USA v. Figueroa

1
In the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
_____________
Case No. 24-cr-40031-TC
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff
v.
ISABELLA ESTRELLA FIGUEROA,
Defendant
_____________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Isabella Estrella Figueroa is charged with one count of possession
of fentanyl with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Doc. 1. She moves to suppress the evidence uncovered
following a traffic stop. Doc. 19. For the following reasons, Figueroa’s
motion is denied.
I
A
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (recognizing incorporation against
the states). Absent a recognized exception, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits suspicionless seizures or warrantless searches that violate a
person’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy by invading a
constitutionally protected space or thing. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 406 (2012); see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307
(10th Cir. 2016). Traffic stops are seizures for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015), and
in a traffic stop “a passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the
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constitutionality of the stop.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251
(2007).
A warrantless stop is valid where the officer has reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that a traffic violation occurred. Kansas v. Glover, 589
U.S. 376, 380 (2020). In particular, the officer must have “a reasonable
articulable suspicion that ‘this particular motorist violated any one of
the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the
jurisdiction.’” United States v. Martinez, 512 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (10th
Cir. 1999)). The stop also must be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United
States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 2020).
Ordinarily, the traffic stop is circumscribed by the traffic violation
giving rise to the initial encounter. That means officers may conduct
unrelated inquiries during a stop only if that conduct does not prolong
the stop. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)). For example,
it is accepted that officers may reasonably inquire as to the driver’s
license, automobile’s registration and proof of insurance, identity of
the individuals, and driver’s travel plans. United States v. Cates, 73 F.4th
795, 806 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). But once the mis-
sion of the stop has concluded, the motorist is generally free to leave.
Morales, 961 F.3d at 1091.
There are, of course, justifications for continued detention. For ex-
ample, the driver may consent to further questioning. United States v.
Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1315 (10th Cir. 2006). Or an officer may de-
velop reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity distinct from the
traffic violation. See United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1157–58
(10th Cir. 2005). “To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an of-
ficer need not ‘rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,’ or even
have evidence suggesting ‘a fair probability’ of criminal activity.” Pettit,
785 F.3d at 1379 (internal citations omitted). A non-exhaustive list of
factors that the Tenth Circuit has recognized as supporting reasonable
suspicion include nervousness, unusual travel plans, criminal history,
and travel route. See United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 950–52 (10th
Cir. 2009); see also Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1380–83 (holding that no one fac-
tor is determinative of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity). Accord-
ingly, an officer who develops reasonable suspicion of illegal activity
“may initiate an investigatory detention even if it is more likely than
not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” Pettit, 785 F.3d
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at 1379–80 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th
Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original).
As a general matter, the authority to detain a motorist while inves-
tigating reasonable suspicion does not include the right to search the
vehicle. Instead, a search of the vehicle must be justified by, for exam-
ple, probable cause. United States v. Forbes, 528 F.3d 1273, 1277–78
(10th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Pinder, 121 F.4th 1367, 1371
(10th Cir. 2024) (allowing contemporaneous search incident to a lawful
arrest). “Probable cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the
totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car con-
tains contraband or evidence.” United States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 823
(10th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d
1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2001)). When an officer smells drugs, such as
marijuana emanating from the vehicle, that observation is “entitled to
substantial weight in the probable cause analysis and can be an inde-
pendently sufficient basis for probable cause.” United States v. West, 219
F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000). Additional observations—such as
nervous behavior and vague travel plans—obviously strengthen the
existence of probable cause. See United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194,
1200 (10th Cir. 1999).
B
On February 4, 2024, Geary County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Al-
brecht was reviewing data from automatic license plate readers.1 Al-
brecht was intrigued by the travel history of a white Buick with Kansas
plates. He noticed that the Buick had traveled west through De Beque,
Colorado, on February 1. It continued south through Jean, Nevada,
the next day. It then returned north through Jean, Nevada, on February
3 and headed east on Interstate 70 toward Kansas on February 4. Al-
brecht also noticed that the Buick had previously made similar inter-
state trips and that its registered owner had been arrested for posses-
sion of a controlled substance. Based on these facts, Albrecht set up
1 The following facts were found based on the witnesses’ testimony and the
evidence produced at the suppression hearing.
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an alert to be notified when the Buick entered Geary County because
he intended to stop it.2
Albrecht received an alert when the Buick entered Geary County.
