Gibson et al v. United States Postal Service et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JANTESHA GIBSON, ET AL. 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-124
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL. 	SECTION: D (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Federal Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, filed by the United
States Postal Service (“USPS”).1 Jantesha Gibson2 and Natisha Gibson (“Plaintiffs”)
oppose the Motion.3 USPS has filed a Reply.4 After careful consideration of the
parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the
Motion.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This suit arises out of an automobile accident.5 On November 29, 2022,
Jantesha Gibson, her two children, and her mother Natisha Gibson were sitting in a
parked car in Ponchatoula, Louisiana, when it was struck by a vehicle performing
mail delivery services related to USPS.6 Porsha Blackmore was operating the mail
delivery 	vehicle 	pursuant 	to 	a 	Highway 	Transportation 	Contract 	(the
1 R. Doc. 19.
2 Jantesha Gibson filed suit individually and on behalf of her children J.W. and J.G. R. Doc. 11 at p. 1.
For the sake of convenience only, the Court solely refers to Plaintiffs Jantesha Gibson and Natisha
Gibson in this Order and Reasons.
3 R. Doc. 27.
4 R. Doc. 32.
5 R. Doc. 11.
6 Id. at p. 3.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 16

2
“Transportation 	Contract”) 	between 	USPS, 	Porsha 	Blackmore, 	and 	Blackmore
Contract Delivery, LLC.7
The Transportation Contract was for a term beginning on April 1, 2020 and
ending on September 30, 2024 for USPS mail delivery services along a specified route
in Ponchatoula, Louisiana.8 Porsha Blackmore was required to supply her own
equipment and vehicle for mail delivery services, subject to vehicle requirements in
the form of size, age, and presentation imposed by USPS.9 Porsha Blackmore was
required to obtain automobile insurance for her vehicle, and the Transportation
Contract provided that she was solely liable for any damage or loss to her equipment
and vehicle, except for any acts of negligence or omissions that could be attributed to
the fault of USPS or a USPS employee.10 The Transportation Contract also provided
Porsha Blackmore with a daily schedule and required that she report to an on-site
USPS administrative official for any issues.11 Blackmore’s salary was based on the
7 Id. at p. 3. Blackmore Contract Delivery, LLC is a limited liability company with one sole member,
Porsha Blackmore. R. Doc. 31 at p. 2.
8 R. Doc. 19-8 at p. 7. The Transportation Contract in effect at the time of the November 29, 2022
accident was for a term beginning on April 1, 2020 and ending on September 30, 2024. Id. The
Transportation Contract was thereafter amended for a new term of October 1, 2024 through September
30, 2030. Id. at p. 3. When the Transportation Contract was amended, a new Statement of Work and
Specifications came into effect on October 1, 2024. Id. at p. 12. The parties have not entered into the
record a different version of the Statement of Work and Specifications, nor have the parties indicated
that the October 1, 2024 Statement of Work and Specifications is different from the Statement of Work
and Specifications that was in effect at the time of the November 29, 2022 accident. Alternatively, both
parties cite to the October 1, 2024 Statement of Work and Specifications for their arguments. See R.
Docs. 19 and 27. In light of this, the Court only considers what is entered into evidence – the October
1, 2024 Statement of Work and Specifications.
9 R. Doc. 19-8 at pp. 15–17.
10 Id. at p. 22.
11 Id. at pp. 12–15.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 2 of 16

3
distance and estimated time for deliveries along with additional compensation for
extra trips or increases in gas prices.12
On or about July 28, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel provided USPS with four
separate Standard Form 9513 documents to present their administrative claims
arising out of the November 29, 2022 accident in Ponchatoula, Louisiana.14 On April
25, 2024, USPS denied Plaintiffs’ administrative claims for losses arising out of the
November 29, 2022 accident.15 Such denial was based on USPS’ finding that no
negligent or wrongful conduct occurred on behalf of any USPS employee because
Porsha 	Blackmore 	was 	an 	independent 	contractor 	operating 	under 	the
Transportation Contract.16
Plaintiffs filed a request for reconsideration from USPS on July 29, 2024,
arguing that Porsha Blackmore’s vehicle did not expressly identify itself as an
independent contractor vehicle.17 Instead, according to Plaintiffs, Porsha Blackmore’s
vehicle bore the USPS insignia, creating a reasonable assumption that the vehicle
was being operated by a USPS employee.18 On November 12, 2024, USPS denied
12 See id. at p. 7–8. While R. Doc. 19-8 at p. 7 illustrates the new contract rate for the September 30,
2024 amendment to the Transportation Contract, it is clear that, at the time of the November 29, 2022
accident, USPS was paying Blackmore Contract Delivery, LLC based on the amount of miles driven
at a rate per mile. Id.
13 The purpose of a Standard Form 95 is to officially present an administrative claim for injury or loss
to the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2; Kirklin v.
U.S. Government, No. CIV. A. 00–3043., 2001 WL 1334991, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2001)(Fallon,
J.)(“The Federal Torts Claim Act . . . requires each individual seeking damages to present his or her
claim to the appropriate administrative agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).”).
14 R. Doc. 19-3.
15 R. Doc. 19-4.
16 Id. at p. 1.
17 R. Doc. 19-5.
18 Id.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 3 of 16

