Lightfoot et al v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHAD LIGHTFOOT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 26-434
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants
SECTION: “E” (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual)1 and a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim filed by Progressive Direct Insurance Company, Progressive Paloverde Insurance
Company (sometimes collectively referred to as “Progressive”), and United Financial
Casualty Company (“United”)2 (sometimes collectively referred to as “Insurance
Defendants”).
Also before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by
Henry Minor Pipes and Kristin Beckman,3 as well as a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim filed by Adam Massey and David Strauss (sometimes collectively referred to
as “Insurance Attorneys”).4
Plaintiffs Chad Lightfoot, Geralyn Hawkins, and their minor children filed
oppositions to these motions.5 The Insurance Defendants and Massey and Strauss filed
replies.6
1 R. Doc. 64.
2 R. Doc. 79.
3 R. Doc. 65.
4 R. Doc. 80.
5 R. Docs. 75; 93; 94.
6 R. Docs. 76; 97; 98.
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BACKGROUND7
This case arises out of a vehicle accident in Orleans Parish and the subsequent
criminal prosecution of Plaintiff Chad Lightfoot for insurance fraud.8 Plaintiffs allege
that, on August 29, 2011, Mr. Lightfoot was involved in a vehicle accident in Orleans
Parish.9 Mr. Lightfoot filed insurance claims with multiple insurance carriers, including
Liberty, Progressive Insurance Company,10 and others.11 Plaintiffs allege the insurance
claim was not “resolve[d]. . . to Mr. Lightfoot’s satisfaction” and, as a result, in 2012, he
brought a personal-injury lawsuit in Orleans Parish Civil District Court against
Progressive Insurance Company and other related defendants (“the underlying civil
action”).12
Plaintiffs allege that, on or about September 19, 2014, Megan Kiefer and Ignatz
Kiefer assaulted Mr. Lightfoot inside the Orleans Parish Courthouse in retaliation for his
bringing the underlying civil action.13 Plaintiffs further allege that, in December 2014,
Megan Kiefer prepared and swore to a false affidavit she submitted to the New Orleans
Police Department stating that Mr. Lightfoot fraudulently obtained a $50,000 payment
from Progressive Insurance Company in connection with the August 29, 2011 accident.14
Plaintiffs allege the affidavit included Megan Kiefer’s statement that, in obtaining the
$50,000 payment from Progressive Insurance Company, Mr. Lightfoot committed
perjury, insurance fraud, and filed false public records.15 Plaintiffs allege these statements
7 These factual allegations are based on the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. R. Doc. 60.
8 Id.
9 Id. at ¶ 85.
10 Progressive Insurance Company is the parent company for Progressive Direct Insurance Company and
Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company.
11 R. Doc. 60 at¶ 87. Apparently, these are Chad Lightfoot’s underinsured motorist insurance carriers.
12 Id. at ¶¶ 87-88.
13 Id. at ¶ 90. Plaintiffs do not bring a cause of action for damages resulting from this physical altercation.
14 Id. at ¶¶ 95-96.
15 Id. at ¶ 96.
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were false and the “Progressive” records confirmed that Mr. Lightfoot never received a
$50,000 payment.16 Plaintiffs allege the Insurance Attorneys obtained a judgment for
attorneys’ fees in the underlying civil action against Mr. Lightfoot.17 Plaintiffs further
allege that, on August 22, 2016, this judgment was recorded as a judicial mortgage against
Mr. Lightfoot’s homestead, which “clouded Mr. Lightfoot’s title and exerted improper
financial pressure. . . .”18 Plaintiffs allege that Kristin L. Beckman and Adam Massey
“participated in preparing, filing, recording, or enforcing civil judgment and judicial-
mortgage materials. . . .”19
Plaintiffs allege New Orleans Police Department Detective Frank Denton, without
conducting further investigation into the affidavit’s validity, relied on Megan Kiefer’s false
affidavit and Denton’s report to obtain an arrest warrant for Mr. Lightfoot charging him
with theft of over $50,000, automobile insurance fraud, perjury, filing false public
records, or related charges.20 Plaintiffs allege that, on January 6, 2015, Mr. Lightfoot was
arrested pursuant to this warrant.21 Plaintiffs further allege that the Louisiana State Police
Insurance Fraud Division began an investigation into Lightfoot’s alleged insurance fraud
scheme.22 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant State Police Lieutenant Alan Arcana stated in a
police report that Mr. Lightfoot received $50,000 in payments from “Progressive.”23
Plaintiffs allege Lieutenant Arcana testified that “Progressive” insurance investigator
Glenn Pardiane represented to him that Mr. Lightfoot received a $50,000 payment.24
16 Id. at ¶ 98.
17 Id. at ¶ 124.
18 Id. at ¶¶ 125-27.
19 Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45.
20 Id. at ¶ 107.
21 Id. at ¶ 110.
22 Id. at ¶ 115.
23 Id. at ¶¶ 117-18.
24 Id. at ¶ 121.
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Plaintiffs allege that, during the criminal proceedings, it was discovered there was no
record of a $50,000 insurance payout to Mr. Lightfoot but that, despite this lack of
evidence, Mr. Lightfoot was criminally prosecuted for insurance fraud.25 Plaintiffs allege
the criminal charges against Mr. Lightfoot were dismissed on or about October 15, 2024.26
Mr. Lightfoot and his spouse, Geralyn Hawkins, filed this suit pro se on October
20, 2025 in Orleans Parish Civil District Court.27 In their original petition, Mr. Lightfoot
and Ms. Hawkins brought a single claim against “unknown named Defendants” under La.
