Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
HOLLY MARIE WARD,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-1080-EFM
FRANK BISIGNANO, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff 	Holly 	Marie 	Ward 	seeks 	review 	of 	a 	final 	decision 	by 	Defendant, 	the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying her application for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq.
Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s testimony
concerning her pain and spinal issues. For the reasons stated below, the Court reverses and remands
the Commissioner’s judgment.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a 48-year-old woman who suffers from chronic pain in her low back and spine,
along with several associated symptoms.1 On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff protectively filed an
application for SSI under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning that
same day. Plaintiff’s application was denied twice, so she appealed those denials to an ALJ. The
ALJ ultimately issued an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled
1 Plaintiff also suffers from headaches, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiff’s
appeal does not challenge the ALJ’s evaluation of her testimony concerning these impairments. Accordingly, the Court
will not address these impairments further.
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within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ based her findings on evidence presented
at a telephone hearing and Plaintiff’s medical records.
At the telephone hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that she
suffers from chronic back pain which led her to undergo back surgery in July 2023, specifically a
L3-S1 	anterior 	lumbar 	interbody 	fusion 	with 	posterior 	lateral 	fusion 	for 	L4/L5, 	L5/S1
spondylolisthesis. After this back surgery, Plaintiff testified that her pain improved from
“crushing” and “unbearable,” but that she still experiences constant pain in her back in the form
of dull pressure and an electrical type of pain where the incisions from her surgery are. She also
testified that she experiences pain in her back, legs, and feet that radiates up her legs when she
walks. Due to this pain, and despite post-operative physical therapy, Plaintiff testified that she is
unable to sit, walk, or stand for prolonged periods of time and spends much of her time lying in
bed.
After reviewing the testimony from the telephone hearing and Plaintiff’s medical records,
the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff exhibits several severe impairments, including degenerative
disc disease in her spine, carpal tunnel syndrome, and bilateral lower extremity edema.
Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”):
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) in that she can lift
and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally, and 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk
2 hours out of an 8-hour day; and sit for 6 hours out of an 8- hour day. [Plaintiff]
may occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. She may occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. [Plaintiff]
can never operate foot controls. She can frequently finger and handle bilaterally.
[Plaintiff] must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and
hazards, 	such 	as 	dangerous 	machinery, 	and 	unprotected 	heights. 	She 	can
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, and make simple work-
related decisions. She can sustain concentration, persistence, and pace through
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simple tasks. She can tolerate occasional interaction with co-workers, and
supervisors, but should have no contact with the general public.
In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s assertions of disabling
symptoms and stated:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the
reasons explained in this decision.
Based on the RFC, the ALJ went on to find Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act and issued an unfavorable decision. Plaintiff now appeals the decision for judicial
review.
II. 	Legal Standard
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is guided by the Social Security Act, which
provides that the Commissioner’s findings as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.2 The Court must therefore determine whether the Commissioner’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standard.3 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; in short, it
2 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
3 Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
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is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion.”4 The Court may
“neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].”5
An individual is disabled under the Act only if she can “establish that she has a physical or
mental impairment which prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity and is
expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.”6 This
impairment “must be severe enough that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, and
further cannot engage in other substantial gainful work existing in the national economy,
considering her age, education, and work experience.”7 The Social Security Administration has
established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is
disabled.8 The steps are designed to be followed in order. If it is determined, at any step of the
evaluation process, that the claimant is or is not disabled, further evaluation under a subsequent
step is unnecessary.9
The first three steps of the sequential evaluation require the ALJ to assess: (1) whether the
claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged disability;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe, or combination of severe, impairments; and (3) whether the
4 Barkley v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3001753, at *1 (D. Kan. July 28, 2010) (citing Castellano v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994)).
5 Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)).
6 Brennan v. Astrue, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1306–07 (D. Kan. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)).
7 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–22 (2002);
20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2005)).
8 Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).
9 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2.
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severity of those impairments meets or equals a designated list of impairments.10 If the impairment
does not meet or equal one of these designated impairments, the ALJ must then determine the
claimant’s RFC, which is the claimant’s ability “to do physical and mental work activities on a
sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments.”11
After assessing the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ continues to step four and five. Step four
requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work.12 Step five
requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant can generally perform other work that exists
in the national economy.13 The claimant bears the burden in steps one through four to prove a
disability that prevents the performance of her past relevant work.14 The burden then shifts to the
Commissioner at step five to show that, despite her alleged impairments, the claimant can perform
other work in the national economy.15
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s appeal lies between steps three and four of the ALJ’s evaluation process.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s assertions of disabling
symptoms related to her spine impairments and concluding that they were “not entirely consistent”
with the record when determining her RFC. Because Plaintiff’s argument concerns the ALJ’s
10 Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084; see also Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2 (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d
748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988)).
