USA v. McCroskey et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	*
v. 	* 	Criminal Action No. RDB-22-220
Civil Action No. RDB-25-1232
*
SUMMER NICHOLE M C CROSKEY,
*
Defendant.
*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Summer Nichole McCroskey is serving a 960-month prison sentence after
pleading guilty, without a written plea agreement, on February 2, 2023, to conspiracy to
commit sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e); seven counts of
sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); and three counts of
possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). (ECF Nos. 43,
44.) In its Sentencing Memorandum, the Government sought a sentence of 2,760 months, or
230 years. (ECF No. 63 at 2 *SEALED*.) McCroskey asked the Court to impose the
mandatory-minimum 180-month, or fifteen-year, sentence. (ECF No. 56 at 2 *SEALED*.)
On May 18, 2023, the Court sentenced McCroskey to 960 months, or eighty years, a term
within the Sentencing Guidelines range. (ECF No. 70.) The Court also imposed eighty years
of supervised release. (Id.)
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 1 of 15

2
Now pending is McCroskey’s pro se § 2255 Motion (ECF No. 108)1 in which she raises
several arguments to vacate or correct her sentence. The Government filed a Response. (ECF
No. 114.) The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions; no hearing is necessary. See Loc.
R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the following reasons, McCroskey’s § 2255 Motion (ECF No.
108) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual History
McCroskey and her husband and co-defendant Lawrence Aquilla Colby IV2 brutally
and serially sexually abused their daughter, Jane Doe, from the time she was three months old
until she was two years old. (ECF No. 114 at 1.) Jane Doe was born in October 2019. (Id. at
1–2.) Beginning on January 21, 2020, when Jane Doe was only three months old, McCroskey
produced a video and images depicting Jane Doe naked with her genitals exposed. (Id. at 2.)
In the video, McCroskey slapped Jane Doe’s buttocks. (Id.) This behavior escalated as time
went on. For example, in February 2020, McCroskey and her husband produced a video and
images that showed Jane Doe, then just four months old, naked, with her genitals exposed,
and with McCroskey slapping her buttocks while her husband, Colby, forced his penis into
her mouth. (Id.) Later, in March 2020, McCroskey produced videos and images in which she
fondled and spit on Jane Doe’s exposed genitals. (Id.) Also in March 2020, McCroskey
1 Unless otherwise noted, all docket references are to McCroskey’s criminal case, RDB-
22-220.2 Colby pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total term of six hundred months (fifty
years) of imprisonment.
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 2 of 15

3
produced further videos and images in which she placed her tongue and finger on Jane Doe’s
genitals while also using her finger to penetrate Jane Doe’s anus. (Id.)
In October 2021, when Jane Doe was two years old, McCroskey produced videos and
images in which she used her hand to touch Jane Doe’s genitals. (Id.) She then sent those files
to her husband with a message telling him that she was excited to help him “rape
and . . . molest” their daughter, Jane Doe. (Id.) On October 19, 2021, Colby sent McCroskey
a message telling her that he was thinking about “doing dirty pedo things. Like training [Jane
Doe] to be a little fuck toy.” (Id.) McCroskey responded that she could not wait to watch Colby
“molest” Jane Doe the next day. (Id.) On October 20, 2021, Colby and McCroskey bound Jane
Doe’s arms and legs and Colby anally raped her. (Id.) McCroskey produced videos and images
of the rape. (Id.) McCroskey used an encrypted messaging application to send the files of the
rape to Colby with a message reading, “that’s you inside of her.” 	(Id. at 2–3.) McCroskey
proceeded to send the video of the rape to another person and told Colby that she wanted to
make more videos like it. (Id. at 3.) On October 25, 2021, McCroskey and Colby again
restrained Jane Doe. (Id.) McCroskey videotaped Colby vaginally and anally raping the two-
year-old. (Id.) On the video, Jane Doe is screaming, which McCroskey says sounds like
“moaning.” (Id.)
McCroskey produced these videos and images on her mobile phones. (Id.) At least four
separate times in 2020 and 2021, she used an encrypted application to distribute files of Jane
Doe’s abuse to others on the Dark Web and to Colby. (Id.) In December 2021, McCroskey
also distributed child pornography other than what she and Colby made containing Jane Doe.
(Id.)
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 3 of 15

