Derrick Wayne Loveless

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LONDON DIVISION
IN RE
DERRICK WAYNE LOVELESS
DEBTOR
CASE NO. 25-61016
CHAPTER 13
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING OBJECTION TO PLAN CONFIRMATION
Debtor Derrick Wayne Loveless filed a chapter 13 plan. Creditor Andover Auto Sales, Inc.
d/b/a Broadway Auto Mall has a claim, secured by a vehicle, treated in the plan. Creditor objects to
plan confirmation based on the treatment of its claim and, more specifically, the proposed interest rate.
Creditor, Debtor, and Beverly M. Burden, Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”), stipulated to pertinent facts
[ECF No. 34], Creditor and Trustee briefed the interest rate issue, and no party sought an evidentiary
hearing. Oral argument is unnecessary. For the following reasons, Creditor’s objection is overruled.
BACKGROUND
On November 23, 2024, Debtor bought a 2013 Ford F150 (the “Vehicle”) from Creditor
pursuant to a Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement (the “Contract”). The purchase price
was $21,969.54, payable at 14.9% interest per annum, via 45 bi-weekly payments of $550 each and a
final payment of $270.47. Debtor granted Creditor a security interest in the Vehicle and the lien was
properly perfected on December 19, 2024.
On September 18, 2025, Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition and a 60-month chapter 13 plan.
[ECF No. 2 (the “Plan”)]. The Plan reflects that Creditor’s claim was incurred within 910 days of the
petition date and is secured by a purchase money security interest in a motor vehicle acquired for
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Debtor’s personal use. Creditor’s claim thus is not subject to valuation under § 506 in accordance with
the “the hanging paragraph” following § 1325(a)(9).1 In other words, Creditor has a “910 claim.”
The Plan provides Creditor will be paid the principal amount of its claim (as set forth in its
proof of claim) over the Plan’s term with interest at 9.25% in accordance with Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,
541 U.S. 465 (2004). Creditor objected to confirmation of the Plan on November 5, 2025, raising, inter
alia, the proposed interest rate. [ECF No. 17 (the “Objection”).] All other issues raised in the Objection
have been resolved as moot or are deemed withdrawn.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter. 28 U.S.C. §1334. This is a core
proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(A), (L), and (O). Venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. §1409.
ANALYSIS
I. 	A Debtor May Cram Down the Interest Rate on a 910 Claim in a Chapter 13 Plan.
The narrow issue presented is one which several courts already have resolved: can a debtor’s
chapter 13 plan alter the contract interest rate on a 910 claim? Aside from some cases issued shortly
after Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”)
in 2005,2 the seemingly unanimous answer is yes.3 But Creditor disagrees with this conclusion,
particularly as to the application of Till to a chapter 13 plan’s treatment of 910 claims.
A. 	The Bankruptcy Code.
Several Code provisions apply to the issue presented. To begin with, § 1322(b) states a chapter
13 debtor may submit a plan that modifies the rights of secured and unsecured creditors. Next, a
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.
2 Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80.
3 Shortly after BAPCPA’s enactment, some courts read the amendments to mean 910 claims were not secured claims and
should not be paid with interest in a chapter 13 plan. See, e.g., In re Carver, 338 B.R. 521, 525-27 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006);
In re Wampler, 345 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). The cases largely have been overruled or otherwise are disfavored.
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bankruptcy court will confirm a chapter 13 plan that satisfies the mandatory requirements in § 1325(a).
See Shaw v. Aurgroup Fin. Credit Union, 552 F.3d 447, 462 (6th Cir. 2009).
Section 1325(a)(5) addresses the treatment of secured claims provided for in a plan. It states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if—
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan—
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that—
(I) the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim until the
earlier of—
(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined under nonbankruptcy
law; or
(bb) discharge under section 1328; and
(II) if the case under this chapter is dismissed or converted without
completion of the plan, such lien shall also be retained by such holder to the
extent recognized by applicable nonbankruptcy law;
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of
such claim; and
(iii) if—
(I) property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form of
periodic payments, such payments shall be in equal monthly amounts; and
(II) the holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount of
such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to provide to the
holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of the plan; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder[.]
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (emphasis added). The underlined language is key in this case.
