Swan v. Garretson Resolution Group, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PAUL W. SWAN II 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1303
GARRETSON RESOLUTION GROUP, INC. 	SECTION: “J”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Rec. Doc. 8)
filed by Defendant, Garretson Resolution Group, Inc. (“GRG”). Plaintiff, Paul W.
Swan, II, opposed the motion (Rec. Doc. 9), and GRG filed a reply (Rec. Doc. 10).
Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable
law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Swan, a class member under the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement (“the MSA”), held employment as a shoreline cleanup worker after the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. (Rec. Doc. 9, at 3). On February 14, 2018, Swan
submitted a Notice of Intent to Sue (“NOIS”) to GRG (Rec. Doc. 1-2), in which Swan
stated 	that 	he 	suffered 	from 	asthma, 	among 	other 	later-manifested 	physical
conditions, resulting from his employment after the oil spill. Id. at 12. Swan listed
November 17, 2017 as the date of diagnosis for all of the conditions he claimed in the
NOIS. 	Id. 	GRG 	did 	not 	approve 	Swan’s 	NOIS 	because 	it 	lacked 	sufficient
documentation and instead issued a Notice of Defect (“NOD”), which explained the
consequence Swan would face if he failed to cure the defective NOIS. (Rec. Doc. 1-3,
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at 2). Swan subsequently cured the defects for the other claims listed in the NOD but
not for the asthma claim, which he voluntarily withdrew. (Rec. Doc. 1-4, at 3). On
January 6, 2025, Swan submitted another NOIS to GRG citing January 11, 2023 as
the date he received his first asthma diagnosis (Rec. Doc. 1-6, at 10), and in a letter
dated January 17, 2025, the Claims Administrator informed Swan that his BELO
claim for asthma was barred (Rec. Doc. 1-7, at 3). On June 25, 2025, Swan filed the
instant action to challenge GRG’s decision (Rec. Doc. 1), and Defendant GRG
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (Rec. Doc. 8)
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, Swan’s complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. There must
be enough factual content for a court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff. Id. This is a “context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679,
129 S.Ct. 1937. Although a court must accept factual allegations in the complaint as
true, it need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. at 678,
129 S.Ct. 1937.
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PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
In its Motion to Dismiss, GRG argues that Swan’s 2025 NOIS based on an
asthma diagnosis was barred because Swan failed to timely submit the claim. (Rec.
Doc. 8-1, at 6). Specifically, GRG asserts that the Court should grant its motion
because it has been more than seven years since Swan’s first diagnosis of asthma,
which is outside the four-year period established under the MSA. Id.
First, GRG asserts that Swan’s “‘first diagnosis’ was based on [his] own sworn
representations and prior medical history as submitted by [Swan] in the First NOIS.”
(Rec. Doc. 8-1, at 7). By signing the NOIS, GRG contends that Swan declared under
penalty of perjury that the information included in the NOIS was true and correct.
(Rec. Doc. 10, at 1-2). GRG also states that the NOD served as notice and warning to
Swan of the consequences for failing to timely file or refile a BELO claim, which he
chose to ignore, only to refile the claim more than seven years later with a new
diagnosis date. (Rec. Doc. 8-1, at 8). GRG further argues that it simply accepted the
sworn representations made by Swan, who was represented by legal counsel,
regarding the date of his first asthma diagnosis as true and correct. (Rec. Doc. 10, at
2).
In his opposition, Swan states that his 2025 NOIS was timely filed and
contends that the 2017 asthma information was merely a record of a self-reported
history of asthma, not an official diagnosis. (Rec. Doc. 9, at 8). He goes on to assert
that the asthma claim included in the 2018 NOIS was “an honest mistake that was
promptly corrected once discovered.” Id. at 14. Swan claims that by withdrawing the
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asthma claim, he preserved his ability to later submit a valid NOIS once he was
formally diagnosed, thus rendering his 2025 NOIS for asthma timely. Id. at 10.
The applicable passages of the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement (“MSA”) on which GRG relies are as follows:
THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE and materials submitted therewith
must be submitted to the CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR within 4 years
after 	either 	the 	first 	diagnosis 	of 	that 	LATER-MANIFESTED
PHYSICAL CONDITION or the EFFECTIVE DATE [of the MSA,
February 12, 2014], whichever is later.
In re: Deepwater Horizon, No. 10-md-2179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012), ECF No. 6427-1, §
VIII(A). Moreover, a class member “may assert a claim against a BACK-END
LITIGATION OPTION DEFENDANT in a BACK-END LITIGATION OPTION
LAWSUIT only for that LATER-MANIFESTED PHYSICAL CONDITION for which
he or she timely submitted a NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE.” Id. § VIII(G)(2)(a)
(emphasis added).
Here, Swan submitted his first NOIS for asthma in 2018, listing the diagnosis
date as November 17, 2017. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 12). In at least two places on the NOIS
form, one of which is immediately above the signature line for the claimant, appears
the following statement:
This form is an official court document sanctioned by the COURT that
presides 	over 	the 	class 	actions 	arising 	from 	the 	DEEPWATER
HORIZON INCIDENT. Submitting this document to the CLAIMS
ADMINISTRATOR is equivalent to filing it with the COURT, and I
declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this
form is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and
belief.
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(Id. at 18; see also id. at 17). After receiving Swan’s NOIS, the Claims Administrator
sent Swan a Notice of Defect explaining that Swan should provide either medical
records or a Physician’s Certification form supporting the diagnosis of asthma, along
with the medical provider’s signature, OR notify the Claims Administrator of his
desire to withdraw the defective condition. (Rec. Doc. 1-3, at 3). Additionally, the NOD
included 	complete 	instructions—in 	bold 	font 	and 	underlined—regarding 	the
appropriate time period in which Swan was required to cure the defects regarding
this asthma claim. Id. at 2.
Swan chose not to cure the defect and instead chose to withdraw his asthma
claim. Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the MSA, Swan cannot claim,
under penalty of perjury, that he was diagnosed with asthma in 2017, voluntarily
withdraw that claim, and then file a second NOIS for an asthma claim more than
seven years later.
Additionally, Swan presents a constitutional claim, arguing that the Court
should deny GRG’s Motion to Dismiss because GRG’s actions deprive him of due
process. (Rec. Doc. 9, at 15). When GRG failed to process his NOIS, Swan states that
they impermissibly acted outside their eleven enumerated duties and took on the role
of adjudicator. Id. at 13. Swan notes that according to the United States Supreme
Court, courts shall not construe administrative rules relating to Multi-District
Litigation and FRCP 23 to abridge or modify any of the plaintiff’s substantive rights.
Id. at 16.
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GRG contends that Swan’s constitutional claim lacks merit, and the Court
agrees. Here, Swan himself provides rebuttal to his own claim of overreach by GRG.
Swan states that one of the enumerated duties of the Claims Administrator is to
“review each completed NOIS and materials submitted to confirm: (1) the NOIS and
related materials have been timely submitted.” (Rec. Doc. 9, at 11) (emphasis added).
This was exactly the action that GRG took when it identified Swan’s claim as time-
barred. Thus, there is nothing to indicate that GRG acted outside its authority or
violated Mr. Swan’s constitutional right to due process.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Rec. Doc. 8) is GRANTED, and that Plaintiff’s Complaint to Challenge
GRG’s Incorrect Factual Determination and/or for Declaratory Relief (Rec. Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of October, 2025
____________________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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