He positioned himself on Interstate 70 so that he would notice the
Buick when it drove past him. As the Buick went by, Albrecht pulled
out behind it. He testified that he believed the Buick was following the
vehicle in front of it too closely given the rainy road conditions. Be-
lieving that this was a violation of K.S.A. § 8-1523(a), which prohibits
the unreasonable and imprudent following of another vehicle, Al-
brecht pulled over the Buick.
Defendant Figueroa was driving the Buick and Gilberto Lopez Pe-
rez was in the passenger seat. Albrecht approached the Buick’s passen-
ger side and immediately noticed a strong odor of air freshener and
saw a couple of air fresheners in the vehicle. He asked Figueroa to sit
in his patrol car while he issued her a warning for “following that car
too close.” In the patrol car, he asked Figueroa where she had been,
and Figueroa replied that she had been visiting family in Wichita, Kan-
sas. Albrecht knew this to be untrue: He knew that the Buick was not
coming from Wichita, but from Colorado on Interstate 70. Albrecht
then called in Figueroa’s license and the Buick’s information to dis-
patch and requested a drug dog. Albrecht continued to question
Figueroa about her travel plans, and she stated that she had spent two
nights in Wichita. Albrecht also testified that he noticed that Figueroa
was breathing heavily and seemed concerned.
Albrecht left Figueroa in his patrol car and went to speak with
Lopez, who was still in the Buick. He asked Lopez about his travel
history and plans. Lopez responded with an entirely different story
from Figueroa’s, claiming that he had been in Salina, Kansas.
2 The Fourth Amendment generally forbids roving patrols. Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). But pretextual stops are not imper-
missible under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
811 (1996). Moreover, “[i]t is irrelevant that the officer may have had other
subjective motives for stopping the vehicle.” Phillips, 71 F.4th at 822. Al-
brecht expressly admitted that he decided he would stop the Buick and only
followed it in the hopes of identifying a traffic violation that would provide
him with reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.
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Albrecht then returned to his patrol car and gave Figueroa a warn-
ing. As Figueroa was getting out of Albrecht’s patrol car, Albrecht said
that he was “done with the traffic stop” but that he wanted to ask her
more questions. Figueroa said that was alright. Albrecht then explained
that part of his job was investigating human and drug trafficking. He
asked Figueroa whether she had any weapons, drugs, cash, or a person
in the trunk. Figueroa said no, and Albrecht asked whether he could
“verify that.” When Figueroa did not consent to a search, Albrecht
stated that he was detaining Figueroa to wait for a canine. He explained
that Figueroa looked “like [she was] in extreme distress,” and asked if
she was “being forced to do something that [she did not] want to.”
Figueroa said she was just tired.
Albrecht Mirandized Figueroa and continued to question her. He
asked her whether there was any marijuana in the car, and Figueroa
said there was. Albrecht then searched the car and located a heat sealer
and a large roll of cash, but no marijuana.3 He also noticed a strong
chemical smell emanating from the Buick’s wheel well. Along with his
partner, Albrecht then took the Buick back to the Sheriff’s department.
He explained to Figueroa that there was a “chemical smell” and that
he thought there was “stuff concealed inside.” At the Sheriff’s depart-
ment he searched the Buick again and found fentanyl pills and mariju-
ana.
The Government indicted Figueroa on one count of possession of
fentanyl with the intent to distribute. Doc. 1. Figueroa now moves to
suppress the evidence seized from the Buick on two grounds, claiming
that Albrecht lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and
that he unreasonably prolonged the stop. Doc. 19.4 The Government
opposes each argument. Doc. 25.
II
3 Deputy Cayla Da Giau arrived on scene with a drug dog, but she did not
deploy the dog because Albrecht concluded that he had probable cause to
search the Buick on account of Figueroa’s admission that there was marijuana
in it.
4 All document citations are to the document and page number assigned in
the CM/ECF system.
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Albrecht had reasonable suspicion to stop the Buick. And he did
not unreasonably extend the stop. Accordingly, Figueroa’s motion is
denied.
A
Figueroa first argues that the stop was unlawful. Doc. 19 at 14.
That argument fails because Albrecht reasonably suspected the Buick
of violating a Kansas traffic law.
