Asante-Chioke v. Dowdle et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MALIKAH ASANTE-CHIOKE 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 22-4587
NICHOLAS DOWDLE ET AL. 	SECTION: “J”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: the first, a Motion in Limine to Strike
Certain Expert Opinions, Testimony, and Documents (Rec. Doc. 197) filed by
Defendants Col. Lamar A. Davis and Nicholas Dowdle (“LSP Defendants”); the
second, a Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert Cole Young (Rec. Doc. 200) filed by
Defendants Officers Johnathan Downing, Gerard Duplessis, and Terry Durnin
(“EJLD Defendants”). Plaintiff filed oppositions to both motions. (Rec. Doc. 215; Rec.
Doc. 220). LSP Defendants filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 228). Having considered the
motions and memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that LSP
Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and that EJLD
Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as
an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's “specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact 	to 	understand 	the 	evidence 	or 	to 	determine 	a 	fact 	in 	issue”; 	(2)
the expert's testimony “is 	based 	on 	sufficient 	facts 	or 	data”; 	(3)
the expert's testimony “is the product of reliable principles and methods”; and (4) the
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 1 of 12

2
principles and methods employed by the expert have been reliably applied to the facts
of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical
framework for determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both 	scientific 	and 	nonscientific expert testimony are 	subject 	to
the Daubert framework, 	which 	requires 	trial 	courts 	to 	make 	a 	preliminary
assessment of “whether the expert testimony is both reliable and relevant.” Burleson
v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
When expert testimony is 	challenged 	under Daubert, 	the 	party 	offering
the expert's testimony bears the burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a
preponderance of the evidence. Moore v. Ashland Chem. Co., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th
Cir. 1998).
To be reliable, expert testimony must be based on “scientific knowledge,”
meaning it must be “ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science” and based
on “more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at
589-90. However, this rule does not require the testimony to be based on a scientific
study, but allows testimony based on “personal experience” if, in the trial court's
view, 	there 	is 	a 	sufficient 	level 	of 	“intellectual 	rigor” 	underlying
the testimony. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. Indeed, “reliance upon extensive
personal 	experience 	or specialized knowledge 	is 	an 	acceptable 	ground for the
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 2 of 12

3
admission of expert testimony.” Derouen v. Hercules Liftboat Co., LLC, No. CV 13-
4805, 2015 WL 13528499, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2015).
A number of nonexclusive factors may be relevant to the reliability analysis,
including: (1) whether the technique at issue has been tested; (2) whether the
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the potential error
rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation; and (5) whether the technique is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community. Burleson, 393 F.3d at 584. The reliability inquiry must remain
flexible, however, as “not every Daubert factor will be applicable in every situation;
and a court has discretion to consider other factors it deems relevant.” Guy v. Crown
Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Runnels v. Tex. Children's
Hosp. Select Plan, 167 F. App'x 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] trial judge has
considerable leeway in determining how to test an expert's reliability.”).
With respect to the relevancy prong, the proposed expert testimony must be
relevant “not simply in the way all testimony must be relevant [pursuant to Rule
402], but also in the sense that the expert's proposed opinion would assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320
F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2003). Ultimately, a court should not allow its “gatekeeper”
role to supersede the traditional adversary system, or the jury's place within that
system. Scordill v. Louisville Ladder Grp., LLC, No. 02-2565, 2003 WL 22427981 at
*3 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2003). As the Supreme Court noted, “vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 3 of 12

4
the 	traditional 	and 	appropriate 	means 	of 	attacking 	shaky 	but 	admissible
evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Generally, questions relating to the basis and
sources of an expert's opinion rather than its admissibility should be left for the jury's
consideration. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)).
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
EJLD Defendants request that this Court exclude Cole Young as an expert,
along with all of his testimony and opinions. (Rec. Doc. 200). Taking a more targeted
approach, LSP Defendants request that this Court exclude the following:
1. 	Cole Young’s testimony and opinion as to any visual depictions of
video;
2. 	Cole Young’s “Stabilized Video” created from Nicholas Dowdle’s
bodycam footage;
3. 	Graphics contained in Exhibit 10 from the deposition of Thomas
Martin created by Cole Young; and
4. 	The DOJ investigation document attached to the deposition of Mark
Candies as Exhibit 11 (Rec. Doc. 197).
I. 	Expert Testimony Admissibility
As an initial matter, this Court rejects EJLD Defendants’ argument that all
expert testimony is inadmissible at this stage of litigation. EJLD Defendants cite no
case which blanketly prohibits expert testimony in the qualified immunity context.
To the contrary, courts in this circuit routinely utilize expert testimony to determine
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity in excessive force cases. Ambler
v. Nissen, 116 F. 4th 351, 362 (5th Cir. 2024) (affirming denial of qualified immunity
because expert testimony helped raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether an officer used excessive force); Roque v. Harvel, 993 F. 3d 325, 333-34 (5th
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 4 of 12