R.S. 15:572.8, which provides compensation to persons wrongfully convicted and
imprisoned.28
On November 10, 2025, Mr. Lightfoot and Ms. Hawkins filed a First Amended
Petition, adding their minor children as named Plaintiffs and bringing 8 counts against
various defendants for actions related to Mr. Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution and the civil
judgment entered against him and recorded as a judicial mortgage.29 These defendants
include the Insurance Defendants and the Insurance Attorneys in the underlying civil
action—Kristin Beckman and Henry Minor Pipes (attorneys for Liberty Mutual), and
Adam Massey and David Strauss (attorneys for Progressive).30
On January 20, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Petition in state court.31
While this petition did not alter or amend any of the causes of action Plaintiffs attempted
to plead in their First Amended petition, it removed Plaintiffs’ minor children as parties.32
25 Id. at ¶ 136.
26 Id. at ¶ 142.
27 R. Doc. 1-2.
28 Id. at pp. 1-2.
29 R. Doc. 1-3.
30 Id. at pp. 3-5.
31 R. Doc. 1-4.
32 See id. at p. 1.
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Robert Hodges and Alan Arcana removed the matter to this Court on February 27,
2026.33 Following removal, multiple defendants filed motions to dismiss, including
Liberty Mutual;34 Kristin Beckman and Henry Pipes;35 Progressive and United;36 and
Adam Massey and David Strauss.37 In their motions to dismiss, the Insurance Defendants
argue that each of Plaintiffs’ 8 counts were time barred, Plaintiffs’ petition was devoid of
any factual allegations that could plausibly state a claim for relief against them, and
Plaintiffs impermissibly lumped all the defendants together and collectively asserted
claims against them.38
On April 15, 2026, in response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs moved, pro se,
to file a First Amended Complaint in federal court in order to provide additional factual
details, clarify their claims for relief, and “narrow[] certain theories to address issues
raised or anticipated in Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions.”39 The Plaintiffs attached
their proposed amended complaint to their motion.40 On April 22, 2026, the Court
granted Plaintiffs’ leave to file an amended complaint, but advised Plaintiffs to revise their
proposed restated and amended complaint, as the proposed version failed to address the
arguments Defendants made in their motions to dismiss.41 The Court ordered Plaintiffs
to file a revised and restated amended complaint, addressing “fully and completely, all
arguments raised in the Defendants’ motions to dismiss,” on or before on May 6, 2026.42
33 R. Doc. 1.
34 R. Doc. 17.
35 R. Doc. 18.
36 R. Doc. 33.
37 R. Doc. 40.
38 R. Doc. 17 at p. 1; R. Doc. 33 at p. 2.
39 R. Doc. 52 at p. 1.
40 R. Doc. 52-1.
41 R. Doc. 53 at p. 3.
42 Id.
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On May 6, 2026, rather than file their amended and restated complaint, Plaintiffs
simultaneously moved to enroll counsel of record and for an extension of time to file their
restated and amended complaint.43 The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and ordered
Plaintiffs to file their restated and amended complaint on or before June 8, 2026.44
On June 8, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint45—their fourth
petition/complaint filed in the course of this litigation—in response to the Court’s order
that the amended complaint address fully and completely all arguments raised in the
defendants’ motions to dismiss. In Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
bring claims against various defendants they allege were associated with Mr. Lightfoot’s
criminal prosecution, including the Insurance Defendants and Insurance Attorneys.
While Plaintiffs’ previous complaints brought only 8 counts against the defendants for
violating La. C.C.P. art. 2315 and various constitutional violations, their Second Amended
Complaint asserts 20 counts against various defendants for multiple state law tort claims
and constitutional violations.46
On June 15, 2026, Liberty Mutual filed its motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim;47 Beckman and Pipes filed their own motion to dismiss on June 16, 2026.48 On July
8, 2026, Progressive and United, as well as Massey and Strauss, filed their motions to
dismiss.49 In their motions, the Insurance Defendants and Insurance Attorneys argue
Plaintiffs’ allegations are too vague to state a plausible claim against them.50 The
43 R. Doc. 56.
44 R. Doc. 59.
45 R. Doc. 60.
46 In Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, they added Eric Cusimano, Jason Williams, and Sgt. Patrick
Bardley as Defendants.
47 R. Doc. 64.
48 R. Doc. 65.
49 R. Docs. 79; 80.
50 R. Doc. 64-1 at p. 7; R. Doc. 79-1 at pp. 6-7.
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Insurance Defendants and Insurance Attorneys also argue Plaintiffs do not specifically
name any of them in the 20 counts of their Second Amended Complaint.51 The Insurance
Defendants and Insurance Attorneys argue Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim is prescribed
as to all of them, as the last of any alleged acts that could constitute abuse of process
occurred in 2016, when the judgment in the underlying civil action was recorded, thereby
creating a judicial mortgage on Plaintiffs’ property.52
Plaintiffs argue they have made sufficient allegations against the Insurance
Defendants and Insurance Attorneys regarding their conduct that harmed Plaintiffs.53
Plaintiffs further argue their abuse of process claim has not prescribed because the
Insurance Defendants’ and Insurance Attorneys’ abuse of process resulted in Mr.
Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution, which was not dismissed until October 15, 2024.54 As a
result, Plaintiffs argue the prescriptive period for their abuse of process claim began
running on October 15, 2024, not on August 22, 2016, or before.55
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”56 A complaint that does not meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.57 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
51 R. Doc. 64-1 at p. 7; R. Doc. 79-1 at p. 6.
52 R. Doc. 64-1 at pp. 7-9; R. Doc. 79-1 at pp. 7-8.
53 R. Doc. 75 at p. 3; R. Doc. 89-1 at p. 12.
54 R. Doc. 75 at p. 6; R. Doc. 89-1 at p. 20.
55 Id.
56 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
57 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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me accusation.”58 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”59 “Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”60
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss
a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff
has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief.61 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”62 “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”63
The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory
statements, and “‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’”64 Indeed, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”65
or “naked assertion[s]”66 devoid of “further factual enhancement”67 are not sufficient.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’”68 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework
58 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).
59 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
60 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
61 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007).
62 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
63 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
64 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
65 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
66 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
67 Id.
68 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
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of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.”69 “Determining whether
a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”70 “Although
detailed factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the
complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”71 Whether a plaintiff “will be able to offer
sufficient proof to support [his or her] claims is more appropriate in the context of a
motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a motion to
dismiss.72 “‘[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate for
summary judgment . . . .’”73
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiffs’ group pleadings fail to state a cause of action against the
Insurance Defendants.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Based on this Rule, courts have held
that the Federal Rules entitle “each defendant . . . to know what he or she did that is
asserted to be wrongful.”74 Mere “conclusory allegations against [d]efendants as a group”
that “fail[ ] to allege the personal involvement of any defendant” are insufficient to put
Defendants on notice of their alleged wrongdoing.75 A plaintiff must allege facts that
69 Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 545.