Albrecht’s testimony and the video of the traffic stop confirm that
he had an objective basis to suspect that the Buick was following the
car in front of it too closely.5 Kansas law notes that drivers “shall not
follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent,
having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon
and the condition of the highway.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1523(a). Al-
brecht explained that he used the two-second rule to determine the
Buick’s following distance. In particular, he testified that he used a
static spot on the road to measure the distance between the Buick and
the vehicle in front of it. He testified observing that, at times, the Buick
was at a following distance of less than two seconds. Although the
record suggests multiple times that the Buick was three or more sec-
onds behind the vehicle in front of it, Albrecht’s testimony is sufficient
to create reasonable suspicion under Kansas law that the driver of the
Buick was violating section 8-1523(a). State v. Moore, 154 P.3d 1, 7 (Kan.
2007); United States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2011).
Figueroa’s counterargument is unpersuasive. Doc. 19 at 5. The
strongest argument she makes is that the video evidence of the stop
5 The Government argues that Albrecht also relied on violations of K.S.A.
§ 8-133(c), because the state name in the Buick’s license plate was partially
obstructed, and of K.S.A. § 8-1703(a), because the Buick did not have its
headlights on. Doc. 25 at 10, 12. But the evidence offered at the suppression
hearing does not support these arguments. As to section 8-133(c), that statute
cannot reasonably be read to prohibit the covering of the state name in a
license plate. State v. Beck, 577 P.3d 119, 126 (Kan. 2025) (holding as much,
albeit after the stop). And as to section 8-1703(a), Albrecht offered no cred-
ible testimony that visibility on the road was limited to less than 1,000 feet or
that he saw the Buick’s wipers in continuous use. See Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-
1703(a)(2)–(3) (requiring headlights when “persons and vehicles on the high-
way are not clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000 feet ahead” and “when
windshield wipers are in continuous use”).
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contradicts Albrecht’s assertion: It shows that the Buick was roughly
three seconds (and sometimes more) behind the vehicle in front of it
when it passed by Albrecht’s patrol car. As a result, Figueroa argues
that she did not violate section 8-1523(a) because the minimum fol-
lowing distance is two seconds rather than three. Id. at 5 n.10.
Figueroa’s logic is that because the Tenth Circuit approved the use of
the two-second rule in Hunter, a three-second following distance is nec-
essarily not a violation of section 8-1523(a). Doc. 19 at 5 n.10 (citing
Hunter, 663 F.3d at 1143, which stated that the Tenth Circuit had “spe-
cifically approved the two-second rule as supporting reasonable suspi-
cion to effect a traffic stop under § 8–1523(a)”).
This argument is a non sequitur. That two seconds or under provides
reasonable suspicion does not mean that more than three seconds pre-
cludes an officer’s finding that reasonable suspicion of a violation ex-
ists. Contra Doc. 19 at 5. Section 8-1523(a) calls for a following distance
that is “reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the . . . condi-
tion of the highway.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1523(a); see Moore, 154 P.3d
at 7 (noting that the Tenth Circuit’s two-second rule was approved “in
light of” “speed, following distance, road conditions, and traffic con-
ditions,” namely, overcast weather and the driver’s high rate of speed).
As Albrecht testified (and his dash cam footage showed), conditions
on the interstate highway were not ideal because it was raining and the
residual water on the roadway was being thrown up by the tires of the
vehicles. Even if the Buick had consistently traveled three seconds be-
hind the car in front of it, Albrecht’s conclusion that the conditions on
the road warranted a following distance greater than two or even three
seconds was not unreasonable. See United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d
1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that an officer’s “observations of
the speed and distance alone may support an objectively reasonable
suspicion that [the driver] was following . . . more closely than was rea-
sonable and prudent under K.S.A. § 8–1523(a)”).
Figueroa maintains that the video plainly refutes Albrecht’s con-
tention that the Buick was less than three seconds behind the vehicle
in front of it. Doc. 32 at 4. Discerning what the video shows does not,
standing alone, answer the pertinent question of whether Albrecht
possessed a minimal level of objective justification to suspect that the
Buick was following the vehicle in front of it at a distance that was
imprudent given the road conditions. See Hunter, 663 F.3d at 1143–44;
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1523(a). Albrecht testified that he believed the ve-
hicle was travelling less than three seconds behind the vehicle it was
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trailing and that, in light of the road conditions, this was unreasonably
close. His perception of the traffic and road conditions and what is
reasonable under the circumstances is entitled to deference. See Vercher,
358 F.3d at 1261. Albrecht’s observations may have been tainted by
his initial suspicion of the Buick and ultimately not enough to convict
Figueroa of violating section 8-1523(a). But that does not render the
stop unreasonable; the pertinent inquiry is whether Albrecht had a “ba-
sis for a suspicion that a traffic violation might have been occurring.” See
id. at 1262 (emphasis in original). The confluence of the video evi-
dence, speed of the vehicles, road conditions, and his training and ex-
perience satisfy that standard.