5
Cir. 2021) (considering expert evidence in determining that there was a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether officer used excessive deadly force when
continuing to shoot individual). Accordingly, this Court will determine whether each
expert’s testimony is admissible on a case-by-case basis.
II. 	Cole Young’s Visual Depictions of Videos
Defendants 	seek 	to exclude 	any testimony 	or opinions 	from 	Mr. 	Young
concerning what the bodycam footage visually depicts. (Rec. Doc. 197-2, at 4; Rec.
Doc. 200-1, at 6). LSP Defendants contend that, in his expert report, Mr. Young
observes the footage and describes each position that Mr. Asante-Chioke is in from
the initial to the final discharge. (Rec. Doc. 197-2, at 6) (quoting (Rec. Doc. 197-3, at
20)). Specifically, LSP Defendants note that Mr. Young describes, down to the one-
hundredth of a second, when Mr. Asante-Chioke dropped the gun, fell, and turned his
back to Trooper Dowdle. Id. LSP Defendants also seek to exclude the portion of Table
1 of Mr. Young’s report where he describes Mr. Asante Chioke’s posture during the
shooting and Section 6.0 where Mr. Young presents his conclusions. Id. at 7 (citing
(Rec. Doc. 197-3, at 10)). Defendants argue that Mr. Young’s descriptions are
inadmissible because he is no better suited than the factfinder to interpret the video
and determine Mr. Chioke’s posture. Id. at 5; (Rec. Doc. 200-1, at 6).
Plaintiff argues that Mr. Young does not merely observe the video evidence,
but instead relies on his expertise to conduct a technical analysis of the video’s
audible and visual elements. (Rec. Doc. 215, at 4; Rec. Doc. 220, at 3). Plaintiff notes
that Mr. Young uses forensic technology to “assess the weapon discharge timeline,
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 5 of 12

6
measure the relative positions of Mr. Asante-Chioke and the officers involved, and
reconstruct the posture of Mr. Asante-Chioke immediately preceding and during the
weapon discharge.” Id. at 5 (quoting (Rec. Doc. 197-3, at 5)). Plaintiff also argues that
Mr. Young analyzes video details that are unascertainable by a layperson, such as
“recoil angles in the shadow of Shooting Defendant Dowdle’s firearm and the gas
discharge clouds following each shot.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that such an
analysis cannot be conducted by a layperson and will help the factfinder determine
whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 7.
A. Cole Young’s “Visual Observations”
Section 4.1 of Mr. Young’s report is entitled “Video Observations and Weapon
Discharge Timeline.” (Rec. Doc. 197-3, at 5). In the first two paragraphs of this
section, Mr. Young describes the events leading up to the shooting. Id. at 5. Mr.
Young’s descriptions of the events leading up to the shooting are irrelevant to the
issue 	of 	whether 	Officer 	Dowdle’s 	actions 	to 	continue 	firing 	were 	reasonable.
Accordingly, the Court will exclude these descriptions from Mr. Young’s report.
B. Cole Young’s Analysis and Conclusions
In the remainder of Section 4.1, Mr. Young explains his observations and
analysis of events during the shooting and illustrates his findings in Table 1 of his
report. Id. at 6-10. In Section 6.0, Mr. Young presents his conclusions. Id. at 20.
This Court will not exclude the remaining information in these sections. An
expert may testify if his “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 6 of 12