4
Plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration.19 According to USPS, it found no new evidence
warranting a reversal of its previous denial.20 Less than six months later,21 on
January 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit against Porsha Blackmore, Blackmore Contract
Delivery, LLC, and USPS in this Court.22 As relevant here, Plaintiffs assert claims
for negligence and negligent oversight and supervision of Porsha Blackmore against
USPS.23
USPS filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on June 6, 2025, alleging that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against USPS under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).24 USPS specifically alleges
that:
As an initial matter, the complaint names the United States Postal
Service as a defendant, instead of the United States, as suits under the
FTCA may proceed only against the latter. Additionally, and more
significantly, Plaintiffs’ claims are jurisdictionally barred by the FTCA
because co-defendants, Porsha Blackmore and her legal alter ego,
Blackmore 	Contract 	Delivery, 	LLC, 	the 	individual 	whose 	acts 	or
omissions 	allegedly 	gave 	rise 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims, 	comprise 	an
independent 	contractor 	of 	the 	Postal 	Service. 	Since 	the 	allegedly
negligent individual is not a federal employee as defined by the FTCA,
suit against the United States is barred under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Thus, even if Plaintiffs substitute the
19 R. Doc. 19-6.
20 Id.
21 In the letter denying Plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration, mailed on November 12, 2024, USPS
stated that “[i]n accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) and 39 C.F.R. 912.9(a), if dissatisfied with the
Postal Service's final denial of an administrative claim, a claimant may file suit in a United States
District Court no later than six (6) months after the date the Postal Service mails the notice of that
final action.” R. Doc. 19-6 at p. 1. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have timely filed suit solely against
USPS under § 2401(b). The Court, however, makes no determination in this Order and Reasons as to
whether Plaintiffs timely filed suit against Defendants Blackmore Contract Delivery, LLC and Porsha
Blackmore.
22 Plaintiffs initially filed suit on January 17, 2025. R. Doc. 1. The operating Complaint, however, was
filed on February 11, 2025. R. Doc. 11.
23 R. Doc. 11 at pp. 3–4.
24 R. Doc. 19-1 at p. 2.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 4 of 16

5
United States in place of the USPS, i.e., the Federal Defendant, the
lawsuit will still have to be dismissed against Federal Defendant.25
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion.26 Initially, Plaintiffs concede that “under the
FTCA, the United States is the proper party defendant, not the agency itself. This
naming issue is easily cured by substituting the United States as defendant, and
Plaintiffs stand ready to amend the complaint accordingly.”27 Plaintiffs, however,
contend that “USPS retained and exercised substantial control over Blackmore’s day-
to-day mail delivery operations that included her schedule, duties, equipment, and
compliance with USPS policies such that she was ‘acting on behalf of a federal agency
in an official capacity’ and functioned as an agent of USPS. Because Blackmore was
essentially a Postal Service employee for FTCA purposes, Plaintiffs’ claims fall
squarely within the FTCA's waiver of immunity.”28 As a final point, Plaintiffs claim
that “[e]ven if the Court finds any pleading deficiency in naming the proper party or
in alleging the employment relationship, the proper remedy is to permit amendment
or jurisdictional discovery and not dismissal.”29
USPS has filed a Reply.30 In its memorandum, USPS contends that:
Plaintiffs’ 	Memorandum 	in 	Opposition 	. 	. 	. 	focuses 	on 	the
performance requirements 	detailed 	in 	the 	Transportation 	Contract
the 	Postal 	Service 	had 	with 	Porsha Blackmore, 	the 	alleged
tortfeasor/driver, and conflates same with actual supervision of this
contractor’s activities in carrying out the object of the contract—rural
mail delivery. 	These requirements have been reviewed by numerous
other courts, all of whom concluded that their presence and specificity
did not convert the contract carrier into a Postal Service employee.
25 Id. (internal quotation marks removed).
26 R. Doc. 27.
27 Id. at p. 2.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 R. Doc. 32.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 5 of 16