But, before addressing the language of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), the “hanging paragraph” at the end
of § 1325(a) (added via the BAPCPA amendments) must be considered. It states:
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that
paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is
the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day period preceding the
date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor
vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the
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debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was
incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). The unnumbered paragraph created 910 claims for motor vehicles, which are not
subject to the claim valuation process in § 506.
Returning to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), the issue presented is how, for a 910 claim, a debtor’s chapter
13 plan can meet the requirement that the value of property to be distributed under the plan be “not less
than the allowed amount of such claim” measured “as of the effective date of the plan.”
B. 	Creditor’s argument.
In Till, when evaluating how to treat a claim in accordance with § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), a Supreme
Court plurality decided courts should apply an interest rate calculated by taking the national prime rate
and adding a risk adjustment factor (generally 1 to 3%). Till, 541 U.S. at 479-80. Creditor argues the
Court should not follow Till and instead should require Debtor to pay Creditor’s 910 claim at the
Contract’s interest rate of 14.9%. Creditor contends Till, issued before BAPCPA’s enactment, only
addresses claims that can be crammed down to the value of a creditor’s collateral, whereas 910 claims
cannot be treated in this fashion owing to the hanging paragraph added to § 1325(a) in 2005.
Creditor acknowledges existing court opinions are not in line with its view but argues they “fail
to address the circumstance of fully secured creditors in the interplay of sections 1325(a) and 506
according to case law discussing the 2005 amendments affecting the 2004 Till decision, and should be
distinguished.” [Objection at 3 (emphasis in original).] Creditor references those cases in critical terms:
It is clear from a review of other reported cases involving post-2005 910 claims that
they have overlooked and not gotten into the real issue yet. Often trustees or creditors in
those reported cases failed to object to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan which, the
courts noted, waived the later argument challenging use of the Till interest rate.
Secondly, many courts are still robotically applying Till to 910 claims without
consideration of the 2005 statutory amendments to 910 claims (enacted the year after
Till was issued in 2004) and without discussion of [Nuvell Financial Services Corp. v.
Dean (In re Dean), 537 F.3d 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008)] and Shaw, and often without
a party having raised or made the argument. Thus, those other reported cases are of no
benefit to addressing the issue directly presented now.
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[Id. at 10-11; see also ECF No. 43 (the “Reply”) at 2 (stating “BAPCPA changed the law on 910
claims, and several courts since then have fumbled with the language of the amendments as to 910
claims.”).] Based on its reading of the Code and case law, and its view of Congressional intent,
Creditor declares a 910 claim simply cannot be crammed down. [See Objection at 10; Reply at 3.]
To support this view, Creditor’s Objection and Reply walk through several decisions at length.
Creditor’s depiction of these cases is intended to support its conclusion that courts that have written
published opinions on this issue have misapplied the Code and fail to comprehend how 910 claims
must be treated in a chapter 13 plan post-BAPCPA.
C. 	The BAPCPA Amendments allow a debtor to cram down the interest rate via
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and do not require a debtor’s chapter 13 plan to pay contract-
rate interest on a 910 claim.
Section 1325(a)(5) contains three mandatory treatment options for secured claims:
A debtor’s proposed plan must accommodate each allowed, secured creditor in one of
three ways under § 1325(a)(5): (1) by obtaining the creditor’s acceptance of the plan;
(2) by surrendering the property securing the claim; or (3) by permitting the creditor to
both retain the lien securing the claim and a promise of future property distributions
(such as deferred cash payments) whose total “value, as of the effective date of the plan,
. . . is not less than the allowed amount of such claim.” § 1325(a)(5); Till v. SCS Credit
Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 468 [ ] (2004).
Shaw, 552 F.3d at 450. As Debtor has not surrendered the Vehicle and Creditor has not accepted the
Plan, the issue here is whether the Plan proposes to pay Creditor value, as of the effective date of the
Plan, that is not less than the allowed amount of Creditor’s claim pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). To
pay appropriate “value” to Creditor via a stream of future payments, Debtor must pay its claim with
interest. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n. 8 (1993). Indeed, Creditor does not dispute that a plan
must pay a secured claim that is not a 910 claim with interest and can propose the formula rate in Till.