7
Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F. 3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993)). Here Mr. Young
used special forensic software to inspect frame timing and synchronize several videos
of the incident. (Rec. Doc. 197-3, at 5). Relying on this software and his expertise, Mr.
Young analyzed video details beyond the capability of a layperson, such as the recoil
angles in the shadow of Officer Dowdle’s firearm and the gas discharge clouds
following each shot. Id. at 8. He then used that information in conjunction with an
analysis of the positions of all three shooting officers and the position of Mr. Asante-
Chioke to opine on Mr. Asante-Chioke’s posture during the 4.2-second shooting to the
one-hundredth of a second. Id. at 10, 20. 	By analyzing these intricate details and
presenting his findings, Mr. Young provides insight into Mr. Asante-Chioke’s posture
during the shooting that may help the factfinder determine whether Officer Dowdle’s
actions were reasonable. Accordingly, this Court will not exclude the remaining
information contained in Section 4.1 or Section 6.0 of Mr. Young’s report.
III. 	Cole Young’s “Stabilized Video”
LSP Defendants also seek to exclude a “stabilized video from Trooper Dowdle’s
[bodycam] video from 2 seconds prior until 5 seconds after the first discharge,” along
with a PDF of the video’s frames (Rec. Doc. 197-2, at 8). LSP Defendants contend that
the stabilized video should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because
it zooms in on Mr. Asante-Chioke, removes Trooper Dowdle’s perspective and
movements, and offers nothing that the original video does not offer (Rec. Doc. 197-
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 7 of 12

8
2, at 10–11). EJLD Defendants also seek to exclude the stabilized video for similar
reasons. (Rec. Doc. 200-1, at 7).
Plaintiff argues that the stabilized video would not prejudice LSP Defendants
because it does not replace Officer Dowdle’s original bodycam footage, and the
factfinder can view the stabilized video alongside the original. (Rec. Doc. 215, at 11).
Plaintiff argues that the stabilized video and PDF images will help the factfinder
analyze the shooting evidence. Id.
Plaintiff’s argument has merit. Defendants offer no authority to support their
argument that the stabilized video is prejudicial or that it lacks probative value.
Further, many courts have allowed enhanced video to be compared alongside the
original. United States v. Harris, No. 20-cr-21, 2022 WL 1642498, at *7 (D. Colo. May
24, 2022) (holding that an enhanced video was not excludable under Rule 403 because
“the jury will be able to compare the original videos to the enhanced videos to
determine which are more reliable”); United States v. Seifert, 445 F. 3d 1043, 1045–
46 (8 th Cir. 2006) (admitting video that “brightened the image of the suspect and the
surrounding area”); see also Murphy v. Airway Air Charter, Inc., No. 23-cv-23654,
2025 WL 671342, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2025) (holding that a zoomed-in video did
not prejudice defendant’s case because “Plaintiff could have still relied on the original
videos to prove his case.”) The stabilized video will help the factfinder view Mr.
Asante-Chioke’s movements during the 4.2-second shooting. Mr. Asante-Chioke’s
movements are critical to determine whether the officers’ actions to continue shooting
were reasonable. Any prejudice caused by the stabilized video will not substantially
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 8 of 12

9
outweigh its probative value because the factfinder can compare the original to the
stabilized video. The factfinder can determine for themselves the weight, if any, they
choose to give to the stabilized video and PDF images. Thus, this Court will not
exclude the stabilized video or its PDF frames.
IV. 	Exhibits 10 and 11
LSP Defendants also seek to exclude two exhibits presented by Plaintiff during
separate depositions of LSP Defendants’ experts: the first, graphics allegedly created
by Mr. Young; the second, a document detailing an investigation of the Louisiana
State Police by the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division (“DOJ Report”).
(Rec. Doc. 197-2, at 13–14). LSP Defendants argue that both exhibits should be
stricken because they were not disclosed by Plaintiff prior to the deposition. Id.
Plaintiff argues that she did not have to disclose the exhibits because Rule
26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only requires disclosure of exhibits
used by the expert to support his or her opinions. (Rec. Doc. 215, at 12). Plaintiff
contends that the exhibits were only offered to help Plaintiff’s counsel confront LSP
Defendants’ experts’ opinions. Id. Thus, Plaintiff argues they were not required to
disclose the exhibits to opposing counsel prior to the depositions. Id.
Plaintiff’s argument has merit. LSP Defendants offer no rule or legal authority
which require an opposing party to produce exhibits that will not be used by an expert
to support his or her opinions. An expert need only produce “any exhibits that will be
used to summarize or support” “all the opinions the witness will express and the basis
and reasons for them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Neither exhibit was used by
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 9 of 12