70 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
71 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F.App’x. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (citations
omitted).
72 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00492, 2019 WL 4565246, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019).
73 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc'y, LLC, No. CV 21-1109, 2022 WL 898750, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar.
28, 2022) (quoting Bilyeu v. Johanson Berenson LLP, 2010 WL 3896415, at *9 (W.D. La. Sep. 30, 2010)).
74 Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
75 Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims without prejudice for failure to provide each defendant with notice of its alleged participation in the
racketeering enterprise).
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“establish each individual [d]efendant’s liability for the misconduct alleged.”76 When a
number of defendants are named in a complaint, a plaintiff cannot refer to all defendants
“who occupied different positions and presumably had distinct roles in the alleged
misconduct” without specifying “which defendants engaged in what wrongful conduct.”77
“While referring to a collective group of defendants is not a fatal pleading deficiency,
“[e]ach defendant is [still] entitled to know what he or she did that is asserted to be
wrongful.”78 The critical inquiry is whether the complaint, with its group allegations,
provides each defendant with adequate notice of the plaintiff’s claims and the grounds
upon which the claim rests.79 The Court must disregard “bare assertions of collective
responsibility, unsupported by concrete factual allegations.”80
A complaint that contains an “impermissibly vague group pleading” will be
dismissed.81 For example, in Cain v. City of New Orleans, the plaintiffs brought 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims against the City of New Orleans, the Sheriff, and various court officials for
their involvement in the plaintiffs’ allegedly unconstitutional criminal prosecution.82 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs directed their allegations towards “‘defendants’ as a group”
and failed to identify specific acts of misconduct by specific defendants.83 The district
court judge found such allegations insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief because
the allegations “largely prevent[ed] the Court from discerning which defendants [were]
76 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (finding that a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution);
Aruanno v. Main, 467 F. App'x 134, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2012) (dismissal of § 1983 action was appropriate where
Defendants were collectively sued as “[government] personnel” and failed to allege the personal
involvement of the individual Defendants).
77 Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).
78 Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846 F. App'x 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2021).
79 Valadez v. City of San Antonio, No. SA21CV0002JKPRBF, 2022 WL 1608016, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 20,
2022).
80 Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
81 Falat, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3.
82 2016 WL 2849478, at *3.
83 Id. at *5.
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allegedly responsible for which allegedly unlawful actions.”84 Accordingly, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that “lump[ed] all defendants together and assert[ed]
identical allegations as to each, without distinction.”85
The Insurance Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against
them because Plaintiffs lumped “all defendants together and collectively assert claims
against them” and Plaintiffs do not bring any of their 20 counts against any of them by
name.86 The Insurance Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim
against any of them by alleging that “defendants” collectively have committed various acts
of wrongdoing without specifying which defendant did which acts.87 Plaintiffs respond
that, based on the allegations in their complaint, the Insurance Defendants are aware of
the conduct for which Plaintiffs seek redress.88
Although some of the counts asserted in the Second Amended Complaint are
brought against various named defendants, not one of them is asserted against any of the
Insurance Defendants by name. Furthermore, all of the counts are brought against
unidentified defendants.89 For example, Count I is brought against Megan C. Kiefer,
Glenn Pardiane, Frank Denton, Alan Arcana, Sgt. Patrick Bardley, the City of New Orleans
under Monell and also against “other Defendants whose direct conduct or joint action
caused Mr. Lightfoot’s arrest without probable cause.”90 Count VIII for civil rights
conspiracy is brought only against unidentified “Defendants who reached an agreement,
explicit or implicit, to deprive Mr. Lightfoot of equal protection or equal privileges and
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 R. Doc. 64-1 at p. 7-9; R. Doc. 79-1 at p. 6.
87 Id.
88 R. Doc. 75 at p. 3; R. Doc. 89-1 at p. 12.
89 Count XVIII is a demand for declaratory judgment. Counts XIX and XX are descriptions of Plaintiffs’
request for punitive damages and penalties.
90 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 206.
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immunities.”91 Count XIV for intentional infliction of emotional distress is brought only
against unidentified “Defendants whose conduct was extreme and outrageous.”92
Plaintiffs allege the “attorney and insurance Defendants” as a group committed
wrongful acts:
Through that civil litigation, the private attorney and insurance Defendants
gained access to claim information, payment histories, medical
information, financial information, litigation materials, and claim
databases.93
On or about August 22, 2016, attorney and insurance Defendants recorded
or caused to be recorded the January 23, 2015 judgment as a judicial
mortgage against Mr. Lightfoot’s homestead or immovable property.94
Supervisory, policymaking, prosecutorial, Internal Affairs, and insurance
Defendants were placed on notice [of a conspiracy] through complaints,
letters, subpoena proceedings, internal-affairs materials, and court
proceedings.95
Bringing a cause of action against groups of defendants based on the conduct of all
of them is not sufficient to allege the personal involvement of any defendant and does not
put any defendant on notice of alleged wrongdoing. No defendant could receive adequate
notice of a claim and the grounds upon which the claim rests based on this type of
pleading. Apparently, the Plaintiffs would put the burden on the defendants to determine
which counts are asserted against each of them rather than giving each defendant notice
of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests. This
unprecedented manner of pleading, never before seen by this Court, is vague and
impermissible group pleading on steroids.
91 Id. at ¶ 263.
92 Id. at ¶ 304.
93 Id. at ¶ 89.
94 Id. at ¶ 126.
95 Id. at ¶ 270.
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Based on these allegations, neither the Court nor the Insurance Defendants can
discern which causes of action are brought against which defendants and what unlawful
actions were committed by each defendant. Such vague, collective allegations do not state
plausible claims for relief.96 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has
not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”97 Furthermore, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”98
or “naked assertion[s]”99 devoid of “further factual enhancement”100 are not sufficient.
The complaint must provide the defendants with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.”101 Plaintiffs allegations do not allow the Insurance
Defendants or the Court to discern what wrongful conduct Plaintiffs allege the Insurance
Defendants committed.