Rather, Creditor argues 910 claims must be treated differently. This is incorrect.
The hanging paragraph added in 2005 eliminated bifurcation under § 506 for 910 claims. In re
Long, 519 F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2008). Stated differently, it prevents a debtor from splitting a 910
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claim into a secured portion and an unsecured portion based on a vehicle’s value. DaimlerChrysler
Servs. North Am. LLC v. Taranto (In re Taranto), 365 B.R. 85, 89 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007). But the
BAPCPA amendments did not alter, let alone eliminate, the language used in § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
Taranto, 365 B.R. at 90 (“11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) remains unchanged by BAPCPA. This Panel
believes the Till rationale remains valid and binding.”); In re Soards, 344 B.R. 829, 831 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 2006) (“The language of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) was unchanged by BAPCPA[.]”).]
Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requires a chapter 13 plan to pay the “present value” of an allowed
secured claim. To pay “present value,” interest is required and, in Till, the Court adopted a formula
approach (prime rate plus a risk adjustment) to determine the appropriate rate. Id. at 479-80. A prior
opinion of this Court states the plurality opinion in Till constitutes binding precedent. In re Jones, 534
B.R. 149 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015).4
While a chapter 13 plan may not alter (or “cram down”) the secured value of a 910 claim, it
may—indeed, in most circumstances, it must—pay the 910 claim over time at the Till interest rate.5
This is true even if the Till rate is higher than the contract interest rate—which is precisely what
happened in Taranto.6 In Taranto, the debtors and a creditor executed a sales contract for a vehicle
within 910 days of the chapter 13 bankruptcy filing. The debtors proposed a 36-month plan that treated
the creditor’s secured claim by paying it in monthly installments over the plan’s term at the contract
interest rate of 0%. This proposed treatment accelerated the payment schedule on the claim, meaning it
4 While Jones did not involve a 910 claim, it explains: “this Court has followed the Till plurality opinion for the past eleven
years, whether in its Local Form Plan [ ], in its daily Chapter 13 practice, or in its written opinions. See, e.g., In re Kelley,
No. 11-51197, 2012 WL 5457331, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 8, 2012) (stating that a formula rate sixteen points lower
than the contract rate was ‘permissible’ under Till, citing Taranto). The formula rate is the appropriate method to determine
the cramdown rate in a chapter 13 proceeding. The Court joins those courts that have followed [Bank of Montreal v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. HomePatient, Inc.), 420 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2005)] in concluding
that the Till plurality opinion is binding.” Jones, 534 B.R. at 154.
5 An exception to the rule applies when a debtor chooses to perform under a prepetition contract and not amend any of its
payment terms. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chambers (In re Chambers), 838 Fed. Appx. 979 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2021).
6 See also Soards, 344 B.R. at 832 (“The Court finds that the Till analysis is still sound and applies to cases like those at bar
where the contact rate of interest is below prime.”).
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would be paid before the contract’s maturity date. The creditor objected, arguing the debtors’ plan
should apply the “prime-plus” interest rate under Till to its secured claim because the plan proposed to
alter the parties’ contract. The bankruptcy court agreed with the debtors that their proposed treatment
would put the creditor in a better position than it would have been under their contract and, thus, it
should receive the contract interest rate. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed this ruling.
The Panel held the debtors’ plan to accelerate their payments to the creditor, even while
proposing to pay the contract interest rate, constituted a cramdown. Taranto, 365 B.R. at 90 (“Any plan
that seeks to modify a secured creditor’s rights over its objection is a cram down that implicates
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). ‘Cram down’ is a term that refers to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan over the
objection of the holder of a claim.”). When a claim is subject to cramdown, § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
requires the claim be paid with interest at the Till rate, and the contract rate “need not be considered.”
Taranto, 365 B.R. at 90, n.8. The Panel added: “[t]his would be equally true in an instance where a
contract required, say, a twenty-five percent interest rate.” Id.
