Zarco v. Book and Ladder, LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
BRITTANY ZARCO,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 24-2091-JWB
BOOK AND LADDER, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 43) and
motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 49.) 	The motion for default judgment is GRANTED and the
motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART for the reasons stated
herein.
I. 	Facts and Procedural History
Defendant Book & Ladder, LLC, is a property management company that manages the
Rockland apartment complex (the “property”) in Lawrence, Kansas. Defendant employed Plaintiff
at the property as a guest experience associate from July 25, 2022, through March 27, 2023.
Plaintiff was terminated shortly after taking ADA leave for eye surgery in early March
2023. She also made complaints of sexual harassment to Defendant in January and February 2023
which were not properly investigated. 	On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination with the Kansas Human Rights Commission and the EEOC. (Doc. 30-19.)
On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action alleging claims of sex discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the
ADA. 	Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding
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sexual harassment and also terminated for taking leave under the ADA. Plaintiff further alleged
discrimination on the basis of sex and disability. Defendant obtained counsel and appeared in this
matter. 	Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. 	(Doc. 30.) 	The court granted
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sex and disability discrimination claims. (Doc. 33.) The court
denied summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA retaliation claims. 	The parties
participated in an unsuccessful mediation on August 22, 2025. 	This matter was set for trial on
October 27, 2025. On September 3, 2025, the court entered a scheduling order with final deadlines.
(Doc. 36.) On September 12, defense counsel moved to withdraw on the basis that the attorney-
client relationship was irredeemably damaged by Defendant’s failure to communicate with counsel
and failure to abide by the terms of the engagement agreement. (Doc. 37.) The court set the matter
for hearing and ordered an officer or manager of Defendant to appear. (Doc. 38.) The hearing
was held with defense counsel and Plaintiff’s counsel. Defendant was notified of the hearing but
failed to have an officer or manager attend. (Doc. 39.) The court vacated all deadlines and granted
the motion to withdraw. 	The court further ordered Defendant to obtain counsel on or before
October 15, 2025. 	The court notified Defendant that failure to obtain counsel could result in
default judgment for failure to defend. (Id.) Defendant has not obtained counsel in this matter and
Plaintiff has now moved for default judgment.
The court held a hearing on November 19, 2025. Plaintiff testified in support of the motion
and her damages at the hearing. Subsequent to the hearing, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s
fees and costs. (Doc. 49.)
II. 	Entry of Default
Default judgment may be entered against a party who fails to appear or otherwise defend.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. The party must first seek an entry of default from the clerk and then move for
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default judgment with the court. Id. The decision to enter default judgment is “committed to the
district court's sound discretion.” Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co., 327 F.3d 1115, 1124 (10th Cir.
2003) (quoting Dennis Garberg & Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 771 (10th Cir.
1997)). Plaintiff has sought and received a clerk’s entry of default in this matter as required by
Rule 55(a). (Doc. 47.)
Here, Defendant has failed to defend against this case. 	Although Defendant initially
defended this case, Defendant has now abandoned its defense and failed to comply with court
orders. Defendant was notified that it must obtain counsel to proceed in this action and it failed to
do so. Defendant may not appear pro se as an entity. See Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II
Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201–03 (1993). Defendant was placed on notice that the
failure to obtain counsel and defend this matter could result in a default judgment. Therefore, the
court finds that an entry of default judgment is appropriate. See Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben,
957 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming default judgment under Rule 55 where, although they
filed a responsive pleading, the defendants subsequently failed to notify the court or their attorney
of changes in address, failed to appear for hearings, and did not respond to notices from the court).
The court also has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over the parties prior to
entering a default judgment. Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 1986);
see also Hukill v. Okla. Native Am. Domestic Violence Coalition, 542 F.3d 794, 797 (10th Cir.
2008) (“[A] default judgment in a civil case is void if there is no personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.”). 	Turning to the merits, once default is entered Defendant is not entitled to defend
itself on the merits and the court must determine whether Plaintiff’s allegations, which are taken
as true, state a claim against Defendant. See, e.g., Kalinich v. Grindlay, No. 14-1120-SCA, 2014
WL 3740439, at *1 (D. Kan. July 30, 2014). Then, “damages may be awarded only if the record
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adequately reflects the basis for [the] award via a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits
establishing the necessary facts.” Mathiason v. Aquinas Home Health Care, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d
1269, 1275 (D. Kan. 2016) (quoting DeMarsh v. Tornado Innovations, L.P., Case No. 08-2588-
JWL, 2009 WL 3720180, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2009)).