6
Plaintiffs’ suggestion of Jurisdictional discovery is deficiently made
and, 	in 	any 	event, unwarranted as both the contract details and
the attached declaration from the Ponchatoula Postmaster, establish
Porsha Blackmore’s status as an independent contractor beyond cavil.31
Therefore, according to USPS, the instant Motion should be granted.32
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“‘It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suits
save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court
define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’”33 The Federal Tort Claims Act
“constitutes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity[,]”34 and “courts must strictly
construe all waivers of the federal government's sovereign immunity, and must
resolve all ambiguities in favor of the sovereign.”35 According to the Supreme Court,
however, “this principle is unhelpful in the FTCA context, where unduly generous
interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of the
statute.”36 Thus, when analyzing an exception to waivers of sovereign immunity, the
court should “identify those circumstances which are within the words and reason of
the exception—no less and no more.”37
Indeed, “[u]nder the FTCA, Congress has waived sovereign immunity and has
granted consent for the government to be sued for acts committed by any ‘employee
31 Id. at p. 1 (internal quotation marks removed).
32 Id.
33 Linkous v. U.S., 142 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1998)(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,
538 (1980)).
34 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976)).
35 Linkous, 142 F.3d at 275 (citation modified).
36 Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 491–92 (2006)(citation modified).
37 Id. at 492. (citation modified).
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 6 of 16

7
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.’”38
However, 	the 	FTCA 	“does 	not 	extend 	to 	acts 	of 	independent 	contractors.”39
Accordingly, “if the act was not committed by an employee of the Government, then
the court must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1).”40
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the
court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”41 The Court,
when faced with a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), “has the power to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint
alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;
or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of
disputed facts.”42 “A factual attack on the subject matter jurisdiction of the court . . .
challenges the facts on which jurisdiction depends and matters outside of the
pleadings, such as affidavits and testimony, are considered.”43 “If the defendant
makes 	a 	factual 	attack 	on 	the 	Court's 	jurisdiction 	by 	‘submitting 	affidavits,
38 Linkous, 142 F.3d at 275 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). In pertinent part, an “Employee of the
Government” is defined as “officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or
naval forces of the United States, . . . and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without
compensation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
39 Linkous, 142 F.3d at 275.
40 Id. (citation modified).
41 Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)(citation
modified).
42 Campos v. United States, 888 F.3d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 2018).
43 Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981). “A motion to dismiss for want of
subject matter jurisdiction can take the form of a facial attack on the complaint, requiring the court
merely to assess whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient basis of subject matter jurisdiction,
taking all allegations in the complaint as true. A factual attack on the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court, however, challenges the facts on which jurisdiction depends and matters outside of the
pleadings, such as affidavits and testimony, are considered.” Id. (citation modified).
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 7 of 16

8
testimony, or other evidentiary materials,’ then the plaintiff is also required to submit
facts 	through 	some 	evidentiary 	method 	and 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	by 	a
preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	does 	have 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction.’”44 “Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's
jurisdiction—its very power to hear the case—there is substantial authority that the
trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its
power to hear the case.”45
III. 	ANALYSIS
USPS alleges that Porsha Blackmore is an independent contractor, as opposed
to a federal postal service employee, thus immunizing the government from Plaintiffs’
claims under the FTCA.46 Plaintiffs, in turn, contend that Porsha Blackmore is a
federal postal service employee pursuant to the terms of the Transportation Contract,
thereby falling under the government’s waiver of immunity in the FTCA.47 For the
reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Porsha Blackmore is an independent
contractor under the Transportation Contract, requiring dismissal of Plaintiffs’
claims against USPS.48
According to the Fifth Circuit, “‘[t]he critical factor in determining whether an
individual is an employee of the government or an independent contractor is the
power of the federal government to control the detailed physical performance of the
44 Owens v. United States, CIVIL ACTION No. 19-485, 2019 WL 1587159, at *1 (E.D. La. April 12,
2019)(Africk, J.)(quoting Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. May 1981)(citation
modified)).
45 Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2023).
46 R. Doc. 19-1 at p. 2.
47 R. Doc. 27 at p. 2.
48 Leave to amend is likewise denied. See discussion infra Part. IV.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 8 of 16