4
In addition to these horrific acts and statements, the Government also produced
significant and separate evidence of McCroskey’s sexual attraction to infants. (Id. at 7.) In
particular, the record contains statements McCroskey made in 2017 to her then-boyfriend
while she was pregnant with a different daughter, not Jane Doe. (Id.) In those messages,
McCroskey indicated an intent to abuse and rape the child once born. (Id.) In other messages
from that time with the same man, McCroskey discussed prior sexual abuse of another infant.
(Id.) She stated that she had taken pictures of that infant’s genitals. (Id.) These messages were
later discovered by that child’s family and then the California Child Protective Services, which
subsequently removed McCroskey’s older daughter from her care. (Id. at 8.)
II. 	Procedural History
On February 11, 2022, McCroskey and Colby were arrested by agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. (Id.) On June 21, 2022, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
charging McCroskey with conspiracy to commit sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2251(e); eight counts of sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2251(2); five counts of distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2);
and 	three 	counts 	of 	possession 	of 	child 	pornography 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§
2252A(a)(5)(B). (ECF No. 1.) The Government specifically declined to offer a plea agreement.
(ECF No. 114 at 8.) On February 2, 2023, McCroskey pleaded guilty to all counts. (ECF No.
44.)
In anticipation of sentencing, the Presentence Report calculated McCroskey’s offense
level to be a 43, the highest level in the Sentencing Guidelines table. (ECF No. 114 at 9.) The
Probation Officer assigned to this case recommended a sentence of 4,800 months, or 400
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 4 of 15

5
years, of imprisonment. (Id.) The Government sought a sentence of 2,760 months, or 230
years, based on the statutory maximum penalty for all counts to which McCroskey pleaded
guilty. (ECF No. 63 at 2 *SEALED*.) McCroskey sought the mandatory-minimum 180-
month, or fifteen-year, sentence. (ECF No. 56 at 2 *SEALED*.)
This Court held a sentencing hearing on May 18, 2023. (ECF No. 70.) The Court
confirmed that McCroskey had reviewed the Presentence Report with her attorney multiple
times, without objection. (Id.) The Court determined that McCroskey’s final offense level was
43 and that she had a criminal history category of I, resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines range
of life imprisonment. (Id.) The Court heard argument from both parties on the length of
sentence to be imposed, and told the parties that it had reviewed the abusive videos and images
with counsel in advance of the sentencing hearing. (Id.) After considering on the record the
factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court imposed a sentence of 960 months, or 80
years, of imprisonment. (Id.) The Court noted the heinous nature of the crimes done to Jane
Doe as well as McCroskey’s difficult childhood. (Id.) The Court particularly noted that it
recognized that McCroskey’s life “has been an almost continuous series of trauma” and
acknowledged that McCroskey had suffered abuse as a child. (Id.) Nevertheless, the Court
found McCroskey to be a serious threat to the community and that a life-equivalent sentence
was proper. (Id.)
On May 23, 2023, McCroskey appealed the Court’s sentence to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. (ECF No. 72.) On April 12, 2024, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s sentence as both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United
States v. McCroskey, No. 23-4364, 2024 WL 1596670, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Apr. 12, 2024) (per
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 5 of 15

6
curiam) (unpublished). The Fourth Circuit noted both that McCroskey had not shown that
her sentence was substantively unreasonable, and that this Court had “crafted a sentence that
carefully considered the gravity of the offense, the deterrent effect of a lengthy sentence, and
the need to protect the public” from McCroskey. Id. at *1. The Fourth Circuit also credited
this Court’s consideration of McCroskey’s mitigation arguments, including her history of
abuse and mental illness.
On April 11, 2025, one year after the Fourth Circuit’s decision, McCroskey filed this
pro se motion to vacate or modify her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 108.) She
alleges three grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) “judicial and
prosecutorial misconduct and bias”; and (3) the “§ 3553(a) factors.” (Id.) This matter is ripe
for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court “liberally construe[s]” pro se filings and “h[olds] [them] to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in federal custody may seek federal habeas relief to
vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence where: (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States;” (2) “the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence;” (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law;”
or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Federal
habeas relief is “an extraordinary remedy,” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998),
and is therefore cabined to those extreme cases in which a sentence represents a fundamental
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 6 of 15