III. 	Default Judgment
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A federal court “has an affirmative duty to determine whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction” prior to issuing a default judgment. See Ross v. Jenkins, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1161
(D. Kan. 2018). 	One of the statutory bases for subject matter jurisdiction is federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Plaintiff alleges claims of retaliation under Title
VII and the ADA. These claims are both created by federal law. Thus, the court has federal subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
At the outset, the court notes that Defendant has waived any objection to personal
jurisdiction by failing to raise it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). Further, when Defendant was represented
by counsel, Defendant represented that there was no dispute that the court has personal jurisdiction
over the parties. (Doc. 29 at 1.) In any event, out of an abundance of caution, the court discusses
personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
To determine whether this court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant, “the court must
determine (1) whether the applicable statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service
of process on the defendant and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due
process.” Klein v. Cornelius, 786 F.3d 1310, 1317 (10th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Because Title
VII and the ADA do not provide for nationwide service of process, the court applies the law of the
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forum. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see also Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc.,
514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008).
Kansas law allows jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process, so the analysis
collapses into the constitutional analysis. TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European
Group, Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2007). Therefore a “court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist minimum contacts between
the defendant and the forum state.” World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
291 (1979). 	The requisite minimum contacts may be established under one of two theories:
“specific jurisdiction” or “general jurisdiction.” 	If the requisite minimum contacts are met, the
court proceeds to determine whether the “assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with
fair play and substantial justice.” 	Old Republic Ins. Co., 877 F.3d 895, 903 (2017) (internal
quotations omitted). 	Specific jurisdiction exists if the defendant has “purposefully directed his
activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of
or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal
citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges Defendant is a foreign limited liability company doing
business in Kansas. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Defendant operated an apartment complex in Kansas, employed
Plaintiff in Kansas, and the alleged discrimination took place in Kansas. Therefore, Plaintiff's
claims, at a minimum, arise out of Defendant's contacts with Kansas. Accordingly, the court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 	Satisfied that this court has jurisdiction in this
matter, the court proceeds to the merits of Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
C. Title VII Retaliation
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity. To
establish her claim, Plaintiff must show 1) that she engaged in protected opposition to
discrimination, 2) “that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse,” and 3) “that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the materially
adverse action.” Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines, 844 F.3d 914, 925 (10th Cir. 2016).
The court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations in her complaint and her testimony establish her
claim of Title VII retaliation. According to the allegations, which are deemed admitted, Plaintiff
was subjected to sexual harassment during her employment by a tenant at the property and a co-
worker, Nando Mandriquez. Mandriquez kissed Plaintiff on the neck without permission and sat
on her lap without her permission. Plaintiff reported the kiss to her supervisor, Cayce Lay. Lay
also witnessed the sexual harassment but did not intervene. In response to Plaintiff’s complaint
about Mandriquez, Lay told Plaintiff that the “company was under no obligation to provide her
with a safe workplace.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 15.) Due to the lack of any response, Plaintiff escalated her
complaint to the regional manager, Matt Peters, on February 12, 2023. Defendant failed to take
any action on her complaint of sexual harassment.
Shortly after her complaint, Plaintiff went on medical leave for eye surgery. 	Plaintiff
sought and was granted medical leave from March 1 to March 16. 	Shortly after returning, on
March 23, Plaintiff was terminated. 	Plaintiff was told that her termination was due to her bad
attitude. Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she believes that her complaints were the basis for
Lay’s statement that she had a bad attitude.
Based on these uncontested facts, Plaintiff has established that she engaged in protected
activity by making complaints of sexual harassment, Plaintiff’s termination was an adverse action,
and there is a causal connection between her termination and her complaints. See e.g., Ward v.
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Jewell, 772 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014) (“If the protected conduct is closely followed by the
adverse action, courts have often inferred a causal connection.”).
Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff successfully stated a claim of retaliation against
Defendant.
