Wood v. Wichita Police Department et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JUSTIN L. WOOD,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 25-3150-JWL
WICHITA POLICE
DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Justin L.
Wood, who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. It comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint, filed on December 1, 2025. (Doc. 15.) For the reasons explained below, this
matter will be dismissed without prejudice because the second amended complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for relief against a named defendant.
I. Background
This matter began on August 1, 2025, when Plaintiff filed his initial complaint. (Doc. 1.)
Because Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court was required by statute to screen the
complaint and to dismiss it or any portion of it that is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2). During this screening, the Court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). In addition, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true.
Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, the Court “will not
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supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory
on plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).
On August 11, 2025, the Court issued a memorandum and order (“M&O”) that recited the
facts and claims in the initial complaint as follows:
In an “Affidavit of Truth” filed with his complaint, Plaintiff explains that in
2022, he purchased some goats to eat grass at his home and to provide meat and
milk for him and his family. (Doc. 5, p. 1.) At the time, he was unaware of any laws
related to owning goats. Id. Not long after, officials from the City of Wichita (“the
City”) came to Plaintiff’s property and informed him that he needed to purchase a
license and obtain a permit from the City if he wanted to keep the goats. Id.
Believing that the United States Constitution and opinions of the United States
Supreme Court mean that it is not a crime to keep the goats without a license or
permit, Plaintiff obtained neither. Id. at 1-2.
On the night of February 12, 2023, while Plaintiff and his family were
watching television, two police officers knocked on his door “to talk about the
goats.” Id. at 2. This encounter ended in Plaintiff being issued a citation and given
a court date. Id. Plaintiff did not attend the court date, so a warrant was issued for
his arrest. Id. at 3. On another occasion1 , police were called to Plaintiff’s home and
he was again arrested on a warrant “pertaining to the goats.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff was
taken into custody and was held for over 80 hours until his wife paid the required
bond. Id.
Plaintiff is a self-employed carpenter. (Doc. 4, p. 2.) On November 10,
2023, Plaintiff was working at a customer’s home, and his air compressor set off
the home’s alarm system. (Doc. 5, p. 3.) Two sheriff’s deputies arrived at the home
approximately 30 minutes later, confirmed with the homeowner that Plaintiff was
there legitimately, and let him get back to work. Id. The deputies then ran Plaintiff’s
name, discovered he had an outstanding warrant, and arrested him. Id. They did not
allow Plaintiff to put away his tools before arresting him, and they asked the
homeowner for permission to tow Plaintiff’s vehicle, which contained the rest of
his work tools. Id. Plaintiff was taken to jail and was not allowed out until he paid
a bond. Id. Plaintiff sold all of his goats shortly after this incident. Id.
On April 1, 2025, an Animal Services Officer came to Plaintiff’s home and
issued him multiple tickets for owning goats, for failure to license Plaintiff’s two
dogs, and for failure to provide paperwork for the dogs. Id. at 4. Plaintiff believes
that the tickets and warrants violated his constitutional rights. Id. Plaintiff states
that he went to court, and the attachments to the complaint in this matter reflect that
1 Plaintiff asserts that these events occurred “[o]n Friday April 21st.” (Doc. 5, p. 4.) He does not indicate a year. The
Court notes that April 21, 2025 was a Monday. April 21, 2023 was, however, a Friday. The year in which these
events occurred remains unclear.
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in July 2025, Plaintiff attended a hearing in Wichita Municipal Court. Id.; (Doc. 1-
1, p. 22.) Plaintiff contends that all of his motions were dismissed. (Doc. 5, p. 5.)
At the trial, the prosecutor dismissed the charges without prejudice after the sole
witness testified that she neither saw nor heard goats on Plaintiff’s property. Id.;
(Doc. 1-1, p. 22.)
Plaintiff names as Defendants in this matter the Wichita Police Department
(“WPD”), the Wichita Municipal Court (“the Municipal Court”), the Sedgwick
County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”), and the Sedgwick County Jail (“SCJ”). (Doc.