The Plaintiffs place particular emphasis on Count XII—Abuse of Process—and
Count XVII—Property Harm/Judicial Mortgage Damages/Abuse of Civil Judgment
Remedies. As discussed in Section III infra, these claims are prescribed. For the sake of
completeness, the Court notes that, even for these claims, Plaintiffs’ allegations fall short
because they constitute group pleading. In Count XII—Abuse of Process—Plaintiffs allege
that:
This Count is brought against private attorney, insurance, and other Defendants
who misused civil or criminal process for ulterior purposes.
Defendants used civil judgments, judicial mortgages, criminal affidavits, police
reports, warrants, and prosecution not merely for their regular legal purposes, but
96 See Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
97 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
98 Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
99 Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
100 Id.
101 Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Mississippi, Puerto Rico Tchrs. Ret. Sys. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 320
(5th Cir. 2014).
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to pressure Mr. Lightfoot, retaliate against him for pursuing civil claims, cloud his
property, and force abandonment or disadvantage in civil litigation.
Defendants committed willful acts in the use of process not proper in the regular
prosecution of proceedings.102
Count XVII is captioned Property Harm/Judicial Mortgage Damages/Abuse of
Civil Judgment Remedies. Plaintiffs allege this claim is for Louisiana law abuse of process
and tortious use of civil process. Because Count XVII sounds in abuse of process, the
Court will treat Count XVII as an abuse of process claim. Plaintiffs again engage in group
pleading alleging that:
This Count is brought against private attorney and insurance Defendants whose
conduct caused or contributed to improper property harm through civil judgment
and judicial mortgage mechanisms.
Plaintiffs allege that the judgment and judicial mortgages were used to cloud Mr.
Lightfoot’s title, exert financial pressure, and support the false criminal narrative.
Plaintiffs plead this claim as damages, abuse of process, and tortious use of civil
process. Plaintiffs do not seek improper appellate review of a state-court judgment
in this Court.
Plaintiffs seek damages for property-related harm, clouded title, economic losses,
credit impairment, emotional distress, and related injury caused by Defendants’
tortious conduct.103
Plaintiffs bring Counts XII and XVII against “attorney and insurance Defendants,”
but Plaintiffs have named eight attorneys and four separate insurance companies as
defendants. It is not clear from these allegations which attorney or which insurance
company is accused of abusing which process and by what means. Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim for abuse of process against the Insurance Defendants because they do not
allege facts that would provide those defendants with notice of the claims against each of
them and the grounds upon which the claims rest. Plaintiffs do not name any of the
102 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 290-295.
103 Id. at ¶¶ 323-327.
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Insurance Defendants in any of the counts. Plaintiffs do not specify which Insurance
Defendants attempted to “retaliate” against Mr. Lightfoot for pursuing his civil claims or
“disadvantage” him in the underlying civil litigation, or what conduct of any unnamed
Insurance Defendant caused Plaintiffs’ harm. In Counts XII and XVII, they refer
collectively to a group of defendants “who occupied different positions and presumably
had distinct roles in the alleged misconduct” without specifying “which defendants
engaged in what wrongful conduct.”104 As a result, neither the Court, nor the Insurance
Defendants, can ascertain the claims against each of the Insurance Defendants or the
grounds upon which any claim rests. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state any
plausible claim for relief against the Insurance Defendants under Counts XII and XVII.
Finally, in a return to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, Plaintiffs have failed to allege
facts that support the elements of any cause of action against the Insurance Defendants.
The Fifth Circuit instructs us that a plaintiff “must allege facts that support the elements
of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.”105 Plaintiffs’ barebones
allegations fail to establish or even plead facts to support, the elements of any of Plaintiffs’
asserted causes of action. For this reason, as well, Plaintiffs’ factual allegations against the
Insurance Defendants fail to state a valid claim for relief.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the Insurance
Defendants.
II. Plaintiffs’ group pleadings fail to state a cause of action against the
Insurance Attorneys.
The Court’s analysis of the sufficiency of the allegations against the Insurance
Defendants applies equally to the Insurance Attorneys. The Plaintiffs also have engaged
104 Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).
105 City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010).
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in group pleading with respect to the Insurance Attorneys and have otherwise failed to
state claims against them.
The Plaintiffs mention Pipes by name twice in the Second Amended Complaint,
both times in Plaintiff’s listing of defendants, wherein Plaintiffs name Pipes as a
defendant and allege his involvement as follows:
Defendant Henry Pipes, Esq. is a Louisiana-licensed attorney. He is sued in his
individual capacity.
On information and belief, Pipes is alleged to have participated, as insurance-
defense counsel, in advocating, supporting, or coordinating civil litigation steps
and criminal-referral efforts that relied upon disputed or false financial
information.106
The Plaintiffs mention Beckman by name twice in the Second Amended
Complaint, both times in Plaintiffs’ listing of defendants, wherein Plaintiffs name
Beckman as a defendant and allege her involvement as follows:
Defendant Kristin L. Beckman, Esq. is a Louisiana-licensed attorney. She is sued
in her individual capacity.
On information and belief, Beckman is alleged to have participated in preparing,
filing, recording, or enforcing civil judgment and judicial-mortgage materials that
were later used to support criminal allegations and to cloud Mr. Lightfoot’s
property.107
In their opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Pipes and Beckman, Plaintiffs argue
their second amended complaint provides Pipes and Beckman with sufficient notice of
their alleged wrongdoing. Plaintiffs argue the second amended complaint alleges that
Pipes participated “as insurance-defense counsel, in advocating, supporting, or
coordinating civil litigation steps and criminal-referral efforts that relied upon disputed
106 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 48-49.
107 Id. at ¶¶ 44-45.
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or false financial information,” and that Beckman participated in “preparing, filing,
recording, or enforcing civil judgment and judicial-mortgage materials.”108
The Plaintiffs mention Massey by name twice in the Second Amended Complaint,
both times in Plaintiffs’ listing of defendants, wherein Plaintiffs name Massey as a
defendant and allege his involvement as follows:
Defendant Adam Massey, Esq. is a Louisiana-licensed attorney. He is sued in his
individual capacity.
On information and belief, Massey is alleged to have participated in preparing,
submitting, obtaining, recording, or enforcing civil judgment and judicial-
mortgage materials that formed part of the pressure campaign against Mr.