9
individual.’”49 The Supreme Court has determined that the key inquiry “‘is not
whether the . . . agency receives federal money and must comply with federal
standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations are supervised by
the Federal Government.’”50
But the Court’s analysis does not end there. As further explained by the Fifth
Circuit, “[i]f the government lacks the power to directly control an individual, then
the court must look at other factors before deciding the individual's status as
employee or independent contractor.”51 The Fifth Circuit considers the following
additional factors set forth by Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation
or business;
(c) 	the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether 	the 	employer 	or 	the 	workman 	supplies 	the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work;
(f) 	the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) 	whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) 	whether the principal is or is not in business.52
49 Creel v. U.S., 598 F.3d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 2010)(quoting Linkous, 142 F.3d at 275).
50 Cavazos By and Through Cavazos v. U.S., 776 F.2d 1263, 1264 (5th Cir. 1985)(quoting United States
v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815 (1976)).
51 Linkous, 142 F.3d at 276 (citing Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir.1997)).
52 Creel, 598 F.3d at 213 (quoting R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF A GENCY § 220 (1958)).
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 9 of 16

10
“Although such a determination does not require mathematical precision, if the
government lacks the power to control an individual, plus several factors listed
in § 220 weigh in favor of independent contractor status, then a court must conclude
that the individual is an independent contractor.”53
Here, in determining the extent of control which USPS exercised over the
details of the work, the Court finds that the government lacks the power to directly
control Porsha Blackmore on her detailed daily operations. The evidence in the
record, specifically the Transportation Contract,54 the Declaration of the Manager of
the Transportation Contracts for the United States Postal Service Contract Delivery
Services Office,55 and the Declaration of the Postmaster of Ponchatoula,56 each
evinces a lack of day-to-day control by USPS over its contract delivery drivers.
Plaintiff simply relies on the same Transportation Contract to argue that Blackmore
was an employee of USPS.57 True, USPS ensured Porsha Blackmore’s compliance
with the terms and conditions of the Transportation Contract.58 Such terms and
conditions are specifically found in the Statement of Work and Specification, which
addresses route information, times, schedules, inspections, frequencies, and loading
times.59
Even so, such terms and conditions left Blackmore Contract Delivery, LLC and
Porsha Blackmore with substantial daily autonomy. Blackmore Contract Delivery,
53 Linkous, 142 F.3d at 276.
54 R. Doc. 19-8.
55 R. Doc. 19-7.
56 R. Doc. 32-1.
57 See R. Doc. 27.
58 R. Doc. 19-8 at pp. 12–25.
59 Id.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 10 of 16

11
LLC was responsible for the hiring, training, and pay of its employees.60 Moreover,
Blackmore Contract Delivery, LLC provided Porsha Blackmore with the equipment
and vehicles to perform the work.61 Porsha Blackmore was then required to obtain
her 	own 	automobile 	insurance, 	and 	she 	was 	also 	solely 	responsible 	for 	any
maintenance of the vehicle or loss or damages to her equipment or vehicles, except
for those caused by USPS or its employees.62 Thus, while USPS required compliance
with matters such as timeliness, inspections, and vehicle size, Porsha Blackmore
retained broad autonomy over her daily operations. Further, Blackmore was solely
responsible for paying employees she hired in the performance of the Transportation
Contract.63 There was no withholding of taxes or social security from payments made
to Blackmore, nor did USPS provide retirement or any other federal government
benefits for Blackmore or her employees.64 The Court therefore finds that USPS did
not control Porsha Blackmore’s detailed daily operations.
Notably, the authority to monitor compliance “does not itself create liability for
the United States.”65 “[A] contractual reservation ‘to the United States [of] the right
to inspect the work and facilities of the independent contractor . . . and the right to
stop the work, does not in itself override or alter the general rule of nonliability for
the torts of the contractor.’”66 	And “[c]ontractual provisions directing detailed
60 R. Doc. 19-7 at pp. 5–6.
61 R. Doc. 19-8 at pp. 15–16.
62 R. Doc. 19-8 at pp. 22, 24–25.
63 R. Doc. 19-7 at p. 5.
64 Id.
65 Battaglia v. U.S., 495 Fed. Appx. 440, 442 (5th Cir. 2012)(citing Alexander v. United States, 605 F.2d
828, 833 (5th Cir.1979)).
66 Id. (quoting Alexander, 605 F.2d at 834).
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 11 of 16