10
Plaintiff’s experts to form their opinions. Therefore, the Court will not strike the
exhibits on those grounds.
LSP Defendants also argue that the DOJ Report should be stricken as
irrelevant because it does not specifically reference Mr. Asante Chioke’s shooting.
(Rec. Doc. 197-2, at 14).
Conversely, Plaintiff argues that the DOJ Report is relevant because, though
it does not expressly mention Mr. Asante Chioke’s shooting, the DOJ report “provides
factual findings about the Louisiana State Police’s use of excessive force” during the
time period of Mr. Asante Chioke’s shooting. (Rec. Doc. 215, at 15). Plaintiff argues
that the DOJ Report is relevant to assess Officer Dowdle’s use of deadly force during
the shooting and assess LSP Defendants’ expert Mark Candies’ credibility. Id. at 16.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. In the DOJ Report, the investigators explain
that they “reviewed every LSP shooting and hundreds of other randomly selected
force incidents from 2018 to 2023.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div’n, Findings
Report 	— 	Investigation 	of 	the 	Louisiana 	State 	Police 	at 	6 	(Jan. 	16, 	2025)
https://www.justice.gov/crt/media/1384626/dl (last visited October 22, 2025). A report
which reviewed every LSP shooting during the time period of Mr. Asante-Chioke’s
shooting to determine whether the Louisiana State Police used excessive force is
relevant to determine whether Officer Dowdle, a Louisiana State Police officer, used
excessive force when continuously shooting Mr. Asante Chioke. The DOJ Report does
not need to specifically mention the incident to be relevant to the underlying issue.
See Stewart v. Loftin, No. 3:21-CV-03789, 2025 WL 1121881, at *6 (W.D. La. Mar. 14,
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 10 of 12

11
2025) (finding this exact report to be relevant to determine whether plaintiff’s claim
that LSP officers used excessive force against him would survive a 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss even though the report did not specially mention plaintiff’s incident at issue).
Accordingly, this Court finds the DOJ Report to be relevant to the instant case.
Lastly, LSP Defendants argue that the DOJ Report should be excluded because
it was withdrawn. (Rec. Doc. 197-2, at 14). LSP Defendants argue that the DOJ
Report cannot be used because it relies on retracted U.S. DOJ positions. Id. at 15.
Even if it could be used, LSP Defendants argue that the retracted DOJ Report should
be excluded because the prejudice from the DOJ Report outweighs its probative value.
Id.
Plaintiff argues that the DOJ Report was not withdrawn. (Rec. Doc. 215, at
16). Plaintiff notes that the DOJ Report is still publicly available on the DOJ’s
website. Id. Plaintiff also contends that, even if the DOJ Report was withdrawn, it
would not alter the relevancy of the Report’s factual findings. Id. Plaintiff also argues
that LSP Defendants do not adequately explain why the DOJ Report is unfairly
prejudicial. Id.
Plaintiff’s 	argument 	has 	merit. 	While 	the 	DOJ 	did 	withdraw 	their
investigations and findings concerning the Louisiana State Police, they did not
withdraw the DOJ Report, which is still publicly available on the DOJ’s website. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div’n, Findings Report — Investigation of the Louisiana
State 	Police 	(Jan. 	16, 	2025), 	https://www.justice.gov/crt/media/1384626/dl 	(last
visited October 22, 2025). Even if the DOJ Report had been withdrawn, its factual
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 11 of 12

12
findings are still relevant to the excessive force issue of the instant case. LSP
Defendants offer no authority or detailed argument explaining why the DOJ Report
will be unfairly prejudicial. The factfinder can decide what weight, if any, they want
to give to the DOJ Report. Accordingly, this Court will not exclude the DOJ Report.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that LSP Defendants’ motion (Rec. Doc. 197) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows. Mr. Young will be allowed to
testify as an expert in this case, but he will not be able to opine on the events leading
up to the shooting. The remainder of Mr. Young’s report and testimony is admissible.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that EJLD Defendants’ motion (Rec. Doc. 200)
is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of October, 2025.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:22-cv-04587-CJB-EJD Document 240 Filed 10/22/25 Page 12 of 12