1, p. 1-2.) Plaintiff brings his claims in this matter under Article 6, § 2 of the
Constitution of the United States; the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Amendments to the Constitution; 18 U.S.C. § 242; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986; K.S.A. 44-1039; K.S.A. 22-2302(b); and K.S.A. 22-2521. (Doc. 1, p. 4.) He
claims that the WPD issued him a citation without probable cause and arrested him;
the Municipal Court issued a warrant without probable cause and denied him due
process; the SCSO arrested him without a lawful warrant; and the SCJ unlawfully
detained him, unlawfully strip-searched him, and subjected him to cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. As relief, Plaintiff seeks redress of his grievances; over
$1,000,000.00 in actual and punitive damages2 ; and subpoenas to obtain relevant
documents and videos to identify additional violations. Id. at 5.
(Doc. 9, p. 1-3 (footnotes in original).)
The M&O explained to Plaintiff that 18 U.S.C. § 242 did not provide him with a private
right of action, so he could not, as a matter of law, state a plausible claim for relief based on the
violation of that statute. Id. at 5-6. Although 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 provide private rights of
action, the initial complaint did not assert factual allegations that, if taken as true, could support a
plausible claim for relief under either statute. Id. at 6-7. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff sought to
bring claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, or 42 U.S.C. § 1986, those claims were
subject to dismissal. Id. at 5-7.
Next, the M&O turned to Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, explaining that they
2 Specifically, Plaintiff seeks $10,000 for the emotional and psychological harm caused by “[p]olice harassment”;
$50,000 in lost wages and $500,000 in punitive damages for harm to his reputation and future business, as well as
emotional and psychological damage caused by his being arrested at a customer’s home; $200,000 for damage to his
reputation and the emotional damage to his wife and children during his arrest and detainment; and $500,000 to
compensate him for the time he spent in jail, “strip searches, torture, held for bail, emotional psychological damages,
damages to family relationship, loss of trust in [the] judicial system of Wichita and Sedgwick County, [and]
Constitutional Violations. [sic]” (Doc. 1, p. 5.)
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were “subject to dismissal from this matter because he has failed to name a Defendant that may be
sued under § 1983.” (Doc. 9, p. 7.) The WPD and the Municipal Court are subunits of the City of
Wichita and, as such, are not suable under § 1983. Id. at 7-8. Similarly, the SCJ is not a “person”
subject to suit under § 1983. Id. at 8. Regarding the SCSO, Plaintiff had not alleged facts showing
that any identified SCSO employee committed a constitutional violation or that a county policy or
custom was the moving force behind that constitutional violation, as required to state a plausible
claim against it. Id. at 8.
Because all of the Defendants named in the initial complaint were subject to dismissal, the
M&O concluded, the entire complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to state a plausible claim
for relief. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff time in which to file a complete and proper amended
complaint that cured the deficiencies. Id. at 8-9. In the interest of efficiency, the M&O pointed out
additional deficiencies in the initial complaint so that Plaintiff could ensure they did not recur in
any amended complaint he chose to file. Id. at 9-13. Specifically, the M&O discussed the rules
governing joining claims and defendants in one case, the requirement of specific and sufficient
factual allegations to support claims, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
applicable statute of limitations. Id.
Plaintiff timely filed his amended complaint on October 14, 2025. (Doc. 13.) The Court
conducted the statutorily required screening of the amended complaint. In a second M&O issued
on October 28, 2025, the Court described the amended complaint as follows:
The 	amended 	complaint 	names 	as 	Defendants 	Wichita 	Animal
Maintenance Officer Caralee Miller and Wichita City Prosecutor Stephen P.
Young. (Doc. 13, p. 1-2.) As the background of this case, Plaintiff alleges in the
amended complaint that Defendant Miller came to his home on April 1, 2025,
talked with him for a bit, then issued him a citation related to his allegedly owning
goats. Id. at 2. Around April 20, 2025—before the scheduled court date for the
citation—Plaintiff was arrested “for the charge.” Id. He was taken to jail and held
for 4 days until his bail was paid. Id. At the ensuing trial on the citation, Defendant
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Miller admitted that she had not seen or heard any goats at his home. Id. The charges
against Plaintiff were dismissed. Id.