D. ADA Retaliation
Plaintiff has also brought forth an ADA retaliation claim. Even if not disabled under the
ADA, Plaintiff may proceed with an ADA retaliation claim if she has a reasonable good faith belief
that her activity is protected and the statute has been violated. 	Selenke v. Medical Imaging of
Colorado, 248 F.3d 1249, 1264 (10th Cir. 2001). To establish retaliation under the ADA, Plaintiff
must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) a reasonable employee would find the
action materially adverse; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and
the materially adverse action. 	Winston v. Ross, 725 F. App’x 659, 664 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing
EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1051 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Although the court determined on summary judgment that Plaintiff was not disabled under
the ADA, the evidence presented during the hearing and on summary judgment establish that
Plaintiff had a good faith belief that her activity was protected under the statute. Plaintiff testified
that she suffered from a retinal detachment in early 2022. The retinal detachment led to multiple
surgeries. As a result, Plaintiff also suffered from cataracts and needed cataract surgery during her
employment with Defendant. 	Plaintiff testified that her injury impacted her vision and that she
had trouble working on a computer all day. 	Plaintiff believed that she was entitled to medical
leave under the Americans with Disability Act. 	Plaintiff then engaged in protected activity by
taking leave for her surgery. Plaintiff sought and was approved for medical leave from March 1
through March 16. 	Plaintiff was then terminated on March 27. 	Because of the close temporal
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proximity between her leave and termination, the court may infer causation. Fisher v. Basehor-
Linwood Unified Sch. Dist. No. 458, 460 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1205 (D. Kan. 2020), aff'd, 851 F.
App'x 828 (10th Cir. 2021). Moreover, as discussed during the hearing, the evidence submitted
on summary judgment indicated that one of the reasons Plaintiff was terminated was due to her
leave taken in March 2023 for her surgery. (Doc. 30-14 at 3.)
Therefore, the unrebutted evidence supports a determination that Defendant retaliated
against Plaintiff in violation of the ADA. The court now turns to the damages established at the
hearing.
E. Damages
i. 	Back Pay
Plaintiff seeks back pay for her claims. (Doc. 29 at 8); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (stating
that back pay is allowed for an unlawful employment practice). Back pay is the amount of money
plaintiff would have earned from the date she was unlawfully terminated to the date the first
judgment is entered. Daniel v. Loveridge, 32 F.3d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff is also
responsible for mitigating her damages. “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable
diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay
otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1).
Plaintiff testified to her lost back pay at the hearing. Plaintiff was unemployed from March
27 to April 30, 2023. 	During that time, her lost wages were $3,438.50, based on prior pay and
benefits of $133.94 a day. 	From May 1 to June 4, 2023, Plaintiff was able to obtain part-time
employment and worked 15 hours a week at $12 per hour. 	Her lost wages were calculated as
$97.94 per day after subtracting the wages she was paid at her part-time job for a total of $2,350.56
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in lost wages during this time. Plaintiff then obtained full time employment on June 5, 2023 at
Hunter’s Ridge Apartments and continues to be employed full time as a property manager.
In light of the evidence in the record, the court finds a back-pay award of $5,789.06 is
appropriate.
ii. 	Compensatory and Punitive Damages 1
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Defendant. 	Under 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), compensatory and punitive damages are capped based on the number of
employees a defendant has. Plaintiff argues that the cap on damages is an affirmative defense that
must be pled by Defendant. (Doc. 48.) In support, Plaintiff cites to Racher v. Westlake Nursing
Home Ltd. P'ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2017). In Racher, the Tenth Circuit addressed
whether an Oklahoma statute that capped noneconomic compensatory damages operated as an
affirmative defense or created a heightened pleading requirement for the plaintiff. 	There, the
Tenth Circuit was not addressing the statutory cap on damages in § 1981a(b)(3). That provision
explicitly states that the award of compensatory and punitive damages “shall not exceed” a specific
amount depending on the number of employees. Id. Plaintiff fails to cite any authority that holds
that this statutory provision operates as an affirmative defense. Courts who have addressed this
issue determined that this provision is “a Congressional limitation on the court's power to award
damages to a Title VII plaintiff.” Oliver v. Cole Gift Ctrs., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 109, 111–12 (D.
