In re: In the Matter of Texas Petroleum Investment Company

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF TEXAS 	CIVIL ACTION
PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY
NO. 24-2344
SECTION: “D” (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion in Limine, filed by Texas Petroleum Investment
Company (“TPIC”).1 George Walcott and Evelyn Walcott (“Walcott Claimants”) have
filed 	an 	opposition 	to 	the 	Motion.2 After 	careful 	consideration 	of 	the 	parties’
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the Motion.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a previous Order and Reasons,3 the Court has set forth the factual
background in this matter. The Court, however, will briefly recite the factual
allegations as pertinent to the instant Motion.
This limitation action arises out of an early morning April 10, 2024 allision
involving TPIC’s Vessel LA 93954 on the inland waters of Plaquemines Parish,
Louisiana (the “allision”).5 On April 10, 2024, at approximately 5:20 a.m., the Vessel
departed TPIC’s South Pass 24 platform (“SP-24”) as a part of a crew change run to
Venice, 	Louisiana.6 	George 	Walcott, 	a 	catering 	hand 	employed 	by 	Taylors
1 R. Doc. 173.
2 R. Doc. 181. TPIC did not file a reply memorandum in support of the instant Motion.
3 R. Doc. 91.
4 Vessel La 9395 is also referred to as the M/V SYDNEY. The Court will refer to it as the “Vessel”
throughout this Order and Reasons.
5 R. Doc. 173-2 at p. 1.
6 R. Doc. 181.
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International Services, Inc., was a passenger on the Vessel at the time of the allision.7
The vessel was being operated by David Hayes, a production operator employed by
The Production Group, LLC.8 On the voyage to Venice, the Vessel struck a submerged
hazard, causing bodily injuries to George Walcott.9
Six 	days 	later, 	on 	April 	16, 	2024, 	Tommy 	Lejeune, 	a 	Production
Superintendent at TPIC, sent the following email (the “Email”) to TPIC field
personnel:
Due to the recent Boat Incident when making crew change the boat is
not to leave SP-24 until Day Light. On Foggy days the boat is not to
leave until Fog clears. If [f]og doesn't clear I will make crew change with
one of our boats that has a Licensed Captain.10
During his March 2, 2026 deposition, Tommy Lejeune testified as follows pertaining
to the allision and the Email establishing the new instructions (the “Daylight
Policy”11):
Well, at the time of the incident, they left the facility and it was dark,
and that’s when they came out that no more -- no longer are they going
to leave the facility at dark. They have to wait until daylight. And they
would no longer travel in the fog. They would have to wait until the fog
lifted, or I had a licensed boat captain go get them.12
Lejuene further testified that fog was not present when the allision occurred.13
7 R. Doc. 173-2 at p. 1.
8 R. Doc. 181 at p. 1.
9 Id. at pp. 1–2.
10 R. Doc. 173-3 at p. 1.
11 The Court refers to the Email as the “Daylight Policy” since both TPIC and the Walcott Claimants
reference it as such in their briefing. R. Docs. 173 and 181. The Court recognizes that Mr. Lejeune
testified that the Email “was just instructions” since he didn’t make policies. See R. Doc. 181-1 at p.
24. For purposes of this analysis, it is of no moment whether the Email is an official policy or a
company-wide instruction.
12 R. Doc. 181-1 at pp. 25.
13 Id. at p. 29.
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TPIC filed the instant Motion in Limine on March 30, 2026.14 TPIC asks the
Court to exclude any introduction or reference to the Email or the Daylight Policy at
trial.15 TPIC argues that the Email “is evidence of [a] subsequent remedial measure
and, pursuant to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence should be disallowed from
being made part of the record either by way of exhibits or testimonial evidence.”16 As
explained by TPIC:
Allowing the attached exhibit or testimony relating thereto to be
admitted at trial would contradict the purpose of Rule 407. TPIC clearly
performed these measures to implement corrective 	safety procedures
that would potentially prevent this type of incident from occurring
again. Specifically, the rule that crew transfer only take place during
daylight hours is in direct response to the incident involving the allision
of the M/V SIDNEY on April 10, 2024, and Mr. Walcott's 	resulting
injury and thus to prevent similar incidents occurring in the future.
. . . .
TPIC 	is 	relying 	on 	the 	protections 	provided 	under 	Rule 	407 	in
connection with the attached exhibit. 	Allowing claimants to introduce
this exhibit or elicit testimony 	from witnesses 	would allow for the
factfinder 	to 	infer negligence 	on 	the 	part 	of 	TPIC 	and 	would
essentially punish TPIC for taking additional post-incident steps in
furtherance of added safety.17
Moreover, TPIC contends that the Walcott Claimants “cannot present a sufficient
reason to submit the subsequent remedial measures as evidence that would fall under
the exceptions to Rule 407 . . . because ownership, control[,] and feasibility are not in
question.”18 Thus, according to TPIC, its Motion in Limine should be granted.19
14 R. Doc. 173-2.
15 Id.
16 Id. at p. 2.
17 Id. at pp. 2–3.
18 Id. at p. 3.
19 Id.
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The Walcott Claimants oppose the Motion, asserting that although Rule 407
prohibits the introduction of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or
culpable conduct, Rule 407 permits the admission of subsequent remedial measures
for other purposes, such as privity or knowledge of a dangerous condition.20 According
to the Walcott Claimants, they intend to “introduce evidence of TPIC’s ‘safe daylight’
policy change not to prove that nighttime crew changes were inherently negligent,
but rather to establish TPIC’s privity or knowledge of the dangerous conditions (i.e.
