USA v. Metevia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS
ADAM C. METEVIA NO. 24-00004-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant's IVlotion To Dismiss Count One Of The
Indictment (Doc. 15, the "Motion"), which raised facial and as-applied
constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l), as well as Defendants
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Indictment In Light OfDiaz
(Doc. 31). The Government has opposed Defendant's Motion. (Doc. 32). For reasons
provided below, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 allows parties to "raise by pretrial
motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial
on the merits." Fed. R. Grim. P. 12(b)(l).
Here, Defendant pursues "as applied" and facial challenges to § 922(g)(l). "The
distinction between as applied and facial challenges is sometimes hazy." United
States v. Perez, 43 F. 4th 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Generally,
however, in an as-applied challenge, the Court assesses whether a law with some
permissible uses "is nonetheless unconstitutional as applied to [the defendant's]
activity." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 (1974) (reversing defendant's
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criminal conviction); see Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969) (same). By
contrast, in a facial challenge, the Court looks more broadly, assessing whether a law
"could never be applied in a valid manner." M^embers of City Council of City of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984).
II. DISCUSSION
Since the filing of Defendant's Motion, the Supreme Court and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have provided additional guidance on the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). The Court outlines such developments
below, then analyzes the impact of this case law on Defendant's Motion.
a. Second Amendment Jurisprudence
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend.
II. These twenty-seven words, largely unquestioned since their first utterance, see
DannyY. Li, ANTISUBORDINATING THE SECOND AMENDMENT, 132 Yale L.J. 1821, 1846
(2023), have caused considerable consternation among our Nation's courts in the past
two decades. The results of this attention have been dramatic. The Second
Amendment was reinterpreted to provide an individual right to firearms, D.C. v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008), the Supreme Court declared that the Second
Amendment is no longer a so-called "second-class right," New York State Rifle &
Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 70 (2022), and existing constitutional tests for
firearm regulations were upended in favor of extended dives into distant history in
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search of metaphorical ancestors to present-day legislation. See United States v.
Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 697-701 (2024).
Thus, the Court arrives at its current marching orders. When a challenge to
firearm legislation is lodged, the Court is to: (1) ascertain whether the "Second
Amendment's plain text covers [the] individual's conduct," and (2) if the Second
Amendment does cover the relevant conduct, determine whether the Government has
satisfied its burden of showing that "the regulation is consistent with this Nation s
historical tradition of firearm regulation." Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022). In this
process, the Court must not conflate the requirement for a "historical analogue" with
a necessity for a "historical twin," or an identical regulation from this Nation s early
history. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 701.
The Fifth Circuit has also provided guidance to lower courts for navigating the
post-Bruen landscape. In United States v. Bias, 116 F.4th 458, 471 (5th Cir. 2024),
the Fifth Circuit held § 922(g)(l) constitutional as applied to a defendant possessing
prior convictions for car theft, evading arrest, and possessing a firearm as a felon.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that since theft was a felony at the time of the Founding,
and since felonies at the time of the Founding were punishable by death, then the
non-capital punishment of disarmament is also permissible. Id. at 469. The Fifth
Circuit further noted the existence of other laws in place at the time of the Founding
that disarmed "those who menaced others with firearms," "disrupted the 'public
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order,'" and pursued actions that "Ie [d] almost necessarily to actual violence." Id. at
470-471 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 697).
Since deciding Diaz, the Fifth Circuit has not had occasion to consider the
constitutionality of an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(l) for a defendant specifically
having an underlying felony conviction for drug possession. However, numerous
district courts in the Fifth Circuit have upheld § 922(g)(l)'s constitutionality in the
face of as-applied challenges for defendants with felony drug possession convictions
under the theory that several founding-era laws banning the possession and/or
trafficking of various items of non-alcoholic or present-day controlled substance
contraband" constitute the requisite historical analogue to present-day laws
banning drug possession. See United States v. Robinson, No. 2:22-cr-00253, 2024 WL
4827375 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 2024); United States v. Walton, No. 2:24-cr-00066, 2025
WL 259370 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2025); United States v. Carter, No. 2:23-cr-00022, 2024
WL 4723236 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2024); United States v. Wilson, No. 2:22-cr-00238, 2024
WL 4436637 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2024); United States v. Barfield, No. 2:24-cr-00007,
2024 WL 4859094 (W.D. La. Nov. 21, 2024); United States v. Patino, No. 7:24-cr-
00060, 2024 WL 5010146 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2024); United States v. Mack, No. 3:24-
cr-00244, 2025 WL 221808 (W.D. La. Jan. 16, 2025); United States v. Landrum, No.
3:24-cr-00063, 2024 WL 4806486 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 15, 2024); United States v. Staeger,
No. l:24-cr-00108, 2025 WL 605053 (S.D. Miss. Feb, 25, 2025).
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b. Defendant's Challenges to § 922(g)(l)
The Court begins with Defendant's facial attack on § 922(g)(l). Such an attack
was foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Diaz. To sustain a facial challenge,
"the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
statute would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The Fifth
Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(l) was constitutional as applied to Diaz, and thereby ruled
that § 922(g)(l) is facially constitutional. Bias, 116 F.4th at 472.
Regarding Defendant's as-applied challenge, for present purposes the
Government cedes that the first step of the Bruen analysis is satisfied as to
Defendant, and that Defendant, as a member of "the people, is afforded Second
Amendment rights. (Doc. 32 at 5-6). The Government likewise does not contend, for
present purposes, that the Second Amendment's plain text does not cover Defendant's
conduct. (Id. at 6). The Court thus proceeds to the second step: whether there is a
historical analogue for the application of § 922(g)(l) to Defendant.
