doc. 139-7. The City likewise relies on
materials from the Missouri Lawyers Media survey and related compila-
tions to support their arguments. Doc. 139-8; Doc. 139-9. The City
also points to recent attorney fees decisions in the District of Kansas
to contend that a different—lower, not surprisingly—prevailing rate
exists. Doc. 139 at 12–13. Given this evidence, the City argues that the
reasonable hourly rates for Stuart and Harden’s counsel are as follows:
$450 per hour for Mark Jess; $300 per hour for Eric Playter; $300 per
hour for Christie Jess’s work as an attorney and $150 per hour for her
work as a paralegal; and $250 per hour for Christopher Playter. Doc.
139 at 15.
Considering the submitted evidence and arguments, Stuart and
Harden fail to demonstrate that their requested rates align with those
prevailing in the Topeka market. The following analysis will discuss
each rate individually. But before proceeding to that analysis, a few
important observations deserve discussion.
First, while they submit various types of evidence, Stuart and
Harden do not anchor their rates in the District of Kansas. Their affi-
davits do not demonstrate what attorneys in this District actually com-
mand for comparable work, which is Stuart and Harden’s burden.
Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; Malloy, 73 F.3d at 1018. Absent evidence
that paying clients in Kansas have accepted these rates or that courts
in this District have approved them in contested proceedings, state-
ments about market conditions in other jurisdictions are insufficient to
establish a prevailing rate in this matter. Case, 157 F.3d at 1257. A fee-
seeking plaintiff must provide market-tested rates. Id. That Stuart and
Harden’s counsel reside outside the District of Kansas and Topeka is
immaterial. Contra Doc. 128 at 5; see Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555 (“Absent
more unusual circumstances than we see in this case, the fee rates of
the local area should be applied even when the lawyers seeking fees are
from another area.”).
Second, the City’s arguments about its own lawyers’ rates are
largely unhelpful for establishing a prevailing rate. To assert that Stuart
and Harden’s proposed rates are too high, the City highlights the
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15
discrepancy between the rates at which its attorneys billed and the rates
Stuart and Harden propose. Doc. 139 at 13. This is unpersuasive. “Alt-
hough the rate charged by the losing counsel may be relevant in deter-
mining a reasonable hourly rate, [the Tenth Circuit has] discounted that
information where . . . the opposing counsel represents a governmen-
tal entity.” Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 1997).
This is because the economics for defense counsel representing gov-
ernmental entities are fundamentally different: Private “attorneys often
charge lower rates to the government because of counterbalancing
benefits such as repeat business, and ‘[w]here the facts show this, the
fee charged by a government attorney is simply irrelevant to the estab-
lishment of a reasonable hourly rate for a plaintiff’s civil rights lawyer.’”
Case, 157 F.3d at 1257.
Third, reliance on legal publications, including the Missouri Lawyers
Media survey and related compilations, is unpersuasive. For one, Stuart
and Harden’s submission puts some of their attorneys’ rates at the
highest rates for Missouri, Doc. 128-3 at 23, but the relevant legal mar-
ket is the District of Kansas. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555 (stating that the
relevant market is where “the litigation occurs”). Moreover, other
courts have found the Missouri Lawyers Media methodology to be flawed
because it relies on standard billing rates rather than actual judicially
approved awards and lacks essential breakdowns by attorney experi-
ence or litigation forum. Ross v. Pentair Flow Techs., LLC, No. 2:18-
02631, 2021 WL 5493072, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2021); M.B. v. How-
ard, 555 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1064 (D. Kan. 2021).
Fourth, while Topeka and Shawnee County, Kansas, rates are in-
formative, they are not outcome determinative. The City argues that
Shawnee County rates ought to apply. Doc. 139 at 5. But no binding
authority adopts a categorical rule to that effect. Cf. Erickson v. City of
Topeka, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1209–10 (D. Kan. 2002) (considering
the fact that litigation occurred in Topeka relevant in determining rates
for the District of Kansas); Pipeline Prods., Inc. v. Madison Cos., LLC, No.
18-2476, 2019 WL 4305762, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 2019) (declining
to treat the Topeka trial location as outcome-determinative and ex-
plaining that “the Tenth Circuit has not held that the relevant commu-
nity is limited to a specific metropolitan area where the case is desig-
nated for trial”).