Lightfoot and were allegedly used as part of the factual framing for criminal
referral.109
The Plaintiffs mention Strauss by name three times in the Second Amended
Complaint, all in Plaintiffs’ listing of defendants, wherein Plaintiffs name Strauss as a
defendant and allege his involvement as follows:
Defendant David Strauss, Esq. is a Louisiana-licensed attorney. He is sued in his
individual capacity.
On information and belief, Strauss is alleged to have participated in the underlying
civil litigation, including civil filings and judgment-related conduct later used to
support the criminal narrative. Plaintiffs further allege that Strauss personally
threatened Mr. Lightfoot in the hallway of Orleans Parish Civil District Court by
stating or communicating in substance that if Mr. Lightfoot did not dismiss or
abandon his civil claims, Strauss would see that Mr. Lightfoot returned to prison.
Plaintiffs plead the alleged Strauss threat as extra-judicial conduct, evidence of
retaliatory motive, evidence of civil-to-criminal pressure, and evidence of an
improper use of civil and criminal process beyond ordinary advocacy.110
The Insurance Attorneys argue that Plaintiffs lump the defendants together and
collectively assert claims against all of them, which is insufficient to state a claim for
108 R. Doc. 75 at p. 3.
109 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 42-43.
110 Id. at ¶¶ 39-41.
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relief.111 Plaintiffs respond that the allegations of their Second Amended Complaint alert
the Insurance Attorneys to their alleged wrongdoing.112 Plaintiffs argue their complaint
alleges specific conduct by the Insurance Attorneys and specifies how this conduct
harmed Plaintiffs.113
The Insurance Attorneys are not mentioned by name in any of the Plaintiffs’ 20
counts.114 The allegations against those individuals Plaintiffs refer to as “attorney
Defendants” include four attorneys other than Pipes, Beckman, Massey, and Strauss,
namely Megan C. Kiefer, Ignatz J. Kiefer, William Kelly, and Leah Penny. Specifically,
Paragraph 52 of the Second Amended Complaint alleges the attorney Defendants
committed “extra-judicial conduct, false factual submissions to law enforcement, joint
action with state actors, abuse of civil and criminal process, and tortious conduct outside
protected advocacy.”115 In paragraph 89, the Plaintiffs allege the private attorney
Defendants gained access to claim information, payment histories, medical information,
financial information, litigation materials, and claim databases.”116 In paragraph 124,
Plaintiffs allege that “private attorney Defendants obtained or participated in obtaining a
civil judgment against Mr. Lightfoot in the underlying civil litigation.”117 In paragraph 126,
Plaintiffs allege that attorney Defendants recorded or caused to be recorded the January
23, 2015 judgment as a judicial mortgage against Mr. Lightfoot’s homestead or
immovable property.”118 In paragraph 157, Plaintiffs allege “private insurance and
attorney Defendants supplied or framed claim data in a manner that portrayed Mr.
111 R. Docs. 65 at p. 2; 80-1 at p. 5.
112 R. Doc. 75 at p. 5.
113 Id.
114 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 205-338.
115 Id. at ¶ 52.
116 Id. at ¶ 89.
117 Id. at ¶ 124.
118 Id. at ¶ 126.
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Lightfoot as a ringleader while minimizing or favorably treating similarly situated white
or non-Black participants.”119 In paragraph 179, Plaintiffs allege that “the private attorney,
insurance, and SIU Defendants acted under color of law for purposes of § 1983 because
they were willful participants in joint action with state actors.”120 In paragraph 291,
Plaintiffs allege that Count XII “is brought against private attorney, insurance, and other
Defendants who misused civil or criminal process for ulterior purposes.”121 In paragraph
324, the Plaintiffs allege that Count XVII “is brought against private attorney and
Insurance Defendants whose conduct caused or contributed to the improper property
harm through civil judgment and judicial-mortgage mechanisms.”122
These factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint are made
against the “attorney Defendants” as a group and, as a result, fail to notify the Insurance
Attorneys of the claims against each of them or the grounds on which each claim rests.
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not allow the Court or the Insurance Attorneys to discern what
wrongful conduct Plaintiffs allege each Insurance Attorney committed. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs do not include any allegations showing how the Insurance Attorneys acted
improperly other than general allegations that they participated in the underlying civil
action. Plaintiffs’ allegations relate generally to filing materials in the underlying civil
litigation and obtaining and recording a judgment against Mr. Lightfoot; Plaintiffs fail to
detail any specific action each of the attorneys took in the underlying civil action, let alone
any wrongful action.
119 Id. at ¶ 157.
120 Id. at ¶ 179.
121 Id. at ¶ 291.
122 Id. at ¶ 324. As discussed in Section III infra, the claims in Counts XII and XVII are prescribed.
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In addition, as with the Insurance Defendants, Plaintiffs do not allege facts
supporting the elements of any cause of action against the Insurance Attorneys. A plaintiff
“must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a
valid claim.”123 To plausibly state a claim against the Insurance Attorneys, Plaintiffs’
complaint would have to include factual allegations supporting the elements of each cause
of action and show how they are entitled to relief.124
The Insurance Attorneys were counsel for the various Insurance Defendants, not
for Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue they at least have made a claim against Strauss based on his
intentional conduct.125 “Louisiana subscribes to the traditional, majority view that an
attorney does not owe a legal duty to his client's adversary when acting in his client's
behalf. A non-client, therefore, cannot hold his adversary's attorney personally liable for
either malpractice or negligent breach of a professional obligation. The intent of this rule
is not to reduce an attorney's responsibility for his or her work, but rather to prevent a
chilling effect on the adversarial practice of law and to prevent a division of loyalty owed
to a client.”126 “[E]ven though an attorney does not generally owe a legal duty to his client’s
adversary, under the broad ambit of LSA-C.C. art. 2315, an attorney may be held
personally accountable for his intentional tortious conduct.”127 Intentionally tortious
action, even if ostensibly performed for a client’s benefit, will not shroud an attorney with
immunity.128
123 City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010).
124 Id. at 152.
125 R. Doc. 94 at P. 7.
126 Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So.2d 127, 130 (La. 1994).