Conn. 2000); see also Miller v. Coventry Holding Grp., Inc., No. 1:23-CV-2064-TWT, 2025 WL
1008541, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2025).
1 Caselaw within this district has found compensatory and punitive damages to be unavailable remedies for ADA
retaliation. See Boe v. AlliedSignal Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202 (D. Kan. 2001). Here, the court has entered
judgment in favor of Plaintiff on both retaliation claims under the ADA and Title VII. Because § 1981a(b)(3) provides
a limit as to damages for all discrimination claims and the adverse action was the same for both claims, the court’s
order on damages herein is based on the violation under Title VII.
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Therefore, the court finds that the damages cap in § 1981a(b)(3) is not an affirmative
defense that is waived if not presented. 	Turning to the evidence, Plaintiff has testified that
Defendant is a large national company that operates several apartment complexes in the United
States. 	Defendant’s interrogatory response indicates that it has approximately 200 employees.
Given the unrebutted evidence presented and Defendant’s failure to defend this matter and provide
evidence regarding the number of employees, the court finds that the damages cap in this matter
is $200,000 because Defendant has more than 200 employees.
Turning to the requested damages, Plaintiff seeks an award of $50,000 in compensatory
damages. Under § 1981a(b)(3), “compensatory damages [may be] awarded under this section for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.” 	Plaintiff testified that she felt betrayed by
Defendant for her termination and she was embarrassed for being fired. 	Plaintiff lost her
community as a result of the termination. Further, her unemployment caused significant strain and
stress. 	Plaintiff was the primary caregiver for her younger sister who lived with her. 	Plaintiff
resided in an apartment at the property but could not afford to move out after her termination due
to her loss in income. This caused additional stress to Plaintiff because she would see Mandriquez
on the property grounds. 	Further, Mandriquez, as the maintenance person, had access to her
apartment. 	This caused additional stress in that Plaintiff was concerned he would enter her
apartment when she was not at home. Based on the unrebutted evidence at the hearing, the court
finds that an award of $50,000.00 is appropriate to compensate Plaintiff for her mental and
emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and frustration.
Plaintiff also seeks $100,000 in punitive damages because Defendant’s actions were taken
with malice and reckless indifference to her protected rights. The Tenth Circuit “take[s] seriously
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the purpose of punitive damages, i.e., ‘to punish what has occurred and deter its repetition.’”
Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1309 (2003) (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991)). Here, Plaintiff’s unrebutted testimony indicates that she reported
sexual harassment by one of Defendant’s employees, who was also accused of sexual harassment
by a resident of the apartment. Plaintiff also was subjected to harassment by one of the tenants of
the property. 	Although Defendant had knowledge of the harassment, the evidence was that
Defendant failed to investigate the sexual harassment. 	Defendant had no established means for
reporting and investigating claims of sexual harassment even though it is a company that runs
apartment complexes across the nation, primarily for college students. 	Further, in response to
Plaintiff’s complaint of sexual harassment, Defendant terminated Plaintiff instead of taking action
to properly investigate her claims.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds an award of $100,000.00 in punitive damages
appropriate to punish Defendant and deter similar wrongdoing in the future.
F. 	Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Under both the ADA and Title VII, a court has the discretion to award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (ADA); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–5(k) (Title VII). And absent “special” circumstances that would justify nonrecovery, the
norm is that prevailing parties will recover them. See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conf. Resort,
Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 1997). Applicable here, the court in Mathiason v. Aquinas
Home Health Care, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (D. Kan. 2016), held that a plaintiff was the
“prevailing party” when it granted default judgment for her ADA claims. See id. at 1280.
Defendant has not participated in the proceedings, and the court has granted default
judgment to Plaintiff. 	There are also no special circumstances in this case that would render
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attorney’s fees and costs unjust. Thus, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(2)(A), a party
seeking to recover attorney’s fees must do so by filing a motion. Plaintiff submitted a motion for
attorneys’ fees on November 26, 2025, thus satisfying the procedural requirement in Rule
54(2)(A). (Doc. 49.)
Next, the fee must be reasonable. See Ellis v. Univ. of Kansas Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186,
1202 (10th Cir. 1998). To determine a reasonable attorney’s fee, a court finds the lodestar figure—
which is the reasonable number of hours spent on a case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.