In Count I of this matter, Plaintiff asserts the violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 3. As
supporting facts for Count I, Plaintiff alleges that, without having any evidence to
support doing so, Defendant Miller issued a citation that stated under penalty of
perjury that Plaintiff had broken the law. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the citation
“caused [him] to be arrested, jailed, and held for bail.” Id. In Count II of this matter,
Plaintiff asserts that life, liberty, and property were taken from him. Id. As
supporting facts for Count II, Plaintiff alleges that he “was arrested, and held for
bail.” Id. As relief in this matter, Plaintiff seeks a remedy for his incarceration and
“costs to represent.” Id. at 5.
(Doc. 14, p. 2-3.)
The second M&O explained that Defendant Young was subject to dismissal because there
were no facts asserted in the amended complaint that established he had caused a violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and, as a prosecutor, Defendant Young is immune from suit for
damages when the claims are based on acts that occur in his role as a prosecutor. Id. at 4. It further
explained that the Court liberally construed Count I as alleging a Fourth Amendment claim of
malicious prosecution, but it could not determine the federal right at issue in Count II. Id. at 5-6.
Because the amended complaint did not set forth facts to support Count II or explain how a named
Defendant personally participated in the violation, Count II was subject to dismissal for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted. Id. at 6. The second M&O reminded Plaintiff that, as
stated in the first M&O:
“To state a claim, a complaint must ‘make clear exactly who is alleged to
have done what to whom.’” Stone v. Albert, 338 Fed. Appx. 757, 759 (10th Cir.
2009)(quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)). “[I]
is incumbent upon a plaintiff to ‘identify specific actions taken by particular
defendants’ in order to make out a viable § 1983 . . . claim.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718
F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013). . . . Conclusory allegations of involvement are
not sufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint
“contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [the plaintiff] is
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entitled to relief.” The purpose of Rule 8 “is ‘to give opposing parties fair notice of
the basis of the claim against them so that they may respond to the complaint, and
to apprise the court of sufficient allegations to allow it to conclude, if the allegations
are proved, that the claimant has a legal right to relief.’” Monument Builders of
Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass’n of Kan., 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Perington Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 631 F.2d
1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1979)).
(Doc. 14, p. 6 (quoting Doc. 9, p. 10-11.) Because Count II of the amended complaint did not
comply with Rule 8, it was subject to dismissal. (Doc. 14, p. 7.)
The second M&O concluded:
After screening the amended complaint, the Court finds as follows.
Defendant Young is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to state a
plausible claim for relief against him. Count II of the amended complaint is subject
to dismissal because it does not state a plausible claim for relief against a named
Defendant. Plaintiff therefore has three options.
First, Plaintiff may file a written response to this order stating that he wishes
to voluntarily dismiss Defendant Young from this matter and he wishes to
voluntarily dismiss Count II of this matter. If Plaintiff files a written response to
this order that so states, the Court will dismiss Defendant Young and Count II and
the case will proceed on Count I and against Defendant Miller only.
Second, Plaintiff may file a written response to this order showing good
cause why Defendant Young should not be dismissed from this matter and/or why
Count II is not subject to dismissal. If Plaintiff chooses this option, the Court will
review his written response and issue further orders as necessary. Plaintiff is
cautioned that if his written response does not show good cause, Defendant Young
and/or Count II may be dismissed without further prior notice to Plaintiff.
Third, if Plaintiff wishes to further amend his complaint to clarify the legal
basis for Count II, add factual allegations to support Count II, and/or add factual
allegations to support a plausible claim against Defendant Young, he may file a
complete and proper second amended complaint. The Court will direct the clerk to
provide Plaintiff with the required form for filing a second amended complaint in
case Plaintiff chooses to do so. Plaintiff is advised that if he files a second amended
complaint, the Court will conduct the statutorily required screening of the second
amended complaint and issue further orders as necessary.
(Doc. 14, p. 7-8.) Plaintiff was granted time in which to comply with the second M&O. Id. at 9.
On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 15.) The
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Court has now conducted the statutorily required screening of the second amended complaint.