low visibility) that caused the April 10, 2024 allision—a showing essential to
defeating TPIC’s claim for limitation.”21
In support, the Walcott Claimants advance that knowledge is the main issue
in TPIC’s limitation action, as “a vessel owner may limit its liability to the value of
the vessel and pending freight, provided the owner can demonstrate that the loss or
injury occurred without its ‘privity or knowledge.’”22 The Walcott Claimants further
argue that, because knowledge includes actual and constructive knowledge, whether
Tommy Lejeune and corporate supervisors knew or should have known of the
dangerous conditions giving rise to the allision “is at the heart of the limitation
action’s validity.”23 Additionally, the Walcott Claimants contend that the Email
implementing the Daylight Policy evinces TPIC’s constructive knowledge of the
hazardous conditions (i.e., predawn darkness) that gave rise to the allision and the
20 R. Doc. 181 at pp. 3–4.
21 Id. at p. 4 (emphasis original).
22 Id. at p. 4 (quoting In re Omega Protein, Inc., 548 F.3d 361, 371 (5th Cir. 2008)).
23 Id. at p. 5.
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feasibility of implementing the Daylight Policy prior to the allision.24 As a final point,
the Walcott Claimants assert that admission of post-incident safety measures to
prove knowledge is consistent with both Fifth Circuit jurisprudence and Rule 407’s
policy considerations.25 Thus, according to the Walcott Claimants, the instant Motion
should be denied.26
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
According to the Fifth Circuit, the purpose of a motion in limine is to prohibit
opposing counsel “from mentioning the existence of, alluding to, or offering evidence
on matters so highly prejudicial to the moving party that a timely motion to strike or
an instruction by the court to the jury to disregard the offending matter cannot
overcome its prejudicial influence on the jurors’ minds.”27
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 governs the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures, in which Rule 407 provides:
When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or
harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove:
• 	negligence;
• 	culpable conduct;
• 	a defect in a product or its design; or
• 	a need for a warning or instruction.
But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as
impeachment or — if disputed — proving ownership, control, or the
feasibility of precautionary measures.28
24 Id. at pp. 5–6.
25 Id. at pp. 6–9.
26 Id. at p. 9.
27 O’Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1306 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977) (quotation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
28 Fed. R. Evid. 407.
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“The Advisory Committee Notes explain that the primary justification for [R]ule 407
is the ‘social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them
from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.’”29 Rule 407 “also seeks to ensure
that negligence is properly determined ‘according to what the defendant knew or
should have known prior to the accident, not what the defendant knew as a result of
the accident.’”30 	“Any evidence not excluded by Rule 407, of course, must still be
relevant and its probative value must, under Rule 403, outweigh any dangers
associated with its admission.”31
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, or if the
fact it seeks to prove is of consequence in determining the action.32 While all relevant
evidence is admissible, the Court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by danger of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”33
The Fifth Circuit has held that, “[t]he exclusion of evidence under Rule 403
should occur only sparingly.”34 	Additionally, “[r]elevant evidence is inherently
29 Adams v. Chevron USA, Inc., 383 Fed. Appx. 447, 452 (5th Cir. 2010)(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 407,
Advisory Committee Note (1972)).
30 Id. (quoting 2 Stephen A. Salzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence
Manual § 407.02[3], at 407–6 (9th ed.2006) (emphasis original)).
31 Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 1985).
32 Fed. R. Evid. 401.
33 Fed. R. Evid. 403.
34 United States v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1115–16 (5th Cir. 1993); See United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d
741, 749 (5th Cir. 1999) (same).
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prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice, substantially outweighing probative value,
which permits exclusion of relevant matter under Rule 403.”35 	District courts are
afforded wide discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence
under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402.36 A district court’s ruling on evidentiary issues is
reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of discretion.37 Thus, when the district
court conducts “a carefully detailed analysis of the evidentiary issues and the court’s
own ruling, appellate courts are chary about finding an abuse of discretion.”38
III. 	ANALYSIS
TPIC seeks to exclude the Email and the Daylight Policy pursuant to Rule
407’s prohibition on subsequent remedial measures.39 The Walcott Claimants, in
turn, argue that the Email and the Daylight Policy are admissible to prove TPIC’s
actual or constructive knowledge of dangerous operating conditions.40 The Court
agrees with the Walcott Claimants.