Here, Debtor’s Plan proposes to pay Creditor’s 910 claim in periodic payments in a way that
modifies Creditor’s contractual rights and over Creditor’s objection. Accordingly, Debtor seeks to
cram down Creditor’s claim. Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) allows this, and the hanging paragraph does not
preclude it. This conclusion is in line with decisions from opinions issued within the Sixth Circuit and
across the country concerning 910 claims.7 In fact, neither Creditor’s Objection nor its Reply cites to
7 See, e.g., In re Page, 658 B.R. 178 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2024); In re Adkins, Case No. 14-12611, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1675
(Bankr. W.D. La. May 14, 2015); In re Kemmery, 516 B.R. 485 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2014); In re Powell, Case No. 12-
12716, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1848 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 1, 2013); In re Kelley, Case No. 11-51197, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS
5252 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 8, 2012); In re Riley, 428 B.R. 757 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Velez, 431 B.R. 567
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); Marketview Motors, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), Adv. No. 09-8010, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 811
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2009); Drive Financial Services., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2008); Wachovia Dealer
Servs. v. Jones (In re Jones), 530 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2008); Ford Motor Credit Co., LLC v. Robertson, 396 B.R. 672
(S.D.W.V. 2008); In re Harrison, 394 B.R. 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008); In re Vandernick, No. 07-1068, 2008 Bankr.
LEXIS 863 (Bankr. N.D.W.V. March 31, 2008); In re Phillips, 362 B.R. 284 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); DaimlerChrysler Fin.
Servs. N. Am. LLC v. Griffin (In re Wilson) 374 B.R. 251 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007); In re Hopkins, 371 B.R. 324 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Morris, 370 B.R, 796 (E.D. Wis. 2007); CitiFinancial Auto v. Smith, Case No. 07-2190-JAR, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53206 (D. Kan. July 18, 2007); In re Phillips, 362 B.R. 284, 306 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 8, 2007); In re
Ross, 355 B.R. 53 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Murray, 352 B.R. 340, 354 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006); In re Vagi, 351
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even one case—from any court in the country—holding (a) the interest rate on a 910 claim cannot be
crammed down in a chapter 13 plan owing to the hanging paragraph added by the BAPCPA
amendments, or (b) a creditor with a 910 claim treated in a chapter 13 plan must be paid interest at the
contract rate, not a Till rate, to satisfy § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
Finally, Creditor contends a more recent Sixth Circuit decision stands for the proposition that a
“contract interest rate is appropriate for claims not subject to a cramdown.” [Objection at 9, citing
McDonald v. Chambers (In re Chambers), 838 Fed. Appx. 979 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2021).] While this
statement is correct, Creditor misinterprets its implications. The debtor in Chambers confirmed a
chapter 13 plan that stated she would repay a car loan directly to the lender at the contract rate of 15%.
The creditor did not object to the treatment of its claim, thereby implicating § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i). But the
chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation and appealed the confirmation order to the district court
and then to the Sixth Circuit, contending the debtor’s payments to the creditor at “the original interest
rate violates the ‘prime-plus’ formula for interest calculations adopted in Till[.]” Chambers at 981. The
Sixth Circuit disagreed, explaining Till “is inapplicable when a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan proposes to
pay a creditor in accordance with the terms of the original contract.” Id.
Creditor contends Chambers implies that a debtor must pay a 910 claim in accordance with the
parties’ prepetition contract, including the interest rate, as a 910 claim cannot be crammed down. This
is incorrect. The debtor in Chambers proposed a plan that did not alter the secured creditor’s claim,
even though § 1322(b)(2) would have allowed this. In this case, Debtor has not proposed similar
treatment of Creditor’s claim. A chapter 13 debtor may opt to perform in accordance with a prepetition
contract without seeking to cram down a secured claim under § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), but this does not
preclude a different chapter 13 debtor from using cramdown.
B.R. 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); In re Brill, 350 B.R. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Taylor, Case No. 06-30952,
2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4679 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 19, 2006); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re
Brooks, 344 B.R. 417 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006); In re Pryor, 341 B.R.
648 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006); In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 543 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006).
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When a chapter 13 debtor chooses to cram down a secured claim, they can do this by
modifying the interest rate. Chambers, 838 F. Appx. at 981. And “[i]n the case of a cram down, the
applicable interest rate is governed by the ‘prime-plus’ formula adopted in Till.” Id. at 982 (citing
Taranto, 365 B.R. at 90-91); see also Tucker v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. (In re Tucker), No. 25-
8010, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9141, at *9 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. March 30, 2026) (“Cram down can be
accomplished in several ways. . . . Relevant to the present appeal, a debtor can cram down a secured
creditor by modifying the interest rate.” (citations and footnote omitted)). Because a debtor may
propose a plan that alters the contractual interest rate on a 910 claim, Creditor’s objection lacks merit.