II. Nature of the Matter before the Court
The second amended complaint names as Defendants the City of Wichita, Wichita Animal
Control Officers Kaylee Wallis and Caralee Miller, Wichita City Judges Jane Doe and (fnu)3
Burdges, Officers Urban and Brazelton of the Sedgwick County Sheriff’s Office, and City
Prosecutor Stephen Young. (Doc. 15, p. 1-2.) As the background of the case, Plaintiff states that a
few months after he bought some goats, WPD officers began “showing up” to tell him to get rid
of the goats and “[o]ne night two female officers showed up and left [him] a ticket for owning
goats.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff went to court and unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the ticket, after which
he missed a court date and a warrant issued for his arrest. Id. Plaintiff believes that Defendant
Judge Jane Doe issued the arrest warrant. Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that during pretrial hearings in May and June 2023, Judge Doe
denied Plaintiff’s motions for a jury trial and his motion questioning jurisdiction. Id. at 6-7. At this
point, Plaintiff recognized Judge Doe as having presided over a 2021 case in traffic court that
involved Plaintiff. Id. at 7. Plaintiff explains that in the 2021 case, Judge Doe had found Plaintiff
guilty based only on an officer’s word and she “charge[d] him $500 to appeal the case,” telling
him: “The Constitution has no place in my court.” Id.
On or around November 10, 2023, Plaintiff was working at a customer’s home in a very
upscale neighborhood when an alarm sounded. Id. at 7. Plaintiff spoke to the homeowner, who
called the security company to turn off the alarm. Id. Two sheriffs from the SCSO—apparently
Defendant Urban and Defendant Brazelton—arrived at the home and Plaintiff explained to one of
them what had happened. Id. Defendant Urban told Plaintiff to sit on his truck’s bumper, a move
3 The term “(fnu)” is an abbreviation for “first name unknown.”
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Plaintiff characterizes as custodial arrest. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff refused to give Defendant Urban his
name, but Defendant Urban let Plaintiff go after obtaining the homeowner’s phone number from
Plaintiff. Id. at 8. Plaintiff went back to work. Id.
Shortly thereafter, Defendants Urban and Brazelton came into the backyard and arrested
Plaintiff, handcuffed him, and took him to jail, where he was strip-searched. Id. Plaintiff asserts
that because he initially objected to the strip search, his hands were handcuffed behind his back
and he was placed into a small cell that smelled like urine. Id. Plaintiff was eventually moved to a
pod, then a release room, and he was released around 10:00 p.m. Id. at 9. He asserts that his wife
arrived to pay his bail at around 5:30 p.m. but she wasn’t allowed to do so until around 7:00 p.m.
and, even then, it was another three hours before he was released. Id. Within 2 days of his release,
Plaintiff became ill, which he attributes to the “extremely dirty cells” he was held in at the jail. Id.
at 10. He also asserts that he lost respect from his client and the client’s neighbors and the arrest
irreversibly damaged his reputation and image. Id.
On April 1, 2025, Defendant Miller, an animal control officer, came to Plaintiff’s home.
Id. at 10. Although Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Miller, he refused to tell her whether he owned
goats or had any goats on the property. Id. Instead, Plaintiff replied by stating “‘I plead the Fifth’
or ‘I am not at liberty to say,’ which seemed to irritate [Defendant] Miller,” who issued Plaintiff a
citation. Id. After Plaintiff went inside his home, additional police vehicles arrived and spoke to
his neighbors. Id. at 11.
On the night of April 22, 2025, police came to Plaintiff’s home while he “was having a
disagreement with his children.” Id. Despite stating that Plaintiff had done nothing wrong, as soon
as Plaintiff stepped onto his porch, officers arrested him “for two warrants from the goat citations.”
Id. Plaintiff was jailed for 4 days, lost his job, and “lost respect as the father of his family.” Id.
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Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the case and a habeas corpus motion, both of which
Defendant Judge Burdges “ignored.” Id. The case proceeded to trial, where Defendant Miller was
the sole witness and testified that she neither saw nor heard any goats at Plaintiff’s property. Id. at
12. After Defendant Miller was cross-examined, Defendant Young, in his role as prosecutor,
dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. Plaintiff sought reimbursement of costs and fees incurred in
defending himself, which Judge Burdges denied. Id.