127 Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577, 582 (La. 1989).
128 Id.
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Under Louisiana law, a petition alleging an intentional tort in this context “must
allege facts showing specific malice or an intent to cause direct harm on the part of the
attorney in order to state a cause of action against an adversary’s attorney.129
Furthermore, Louisiana courts have held that the plaintiff must prevail in the underlying
case before being permitted to sue the adversary’s attorney, even for intentional acts.130
Plaintiffs allege that Strauss engaged in “extra-judicial conduct, evidence of retaliatory
motive, evidence of civil-to-criminal pressure, and evidence of an improper use of civil
and criminal process beyond ordinary advocacy.131 Plaintiffs did not allege facts that if
undisputed would show that Strauss had specific malice towards the Plaintiffs or an intent
to cause them direct harm. Finally, Plaintiffs do not allege that they prevailed in the
underlying civil action.
Plaintiffs’ barebones allegations fail to plead facts to support the elements of any
of Plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action against the Attorney Defendants. For this reason,
as well, Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid claim for relief against them.
III. Even if Plaintiffs stated Louisiana tort claims against the Insurance
Defendants and Insurance Attorneys, the claims in Counts XII, XIII,
XV, XVI, and XVII are prescribed.
As discussed more fully in Sections I and II supra, Plaintiffs have engaged in
impermissible group pleading against the Insurance Defendants and Insurance
129 Landry v. Base Camp Management, LLC, 206 So.3d 921, 925 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2016).
130 Montalvo, 637 So.2d at 131-132.
131 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 40-41.
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Attorneys. As a result, the Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to provide those defendants with
notice of the claims against them or the grounds upon which Plaintiffs’ claims rest. In fact,
Plaintiffs do not reference the Insurance Defendants or Insurance Attorneys by name in
any of their 20 causes of action. Instead, the Plaintiffs allege that “defendants” collectively
have committed various acts of wrongdoing without specifying which defendant did
which acts.132 As discussed above, this alone is grounds to dismiss the claims against the
Insurance Defendants and Insurance Attorneys. Even if Plaintiffs had stated Louisiana
tort causes of action against the Insurance Defendants and Insurance Attorneys in Counts
XII, XIII, XV, XVI, and XVII, those claims are prescribed.
Counts XII and XVII, both of which are based on the Louisiana tort of abuse of
process, are brought against “private attorney” and “insurance” defendants.133 Louisiana
recognizes abuse of process claims under La. Civ. Code art. 2315.134 To state an abuse of
process claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; and (2) a
willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the
proceeding.”135 Abuse of process is a tort claim that, at the time the incidents alleged
herein occurred, was governed by La. C.C. art. 3492, which provided a prescriptive period
of one year from the date of injury or damage.136 The Court must determine whether the
prescriptive period for this claim begins to run from the date the defendant allegedly used
132 Id.
133 Id. at ¶¶ 291 and 324.
134 Waguespack, Seago & Carmichael (A PLC) v. Lincoln, 1999-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So. 2d
287, 290.
135 Id. (citing Succession of Cutrer v. Curtis, 341 So.2d 1209, 1213-14 (La.App. 1 Cir.1976)).
136 Morice v. Yorkshire Ct. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 23-118, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/23), 377 So.3d 848, 853
(stating that “claims for abuse of process raise delictual claims that are subject to a prescriptive period of
one year.”); Louisiana law regarding prescription was amended effective July 1, 2024 to extend the one-
year prescriptive period to a two-year prescriptive period for delictual actions. See La. C.C. art. 3493.1.
However, these changes apply prospectively only to delictual action arising after July 1, 2024. See 2024 La.
Acts, No. 423, §§ 1 and 2 (providing that the extended period “shall be given prospective application only
and shall apply to delictual actions arising after the effective date of this Act” and that “[t]his Act shall
become effective on July 1, 2024”).
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the improper legal process or from the date the resulting criminal proceeding was
dismissed.
In Rieth v. Munguia, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit analyzed
whether an abuse of process claim had prescribed.137 In that case, the defendant filed a
reconventional demand alleging the plaintiff committed abuse of process by filing the
state court petition relating to a property dispute between the parties.138 The court found
the abuse of process claim was prescribed because the defendant filed the reconventional
demand making the abuse of process claim more than a year after the plaintiff filed the
state court petition that allegedly constituted abuse of process.139 Importantly, the
Louisiana appellate court held “the continuing tort doctrine does not apply to extend the
prescriptive date . . .” and that “[t]he act of filing the petition by [plaintiff] was a singular
act; any damages that occurred may have been continuing, but the allegedly tortious act
occurred when the petition was filed.”140 Similarly, in No Drama, LLC v. Caluda, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit found the prescriptive period for an abuse
of process claim began to run on the date the defendant filed the petition the plaintiff
alleged constituted abuse of process.141 The court held that “[a]lthough plaintiff alleges to
have continuously sustained damages to its reputation and its finances until the dismissal
of the underlying suit, the operating cause, the filing of the lawsuit, is not a continuous
tort.”142 The prescriptive period for an abuse of process claim does not begin at a later
date even when the plaintiff alleges he has continuously sustained damage.143 Moreover,
137 Rieth v. Munguia, 23-0547, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/30/24), 391 So. 3d 39, 43-47.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 48.
140 Id.
141 177 So.3d 747, 752, (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/14/15).
142 Id.
143 Id.
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the prescriptive period does not begin to run at later date just because the plaintiff
allegedly suffered damages from the abuse of process after the abuse of process
occurred.144
The prescriptive period for Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claims against the Insurance
Defendants and Insurance Attorneys began when the allegedly “willful act[s] in the use of
the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding” occurred.145 The
Insurance Defendants and Insurance Attorneys argue that all of their acts alleged to
constitute abuse of process occurred more than one year prior to Plaintiffs filing this
action in state court on October 20, 2025.146 Liberty Mutual argues that Mr. Lightfoot was
arrested on January 6, 2015; the Orleans Parish Civil District Court issued a judgment
against him for attorneys’ fees in the underlying civil litigation on January 23, 2015; and
the civil judgment was recorded in parish mortgage records, thereby creating a judicial
mortgage, on August 22, 2016.147 As a result, Liberty Mutual argues any alleged abuse of
process occurred more than one year before Plaintiffs filed this action.148 Pipes and
Beckman adopted the arguments of Liberty Mutual.149 Similarly, Progressive and United
argue the judgment against Mr. Lightfoot in the underlying civil litigation occurred more
than a decade before Plaintiffs filed this action and, as a result, any claim for abuse of
process related to that judgment has prescribed.150 Massey and Strauss also argue that
the abuse of process claim against them has prescribed.151
144 Id.
145 See Waguespack, Seago & Carmichael (A PLC) v. Lincoln, 1999-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So.
2d 287, 290.