Fifth, the third-party affiants fundamentally disagree on the pre-
vailing market rate. Stuart and Harden’s affiants suggest a top rate of
$850 per hour is consistent with the prevailing rate. See Docs. 128-5–
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16
128-6. The City’s affiants suggest the prevailing ceiling is around $500
per hour. See Docs. 139-4–139-7. Thus, looking to other sources of
“competent market evidence,” as the analysis does below, is appropri-
ate to resolve such disagreements. Case, 157 F.3d at 1257.
c
With these precepts in mind, it is possible to set an hourly rate for
the attorneys. Mark Jess, who served as lead trial counsel, seeks $850
per hour, but a $500 hourly rate is reasonable. After reviewing previous
attorney fee awards in the District of Kansas and considering the rec-
ord, a rate of $850 per hour substantially exceeds a reasonable hourly
rate in the District of Kansas. Stuart and Harden fail to suggest that
any court in this District has endorsed an $850 rate for any attorney,
regardless of experience. Nor do they identify any market basis for
making Mr. Jess the exception in this case. Instead, a survey of recent
award rates in this District suggests rates around $500 per hour are
reasonable for senior partner-level work. Roadbuilders Mach. & Supply
Co. v. Sandvik Mining & Constr. USA, LLC, No. 2:22-2331, 2024 WL
757154, at *5 n.27 (D. Kan. Feb. 23, 2024) (collecting cases). That de-
termination frames the reasonableness of the rates being sought by the
other lawyers.
Eric Playter seeks $760 per hour, but that is also too high. Instead,
an hourly rate of $500 is reasonable. This aligns with the range ap-
proved for senior, experienced trial litigators in this District. Roadbuild-
ers Mach. & Supply Co., 2024 WL 757154, at *5 n.27.
Christie Jess seeks an hourly rate of $600, with a reduced rate of
$150 per hour for her work as a paralegal. Doc. 128-2 at 3–4. Although
her requested rate of $150 per hour for services as a paralegal is appro-
priate, M.B. v. Howard, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 1073, $350 per hour is rea-
sonable for her services as a lawyer. While Ms. Jess is as experienced
as an employment attorney as Mr. Jess, her billing records reflect that
her role in this case was primarily pretrial and supportive rather than
strategic or trial-focused. In determining a reasonable rate, experience
and skill—which she certainly has—are not the only factors, but courts
must also consider the nature of services provided. Blum, 465 U.S. at
895 n.11. Ms. Jess’s entries show extensive time spent on client com-
munications, coordination with co-counsel, document review and
management, scheduling, docket monitoring, and discovery admin-
istration, as well as review of pleadings and materials prepared by oth-
ers. Doc. 128-2 at 4–17. While this work required legal training and
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17
familiarity with the case, it did not reflect primary responsibility for
litigation strategy, trial advocacy, or dispositive motion practice. Id.
Even after excluding clerical and secretarial time, the remaining entries
largely involve coordination-heavy and review-oriented tasks that re-
quire less complex legal judgment than lead-counsel functions, making
her services substantive legal work but more analogous to services typ-
ically provided by experienced associates rather than lawyers com-
manding top-of-market partner rates. Given the nature of the work
reflected in the billing records, a rate of $350 per hour more accurately
reflects the prevailing market rate for comparable services. See, e.g.,
Marquez v. Midwest Div. MMC, LLC, No. 19-2362, 2022 WL 17093036,
at *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2022) (finding rate of $350 per hour reasonable
for attorney with “extensive experience”); Shigo v. Clark, No. 21-2079,
2022 WL 16854271, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 10, 2022) (finding rate of
$325 per hour reasonable for attorney).
Christopher Playter seeks an hourly rate of $550, but an hourly rate
of $350 is reasonable. His requested rate exceeds what District of Kan-
sas decisions have approved for similar services from attorneys with
similar experience. Given his experience and the fact that he per-
formed trial and litigation work alongside and under the direction of
significantly more senior counsel, the services reflected in his billing
records are comparable to work which courts in this District have com-
pensated at a rate around $350 per hour. See, e.g., Marquez, 2022 WL
17093036, at *6; Shigo, 2022 WL 16854271, at *3.
