USA v. Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-221
AARON TEROD JOHNSON 	SECTION I
ORDER
Before the Court is the government’s motion1 in limine to preclude improper
evidence, testimony, or argument. Defendant Aaron Terod Johnson (“Johnson”) filed
a response2 in opposition. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART,
DEFERS IN PART, and DISMISSES IN PART the government’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The superseding indictment charges Johnson with three counts: sex trafficking
of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and 1591(b)(2) (Count 1); coercion
and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b) (Count 2); and interstate transportation of a minor for criminal sexual
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (Count 3).3 The minor victim with respect
to these crimes shall be referred hereinafter as “Minor Victim.”
The government’s motion in limine seeks to preclude introduction of eight
categories of evidence, testimony, or argument that it believes, based in part on
1 R. Doc. No. 73.
2 R. Doc. No. 79.
3 See generally R. Doc. No. 51.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 1 of 18

2
Johnson’s prior statements to law enforcement and in recorded jail calls,4 may arise
at trial. In particular, the government argues that Johnson should be precluded from
introducing any of the following:
1. 	Uncharged innocent acts and “good deeds;”
2. 	That [Johnson’s] conduct should not be criminalized or prosecuted
federally;
3. 	That the instant prosecution is racially motivated;
4. 	Prior statements [Johnson] made to witnesses or third parties;
5. 	Potential consequences of conviction;
6. 	Jury nullification in all forms;
7. 	Lack of knowledge, or mistake, of Minor Victim’s age regarding
Counts One and Three; and
8. 	Impeachment of Government witnesses at trial through the use of
reports authored by law enforcement agents.5
Johnson filed an opposition responding to each of the eight categories that the
government seeks to exclude.6 The Court will address the parties’ arguments with
respect to each of the eight categories in turn.
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
1. 	Uncharged innocent acts and “good deeds”
The first category of evidence the government seeks to exclude is evidence of
Johnson’s “uncharged innocent acts and good deeds.”7 Specifically, the government
4 See R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 6, 10, 12.
5 R. Doc. No. 73, at 1.
6 See generally R. Doc. No. 79.
7 R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 3.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 2 of 18

3
seeks to exclude any “information about [Johnson’s] educational degrees, career,
accolades from teaching, involvement in a church or community, or examples of
interactions with minors he did not pursue sexually.”8 Similarly, the government
seeks to limit any statements “aggregate[ing] or summariz[ing] multiple prior good
acts or an absence of bad acts.”9 According to the government, this evidence is both
“irrelevant and prejudicial,” and its admission is barred by Federal Rules of Evidence
404(a) and 405.
Johnson recognizes in his response that there are “general prohibitions to
introducing character evidence.”10 However, he maintains that should he take the
stand, “he should certainly be permitted to testify as to his background, education,
and upbringing, as many witnesses do.”11 Further, Johnson argues that evidence of
his truthful character is admissible if his “character for truthfulness is attacked,” and
that that evidence “may . . . include some of the information highlighted by the
Government.”12
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 generally prohibits the introduction of character
evidence with limited, enumerated exceptions. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 404 (a)(1)
(“Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”).
In a criminal case, for example, the defendant may introduce evidence of his
8 Id. at 5.
9 Id. at 4.
10 R. Doc. No. 79, at 2.
11 Id.
12 See id.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 3 of 18