146 R. Docs. 64-1 at p. 8; 79-1 at p. 7.
147 R. Doc. 64-1 at p. 8.
148 Id. at p. 9.
149 R. Doc. 65-1.
150 R. Doc. 79-1.
151 R. Doc. 80-1 at pp. 7-8.
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Plaintiffs argue they allege “multiple forms of process” including “criminal
affidavits, police reports, warrants, and prosecution.”152 Plaintiffs argue their complaint
alleges that the “false narrative” of Lightfoot’s $50,000 payment from Progressive was
used in later criminal proceedings and that Progressive failed to correct this false
representation.153 As a result, Plaintiffs argue that some of their later alleged instances of
abuse of process occurred after the judgment in the underlying civil case and have not
prescribed.154 A close reading of the Second Amended Complaint reveals that these
allegations regarding criminal affidavits, police reports, warrants, and prosecution are
made against defendants Megan Kiefer, Ignatz Kiefer, William Kelly, and Glenn Pardiane,
not those defendants defined as Insurance Defendants or Insurance Attorneys in this
Order.155
It is clear that all of the alleged acts of abuse of process by the Insurance
Defendants and Insurance Attorneys occurred well over a year prior to Plaintiffs filing the
present action. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege: on January 23, 2015, “private attorney
Defendants” obtained a civil judgment against Mr. Lightfoot in the underlying civil
litigation;156 and on August 22, 2016 “attorney and insurance Defendants recorded or
caused to be recorded” the judgment in the underlying civil litigation as a judicial
mortgage against Lightfoot’s homestead.157 Most of the acts by the Insurance Defendants
and the Insurance Attorneys that Plaintiffs allege harmed them occurred at least a decade
ago. Plaintiffs do not allege, nor could they, that the Insurance Defendants or Insurance
152 R. Doc. 75 at p. 8.
153 R. Doc. 93 at p. 19.
154 Id.
155 R. Doc. 60, Megan Kiefer at ¶¶ 34-36; Ignatz Keifer at ¶¶ 37-38; William Kelly at ¶47, and Glenn Pardiane
at ¶ 61.
156 Id. at ¶ 124.
157 Id. at ¶ 126.
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Attorneys participated in Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution outside of Progressive
responding to a subpoena duces tecum in 2019, which also occurred well outside the
prescriptive period.158 Moreover, Mr. Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution was allegedly
initiated by NOPD Detective Frank Denton and LSP Lieutenant Alan Arcana.159 Even if
the Court found that, somehow, the initiation of Mr. Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution
constituted abuse of process on the part of the Insurance Defendants or the Insurance
Lawyers, Mr. Lightfoot was arrested in 2015, over a decade before the present action was
filed.
Counts XIII Louisiana Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation, Count XV Louisiana
Loss of Consortium, Service, and Society, and Count XVI Louisiana Negligence/Gross
Fault/Civil Fault are prescribed. These Louisiana tort claims, at the time the incidents
alleged herein occurred, were governed by La. C.C. art. 3492, which provided a
prescriptive period of one year from the date of injury or damage.160 The last date
Plaintiffs allege the Insurance Defendants committed acts harming them was the
recording of the judgment in the underlying civil action in parish mortgage records,
thereby creating a judicial mortgage, on August 22, 2016.161 Accordingly, these Louisiana
torts claims also have prescribed.
IV. Even if Plaintiffs stated federal law claims against the Insurance
Defendants and Insurance Attorneys, claims under Count VIII Civil
Rights Conspiracy and Count IX Neglect to Prevent Civil Rights
Conspiracy are prescribed.
158 Id.
159 Id. at ¶¶ 101, 116.
160 As discussed supra Section I, the Louisiana tort claims in count XI Louisiana Malicious Prosecution and
Count XIV Louisiana Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress are dismissed for failure to state a claim and
for impermissible group pleading.
161 R. Doc. 64-1 at p. 8.
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The Court has found that Plaintiffs have engaged in impermissible group pleading
against the Insurance Defendants and Insurance Attorneys and the claims against them
should be dismissed for that reason alone. To the extent Plaintiffs assert causes of action
against the Insurance Defendants under Count VIII—Civil Rights Conspiracy—and Count
IX—Neglect to Prevent Civil Rights Conspiracy—these claims also are prescribed.162
In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), stating:
This Count is brought against Defendants who reached an agreement, explicit or
implicit, to deprive Mr. Lightfoot of equal protection or equal privileges and
immunities.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to fabricate, adopt, repeat, conceal, and
continue using the false $50,000 Progressive-payment narrative.
Plaintiffs allege overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including Kiefer’s
affidavit, Denton’s report and warrant application, Pardiane’s SIU representation,
Arcana’s LSP report, Bardley’s approval, prosecutorial continuation, Internal
Affairs ratification, failure to correct records, and continued property pressure.
Plaintiffs allege that the conspiracy was motivated by race-based discriminatory
animus and resulted in injury to Mr. Lightfoot and his family.163
In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, stating:
This Count is brought against Defendants who knew of the § 1985 conspiracy,
had power to prevent or aid in preventing it, and neglected or refused to do so.
Supervisory, policymaking, prosecutorial, Internal Affairs, and insurance
Defendants were placed on notice through complaints, letters, subpoena
proceedings, internal-affairs materials, and court proceedings.
Defendants had the ability to correct records, disclose evidence, halt the
prosecution, retract false reports, discipline personnel, or prevent further injury.