Applying rates that reflect those prevailing in the local market for
similar services from lawyers of similar skill and experience, accord-
ingly, results in the following reasonable rates: $500 for Mark Jess, $500
for Eric Playter, $350 for Christie Jess, $350 for Christopher Playter,
and $150 for Christie Jess’s paralegal time. This is consistent with the
practice required by the lodestar method. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11;
Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555.
3
With the total hours and reasonable rates now determined, the
analysis can proceed to the lodestar calculation. The lodestar is deter-
mined by multiplying the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable
hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. After applying the 25 percent re-
duction to each individual’s requested hours to account for duplicative
staffing, inadequate billing records, and noncompensable time, 1,034.5
compensable hours remain from the 1,379.4 hours originally billed.
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Case 2:23-cv-02021-TC Document 156
Filed 02/17/26
Page 18 of 22
Multiplying those hours by the reasonable hourly rates identified above yields the following lodestar:
Attorney
Hours Requested Awarded
Hours
Rate Awarded
Awarded Hours*Rate
M. Jess
382.8
287.1
$500
$143,531.30
E. Playter
208
156
$500
$78,000.00
C. Jess (Attorney)
464.7
348.5
$350
$121,983.80
C. Jess (Paralegal)
58.4
43.8
$150
$6,570,00
C. Playter
265.5
199.1
$350
$69,693.80
Lodestar Amount
$419,778.80
These figures reflect the hours reasonably expended on the suc- cessful claims multiplied by rates consistent with those prevailing in this District. The resulting lodestar is $419,778.8. That amount repre- sents the reasonable attorney fees recoverable before considering any further adjustments.
C
The lodestar figure carries a presumption of reasonableness, but courts may adjust it upward or downward based on the circumstances. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554. The City has argued that a downward departure is appropriate given the limited success of Stuart and Harden's attor- neys. Doc. 139 at 14. The City is right: While most of the relevant adjustment considerations discussed below are neutral, the limited suc- cess obtained indicates a modification of the lodestar is necessary.
1
In evaluating whether any adjustments are necessary, courts should consider the twelve factors identified in Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th at 1193. The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that many of these considerations overlap with the lodestar calculation process. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a district court does not err by de- clining to discuss each Johnson factor explicitly so long as the lodestar
18

19
analysis considers those factors “most applicable to [a given] case.” In
re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th at 1196 n.44; see also An-
chondo, 616 F.3d at 1103–04.
The foregoing lodestar analysis accounts for nearly all of the John-
son factors. As discussed above, lodestar analysis reflects the time, la-
bor, skill, and experience of the involved counsel. It also addressed the
complexity involved in the litigation, billing history, and prevailing
market trends. Id. Those findings encompass the substance of the John-
son inquiry and leave no basis for adjustment on those grounds. Neither
the contingency-fee arrangement nor the nature of the attorney-client
relationship warrants a modification, and nothing in the record sug-
gests that the case was unusually undesirable.
One consideration, however, is not fully captured by the lodestar
calculation: the results obtained. A fee award must reflect the degree
of success obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37. Where a party prevails
on only some claims, courts may reduce the fee to account for limited
success, particularly when unsuccessful claims are distinct and do not
share a common core of facts with the claims that succeeded. Id.; Val-
dez v. Macdonald, 66 F.4th 796, 842 (10th Cir. 2023).
Stuart and Harden’s attorneys achieved only limited success. In
particular because Stuart and Harden prevailed on a single Title VII
failure-to-promote claim arising from a 2021 major promotion deci-
sion, while the remainder of their claims were dismissed at summary
judgment. A reduction is therefore appropriate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
434–35.
Stuart and Harden argue against such a reduction because “the dis-
missed claims involved the same set of facts and consistent legal theo-
ries.” Doc. 128 at 5. But this argument fails as they provide no analysis
or evidence supporting this assertion. Even charitably construing Stu-
art and Harden’s argument, it may be the case that all the claims arose
from a general shared theory of gender discrimination. Id. But the rel-
evant inquiry is not whether the claims share a common theme. Rather
it is whether the work on the unsuccessful claims was “expended in
pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Claims
are unrelated when they depend on different facts and legal theories.
Fox, 563 U.S. at 834.