4
“pertinent trait,” and “if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence
to rebut it.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A). “In the criminal context, a pertinent trait is
one that is relevant to the offense charged.” United States v. Baker, No. 24-99, 2025
WL 1866022, at *1 (E.D. La. July 7, 2025) (Vance, J.) (quoting United States v. John,
309 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002)).
“Rule 405 establishes the methods by which a defendant may prove character.”
Id. at *2. The rule limits the method by which pertinent character evidence may be
introduced “to testimony about the person’s reputation or by testimony in the form of
an opinion,” meaning “Rule 405(a) precludes such evidence from taking the form of
specific instances in which the defendant acted in conformity with that trait.” United
States v. Warren, No. 10-154, 2010 WL 4668345, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2010) (Africk,
J.); Fed. R. Evid. 405(a).
However, a defendant may introduce specific instances of conduct as evidence
of character in “cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 405(b); see also
United States v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 818 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 405(b) . . . limits the
use of specific prior acts to cases where character is at issue ‘in the strict sense’
because that method of proof ‘possess[es] the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to
confuse, to surprise, and to consume time.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. advisory comm.
notes). In addition, “[o]n cross-examination of [a] character witness, the court may
allow an inquiry into relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct.” Fed. R. Evid.
405(a).
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 4 of 18

5
Johnson’s character is not an “essential element” of the charges against him.
See §§ 1591(a), 2422(b), 2423(a). Accordingly, the Court agrees with the government
that Johnson may not introduce prior good acts as evidence of his character.
Additionally, the Court agrees that evidence of Johnson’s interactions with minors he
did not pursue sexually are irrelevant to whether he committed the charged offenses.
Cf. Marrero, 904 F.2d at 260 (“The fact that [the defendant] did not overcharge in
every instance in which she had an opportunity to do so is not relevant to whether
she, in fact, overcharged as alleged in the indictment.”).
However, the Court agrees with Johnson that he is allowed to testify to his
background, education, and upbringing, generally. The parameters of such testimony
will be decided at trial.
2. 	Evidence, comment, and argument suggesting that Johnson’s conduct
should not be criminalized
The second type of testimony that the government seeks to limit is testimony
suggesting that “(1) the Minor Victim was a willing participant, (2) Johnson treated
her well, and (3) Johnson actually cared about the Minor Victim.”13 The government
also seeks to limit testimony regarding the state age of consent.14 It argues that such
testimony is irrelevant15 and is likely to confuse the jury.16
13 R. Doc. No. 73-1, 6.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 6–7 (“In short, the evidence, comment, and argument this motion seeks
to preclude are not relevant in the trial of the charged crimes; they have zero
probative value in this case. . . . Additionally, and independently, even if the Court
finds this evidence and comment to be relevant, that evidence should be excluded
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 5 of 18

6
Johnson objects to this limitation to the extent that it “impedes on his ability
to challenge the Government’s case relative to individual elements of the charges
themselves.”17
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Rule 403 allows a court to “exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
The Louisiana state age of consent is irrelevant to the crimes with which
Johnson is charged; the pertinent age with respect to each statute is 18 years old, as
is explicitly contained in the text of each statute. See § 1591(a) (“. . . that the person
has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex
act . . .”); § 2422(b) (“. . . any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years . .
.”); § 2423(a) (“. . . transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years
. . .”). Johnson’s belief that a younger age of consent does or should apply is also
irrelevant. Cf. United States v. Kallestad, 51 F.3d 1044 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding the
defendant’s belief that seventeen year olds were “legal” only “hurt [the defendant,]
since it further support[ed] the existence of knowledge on his part for the age of his
seventeen-year-old subjects”).
because it creates the substantial risk that the jury will be unfairly prejudiced and
confused.”).
17 R. Doc. No. 79, at 3.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 6 of 18

