Isidore v. Westport Linen Services, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GERTRAND ISIDORE 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-410
WESTPORT LINEN SERVICES,
LLC ET AL.
SECTION: “J”(3)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Re-Urged Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for
Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 22) filed by Defendant Westport Linen Services,
LLC (“Westport”). Plaintiff Gertrand Isidore did not file an opposition to this motion,
but the Court treated Plaintiff’s opposition (Rec. Doc. 10) to Defendant Westport’s
earlier Motion to Dismiss as an opposition to this re-urged motion. The Court also
considered Defendant Westport’s earlier reply to Plaintiff’s opposition (Rec. Doc. 11).
Having considered the motions and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable
law, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the termination of Plaintiff’s employment by Westport.
Employed by Westport as a maintenance handyperson, Plaintiff states he was
electrocuted while working on a washing machine, rendering him temporarily
unconscious 	and 	permanently 	without 	the 	use 	of 	an 	eye 	and 	a 	limb. 	After
unsuccessful negotiations related to the incident, Plaintiff avers his employment was
terminated. 	Against 	his 	former 	employer, 	he 	now 	alleges 	various 	theories 	of
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discrimination, particularly related to his national origin. Plaintiff is of Haitian
descent and complains that workplace documents were not translated into French or
Haitian Creole. Plaintiff further contends he suffered discrimination through lower
pay and more menial job tasks than other, non-Haitian employees. Among his federal
and state claims, Plaintiff alleges Westport, its manager Bryan Palmer, and other
unnamed employees committed fraud, “engag[ing] in subterfuge in order to deprive
Plaintiff of his rights to maintenance and cure and/or other compensation related to
his injury at work.” (Rec. Doc. 1, at 25).
The instant suit is before this Court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff makes claims against Defendant Westport under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”), the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Additionally, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Defendant Westport now moves to dismiss
the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively,
for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient
facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The
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factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are
not 	required, 	but 	the 	pleading 	must 	present 	“more 	than 	an 	unadorned, 	the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Beavers v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Westport accurately points out, and
Plaintiff concedes, that neither OSHA nor IRCA provides a private cause of action.
Westport 	cites 	multiple 	cases 	to 	support 	its 	proposition 	that 	“Fifth 	Circuit
jurisprudence unequivocally establishes that ‘OSHA does not give rise to a private
cause of action.’” (Rec. Doc. 22, at 9 (quoting Perez v. Ormiston, 364 F. App’x 93, 94
(5th Cir. 2010))). Accordingly, because OSHA does not create a private cause of action,
a federal court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. Aranyosi
v. Delchamps, Inc., No. 97-0251, 1997 WL 118389, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 1997) (“The
court first finds that there is no federal question jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have
not pled a cause of action pursuant to OSHA and indeed OSHA § 11(c) does not
provide a private right of action and remedy to Plaintiffs.”).
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Plaintiff’s counsel accurately notes that Mr. Isidore may seek “employee-driven
relief under [29 U.S.C.] § 662(d)” and requests the opportunity to amend Plaintiff’s
Complaint or to make a more definite statement. (Rec. Doc. 10, at 6). However, even
under § 662(d), Plaintiff would not have a cause of action against his employer.
Instead, Plaintiff would have to bring an action against the Secretary of Labor, but
only if “the Secretary arbitrarily or capriciously fail[ed] to seek relief” on behalf of
Plaintiff. 29 U.S.C. § 662(d). Therefore, Plaintiff would first have to seek redress from
the Secretary of Labor under OSHA.
Similarly, Westport notes that Plaintiff does not have a cause of action under
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), which amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff
must first pursue the statutory remedy outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, which provides
in part that “any person alleging that the person is adversely affected directly by an
unfair immigration-related employment practice . . . may file a charge respecting such
practice or violation with the Special Counsel” for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(b)(1). Accordingly, Mr. Isidore must pursue
this administrative remedy for his claims that Defendant discriminated against him
based on his national origin.