12
performance generally do not abrogate the contractor exception. The United States
may ‘fix specific and precise conditions to implement federal objectives’ without
becoming liable for an independent contractor's negligence.”67 Thus the Court finds
that the limited degree of control exercised by USPS weighs in favor of independent
contractor status. For the same reasons, in its analysis of factor (a), the extent of
control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work,
the Court finds that this falls squarely in favor of independent contractor status.
As to factor (b), whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business, Porsha Blackmore formed a distinct business entity in
Blackmore Contract Delivery, LLC.68 Such company was responsible for hiring its
own employees, and Porsha Blackmore was not entitled to any federal government
employee benefits such as workers’ compensation, retirement, or thrift savings plan
benefits.69
Factor 	(e), 	whether 	the 	employer 	or 	the 	workman 	supplies 	the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work, likewise
supports finding independent contractor status. Under the Transportation Contract,
Porsha Blackmore provided her own equipment and vehicle for carrying out mail
67 Autery v. U.S., 424 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Orleans, 425 U.S. at 816). See also James
v. Ailes, NO. 4:20-CV-124-DMB-JMV, 2021 WL 3877681, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2021); Jimenez v.
United States, SA-20-CV-00575-XR, 2021 WL 860008, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2021); Estate of
Anderson-Coughlin v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-01492 (JAM), 2017 WL 6624020, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec.
28, 2017) (“By imposing these requirements, the Postal Service was acting as a general overseer of the
delivery of mail under the contract, but the job of supervising drivers’ conformity with the
requirements under the contract was delegated to Beam.”).
68 R. Doc. 11.
69 R. Doc. 19-7 at p. 5.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 12 of 16

13
delivery services under the contract.70 As noted, she was required to obtain her own
vehicle, vehicle insurance and was also liable for any loss or damages to her vehicle
or equipment, except for those that were caused by USPS or one of its employees.71
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the mail to be delivered was a tool, the Court
disagrees.72
Factor (g), the method of payment, as conceded by Plaintiff, also favors
independent contractor status as Blackmore was paid under a contract rate.73 Lastly,
pertaining to factor (i), whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant, the terms and conditions of the Transportation
Contract 	suggest 	that 	the 	parties 	did 	not 	intend 	to 	create 	a 	traditional
employee/employer relationship. Porsha Blackmore was required to complete a Form
1099,74 did not receive any federal employee benefits, and was defined as a “Supplier”
throughout the Transportation Contract.75 Further, and perhaps most importantly,
the Transportation Contract provided that “[e]mployees of the U.S. Postal Service”
are “[p]ersons ineligible to become suppliers[.]”76 Thus, it cannot be reasonably
argued 	that 	the 	contracting 	parties 	believed 	they 	were 	creating 	a 	traditional
employee/employer relationship whereby Porsha Blackmore would become a USPS
70 R. Doc. 19-8 at pp. 15–17.
71 Id. at p. 22.
72 R. Doc. 27 at pp. 16–17.
73 Id. at p. 17.
74 1099 employees are “workers who receive a Form 1099 at the end of the tax year indicating that
they are independent contractors. This is in contrast to the W-2 form that traditional employees
receive.” M.D. Claims Group, LLC v. Anchor Specialty Insurance Company, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 17-
00369-BAJ-RLB, 2018 WL 6739066, at *4 n.2 (M.D. La. Dec. 24, 2018).
75 R. Doc. 19-7 at pp. 4–6.
76 R. Doc. 19-8 at p. 34.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 13 of 16