162 Plaintiffs argue that the prescriptive period for fabrication of evidence in Count III begins when the
criminal proceeding terminates in the plaintiff’s favor, not when the plaintiff first learns of the allegedly
fabricated evidence. McDonough v. Smith, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022). Count III is brought against Megan
Kiefer, Glenn Pardiane, Frank Denton, Alan Arcana, Sgt. Patrick Bardley, and “any prosecutorial Defendant
who non-immune investigative or evidence-management conduct involved fabrication or continued use of
fabricated evidence.” These defendants do not include the Insurance Defendants or the Insurance
Attorneys.
163 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 262-266.
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Defendants neglected or refused to prevent the continued constitutional violations.
Plaintiffs plead this claim within the one-year limitation period to the extent the
last overt acts and continuing failures occurred within the applicable period and
plead all timeliness doctrines in the alternative.164
As there is no federal statute of limitations for §§ 1985(3), Louisiana’s prescriptive
period for personal injury claims is applicable to this claim.165 At the time the alleged
incidents occurred, personal injury claims were governed by La. C.C. art. 3492, which
provided for a prescriptive period of one year from the date of injury or damage.
Accordingly, under Louisiana law, Plaintiff’s §§ 1985(3) claim is subject to a one-year
prescriptive period.166 The prescriptive period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 is one
year. The prescriptive period for a claim under of 42 U.S.C. § § 1985(3) and 1986 begins
to run from the moment the plaintiff becomes aware or has sufficient information to know
that his rights have been violated.167 In this matter, Plaintiffs became aware of the alleged
conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and the Insurance Defendants
alleged failure to prevent this conspiracy, when they became aware that Mr. Lightfoot’s
criminal prosecution relied on Mr. Lightfoot’s receipt of a $50,000 payment from
Progressive. Plaintiffs were or should have been aware of the “false payment narrative”
when Mr. Lightfoot was arrested in 2015. At the latest, Plaintiffs were aware that the
Insurance Defendants had allegedly conspired to create this “false payment narrative”
when Lieutenant Arcana testified in the underlying criminal proceeding that “the
$50,000 representation came from Progressive SIU personnel, including Pardiane.”168 At
that point, and likely well before, Plaintiffs were aware that a Progressive employee had
164 Id. at ¶¶ 262-266.
165 See Anders v. Town of Franklinton, No. CV 25-869, 2025 WL 3017217, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2025)
(citing Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1987).
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 121.
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communicated with the state police concerning the “false payment narrative.” As a result,
Plaintiffs were aware that he had suffered an injury from the Insurance Defendants’ and
Insurance Attorneys’ alleged conspiracy, or neglect to prevent a conspiracy, on August 22,
2022, several years before this action was filed. This date falls outside of the one-year
prescriptive period that governs §§ 1985(3) and 1986. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under
these statutes are prescribed.
In addition, Section 1986 provides for liability against third parties based on their
knowledge of Section 1985 violations. Section 1986 does not provide an independent
cause of action but instead requires the existence of a valid claim under Section 1985.169
“[A] valid § 1985 claim is a prerequisite to a § 1986 claim.”170 Even if the Plaintiffs Section
1986 claim had not prescribed, this cause of action is not cognizable because Plaintiffs fail
to state a valid Section 1985 claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ cause of action under Section
1986 will be dismissed with prejudice on these grounds, as well.
V. Plaintiffs have been given multiple opportunities to amend their
complaint and will not be given another.
Plaintiffs ask the Court for leave to amend their complaint in the event the Court
“concludes Plaintiffs should plead more defendant-specific facts.”171 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely granted when justice so
requires.” A “court must have a ‘substantial reason’ to deny a request for leave to amend”
169 Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 799 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981).
170 Bryan v. City of Madison, Miss., 213 F.3d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 2000).
171 R. Doc. 75 at p. 12.
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and “may consider factors such as whether there has been ‘undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of
amendment.’”172 “The district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a
motion to amend.”173
The Court will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs already have filed four
complaints—three petitions in state court and one amended complaint in this action after
they retained counsel.174 Plaintiffs have had ample opportunities to state plausible claims
for relief against the Insurance Defendants and the Insurance Attorneys. The Court finds
the fact that the Plaintiffs have been given numerous opportunities to amend is a
substantial reason to justify a refusal to allow the Plaintiffs another opportunity. The
Court is not obligated to provide Plaintiffs with unlimited opportunities to try to state a
claim against the Insurance Defendants and the Insurance Attorneys.
Based on Plaintiffs’ “repeated failure[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed,”175 the Court finds further amendment is not warranted. Moreover,
any amendment to Plaintiffs’ abuse of process and other Louisiana tort claims would
prove futile, as Plaintiffs cannot remedy the deficiency to the extent the claims have
prescribed.176 As a result, the Court will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint
and will decide these motions based on the current pleadings.
172 Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 566 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Jacobsen v.
Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998)).
173 Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones
v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)).
174 Plaintiffs even had the benefit of a review of their proposed amended complaint (R. Doc. 52-1) by the
Court. The Court advised Plaintiffs that the proposed amended complaint failed to address the arguments
raised in the defendants’ motions to dismiss and that it should be revised before filing. R. Doc. 53.
175 Herrmann Holdings Ltd., 302 F.3d at 566.
176 See Section III supra.
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CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company is GRANTED.177
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by Progressive
Direct Insurance Company, Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company, and United
Financial Casualty Company is GRANTED.178
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by Henry Pipes
and Kristin Beckman is GRANTED.179
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by Adam Massey
and David Strauss is GRANTED.180
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s causes of action against Progressive
Direct Insurance Company, Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company, United Financial
Casualty Company, Kristin Beckman, Henry Pipes, Adam Massey, and David Strauss are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 181
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of October, 2026.
________ ______ _____________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
177 R. Doc. 64.
178 R. Doc. 79.
179 R. Doc. 65.
180 R. Doc. 80.
181 Plaintiffs seek to hold Progressive and Liberty vicariously liable for the actions of their attorneys and
other agents. R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 53, 57. Progressive requested that these vicarious liability claims also be
dismissed. R. Doc. 79-1 at p. 8. Vicarious liability is not a cause of action but instead is a method of holding
one party financially responsible for another party’s action. The Court will address Plaintiffs’ attempts to
hold Progressive and Liberty liable for the torts of their employees and agents at a later date, if necessary.
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