In Count I of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 3. As the supporting
facts for Count I, Plaintiff states:
Mr. Wood received a citation on Feb 12, 2023 at his home for property he
allegedly owned absent proof. [His] name was searched while he was working at a
customer’s home when it was unreasonable to search his name, or to arrest him
with an invalid misdemeanor warrant. Mr. Wood was seized for an unconstitutional
warrant which lacked reasonableness considering the charge on two separate
occasions – 11/1-/23, 4/22/25.
Id. at 3, 13.
In Count II, Plaintiff again asserts the violation of the Fourth Amendment, this time
focusing on the probable cause requirement for the issuance of warrants. Id. at 3. As supporting
facts for Count II, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Young brought charges against him without
probable cause and that Judges Doe and Burdges “both signed a warrant” without probable cause
that Plaintiff had committed a crime. Id. at 3, 13.
In Count III, Plaintiff asserts the violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’
protections involving “the right to life, liberty, and property[ a]nd Equal Protection of all his
rights.” Id. at 4. As supporting facts for Count III, Plaintiff states that he “was arrested, held for
bail, and suffered great harm to his confidence, image and respect as a father and as ann
entrepreneur to his company.” Id. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $1,200,000.00 for reputational harm
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and lost wages and he generally requests declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 5.
III. Discussion
The standards under which this Court screens Plaintiff’s second amended complaint are set
out above and will not be repeated in full here. The Court assures Plaintiff that it has liberally
construed his pro se second amended complaint, but it reminds Plaintiff that it does not act as
Plaintiff’s advocate or construct claims on his behalf. (See also Doc. 9, p. 11; Doc. 14, p. 3.)
A. Rule 8
As Plaintiff was informed in the first M&O and reminded in the second M&O, in order to
state a plausible claim for relief, a complaint must identify specific actions taken by specific
defendants. (Doc. 14, p. 6 (quoting Doc. 9, p. 10-11).) It must describe “exactly who is alleged to
have done what to whom.” See Stone v. Albert, 338 Fed. Appx. 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that a complaint must give opposing parties fair notice of the claims against
them and it must contain sufficient allegations, if taken as true, to show that the plaintiff has a legal
right to relief. (See Doc. 9, p. 10-11; Doc. 14 p. 6.) “When a plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 8,
this Court is authorized to dismiss the complaint.” (Doc. 9, p. 11 (citation omitted).)
Contrary to the requirements of Rule 8, the second amended complaint does not provide
certain named Defendants the fair notice of the claims against them. In the portion of the second
amended complaint form designated for Plaintiff to “[b]riefly state the background of your case,”
Plaintiff has written a lengthy narrative. (Doc. 15, p. 2, 6-13.) Yet in the portions of the second
amended complaint for setting forth “all of the facts [Plaintiff] consider[s] important, including
names of persons involved, places and dates,” and for “[d]escrib[ing] exactly how each defendant
is involved” in Count I, Count II, and Count III, Plaintiff fails to mention by name any Defendants
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other than Defendants Young, Doe, and Burdges. (See Doc. 15, p. 3-4, 13.)
The failure to state which Counts involve Defendants Miller, Wallis, Urban, Brazelton, and
the City of Wichita means that the second amended complaint fails to give those Defendants fair
notice of the constitutional violations in which Plaintiff believes each participated or the Counts
in the second amended complaint to which each Defendant would be required to respond if this
case proceeds to service. This violates Rule 8. Thus, Defendants Miller, Wallis, Urban, Brazelton,
and the City of Wichita are subject to dismissal.
B. Count I
To the extent that Count I of the second amended complaint is based on events that occurred
in February 2023, it must be dismissed because, as previously explained to Plaintiff, those events
fall outside the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(See Doc. 9, p. 12-13.) To the extent that Count I is based on events that occurred in November
2023 and April 2025, Plaintiff makes only conclusory assertions about the violation of his rights.
He alleges only that his “name was searched while he was working at a customer’s home when it
was unreasonable to search his name, or to arrest him with an invalid misdemeanor warrant” that
“lacked reasonableness considering the charge.” (Doc. 15, p. 3, 13.)