7
Furthermore, 	introduction 	of 	this 	evidence 	has 	a 	substantial 	danger 	of
confusing the jury. As the Eighth Circuit reasoned in United States v. Lazzaro:
“Reference to whether [the defendant] complied or attempted to comply with [state]
law would only confuse the issues. He was charged with violating § 1591, and the
relevant age under that statute is 18, regardless of what state law permits.” 129 F.4th
514, 530 (8th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-150, 2025 WL 2824204 (U.S. Oct. 6,
2025). The government’s motion is therefore granted with respect to introduction of
the state age of consent.
Likewise, the Court struggles to understand how any evidence that Johnson
“cared about the Minor Victim” or “treated her well” would be relevant to Johnson’s
defense against any of the elements of the charged offenses unless specific testimony
is used to contradict the testimony of the Minor Victim. For this reason, the Court
grants the government’s motion in these respects, and such evidence or argument
may not be introduced at trial. The Court defers ruling on all remaining arguments,
evidence, or testimony that may fall within this category.
3. 	Argument or Inference that Johnson’s Prosecution is Racially
Motivated
For its third category, the government seeks to preclude Johnson from
introducing argument or inference that his prosecution is racially motivated.18 As a
threshold matter, the government argues that such argument is “improper for a jury
to decide” because it is a legal issue that, had Johnson wanted to raise it, should have
18 R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 8.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 7 of 18

8
been raised in a pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)(1).19 More importantly, the government emphasizes that Johnson’s
“prosecution is the result of an impartial, thorough investigation and the extended
presentation of competent evidence before a federal grand jury. The grand jury’s
decision to prosecute was based upon its impartial assessment of the evidence and
not upon race, prejudice, or other illegitimate motives.”20
Johnson’s counsel stated in response that she “has no intention of making that
argument at trial, unless new facts should arise through testimony of one of the
Government’s witnesses and would be relevant to the actions of law enforcement
personnel in this case.”21 For this reason, Johnson asks that the Court “rule as it
becomes relevant or an issue at trial.”22
Given Johnson’s representation that he will not make these arguments at trial
at this time, the Court dismisses this portion of the government’s motion in limine as
moot. See Daggs v. Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC, No. 19-00071, 2020 WL 13888143,
at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2020) (Ashe, J.) (dismissing the plaintiff’s motion in limine as
moot because the defendants represented that they did “not intend to introduce such
evidence”). As with all its rulings on motions in limine, the Court retains its power to
revisit issues or overrule itself should the evidence at trial evince the need to do so.
See LaShip, LLC v. Hayward Baker, Inc., 296 F.R.D. 475, 479 (E.D. La. 2013) (Brown,
19 See id.
20 See id. at 10.
21 R. Doc. No. 79, at 3.
22 Id.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 8 of 18

9
J.) (“The Fifth Circuit has instructed . . . that a district court has a duty to reconsider
its interlocutory decisions, including those related to motions in limine. The Fifth
Circuit has suggested that ‘the duty to reconsider a ruling is triggered when the court
receives positive proof that its prior ruling was erroneous.’” (quoting Guillory v.
Domtar Indus. Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1332 (5th Cir. 1996)).
4. 	Johnson’s Prior Statements to Witnesses or Third Parties
In its fourth argument, the government seeks to limit Johnson from admitting
or introducing statements he made to third parties.23 Specifically, the government
seeks to limit the “self-serving” statements that Johnson made to law enforcement
after he was arrested in August 2024 and in jail calls that “he was ‘baited’ into
commercial sex with Minor Victim, that he was ‘blackmailed,’ that he only paid Minor
Victim so that she would not report him, that he did not know that Minor Victim was
sixteen years old when he transported her,24 and that he thought he had Minor
Victim’s family’s ‘permission’ to have sex with Minor Victim.”25 The government
recognizes that Johnson “may testify to these purported beliefs at trial, but he may
not introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statements to improperly avoid cross
examination.”26
Johnson, in response, argues that “if the Government seeks to introduce calls
Mr. Johnson made discussing his case and making admissions, the jury should be
23 R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 12.
24 See infra subsection II.7.
25 See R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 12.
26 See id. at 12–13.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 9 of 18

