Toliver v. Navy Federal Credit Union et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TONYELL T. TOLIVER 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1420
NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
ET AL.
SECTION “R” (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Weltman, Weinberg, & Reis Co., LPA’s
(Weltman) opposed 1 motion to dismiss. 2 	For the following reasons, the
Court grants the motion to dismiss.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff opened a credit card account with
Navy 	Federal 	Credit 	Union 	(Navy 	Federal). 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	on
November 28, 2022, the credit card account was “charged off,” meaning that
it was unpaid for more than six months. 3 Toliver allegedly then called Navy
Federal about the debt; Navy Federal referred her to Weltman, who gave her
A Professional Law Corporation’s (APLC) phone number. 4
1 	R. Doc. 34.
2 	R. Doc. 29.
3 	R. Doc. 1-6, at 2.
4 	R. Doc. 31-1, at 2.
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Then the lawsuits began. On May 17, 2024, Navy Federal sued Toliver
in state court over the unpaid debt. 5 	On October 1, 2024, plaintiff filed two
suits against two lawyers representing Navy Federal, Edward Bukaty of
APLC and Warren Wingerter, in state court, alleging Fair Debt Collection
Practices 	Act 	(FDCPA) 	violations. 6 	Bukaty 	and 	Wingerter 	filed 	for
consolidation of the cases against them. 7 	Plaintiff then removed the case
against her and the cases against the lawyers to this Court. 	This Court
remanded all three cases on May 14, 2025. 8
On July 10, 2025, Toliver sued Navy Federal, Weltman, and APLC in
this Court pro se. 	Plaintiff asserted claims for fraud and concealment,
violations of the FDCPA, fraud on the court, commercial dishonor and
fiduciary breach, unjust enrichment and unauthorized securitization, and
5 	Toliver removed that case to this Court on February 13, 2025, and this
Court remanded the case on May 14, 2025. Navy Federal Credit Union
v. Toliver, 25-326 (E.D. La. May 14, 2025) (Vance, J.).
6 	See Navy Federal Credit Union v. Tonyell Toliver, Case No. 141-256,
May 17, 2024; see also Toliver v. A Professional Law Corporation,
Case No. 24-192, October 1, 2024; Toliver v. A Professional Law
Corporation, Case No. 24-193, October 1, 2024; and Toliver v. Edward
F. Bukaty, III and Warren W. Wingerter, Jr., 25-cv-00326, February
26, 2025.
7 	Id.
8 	Navy Federal Credit Union v. Toliver, 25-326 (E.D. La. May 14, 2025)
(Vance, J.), R. Doc. 16.
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declaratory relief. 9 Navy Federal and APLC moved to dismiss. 10 This Court
dismissed the claims against Navy Federal and APLC as abandoned. 11
Weltman, the lone remaining defendant, now moves to dismiss. 12 	In
her response, plaintiff explicitly withdrew her claims against Weltman for
fraud, fraud on the court, commercial dishonor, fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, 	securitization, 	and 	declaratory 	relief. 13 	Plaintiff’s 	sole
remaining claim against Weltman is that Weltman violated the FDCPA.
Weltman in reply asserts that plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 14
The Court considers the motion below.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. 	The
court’s power to resolve disputes is limited to cases and controversies. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2; see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992). A lawsuit is not a case or controversy unless the plaintiff can prove
that she has standing to bring suit. Id.
9 	R. Doc. 1.
10 	R. Docs. 17, 31.
11 	R. Docs. 30, 38.
12 	R. Doc. 29-1.
13 	R. Doc. 34-1.
14 	R. Doc.
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Standing requires the plaintiff to show (i) an injury in fact that is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was
likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury is likely redressable
by judicial relief. 	See id. 	A plaintiff does not automatically have Article III
standing “even in the context of a statutory violation.” 	Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016). Under Article III, “an injury in law is not
an injury in fact.” 	TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 427. 	The plaintiff must
demonstrate standing “with the manner and degree of evidence” required at
the stage of the litigation. At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff must
allege enough facts to show that standing is facially plausible. 	See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Federal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte and must dismiss the action if the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. 	Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). 	Here, though
neither party contests the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Court first
examines its jurisdiction, one element of which is standing. Id.
Plaintiff’s lone remaining claim against Weltman is for a violation of
FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) and (g), which provide that a debt collector
“may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
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connection with the collection of any debt” and that a debt collector is
required to send a written notice within five days after initial communication
with a consumer. 	A “statutory cause of action to sue a defendant over the
defendant’s violation of federal law” is insufficient to establish a “concrete
harm because of the defendant’s violation of federal law.” TransUnion, 594
U.S. at 426-27. 	Thus, Toliver must plausibly allege the three elements of
standing.
Toliver must plausibly allege (i) an injury in fact that is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused
by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by
judicial relief. 	See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 	As to the first element,
Toliver’s sole alleged injuries are “reputational harm” and “denial of credit.” 15
Pretermitting other issues with the alleged injury, for the second element,
Toliver must plausibly allege that her reputational harm and denial of credit
were likely caused by the defendant.
Toliver’s pleadings make no such factual allegations. The only factual
allegation against Weltman is that Weltman answered the phone when
Toliver called and provided her with a phone number of a different law firm.
Toliver does not plead how that provision of information likely caused her
15 	R. Doc. 1, at 2.
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alleged injuries. There is nothing to suggest that Weltman providing Toliver
with the phone number for a separate law firm injured her in any way, let
alone harmed her reputation or led to her being denied credit. Toliver does
not plausibly plead that Weltman’s actions likely caused her injury. Without
such a pleading, plaintiff does not have standing, and the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the remaining claim. 	The Court must dismiss the
action without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Green Valley Special
Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(holding that complaints dismissed for lack of standing should ordinarily be
dismissed without prejudice).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES plaintiff’s claims
against Weltman WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ____ day of October, 2025.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
27th
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