11 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545.
12 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2 (citing Williams, 844 F.2d at 751).
13 Id.
14 Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084.
15 Id.
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evaluation of Plaintiff’s testimony, the Court must analyze whether the ALJ conducted a proper
credibility determination.16
Recognizing that “some claimants exaggerate symptoms for the purposes of obtaining
government benefits,”17 an ALJ’s credibility determination is generally treated as binding on
review.18 “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact” and will not
be overturned when supported by substantial evidence.19 The Court cannot displace the ALJ’s
choice between two fairly conflicting views even though the Court may have justifiably made a
different choice.20 Notwithstanding the deference generally given to an ALJ’s credibility
determination, “findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial
evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.”21
To that end, regulation requires an ALJ to “consider whether there are any inconsistencies
in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between [the claimant’s] statements
and the rest of the evidence.”22 SSR 16-3p in particular requires that an ALJ “explain which of an
16 See Randy Paul Stephen H. v. Dudek, 2025 WL 1094122, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 11, 2025) (reviewing an
ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s testimony alleging disabling symptoms under a credibility determination analysis);
see also Brownrigg v. Berryhill, 688 F. App’x 542, 545–46 (10th Cir. 2017).
17 Bolan v. Barnart, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1260 (D. Kan. 2002) (citing Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 517
(10th Cir. 1987)).
18 Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990).
19 Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Diaz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir.
1990)); Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)).
20 Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2007).
21 Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988); Kepler, 68
F.3d at 391).
22 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).
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individual’s symptoms [the ALJ] found consistent or inconsistent with the evidence in his or her
record and how [the ALJ’s] evaluation of the individual’s symptoms led to [the ALJ’s]
conclusions.” 23
Turning to the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s reported symptoms, Plaintiff notes the ALJ’s
finding that her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record
for the reasons explained in this decision.”24 But Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s promised
explanation is absent from the record. Instead, Plaintiff argues, the ALJ “relies on conclusory
statements and an even-handed summary of the record that did not identify inconsistencies
between [Plaintiff]’s statements and the record.”25
The Court has reviewed the record and concludes that the ALJ failed to explain which of
Plaintiff’s reported symptoms concerning her spinal issues were inconsistent with the record as
required by SSR 16-3p. After concluding that Plaintiff’s statements were not entirely consistent
with the record, and stating her intention to explain her reasoning, the ALJ merely summarized the
evidence related to Plaintiff’s chronic lower back pain and the reported results from her back
surgery. But citing evidence—however abundant it may be—does not substitute for the required
explanation of how the evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion.26 Thus, the ALJ’s evaluation of
23 SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (Oct. 25, 2017).
24 Doc. 7-3 at 25.
25 Doc. 8 at 10 (citing Attia D. S. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 4381228, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2024)).
26 Catherine A. v. Saul, 2020 WL 996798, at *6 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2020) (“Here, although there is abundant
evidence cited, the ALJ has not explained how the evidence supports the conclusion reached, leaving merely a
conclusion in the guise of findings.”).
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Plaintiff’s testimony as “not entirely consistent” with the record is an insufficient “conclusion in
the guise of findings.” 27
The Commissioner, for his part, argues the Court should defer to the ALJ’s evaluation
“since the ALJ’s reasoning can be traced and a reasonable mind could agree with it.”28 The
Commissioner then points out possible inconsistencies between the record and Plaintiff’s
testimony the ALJ could have relied upon, including Plaintiff’s medical records that note she
reported improvement in her pain after back surgery and wrist splint treatment. But even if the
ALJ’s reasoning “can be traced” in her decision, it is not the Court’s duty to trace the ALJ’s
reasoning for her. As one court within this District recently said, “[t]hat is not the responsibility of
the reader, either Plaintiff, the general public, or the Court. That is the ALJ’s duty.”29 The Court’s
duty is to determine whether the inconsistencies relied upon are supported by the record
evidence.30 Because the ALJ did not properly identify which inconsistencies between the record
and Plaintiff’s testimony she relied upon, there is nothing for the Court to determine other than
that remand is necessary for proper evaluation in accordance with SSR 16-3P.31
27 Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1144 (citation omitted).
28 Doc. 12 at 6.
29 Randy Paul Stephen H., 2025 WL 1094122, at *3.
30 Stephanie Jean S. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 204244, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 2022); Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084.
31 The Court does not intend to suggest here that the record demonstrates a greater RFC limitation than what
the ALJ assessed, or even a contrary result concerning Plaintiff’s SSI application. Rather, the Court merely holds that
the ALJ did not properly explain her evaluation of Plaintiff’s testimony.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s judgment is reversed and
remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with
this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
This case is closed.
Dated this 30th day of March, 2026.
ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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