B
Figueroa also argues that suppression is required because Albrecht
unreasonably extended the stop. Doc. 19 at 5 (invoking Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)). She contends that at various points
Albrecht lacked a lawful basis to extend the stop. That argument fails.
As noted, a traffic stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure
and, as a result, must be reasonable. United States v. Baker, 108 F.4th
1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2024). This means that it must be “justified at its
inception and . . . the officer’s actions during the stop must be reason-
ably related in scope to ‘the mission of the stop itself.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2020)). In Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop “becomes unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” it. Baker,
108 F.4th at 1246–47 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350–51) (internal
citations omitted). And while there is no de minimis exception to the
rule, Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830, the question is only whether “police
diligently pursued the [traffic] investigation,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354,
and not whether they took the quickest route humanly possible to con-
cluding the stop. Mayville, 955 F.3d at 827. Thus, courts are not per-
mitted to “second-guess the logistical decisions of officers so long as
their actions were reasonable and diligently completed within the con-
fines of a lawful traffic stop[ ] . . . because reasonableness—rather than
efficiency—is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
The Tenth Circuit has established a three-part test for analyzing
the lawfulness of a delay under Rodriguez: In particular, an unlawful sei-
zure occurs when an officer diverts from the traffic-based mission of
the stop to investigate ordinary criminal conduct, does so in a way that
“prolongs” (i.e., adds time to) the stop, and the investigative detour is
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unsupported by any independent reasonable suspicion. Baker, 108
F.4th at 1248 (quoting Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1173). In other words, “the
government prevails if the officers’ actions did not divert from the
traffic mission, the search was not prolonged, or reasonable suspicion
existed.” Id. An officer may extend the stop if he or she has, at a min-
imum, reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Id. at 1247 (citing
Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830).
Figueroa argues that there were five Rodriguez moments where Al-
brecht unlawfully extended the stop. They are as follows: at approxi-
mately at 1:03 p.m. when Albrecht asked Figueroa about her travel
plans inside his patrol car; a minute later at 1:04 p.m. when he re-
quested a drug dog from dispatch; later on when he asked Figueroa if
he could ask her more questions; when he told Figueroa that he was
going to get a drug dog; and when he questioned Lopez about the pair’s
travel plans. Doc. 19 at 6–9. But none of these actions unlawfully ex-
tended the stop.
Figueroa first argues that the travel plan questions unreasonably
extended the stop because they did not relate to Albrecht’s traffic mis-
sion and because Albrecht “already knew the answers.” Doc. 19 at 7.
That argument fails because police are entitled to ask drivers about
their travel plans during the course of a traffic stop. See United States v.
Cates, 73 F.4th 795, 806 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Cortez,
965 F.3d 827, 838 (10th Cir. 2020)) (rejecting a Rodriguez argument and
noting that “[a]n officer may also inquire about the driver’s travel
plans”). There is no requirement that such questions relate to the traf-
fic infraction under investigation. See Cortez, 965 F.3d at 838; accord
United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015) (“An officer
may also inquire about the driver’s travel plans . . . and ask about mat-
ters unrelated to the stop.”) (citations omitted). But even if there was
a relatedness requirement, it would have been satisfied: The questions
Albrecht posed could have shed light on why Figueroa was following
too closely. For instance, she could have been tired or maybe there was
a medical emergency. See Cortez, 965 F.3d at 839. Figueroa cites no au-
thority for the proposition that police may not ask travel-related ques-
tions if they already know about the vehicle’s travel history.
Figueroa’s response to those questions, in light of other attendant
factors, gave Albrecht reasonable suspicion to believe that she was en-
gaged in unlawful drug trafficking. In particular, he knew the Buick had
a travel history that, based on his training and experience, was suspi-
cious and consistent with drug trafficking. See United States v. Hayes, 62
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F.4th 1271, 1279 (10th Cir. 2023) (finding that police reasonably sus-
pected the defendant of drug trafficking when he had, among other
things, “made multiple short trips between [two distant cities]”); accord
United States v. Batara-Molina, 60 F.4th 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2023) (“To
make such a long trip—only to stay at the destination for such a short
amount of time—is also consistent with the behavior of a drug cou-
rier.”). Then, when Albrecht asked Figueroa about her travel history,
she lied about it. And so did Lopez, who gave a completely different
story. That also gives rise to reasonable suspicion. See United States v.
Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1152 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that evasiveness
and inconsistent travel plans, along with other factors, gave rise to rea-
sonable suspicion); see also Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1381 (“We have consist-
ently held that implausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable
suspicion.”) (alterations omitted). In addition, Albrecht knew that
Figueroa had previously been arrested for possession of a controlled
substance. This, too, can contribute to an officer’s reasonable suspi-
cion of drug trafficking. See Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1147 (finding that
criminal history, in conjunction with other factors, contributed to rea-
sonable suspicion); United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th
Cir. 2005) (same). And Albrecht had noticed several air fresheners in
the Buick and a strong odor of air freshener emanating from it. Again,
the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that the presence of air
freshers can be an indication of attempts to mask the odor of illegal
contraband. See Batara-Molina, 60 F.4th at 1256. The combination of
these factors provided Albrecht with reasonable suspicion that
Figueroa was engaged in the trafficking of illegal narcotics and justified
further inquiry. See id. at 1259 (affirming the district court’s denial of
suppression because police had reasonable suspicion of drug traffick-
ing when the officer noticed, among other things, a strong cover odor
and that the defendant had made a long trip with a short turnaround
time); Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1383 (affirming the district court’s denial of
suppression where the officer suspected criminal activity based on,
among other things, unusual travel plans and abnormal nervousness).
That Albrecht had reasonable suspicion precludes Figueroa’s addi-
tional delay arguments. Contra Doc. 19 at 8–9. The rule in Rodriguez—
that police may not unlawfully prolong a traffic stop—applies only
when their investigative detour is “unsupported by any independent
reasonable suspicion.” Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1173. Figueroa’s motion to
suppress based on Rodriguez fails because reasonable suspicion existed
after she falsely answered Albrecht’s travel related questions. See Baker,
108 F.4th at 1248.
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And Albrecht’s investigation into drug trafficking provided him
probable cause to search the Buick. As noted, Figueroa admitted to
Albrecht that there was marijuana in the Buick.6 This is a violation of
Kansas law that justifies a search of the vehicle. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-
5706; see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal
the object of the search.”). And Deputy Ali Huizar, who arrived on
scene to assist Albrecht, noted that she smelled marijuana as she ap-
proached the Buick to speak to Lopez.7 See United States v. McGehee, 672
F.3d 860, 869 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. West, 219 F.3d
1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000)) (“An officer’s detection of the smell of
drugs . . . in a car is entitled to substantial weight in the probable cause
analysis and can be an independently sufficient basis for probable
cause.”). Additionally, Albrecht discovered a heat sealer, a strong
chemical smell in the trunk, and a large roll of cash in the glove box.
This gave him further probable cause to believe that there were drugs
in the car. See United States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 823 (10th Cir. 2023)
(explaining that the smell of drugs can give rise to probable cause to
search); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that the smell of an “ether-like substance” gave rise to probable
cause); Hoskins v. Withers, 92 F.4th 1279, 1296 (10th Cir. 2024) (explain-
ing that large amounts of cash are indicative of drug activity).
Figueroa’s claim that the officers’ initial failure to find contraband
while searching the Buick on the roadside precluded additional intru-
sions lacks merit. Contra Doc. 19 at 9. Probable cause becomes stale
“when new information received by the police nullifies information
critical to the earlier probable cause determination . . . .” United States
v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2019). The question is whether
a new fact nullifies a material fact that gave rise to the finding of
6 That fentanyl—not marijuana, as Figueroa admitted—was ultimately lo-
cated is beside the point. The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Bradford, 423
F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005), recognized that a driver’s admission to the
possession of any contraband in the vehicle justifies a full search because “[a]
reasonable officer would think that a suspect might confess to a small amount
of drugs in order to avoid an investigation which would reveal a much larger
amount of drugs.”
7 Albrecht testified that a prior COVID-19 infection rendered him temporar-
ily unable to detect the odor of marijuana.
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probable cause. Id. That Albrecht did not discover marijuana while the
vehicle was parked along the road did not vitiate probable cause:
Figueroa told him there was marijuana in the car; he simply was unable
to locate it without additional efforts that occurred away from the
roadside stop. On the contrary, the search that occurred yielded addi-
tional facts that enhanced the probable cause to search the vehicle.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Figueroa’s Motion to Suppress, Doc.
19, is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Date: March 17, 2026 s/ Toby Crouse
Toby Crouse
United States District Judge
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