USA v. Walker

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 23-10098-JWB
STANLEY WALKER, SR.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion to vacate. (Doc. 35.) The motion
has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.1 (Doc. 37.) The motion is DENIED for the reasons
stated herein.
I. 	Facts and Procedural History
On September 6, 2023, the grand jury returned a single count indictment against Defendant
charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 1.) Assistant Federal Public Defendant Mitch
Biebighauser represented Defendant in this matter. 	A superseding indictment was returned on
March 12, 2024, adding a second count of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) which occurred on a later date
than the initial offense. (Doc. 13.) A second superseding indictment was returned on April 16,
2024, which only modified the descriptions of the firearms. Defendant entered a guilty plea on
August 12, 2024. (Doc. 23.) Defendant pleaded guilty to the second § 922(g)(1) count. Defendant
indicated in his plea petition that his mind was clear, he was not under the care of a doctor, knew
of no reason why his mental competence should be questioned, and had read and understood the
petition to plead guilty with his attorney. (Doc. 26.) Defendant signed the plea petition in open
1 Defendant failed to file a reply and the time for doing so has now passed.
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court. In the plea agreement, he admitted to possessing the firearm and ammunition and that he
knew on the date of the offense that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Defendant also
knew that he was previously convicted of a felony. 	The firearm at issue had been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce after it was manufactured. (Doc. 27 at 2.)
The court ordered a presentence report (“PSR”) to be completed by the probation office.
The PSR stated that Defendant reported that he suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”) with reported symptoms including “being hypersensitive and ‘paying attention to
everything.’” (Doc. 32 ¶ 119.) 	Defendant had counseling as a juvenile but “stated he is not
interested in participating in mental health counseling.” (Id. ¶¶121–122.) Defendant further stated
that he was not addicted to any substances but reported past drug use. (Id. ¶ 124.) Defendant was
also not interested in drug counseling. (Id. ¶ 129.)
On October 29, 2024, a sentencing hearing was held. In that hearing, Defendant appeared
with defense counsel and represented that he was satisfied with his counsel’s performance.
Defense counsel informed the court about Defendant’s personal history and the difficulties he
faced throughout his life. (Doc. 36 at 8–20.) Defense counsel asked the court to vary down to 24
months from the guideline range of 27 to 33 months. Defendant was sentenced to a term of 24
months. (Doc. 33.)
Prior to this conviction, Defendant faced similar charges in 2013. See Case No. 13-10051-
EFM. In that case, Defendant was initially represented by David Freund, Assistant Federal Public
Defender. However, Mr. Freund was allowed to withdraw after learning of a conflict of interest.
(Id.; Docs. 7, 11.) On May 23, 2013, Defendant Walker’s new counsel obtained an Order for Writ
of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum for an individual named Jimmy Ponds so that he could testify
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as a witness at trial. (Id., Doc. 26.) However, Defendant ultimately entered a guilty plea. (Id.,
Doc. 33.)
On November 7, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction.2 	Defendant
argues that his counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest and for failing to alert the court
to Defendant’s mental health issues.
II. 	Standard
Section 2255(a) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides in part that “[a] prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon
the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States ... or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.” Unless the motion and the record of the case
conclusively show the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court must promptly grant a hearing. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(b). However, if it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the
record that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion. Rule 4(b),
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. See United States v. Santiago, No. 19-10055-JWB,
2021 WL 663201, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 19, 2021).
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of counsel at
‘critical stages of a criminal proceeding,’ including when he enters a guilty plea.” Lee v. United
States, 582 U.S. 357, 363 (2017) (citation omitted). 	“To demonstrate that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must show that counsel's representation ‘fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness’ and that he was prejudiced as a result.” 	Id. (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984)). 	A court considering a claim of
2 A letter attached to the motion indicated that Defendant planned to supplement his motion. (Doc. 35-1.) Defendant
has failed to do so and the time for filing a § 2255 motion has now passed.
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ineffective assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that counsel's representation was within
the “wide range” of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To establish
prejudice, a defendant must show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 	A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
III. 	Analysis
A. Conflict of Interest
Defendant’s motion raises two grounds that are based on a conflict of interest. 	These
grounds can be collapsed into one issue. 	Defendant asserts that the Federal Public Defender’s
(“FPD”) Office had a conflict in his 2013 case because of their representation of Jimmy Ponds.
Defendant contends that any past or current conflict is “imputed” to Mr. Biebighauser because he
works for the FPD’s Office. (Doc. 35 at 5.) In response, the government argues that Mr. Ponds
was not a witness to this case and that Defendant has not identified an actual conflict of interest in
Mr. Biebighauser’s representation of Defendant.
Defendant did not raise the issue of a conflict in the trial court. Therefore, to establish his
claim of ineffective assistance, he “must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.” United States v. Walters, 163 F. App'x 674, 682 (10th Cir.
2006) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)). “[T]o demonstrate an actual conflict
of interest, the petitioner must be able to point to specific instances in the record which suggest an
impairment or compromise of his interests for the benefit of another party.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). Here, Defendant has
wholly failed to identify an actual conflict of interest. Defendant’s claim is entirely conclusory
and based on an alleged conflict that occurred in his prior case. Defendant fails to put forth any
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specific instance in the record in this case that suggests that Mr. Biebighauser was operating under
a conflict of interest during his representation of Defendant in this case. 	Therefore, “without a
showing of inconsistent interests, any alleged conflict remains hypothetical, and does not
constitute ineffective assistance.” Id.
Because Defendant has not shown an active conflict of interest during his representation,
his claim fails.
B. Sentencing
Finally, Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have
Defendant evaluated for mental and emotional challenges he faced during the proceedings, for
failing to mention the issues that Defendant faced, and failing to ask for a court recommendation
for programming to address these challenges. 	This claim is entirely conclusory. 	Although the
court construes Defendant’s motion liberally, the court is not required to “fashion Defendant’s
arguments for him where his allegations are merely conclusory in nature and without supporting
factual averments.” United States v. Fisher, 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 1994). Defendant’s
conclusory allegations fail to identify exactly what challenges he faced during the proceedings that
were different from the issues raised by defense counsel at sentencing and whether defense counsel
was aware of these issues.
With respect to the failure to obtain an evaluation, the court notes that an evaluation is
necessary only when there is evidence of incompetency. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
449 (1992). Here, Defendant’s competence was not in question, so it was not unreasonable for
defense counsel not to request such an evaluation. Moreover, Defendant has not set forth any facts
to show that such an evaluation would have led to a reduced sentence. The court already varied
downward from the guidelines on Defendant’s sentence.
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With respect to programming, Defendant fails to identify what programming defense
counsel should have requested at sentencing. Notably, Defendant told the probation office that he
did not want mental health counseling or drug treatment. 	Moreover, as pointed out by the
government, the court has no control over the programming that is provided by the Bureau of
Prisons.
The court finds that the allegations in the petition fail to show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and fail to show that Defendant suffered any
prejudice as a result.
IV. 	Conclusion
Defendant’s motion to vacate sentence (Doc. 35) is DENIED.
An appeal from a final order on a § 2255 motion may not be taken absent a certificate of
appealability, which may issue only if a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The court concludes Defendant has failed to make
such a showing and accordingly a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 25th day of February, 2026.
__s/ John W. Broomes__________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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