II. 	An Interest Rate Based on Till is Appropriate Here.
Creditor’s fallback argument (if “the 2005 BAPCPA amendments are ignored”) is that “[e]ven
Till’s non-majority plurality opinion countenanced circumstances where its prime-plus guidance
should not be utilized.” [Objection at 12.] Creditor avers the contract rate, not a Till rate, is appropriate
for the sub-prime auto loan at issue. It contends “the proposed Till adjustment is inadequate in
matching actual lending risks in the sub-prime market. In no way is the interest rate proposed by
Debtor in his Plan close to rates for a sub-prime loan in these circumstances and the risks to Creditor
involved with this debt, including the risks pending in this Chapter 13 repayment plan.” [Id.] Creditor
then speculates about Debtor’s likelihood of success in chapter 13 and notes the Plan will extend
Debtor’s payments on the Vehicle several years beyond the Contract’s term, thereby increasing
Creditor’s risk, particularly given the Vehicle’s expected depreciation over the Plan’s five-year term.
[Id. at 12-13; see also Reply at 9-11 (citing, inter alia, In re Hoskins, 590 B.R. 842 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
2018), for proposition that a court may approve a rate higher than 1-3% over the prime rate).]
In Till, the Supreme Court’s plurality gave creditors the burden to present evidence that a
higher interest rate is warranted under the circumstances:
Because bankrupt debtors typically pose a greater risk of nonpayment than solvent
commercial borrowers, the approach then requires a bankruptcy court to adjust the
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prime rate accordingly. The appropriate size of that risk adjustment depends, of course,
on such factors as the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the
duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan. The court must therefore hold a
hearing at which the debtor and any creditors may present evidence about the
appropriate risk adjustment. Some of this evidence will be included in the debtor’s
bankruptcy filings, however, so the debtor and creditors may not incur significant
additional expense. Moreover, starting from a concededly low estimate and adjusting
upward places the evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors, who are likely to have
readier access to any information absent from the debtor’s filing[.]
Till, 541 U.S. at 479. Thus, under Till, a court may find a higher interest rate to be appropriate when
evidence supports it. But Creditor neither provided any such evidence with its legal arguments nor
requested an evidentiary hearing on its Objection.
The parties stipulated to facts so that the Court could address this issue on the papers. The
stipulations do not concern factors bearing on an appropriate risk adjustment, or that suggest it would
be appropriate here to require an interest rate above the typical Till rate proposed in Debtor’s Plan.
Beyond the stipulations, Creditor did not submit expert or any other evidence concerning an
appropriate interest rate for this claim. Its anecdotal contentions regarding the risk here, and Debtor’s
ability to perform under his Plan, are either unsworn, underdeveloped, or concern typical aspects of
chapter 13 plans (e.g., extending the term of a loan beyond its original length).
Creditor has not satisfied its burden to establish the interest rate proposed in the Plan is
inadequate. Accordingly, Creditor’s alternative argument fails as well.
CONCLUSION
As the Eleventh Circuit stated, “the hanging paragraph has caused significant ‘confusion and
incoherence in the law’ and [it] has been rightly criticized for its poor drafting[.]” Graupner v. Nuvell
Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). With that
said, an overwhelming consensus exists that the Code allows a debtor to propose and confirm a chapter
13 plan that modifies the interest rate paid on a 910 claim from the contract rate. Creditor criticizes this
unanimity and derides several of the opinions that establish that accord, but Creditor offered not one
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single case espousing its interpretation of the Code. This is because Creditor’s argument goes against
the Code’s plain language and lacks merit.
Creditor’s Objection [ECF No. 17] is OVERRULED.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
The affixing of this Court's electronic seal below is proof this document has been signed by the Judge and
electronically entered by the Clerk in the official record of this case.
Signed By:
Douglas L Lutz
Bankruptcy Judge
Dated: Monday, April 20, 2026
(dll)
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