10
permitted to hear additional calls Mr. Johnson made if they were determined to be
helpful to his defense.”27
“Federal Rule of Evidence 802 provides that ‘[h]earsay is not admissible unless’
a federal statute, rule of evidence, or other rule prescribed by the Supreme Court
‘provides otherwise.’” United States v. Akula, No. 21-98, 2023 WL 4235568, at *2 (E.D.
La. June 28, 2023) (Africk, J.). “While the Rules provide exceptions to the general
prohibition 	against 	hearsay, 	they 	do 	not 	provide 	exceptions 	for 	self-serving,
exculpatory statements made by a party which are being sought for admission by that
same party.” Id. (internal alterations and quotations omitted).
However, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that “Rule 106 ‘allows the admission
of such statements even when they are otherwise barred by the hearsay rules.’”
United States v. Carpenter, 140 F.4th 733, 740 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States
v. Portillo, 969 F.3d 144, 176 (5th Cir. 2020)). Rule 106 states that “[i]f a party
introduces all or part of a statement, an adverse party may require the introduction,
at that time, of any other part—or any other statement—that in fairness ought to be
considered at the same time. The adverse party may do so over a hearsay objection.”
Still, introduction of a writing or statement for completeness pursuant to Rule
106 is required “only when the omitted portion is necessary to qualify, explain, or
place into context the portion already introduced.” Carpenter, 140 F.4th at 740
(internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also Baker, 2025 WL 1866022, at
*2–3 (noting that the committee notes to Rule 106 state that the amended rule to
27 R. Doc. No. 79, at 4.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 10 of 18

11
allow 	hearsay 	statements 	for 	completeness 	“does 	not 	give 	a 	green 	light 	of
admissibility to all excised portions of statements. It does not change the basic rule,
which applies only to the narrow circumstances in which a party has created a
misimpression about the statement, and the adverse party proffers a statement that
in fact corrects the misimpression”). “[T]he Rule ‘does not permit a party to introduce
. . . additional material to affirmatively advance their own, alternative theory of the
case.’” Baker, 2025 WL 1866022, at *3 (internal alterations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Herman, 997 F.3d 251, 264 (5th Cir. 2021)).
To utilize Rule 106, Johnson “must point to the specific statements [he] wants
admitted so that the district court can assess their admissibility on fairness grounds.”
Id. (internal references omitted). Johnson has not pointed to specific statements that
he seeks to admit pursuant to Rule 106. In more recent filings, it has been indicated
that Johnson does not have any additional portions of his statements that he wishes
to introduce for completeness.28 Accordingly, the Court grants the government’s
motion, retaining its inherent power to revisit the issue should it arise at trial.
5. 	Potential Penalties
In its fifth argument, the government argues that Johnson “should . . . be
instructed not to inform the jury of, or discuss, the potential penalties which [he]
faces, or the hardships his conviction would place upon him or his family.”29 This
would include limiting Johnson’s ability to discuss the possibility that conviction
28 See R. Doc. No. 136, at 2.
29 R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 13.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 11 of 18

12
would result in life imprisonment, require him to register as a sex offender, and
prevent him from working as a high school teacher in the future.30 In response,
Johnson concedes that such arguments are improper and that no such arguments will
be made at trial.31
“‘It is well established that when a jury has no sentencing function, it should
be admonished to reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed’
and ‘[i]nformation regarding the consequences of a verdict is therefore irrelevant to
the jury’s task.’” Akula, 2023 WL 4235568, at *1 (quoting Shannon v. United States,
512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994)). “For this reason, courts exclude evidence regarding the
personal consequences of a guilty verdict.” Id.
Consequently, and given Johnson’s representation that he will not raise these
arguments at trial, the Court dismisses the government’s motion as moot. See Daggs,
2020 WL 13888143, at *1.
6. 	Jury Nullification
The government seeks to limit Johnson from introducing evidence or making
comment or argument that sound in jury nullification.32 Specifically, the government
contends that arguments that are “designed to encourage the jury to ignore their
duties, reject the law, and engage in jury nullification” should be blocked from trial,
30 See id.
31 See R. Doc. No. 79, at 4.
32 See R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 14–16.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 12 of 18