See Mathiason, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1280. A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the
number of hours is reasonable, see id., and typically, counsel must exercise “billing judgment”
which is a “good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary.” Ellis, 163 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018
(10th Cir. 1996)). A court also has a duty to “exclude” hours that were not “reasonably expended.”
See id. The second prong to the lodestar analysis (i.e., a reasonable hourly rate) is determined by
comparing the hourly rates requested “with rates ‘prevailing in the community for similar services
for lawyers of reasonably competent skill, experience, and reputation.’” Mathiason, 187 F. Supp.
3d at 1281 (citation omitted). A judge may also rely on his knowledge of the prevailing hourly
market rates to determine if the amount requested hews closely to them. See id.
Plaintiff’s evidence indicates that counsel seeks $102,312.50 in attorneys’ fees for 226.7
hours billed by two attorneys. The record reflects that Kevin Todd, an associate, billed 175 hours
and John J. Ziegelmeyer, a partner, billed 51.7 hours. After reviewing the breakdown of the billing
records in Document 49-1, the court finds that the number of hours billed should be reduced for
duplicative work by two attorneys and to reflect that Plaintiff did not prevail on two of her claims
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at summary judgment. Zisumbo v. Ogden Reg’l Med. Ctr., 801 F.3d 1185, 1207 (10th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the court may reduce an award based on limited success and redundant billing).
Therefore, the court finds that a reasonable number of hours in this matter is 125 hours, to be
allocated as 100 hours for Mr. Todd and 25 hours for Mr. Ziegelmeyer.
Plaintiff also requests reasonable hourly rates for the attorneys given their experience. Mr.
Ziegelmeyer is a partner at the firm representing Plaintiff and has spent 18 years practicing law in
Kansas and Missouri. (Doc. 49 at 2–3.) He requests an hourly rate of $625. (Id. at 3.) Mr. Todd
has been a lawyer for five years. 	(Id.) 	He has extensive litigation experience and requests an
hourly rate of $400. (Id.) After the arguments and the supporting evidence, the court finds that
the requested rates are reasonable in this district. Accordingly, the court awards Plaintiff’s counsel
$55,625.00 in legal fees.
Plaintiff also seeks to recover litigation expenses. Like the process to recover attorney’s
fees, a party seeking to recover litigation expenses must also do so by filing a motion. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(2)(A). Counsel satisfies this requirement because they requested litigation expenses in their
motion for attorney’s fees. 	Plaintiff seeks $5,407.86 for expenses incurred in creating a digital
image of Plaintiff’s phone, collecting Plaintiff’s medical records during discovery, travel expenses
incurred for trips between Kansas City and Lawrence, KS for depositions and mediation, costs of
mediation, and costs paid to the court reporter for deposition services. (Doc. 49-1 at 13.) Courts
typically permit prevailing parties to recover reasonable expenses that are “usually itemized and
billed separately.” See Marmon v. RPS Auto, LLC, No. CV 22-2381-KHV, 2024 WL 1961432, at
*6 (D. Kan. May 3, 2024) (citing Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1997));
see also Mathiason, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1281. The court in Marmon considered travel expenses as
non-taxable litigation expenses. 	See Marmon, 2024 WL 1961432, at *6. 	The court finds that
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counsel’s requested litigation costs are non-taxable litigation expenses, and it also finds that the
amount is reasonable. Therefore, the court awards $5,407.86 in litigation expenses.
Next, Plaintiff seeks $663.48 in taxable costs. 	Federal Rule of Civil procedure 54(d)
authorizes the “[t]axation of costs” and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 governs it. However, to recover taxable
costs under § 1920(1), counsel must follow the procedures set forth in District of Kansas Local
Rule 54.1(a). See Marmon, 2024 WL 1961432, at *6. Plaintiff has not done so. Therefore, the
request for $663.48 in taxable costs is denied without prejudice.
IV. 	Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 43) is GRANTED. Judgment is to be entered
in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Book and Ladder LLC in the amount of $155,789.06
for back pay, compensatory, and punitive damages.
Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 49) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. 	Plaintiff is also awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of 	$55,625.00 and non-taxable
litigation expenses in the amount of $5,407.86.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 11th day of December 2025.
__ s/ John Broomes__________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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