14
employee. Plaintiff concedes that this factor, too, falls in favor of independent
contractor status.77
As a final point, numerous district courts have found that delivery drivers
operating under similar transportation contracts are not employees of the Postal
Service.78 At least one previous Section of this Court has found that a mail delivery
driver acting on behalf of USPS pursuant to a transportation contract is not a federal
employee but instead an independent contractor.79 A similar result was also reached
in the Middle District of Louisiana in a case where, coincidentally, the driver of the
vehicle involved in the accident was Rekeya Blackmore and the vehicle was allegedly
owned by Porsha Blackmore.80 In that case, the government advised that the driver
was also performing contract mail delivery services.81
In sum, the Court finds that USPS did not control the detailed daily operations
of Blackmore Deliveries, LLC and Porsha Blackmore under the Transportation
Contract. The Court has further analyzed the Fifth Circuit’s factors and determines
that factors (a), (b), (e), (g), and (i) support finding independent contractor status.
Again, the Fifth Circuit has held that “if the government lacks the power to control
77 R. Doc. 27 at p. 18.
78 Jimenez, 2021 WL 860008, at *6 (gathering authority).
79 Duncan v. United States, 562 F.Supp. 96, 100 (E.D. La. 1983)(Heebe, J.)(“Those provisions of the
contract, which described in detail the service requirements placed by the government on the carrier,
did not amount to a control of the manner and method in which the actual delivery of the mail was
made, or of his conduct along the route. Instead, they merely indicated the right of the government by
these provisions to insure that the mail would be properly transported and delivered in accordance
with the intent of the contract.”).
80 Arbuthnot v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1667-JWD-RLB, 2018 WL 6528461, at *1
(M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2018)(deGravelles, J.).
81 Id. at *2 (granting the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
noting that “[t]he Government has stridently argued that Blackmore and Cage, her employer, were
independent contractors and that it did not have an employment relationship with either[]”).
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 14 of 16

15
an individual, plus several factors listed in § 220 weigh in favor of independent
contractor status, then a court must conclude that the individual is an independent
contractor.”82 The Court has determined that the government lacked the day-to-day
control of Blackmore. It has further found that an analysis of the additional factors
weigh in favor of independent contractor status. The Court declines to undercut
precedent. Dismissal is required.83
IV. 	LEAVE TO AMEND
The 	Court 	freely 	grants 	leave 	to 	amend 	when 	justice 	requires, 	unless
amendment would be futile.84 Plaintiff 	contends, correctly, that “a court generally
should not dismiss an FTCA claim for misnaming the agency without permitting
substitution of the United States[.]”85 While that is accurate, considering Plaintiffs’
concession that the United States government, not USPS, is the proper federal
defendant in this matter,86 the Court finds that granting Plaintiffs leave to amend
their Complaint would be futile. Importantly, even if Plaintiffs were granted leave to
amend to add or substitute the United States government as the appropriate federal
defendant, 	the 	Court’s 	analysis 	that 	it 	lacks 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	over
82 Linkous, 142 F.3d at 276.
83 Insofar as Plaintiffs ask the Court to permit jurisdictional discovery, the Court denies such request.
R. Doc. 27 at p. 2. A “plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery when ‘the record shows that
the requested discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.’”
Monkton Ins. Services, Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2014)(quoting Freeman v. United
States, 556 F.3d 326, 342 (5th Cir. 2009)). Further, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the
necessity of jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff has failed to carry that burden. Here, the Court finds
that jurisdictional discovery would fail to unearth significant facts that would change its calculus.
Plainly, no additional facts would change the nature of the Transportation Contract and Porsha
Blackmore’s status as an independent contractor.
84 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
85 R. Doc. 27 at p. 22.
86 Id. at p. 2.
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 15 of 16

16
Plaintiffs’ claims against the government would remain unchanged. An amended
Complaint properly naming the United States as the defendant would fail for the
reasons stated herein. Therefore, any amendment would be futile as the court would
lack jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are denied leave to amend their Complaint.87
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Federal
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss88 is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims against the government
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.89
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 5, 2026.
_____________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
87 See Stripling v. Jordan Production Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 2000)(“It is within the
district court’s discretion to deny a motion to amend if it is futile.”).
88 R. Doc. 19.
89 See Hix v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, 155 Fed. Appx. 121, 128 (5th Cir. 2005)(“Finally, because
it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellants' claims, the district court erred in dismissing the
claims with prejudice, which also operates as a judgment on the merits.”).
Case 2:25-cv-00124-WBV-MBN Document 43 Filed 01/05/26 Page 16 of 16