13
and may be more appropriately raised at sentencing, “outside the presence of the
jury.”33
In response, Johnson argues that this request is “overly broad,” and that the
Court should defer ruling on the motion until trial because “a blanket ban without
definition would certainly be confusing and prejudicial, unduly hampering Mr.
Johnson’s ability to prepare his case for trial, as well as make arguments for acquittal
based on evidence and elements presented (or not presented) at trial.”34 Johnson also
notes that a court “must not go too far” in limiting arguments that sound in jury
nullification.35 For example, “a court should not state or imply that (1) jurors could
be punished for jury nullification, or that (2) an acquittal resulting from jury
nullification is invalid.”36
The Fifth Circuit has “categorically reject[ed] the idea that, in a society
committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit
it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent.” United States v. Thompson,
253 F.3d 700, 2001 WL 498430, at *16 (5th Cir. 2001). “Jury nullification is not a
‘right’ belonging to the defendant,” id., and “[t]he defendant may not invite or
encourage the jury to disregard its duty to apply the law as instructed by the Court,”
McKoin, 2025 WL 1126550, at *2 (citing id.). See also United States v. Nicholson, No.
18-23, 2019 WL 339449, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 28, 2019) (“Although jury nullification
33 See id. at 15–16.
34 R. Doc. No. 79, at 5.
35 See id.
36 Id. (quoting United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2017)).
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 13 of 18

14
‘is an important part of the jury trial system,’ a criminal defendant has no right to
‘make an improper argument encouraging the jury to use its de facto power to refuse
to apply the law as instructed by the court. . . .’” (quoting Thompson, 2001 WL 498430,
at *16)).
Recognizing these standards, the Court defers ruling to trial, if and when this
issue arises.
7. 	Knowledge of Minor Victim’s Age
As for its seventh argument, the government seeks an order preventing
Johnson “from asserting at trial that he did not know the age of the victim as it relates
to Counts One and Three,” because such evidence is “unnecessary” to sustain a
conviction as to these counts.37
As it pertains to Count 1, the government argues that § 1591(c) provides that
“in [a] prosecution under Section 1591(a), where the defendant had ‘a reasonable
opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported,
provided, obtained or maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant
knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.’”38 Given § 1591(c), the
government 	argues, 	“while 	a 	factual 	issue 	surrounds 	the 	extent 	of 	Johnson’s
opportunity to observe the Minor Victim, whether he, in fact, knew her age or believed
her to be over 18 is not an element of the crime.”39
37 R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 16.
38 See id. at 17 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)).
39 Id.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 14 of 18

15
As for Count 3, the government notes that the statute holds culpable “[a]
person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18
years in interstate . . . commerce,” without regard to whether that person knew or
was mistaken with respect to the individual’s age.40 The government does not seek to
limit any evidence pertaining to Johnson’s knowledge of minor victim’s age with
respect to Count 2, recognizing that knowledge of age is an element of that offense.41
Defendant agrees with the government’s assessment of the elements of Counts
1 and 3 but emphasizes that Johnson’s “right to present a defense” with respect to
the government’s ability to establish the “extent of Johnson’s opportunity to observe
the Minor Victim” for purposes of § 1591(c) should not be inhibited.42
The Court agrees that the statutes at issue for Counts 1 and 3 do not require
Johnson to have knowledge of the minor’s age. See United States v. Copeland, 820
F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that Congress has imposed strict liability with
respect to a victim’s age with respect to § 2423(a)); United States v. Sims, 11 F.4th
315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The knowledge or mens rea requirement [of § 1591(a)] can
be met in one of three ways: (1) actual knowledge; (2) reckless disregard of the minor’s
age; or (3) a defendant’s reasonable opportunity to observe the minor. The third option
regarding observation of the victim has been characterized by this Court as a strict
liability option for the Government.”).
40 See id. at 18.
41 See id. (citing Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 2.93 (2024)).
42 See R. Doc. No. 79, at 6.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 15 of 18