Next, Plaintiff brings claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), but
he does not allege sufficient well-pleaded facts for the Court to reasonably infer that
Defendants violated the FLSA. Plaintiff claims that he was paid “below-market
wages” (Rec. Doc. 1, at 7), for example, but the Complaint never says what those
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wages were, nor does the Complaint contend that these below-market wages were
actually below the federal minimum wage. Later, Plaintiff asserts that he was
employed “at a wage per hour well below the wage paid to other similarly situated
Westport employees” (Rec. Doc. 1, at 8), but again, he does not explain what either he
or the similarly situated employees were paid. Plaintiff’s claims under FLSA are
conclusory statements without facts to support them, and therefore, these claims are
not plausible on their face and cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.
Lastly, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which 	provides 	for 	equal 	protection 	of 	enumerated 	rights 	even 	against
“nongovernmental 	discrimination.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1981. 	Specifically, 	the 	statute
provides that
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens . . . .
Id. In the Complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel accurately notes that the “primary focus of
Section 1981 is to prohibit discrimination based on race or ethnicity in contractual
relationships.” (Rec. Doc. 1, at 14). Claims for racial discrimination in an employment
context are cognizable under Section 1981 under certain circumstances and are
governed by the same rules as claims under Title VII.
In Mr. Isidore’s Complaint, he alleges that Defendants “engaged in unlawful
behavior, including but not limited to, discriminating against [him] in his hiring and
employment (i.e. the making and enforcement of his contract), creating and/or
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maintaining 	an 	unsafe 	work 	environment, 	committing 	fraud 	on 	Plaintiff 	and
otherwise engaging in other dishonest acts as will be shown at trial.” (Rec. Doc. 1, at
6–7). He further asserts that Defendants “conspired with each other” to pay him at
“below-market wages” and “to have him work under unsafe conditions, including but
not limited to falsely representing the condition of the machine whose malfunction
caused Isidore to be electrocuted.” (Rec. Doc. 1, at 7).
The most specific claims that Mr. Isidore makes concern Westport’s alleged
failure to provide legally required disclosures to Mr. Isidore in French or Haitian
Creole. Further, Plaintiff presents a list of discriminatory conduct in his Complaint,
which includes that Defendants treated him “differently during his employment,”
failed to “provide [him] with medical treatment” when he suffered his catastrophic
injury on the job, and failed “to provide [him] with medical insurance coverage when
he became injured at work.” (Rec. Doc. 1, at 15). However, throughout the Complaint,
Plaintiff has not provided any facts to support these conclusory statements.
As 	stated 	previously, 	it 	is 	well-established 	that 	“[c]laims 	of 	racial
discrimination in employment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . are governed by the
same analysis as that employed for such claims under Title VII.” DeCorte v. Jordan,
497 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., Inc.,
26 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.7 (5th Cir.1994)). Under Section 1981, a plaintiff must make a
prima facie case of racial discrimination, and the elements that the plaintiff must
prove vary only slightly based on the type of discrimination claim at issue (i.e., failure
to promote, hostile work environment, etc.).
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Generally, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 1981, a
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence “‘(1) that [he] is a member of
a racial minority; (2) that [the defendant] had intent to discriminate on the basis of
race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities
enumerated in the statute.’” Powell v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 653 F. App’x 292, 297 (5th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he is a member of a racial minority,
although it is not clear at times whether he alleges discrimination based on race or
national origin (or both). However, Plaintiff has not provided any facts to support or
suggest that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race.
The Fifth Circuit has held that “‘naked allegation[s]’ of discriminatory intent are too
conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss.” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff’s Complaint consists solely of
“naked allegations.” For example, Plaintiff claims that Defendants “caused him to
suffer a catastrophic injury at work on or about January 14, 2024,” but does not
explain how they did so. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 16). In fact, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
include enough specific facts even to support that employment discrimination took
place. Stated another way, Plaintiff has not pleaded “sufficient facts to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court sympathizes with Mr. Isidore in terms of the injuries he suffered,
but based on Plaintiff’s claims, the Court does not have the legal means to provide
him with a remedy.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Westport Linen Services, LLC’s
Re-Urged Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 22) is GRANTED, and that Plaintiff
Gertrand 	Isidore’s 	federal 	claims 	against 	Westport 	Linen 	Services, 	LLC 	are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	state-law 	claims 	against
Defendant 	Westport 	Linen 	Services, 	LLC 	are 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of November, 2025.
____________________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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