The prevailing claims narrowly focused on a 2021 promotion de-
cision and required proof specific to that event, including the scoring
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20
process, candidate qualifications, and the decisionmakers’ actions. See
Doc. 81 at 21–28. By contrast, Cross’s dismissed claims challenged dif-
ferent promotional contests in 2018 and 2022 and involved different
positions and selection boards. See id. at 13–20. Work devoted to those
separate events did not advance the successful 2021 claim and played
no role in the trial presentation.
This is also true of the Section 1983 claims, which required proof
of an official municipal policy or custom attributable to a final policy-
maker. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Those
claims were rejected because Stuart and Harden failed to identify any
policy or policymaker and because their pattern-and-practice evidence
did not create a triable issue. See Doc. 81 at 32–35. The legal and factual
work undertaken to support municipal liability was unnecessary to es-
tablishing liability on the Title VII claim and could not have contrib-
uted to the verdict on the 2021 promotion decision. Thus, Stuart and
Harden’s argument fails. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
Because work on the unsuccessful claims did not contribute to the
verdict obtained, the next step would ordinarily entail excluding time
devoted to those claims. That is impossible here. Given the tendency
of Stuart and Harden’s billing entries to combine multiple tasks and
employ vague descriptions, most entries do not allow a reviewer to
meaningfully distinguish between time spent on successful Title VII
claims and time spent on unsuccessful Section 1983 theories or claims
brought by Plaintiff Cross. Where no clear process exists to extract
such hours, it is appropriate to apply percentage reduction for limited
success. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Golf Course Superintendents Ass’n of Am., 900 F.2d
227, 228 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming a percent reduction for limited
success); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 990 (10th Cir. 1996)
(affirming percent reduction to lodestar where monetary damages
awarded fell far short of the amount sought).
As for the size of the percentage reduction, the City argues that
because Stuart and Harden’s attorneys prevailed on only two of the
nine original claims, they should receive less than a quarter of the lode-
star amount. Doc. 139 at 14. But there is “no precise rule or formula”
requiring that the partial reduction need be directly proportional to
success. Zisumbo v. Ogden Reg’l Med. Ctr., 801 F.3d 1185, 1208 (10th Cir.
2015); Flitton, 614 F.3d at 1177. For example, a district court in New
Mexico relying on Tenth Circuit authority reduced the lodestar amount
by one third when only three of nine claims were successful. Republican
Party of New Mexico v. Torrez, No. 1:11-900, 2024 WL 363188, at *11
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Case 2:23-cv-02021-TC Document 156 Filed 02/17/26 Page 21 of 22
(D.N.M. Jan. 31, 2024) (relying on Iqbal, 900 F.2d at 228). Given the proportion of successful claims, a reduction of 33 percent is warranted in this case. Stuart and Harden secured a verdict finding the City liable for gender discrimination for their non promotions under Title VII. Reducing the lodestar by one third adequately reflects that they were vindicated at trial on their Title VII claims but avoids compensating their attorneys for work undertaken on behalf of Cross and the Section 1983 claims that failed.
2
Having calculated the lodestar amount at $419,778.80, the one- third partial success reduction means the to-be awarded amount of at- torney fees on the merits is $279,852.50. The following reflects how that applies by attorney:
Attorney
Lodestar Amount
Partial Success Amount
M. Jess
$143,531.30
$95,687.50
E. Playter
$78,000.00
$52,000.00
C. Jess (Attorney)
$121,983.80
$81,322.50
C. Jess (Paralegal)
$6,570.00
$4,380.00
C. Playter
$69,693.80
$46,462.50
Total
$419,778.80
$279,852.50
The figures shown reflect the lodestar amounts attributable to each timekeeper after applying reasonable hourly rates and the across-the- board reduction in compensable hours. They also incorporate the one- third reduction to account for partial success. Together, these amounts identify the portion of each attorney's and paralegal's work that is re- coverable and form the total reasonable fee awarded on the merits.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Stuart and Harden's Motion for Attor- ney Fees, Doc. 128, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
21

22
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
Mark Jess is awarded $95,687.50 in attorney fees;
Eric Playter is awarded $52,000.00 in attorney fees;
Christie Jess is awarded $85,702.50 in attorney fees (including
paralegal work);
Christopher Playter is awarded $46,462.50 in attorney fees.
It is so ordered.
Date: February 17, 2026 s/ Toby Crouse
Toby Crouse
United States District Judge
Case 2:23-cv-02021-TC Document 156 Filed 02/17/26 Page 22 of 22