USA v. Lara et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
LEONARDO LARA,
Defendant.
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Criminal Action No. 23-cr-10207-ADB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Before the Court is Defendant Leonardo Lara’s motion for issuance of a post-trial
subpoena duces tecum, [ECF No. 320 (“Mot.”)], in which he seeks an order allowing him to
serve third-party discovery requests to obtain impeachment evidence against a cooperating
witness called by the government at Lara’s trial. For the following reasons, the motion is
DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 20, 2025, following a five-day trial, a jury found Lara guilty of conspiring to
distribute cocaine and possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. [ECF Nos. 257–261,
263]. The Court has already recounted the factual background of this case and a summary of the
evidence presented at trial in its memorandum and order denying Lara’s renewed motion for
acquittal and for a new trial, see United States v. Lara (Lara I), No. 23-cr-10207, 2026 WL
1785172, at *1–3 (D. Mass. June 22, 2026), and will generally assume familiarity with the same.
As relevant to the present motion, the government relied at trial on the testimony of
Merced Navarro-Morfin, a cooperating witness who testified that he and Lara were “‘partners’ in
the ‘cocaine business.’” Lara I, 2026 WL 1785172, at *1. The government also presented the
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jury with other evidence of Lara’s involvement in a cocaine conspiracy, including that “eight
kilograms of cocaine [were] seized from his house.” Id. at *5.
In his motion, Lara asserts that Navarro-Morfin testified falsely to certain facts, including
(1) the extent of the involvement of a third individual, Leandro Martinez, in the conspiracy, and
(2) whether Lara spoke with Navarro-Morfin on the phone on April 20, 2022, the day law
enforcement performed a traffic stop of Lara and later seized cocaine, money, and drug
paraphernalia from his house. [Mot. at 3–4]. Lara contends that these falsehoods were material
and strongly diminish Navarro-Morfin’s credibility. [Id.].
In order to demonstrate the purported falsity of Navarro-Morfin’s statements in a post-
trial motion, Lara seeks the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to pursue two categories of
evidence.1 [Mot. at 2]. First, he wants to obtain recordings of approximately two months of
Navarro-Morfin’s jail calls from Wyatt Detention Facility, which he claims will reveal evidence
that Navarro-Morfin told Martinez’s wife that Navarro-Morfin planned to minimize Martinez’s
role in the conspiracy during his testimony. [Id. at 2–3]. Second, Lara seeks cell phone location
records from T-Mobile, which he claims will demonstrate that the cell phone Lara called on
April 20, 2022, was not at the house where Navarro-Morfin testified he was located at the time
of the call. [Id. at 3–4]. The government opposes Lara’s motion. [ECF No. 338 (“Resp.”)].
1 Lara already filed a motion for a new trial prior to the present motion, [ECF No. 290], which
the Court denied, see Lara I, 2026 WL 1785172, at *4–6. The Court therefore understands that
Lara is seeking the evidence at issue to prepare for a successive motion for a new trial.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) allows the Court to issue a subpoena to “direct
[a] witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before they are to be offered in
evidence.” In order to obtain such a subpoena, the moving party must show:
(1) that the documents [sought] are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not
otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence;
(3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and
inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith
and is not intended as a general ‘fishing expedition.’
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699 (1974).
Because the rule itself speaks only of issuing subpoenas for pre-trial purposes, “there is
conflicting authority as to their availability with respect to post-trial motions and sentencing.”
United States v. Bendy, No. 24-cr-00109, 2026 WL 1217369, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 1, 2026)
(first citing United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825, 833 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding that Rule 17(c)
does not preclude the issuance of a subpoena for post-trial motions and sentencing); and then
citing United States v. Martin, 141 F.3d 1152 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that Rule 17(c) only
applies to pretrial matters)). Where courts find that the rule allows post-trial subpoenas, they
apply the same Nixon factors but consider the relevance, necessity, and good faith of the
subpoena with respect to the anticipated post-trial motion or sentencing, rather than to trial. See
Winner, 641 F.2d at 833; United States v. Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f a pre-
sentencing subpoena is sought, the trial court must apply the Nixon factors in the specific context
of sentencing.”).2
2 In his motion, Lara also makes reference to “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the [C]ompulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and 28 U.S.C. § 1825,” a statute
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Lara argues that the evidence he intends to pursue through his requested subpoenas is
relevant to a potential motion for a new trial because it will demonstrate that Navarro-Morfin
“perpetrated a fraud on the Court by perjuring himself regarding roles in the conspiracy.” [Mot.
at 3]. The government responds that impeachment evidence is not a proper target of a post-trial
subpoena and that, in any event, the evidence Lara seeks is irrelevant, and some of it no longer
exists. [Resp. at 3–6].
The government is largely correct. Even assuming that Rule 17 allows for the issuance of
subpoenas for post-trial purposes, and that the evidence will show what Lara claims it will show,
such evidence would have little to no bearing on the soundness of Lara’s conviction and would
not entitle him to a new trial. As the Court has already observed, “there was ample evidence
against Lara—including the eight kilograms of cocaine seized from his house—that was entirely
independent of Navarro-Morfin’s testimony at trial,” Lara I, 2026 WL 1785172, at *5, and the
sought-after evidence is therefore of little relevance to any successive motion for a new trial.
Moreover, like the text message evidence Lara already presented in his previous motion
for a new trial, the areas of Navarro-Morfin’s testimony implicated by this impeachment
evidence do not meaningfully call into question the jury’s verdict. Martinez’s role in the
conspiracy, and the occurrence of a specific telephone conversation between Lara and Navarro-
governing the payment of witness fees. [Mot. at 1]. Lara does not, however, explain their
relevance to his request for a subpoena or cite any cases discussing them. To the extent Lara
intended to raise these other sources of law as distinct bases for granting his requested
subpoenas, he has waived any such argument by failing to adequately develop or explain it. See
LaVallee v. Town of Dedham, 736 F. Supp. 3d 26, 53 (D. Mass. 2024) (“When an issue is
merely mentioned in an undeveloped fashion and in a perfunctory manner, the court may deem
the issue waived.” (quoting Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F. Supp. 2d 198, 213 (D.P.R.
2013))), appeal dismissed, No. 24-cv-01644, 2024 WL 5347171 (1st Cir. Nov. 26, 2024).
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Morfin, are tangential to the fundamental facts underlying Lara’s guilt, particularly in light of the
strength of other evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, because the Court finds it unlikely
that the potential impeachment evidence at issue “could in any reasonable likelihood have
affected the judgment of the jury,” Lara I, 2026 WL 1785172, at *5 (quoting United States v.
Vavic, 139 F.4th 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2025)), it cannot conclude that the evidence Lara seeks is
“evidentiary and relevant” under Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Lara’s motion for issuance of a post-trial subpoena duces
tecum, [ECF No. 320], is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
October 13, 2026 	/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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