Evidence 	of 	subsequent 	remedial 	measures 	is 	admissible 	“as 	proof 	of
subsidiary issues in [a] case, such as knowledge of the dangerous condition or
feasibility of precautionary measures.”41 “[T]he key to designating an action as a
35 Pace, 10 F.3d at 1115–16 (quotation omitted).
36 Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384, 128 S.Ct. 1140, 1144–45, 170
L.Ed.2d 1 (2008).
37 Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Services, Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1995).
38 Id.
39 R. Doc. 173-2.
40 R. Doc. 181.
41 Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978). See Kirkland v. Marriott Intern., Inc.,
416 F.Supp.2d 480, 489 (E.D. La. 2006)(Vance, J.)(“Although Rule 407 prohibits the use of evidence of
a defendant's subsequent remedial measures as proof of its negligence, the rule provides that evidence
of such remedial measures may be admissible for certain purposes, including impeachment.
Impeachment in this sense may include proving defendants’ knowledge of the alleged dangerous
condition at the time of the accident.”)(internal citations omitted).
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remedial measure . . . is whether the action would have made an earlier injury or
harm less likely to occur.”42 Evidence is excluded under Rule 407 if three conditions
are met:
First, the evidence must be proof of a remedial measure. Next, had the
remedial measure been implemented in time, it would have made the
earlier injury or harm at issue in the case less likely to occur. Finally,
the evidence is offered to prove either negligence, culpable conduct, a
defect in a product or its design, or the need for a warning or other
instruction.43
“Any evidence not excluded by Rule 407, of course, must still be relevant and its
probative value must, under Rule 403, outweigh any dangers associated with its
admission.”44
Here, the Email is the proof of a remedial measure – the Daylight Policy.45
Second, the Daylight Policy arguably would have made the allision less likely to occur.
The Vessel allided with a submerged obstruction in the water during the predawn
hours.46 Thus, had the Daylight Policy been in effect prior to the allision, the operator
of the Vessel may have visualized the submerged obstruction in the water and
avoided impact with the submerged obstruction.47 The third element, however, is not
satisfied. The Walcott Claimants do not seek to introduce the Email and the Daylight
42 23 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 5283 (2d. ed. 2025)(citation modified).
43 Id.
44 Dixon, 754 F.2d at 584.
45 R. Doc. 173-3. The Court acknowledges that there is no evidence that fog was present when the
allision occurred. See R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 29. Tommy Lejuene nonetheless testified that the company-
wide Email setting forth the Daylight Policy, which addresses scenarios where fog is present, was
issued in response to the allision. See R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 29.
46 R. Doc. 173-2 at p. 1.
47 Insofar as the Daylight Policy pertains to fog, it would not have made the Allision less likely to occur,
as fog was not present when the allision occurred. See R. Doc. 181-1 at p. 29.
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Policy to prove negligence or demonstrate culpable conduct attributable to TPIC.48
Therefore, the Court finds that Rule 407 does not bar the admission of the Email and
the Daylight Policy.
Nor does Rule 403 prohibit admitting evidence of the Email and the Daylight
Policy at this bench trial. Insofar as TPIC argues that the Walcott Claimants seek to
impermissibly “influence the factfinder as to TPIC’s negligence[,]” the Court is
unpersuaded.49 There is no danger of prejudice in this bench trial. As explained by
the Fifth Circuit:
The exclusion of this evidence under Rule 403’s weighing of probative
value against prejudice was improper. This portion of Rule 403 has no
logical application to bench trials. 	Excluding relevant evidence in a
bench trial because it is cumulative or a waste of time is clearly a proper
exercise of the judge’s power, but excluding relevant evidence on the
basis of “unfair prejudice” is a useless procedure. Rule 403 assumes a
trial judge is able to discern and weigh the improper inferences that a
jury 	might 	draw 	from 	certain 	evidence, 	and 	then 	balance 	those
improprieties against probative value and necessity. Certainly, in a
bench trial, the same judge can also exclude those improper inferences
from his mind in reaching a decision.50
Indeed, as noted by the Walcott Claimants, the Court “is more than equipped to
selectively apply evidence about ‘safe daylight’ to the appropriate factual inquiry—
i.e. privity and knowledge as opposed to negligence so as to stay within the bounds of
FRE 407.”51 Further, the Court finds that TPIC’s knowledge, whether actual or
constructive, is a disputed, relevant issue for TPIC’s limitation claim.52
48 R. Doc. 181 at p. 9.
49 R. Doc. 173-2 at p. 3.
50 Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1981).
51 R. Doc. 181 at p. 9.
52 See In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2001)(“Under the [Limited Liability] Act, a party
is entitled to limitation only if it is without privity or knowledge of the cause of the loss.” (citation
modified)).
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Accordingly, the Court finds that neither Rule 407 nor Rule 403 bar the
admission of the Email and the Daylight Policy in this bench trial. To the extent that
a witness may seek to impute negligence and culpable conduct upon TPIC through
the Email and the Daylight Policy, the Court will appropriately disregard such
conclusions.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion in
Limine53 is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, April 30, 2026.
______________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
53 R. Doc. 173.
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