The Government contends that there are historical analogues—namely,
statutes forbidding "contraband" possession in place at or around the era of our
Founding—that support the application of § 922(g)(l) to Defendant. (Id. at 7-11). To
that end, the Government cites numerous authorities for the proposition that certain
forms of contraband possession constituted common-law felonies punishable by death
or many years' incarceration in the United States during the Founding Era. (Id.). As
noted supra, the broad consensus among the vast preponderance of districts in the
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Fifth Circuit has been to accept this characterization of the legal climate in the
Founding Era. And, although the Fifth Circuit has not yet ruled squarely on the issue,
many circuit and district courts across the country have furthered this understanding
of § 922(g)(l)'s constitutionality as applied to those with narcotics possession
convictions such as that accrued by the Defendant.1 See United States v. Jackson, 110
F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024) (holding that Congress may disarm individuals with
certain felony convictions who present an unacceptable risk of dangerousness or
"who deviate [d] from legal norms," such as through drug possession); United States
v. Canales, 702 F. Supp. 3d 322 (E.D. Pa. 2023); United States v. Gains, 647 F. Supp.
3d 538(F.Supp. 3d 538 (E.D. Ky. 2022), aff'd, 118 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2024); United
States v. Pearson, No. OR 22-271, 2023 WL 6216527 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2023); United
States v. Blackshear, No. CR 23-159, 2023 WL 5985284 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2023);
United States v. Reichenbach, No. 4:22-CR-57, 2023 WL 5916467 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11,
2023); United States v. Wise, No. 21-CR-511, 2023 WL 6260038 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26,
2023).
This Court, too, recently found that a defendant's prior convictions for
possession of drugs and possession of a firearm alongside drugs were sufficiently
1 The Court notes that in United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), the Fifth Circuit
ruled that "disarming a sober person based solely on past substance usage" did not fit within our
nation s history and tradition. However, the Fifth Circuit distinguished this ruling in United States
v. Contreras, 125 F.4th 725 (5th Cir. 2025), by upholding § 922(g)(l) as applied to a defendant who
was under the influence of marijuana at the time of his arrest for possession of a firearm, and in
United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cu\ 2025), by upholding its application to a defendant
with prior convictions for drug trafficking.
6
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analogous to the founding era crimes of "possession of and trafficking in contraband,
such that disarmament on these grounds "fits nearly within [our nation's historical]
tradition." United States v. Chenier, 2025 WL 1901345, at *4 (M.D. La. July 9, 2025)
(deGravelles, J.).
The government also argues that application of § 922(g)(l) to Defendant is
constitutional on account of his dangerousness, noting that "each of the predicate
offenses arose out of Defendant's use of a firearm to commit or threaten a violent act.
(Doc. 32 at 12-13). The Fifth Circuit has indeed held that disarmament is valid based
on a defendant's perceived dangerousness, United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269,
278 (5th Cir. 2024), that "drugs and guns are a dangerous combination, Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993), and that courts may consider the facts
underlying a defendant's felony convictions. United States v. Bullock, 123 F.4th 183,
185 (5th Cir. 2024). Here, the government has similarly shown that the circumstances
surrounding Defendant's prior convictions and arrest were sufficiently dangerous
such that the application of § 922(g)(l) does not offend our nations history and
tradition of disarmament.
Based on the authority described supra and the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Diaz,
the Court concludes that the Government has carried its burden under step two of
the Bruen analysis to identify a historical analogue such that § 922(g)(l)'s application
to Defendant, who has previously been convicted of Schedule II drug possession, (Doc.
32 at 2), "fits neatly" within our Nation's history and tradition. See Rahimi, 602 U.S.
7
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at 698. In reaching this decision, the Court adopts and relies on the Fifth Circuit s
reasoning in Diaz comparing the "why" and "how" of the historical analogues to
922(g)(l). See 116. F.4th at 469. The Fifth Circuit instructed that the purpose behind
imposing capital punishment or estate forfeiture for common-law felonies was to
deter violence and lawlessness, and that the method of punishment was chosen
specifically for its permanence. Id. Just so here. As applied to Defendant, § 922(g)(l) s
purpose is to deter future violence and lawlessness, and the method is a serious and
irrevocable punishment—permanent disarmament—that is a similarly substantial,
albeit more forgiving, discipline than Defendant would have faced in this Nation's
early years. The Court therefore concludes that § 922(g)(l) is constitutional as applied
to Defendant and will deny Defendant's Motion.2
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion (Doc. 15) be and is hereby
DENIED.
2 The Court also finds that § 922(g)(l) is constitutional as applied to Defendant based on the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Giglio where the court found an independent basis to uphold a
§ 922 (g)(l) conviction where the defendant was found armed while still serving his sentence on
supervised release—again because, historically, convicts could be required to forfeit their weapons
and were prevented from reacquiring arms until they had finished serving their sentences. 126
F.4th 1039, 1044 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Contreras, 125 F.4th
725, 732—33 (5th Cir. 2025). Here, Defendant was similarly arrested in possession of a firearm while
serving his sentence supervised release. (Doc. 32 at 13).
8
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a telephone status conference in this
matter shall be SET for February 11, 2026, at 3:00 P.M. Dial-in information will be
sent to counsel separately.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this
^ of February, 2026
JUDGE BRIAN A. JA(t?SON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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