16
The Court also agrees that Johnson must be able to establish the facts relevant
to establishing whether he “had a reasonable opportunity to observe” Minor Victim
for purposes of § 1591 (c). See Sims, 11 F.4th at 321; see also United States v. Herndon,
No. 21-54, 2025 WL 1410016, at *4 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2025) (“In the context of
[§ 1591], an opportunity to observe a minor victim is a ‘reasonable opportunity’ when
a reasonable person in that situation would perceive the risk that the victim is a
minor.”).
For these reasons, the Court grants the government’s motion narrowly, and
only with respect to evidence indicating that Johnson did not know Minor Victim’s
age with respect to Counts 1 and 3.43 The Court defers ruling on that portion of the
government’s motion in limine with respect to statements or evidence that may
contribute to establishing whether Johnson had a reasonable opportunity to observe
Minor Victim.
8. 	Impeaching Government Witnesses Through Interview Reports
The government’s last argument seeks to preclude Johnson from impeaching
government witnesses with interview reports created by law enforcement agents that
summarize interviews conducted with prospective witnesses.44 The government
reasons 	that 	“[b]ecause 	such 	interview 	reports 	do 	not 	constitute 	a 	witness’s
statements,”—specifically, because they are not “verbatim recordings of witness
43 Again, as the parties recognize, knowledge of age is an element of the offense
charged in Count 2. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 2.93
(2024). The Court will appropriately instruct the jury with respect to the essential
elements of each count.
44 See R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 19.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 16 of 18

17
statements” and “were not signed or adopted by any witnesses”—Johnson “should be
precluded from introducing the contents of the reports as a prior inconsistent
statement in an attempt to impeach the witness.”45 In addition, the government
requests that Johnson be barred from “publishing the contents of the interview
reports to the jury, or otherwise suggesting to the jury that the interview report is a
statement of the witness.”46 The government concedes that Johnson may ask the
witness “whether he or she made a statement that is reflected in an agent’s interview
report.”47
In response, Johnson signals his concern that “he will be limited on cross with
any ruling on this issue” and that “to set [cross examination] restrictions ahead of
time and out of context would have a chilling effect on Mr. Johnson’s trial preparation
and development of his theory of the case.”48 Furthermore, Johnson states that
Federal Rule of Evidence 607 allows him to attack the credibility of any witnesses.49
Considering 	the 	parties’ 	arguments, 	the 	Court 	adopts 	the 	holding 	and
reasoning articulated in United States v. Crinel, No. 15-61, 2016 WL 6441249, at *3–
4 	(E.D. 	La. 	Nov. 	1, 	2016) 	(Morgan, 	J.). 	The 	parties 	shall 	comply 	with 	the
jurisprudence set forth in Crinel.
The government asks the Court to order an evidentiary hearing prior to trial
to establish the requisite foundation for these reports, should Johnson wish to
45 Id.
46 Id. at 19–20.
47 See id. at 20.
48 R. Doc. No. 79, at 7.
49 See id.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 17 of 18

18
establish that they may be used to impeach government witnesses.50 In its discretion,
the Court declines to hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the matter. Should
Johnson seek to admit the interview reports, he must first establish the requisite
foundation to their admissibility pursuant to Rule 613.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the government’s motion51 in limine is GRANTED IN
PART, DEFERRED IN PART, and DISMISSED IN PART consistent with the
Court’s rulings above.
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 7, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
50 See R. Doc. No. 73-1, at 20 n. 5 (“[T]he Government here requests the Court order
that, in the event Johnson believes statements in a report meet this requirement, he
must request an evidentiary hearing prior to trial to obtain testimony from both the
law enforcement agent and the Government witness to establish a proper foundation
for the admission of the extrinsic evidence in connection with the cross-examination
of the witness who allegedly made the statement.”).
51 R. Doc. No. 73.
Case 2:24-cr-00221-LMA-KWR Document 138 Filed 11/07/25 Page 18 of 18