Even liberally construing the second amended complaint, Plaintiff does not identify a
named defendant who “searched” his name without reason to do so or otherwise engaged in the
conduct on which Count I is based. Thus, it remains unclear which Defendant is implicated in
Count I and the second amended complaint would not give fair notice to any Defendants of a claim
against him or her. As such, Count I violates Rule 8.
In addition, at no point in the second amended complaint does Plaintiff allege facts that
sufficiently support his conclusory assertion that his November 2023 arrest on an outstanding
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warrant was unreasonable. Plaintiff mentions arrest warrants twice in the facts alleged in the
second amended complaint: first, he refers to the arrest warrant issued by Judge Doe after Plaintiff
failed to appear in court and second, he briefly refers to being arrested in April 2025 on “two
warrants from the goat citations.” (Doc. 15, p. 2, 11.) He does not explain the basis for the
“warrants from the goat citations.” Even liberally construing Count I and the alleged facts that
appear to relate to Count I, this Court cannot conclude that Count I states a plausible claim for
relief against a named Defendant. Count I is therefore subject to dismissal.
C. Count II.
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Young violated his Fourth Amendment rights
by filing charges against Plaintiff without probable cause to do so. As explained in the second
M&O, Defendant Young is immune from liability for actions he took in his role as a prosecutor,
including preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial. (See Doc. 14, p. 4-5.)
Thus, Defendant Young must be dismissed as a defendant in this action. See Warnick v. Cooley,
895 F.3d 746, 751 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is well-established law that ‘[p]rosecutors are entitled to
absolute immunity’ for anything they do in their role as advocates, including their ‘decisions to
prosecute.’”).
Similarly, Judges Doe and Burdges enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits based on
actions taken in their judicial capacity, except where they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
The facts alleged in the second amended complaint that relate to Judges Doe and Burdges describe
only actions taken in their judicial capacity, such as denying motions and issuing arrest warrants.
(Doc. 15, p. 2, 6-7, 11-13.) Thus, Judges Doe and Burdges also must be dismissed as defendants
in this action. Because the supporting facts for Count II implicate only these three Defendants,
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their dismissal means that Count II fails to state a plausible claim on which relief can be granted
and it is subject to dismissal in its entirety.
D. Count III
Count III of the second amended complaint asserts that Plaintiff’s rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments were violated; specifically, Plaintiff identifies “the right to life,
liberty, and property[ a]nd Equal Protection of all his rights.” (Doc. 15, p. 4.) As supporting facts,
Plaintiff relies upon his arrest, being held for bail, and suffering harm as a result. Id. This is similar
to Count II of the amended complaint, in which Plaintiff argued “that life, liberty, and property
was taken from him when he was arrested and held for bail.” (See Doc. 14, p. 6 (describing Count
II of the amended complaint).) To his credit, Plaintiff has complied with the second M&O’s
guidance to some extent and has identified in his second amended complaint the precise
constitutional provisions he believes were violated. (Doc. 15, p. 4.)
However, the second M&O also explained to Plaintiff that Count II of the amended
complaint was subject to dismissal because “he has not adequately identified a named Defendant
who violated the right[] and he has not alleged sufficient facts to show the right was violated by
that Defendant.” (Doc. 14, p. 7.) Count III of the second amended complaint suffers from these
same deficiencies. (See Doc. 15, p. 4.) Thus, Count III is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
plausible claim on which relief could be granted.
IV. Conclusion
The Court has granted Plaintiff multiple chances to cure the deficiencies in his pleading
that leave it subject to dismissal, but Plaintiff has not done so. Moreover, the Court has previously
identified for Plaintiff certain deficiencies in the initial complaint and the amended complaint that
continue to appear in the second amended complaint. The Court thus declines to allow Plaintiff
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the opportunity to further amend his complaint and will dismiss this matter without prejudice for
failure to state a plausible claim on which relief could be granted. See Jensen v. West Jordan City,
968 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2020) (explaining that refusing leave to amend is justified when
there is “‘failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed’”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: This 12th day of December, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
United States District Judge
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