7
constitutional 	or 	jurisdictional 	error. 	United 	States 	v. 	Addonizio, 	442 	U.S. 	178, 	185
(1979). Therefore, a district court may only modify or vacate a sentence in those rare cases in
which not granting relief would “‘inherently result[] in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”
Id. (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
“[I]t is well settled that [a petitioner] cannot ‘circumvent a proper ruling on . . . direct
appeal by re-raising the same challenge in a § 2255 motion.’” United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d
354, 360 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Linder, 552 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2009)). A
petitioner may not “recast, under the guise of collateral attack, questions fully considered by
[the Court of Appeals on direct appeal].” Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 537 F.2d 1182, 1183 (4th
Cir. 1976). Furthermore, “claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral
review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,
504 (2003) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982); Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622).
Conversely, any “failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct
appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under
§ 2255.” Massaro, 538 U.S. at 509. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires that a
petitioner satisfy the two-prong test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476–77 (2000)
(applying Strickland’s two-prong test). A petitioner claiming “ineffective assistance of counsel
must 	show 	(1) 	that 	counsel’s 	representation 	‘fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of
reasonableness,’ and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” Id. at
476–77 	(quoting 	Strickland, 	466 	U.S. 	at 	688, 	694). 	The 	first 	prong, 	also 	called 	the
“performance” prong, requires a petitioner to show that “counsel made errors so serious that
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 7 of 15

8
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687. 	When courts undertake review of this first prong, they adopt a “strong
presumption” that counsel’s actions fall within the “wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689. As regards the second prong, also called the “prejudice” prong, a
petitioner must show that his counsel’s errors deprived him of a fair trial. Id. To establish this
level of prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that there is a “reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 694. A petitioner must meet both prongs of the Strickland test to be entitled
to relief. See id. at 687.
ANALYSIS
McCroskey raises three arguments to vacate or modify her sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. (ECF No. 108.) First, she claims ineffective assistance of counsel by her trial counsel.
(Id.) Second, she claims both judicial and prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.) Third, and finally, she
claims relief pursuant to the factors guiding the imposition of sentences under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). (Id.) Relief is not merited under any of these arguments, and McCroskey’s § 2255
motion is denied.
I. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
McCroskey’s first argument for habeas relief under § 2255 is that her trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. (ECF No. 108 at 4.) She alleges seven separate instances of
ineffective assistance: (1) counsel “[f]ailed to obtain expert psychosexual evaluation that would
show McCroskey is not a threat to society”; (2) counsel “[d]id not argue that there was a
disparity between potential sentence and the sentence of similarly situated offenders”; (3)
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 8 of 15

9
counsel did “[n]ot object[] to preponderance findings, that effected [sic] way defendant was
presented to the court”; (4) counsel “failed to obtain a plea agreement, or any type of proffer
with the court, even though she is thanked for admitting all facts early on and not going to
trial”; (5) “proof of childhood trauma and severe mental health issues went undocumented by
counsel”; (6) counsel “[f]ailed in their duty to make reasonable investigations in which may
have insured [sic] a fair trial”; and (7) counsel “[d]id not show to Court, or make evident that
McCroskey had been admitted to state mental hospital(s).” (Id.)
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the representation of an
attorney that falls “within the range of competence normally demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A criminal defense attorney’s representation of her
client is evaluated from the attorney’s perspective at the time of the trial. Id. at 689. Further,
district courts “must be highly deferential” and “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. It is the
petitioner’s burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). “Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690–91. Put simply, Strickland
sets a “high bar.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
As noted above, for a petitioner to succeed in showing ineffective assistance of counsel
under Strickland, she must show both “(1) that counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 476–77 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694). Showing
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 9 of 15

10
prejudice requires the petitioner to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As the Supreme Court noted in Padilla, “it is often quite
difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice
prong.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371 n.12.
Applying Strickland here, McCroskey cannot show either objectively unreasonable
representation by her trial counsel or that any allegedly deficient performance by her trial
counsel actually prejudiced her. Given this Court’s obligation to start from a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, nothing in McCroskey’s § 2255 motion overcomes that
presumption.
First, McCroskey’s claim of deficient assistance of counsel in not obtaining an expert
psychosexual evaluation is insufficient to show either deficient performance or prejudice.
Nothing in her § 2255 motion raises any inference that such an expert would have led to a
decreased sentence. Indeed, the Probation Officer calculated the Guidelines sentence to be
400 years. (ECF No. 47.) The imposition of an eighty-year sentence reflected, as the Fourth
Circuit noted, this Court’s “careful[] consider[ation] of the gravity of the offense, the deterrent
effect of a lengthy sentence, and the need to protect the public.” McCroskey, 2024 WL 1596670,
at *1. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that sentence as reasonable within this Court’s discretion.
Id. at *2. Therefore, even if McCroskey’s trial counsel had secured an expert psychosexual
evaluation, there is nothing in the § 2255 motion which shows that such an expert would have
changed McCroskey’s sentence. More to the point, however, the decision not to obtain such
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 10 of 15

11
an expert represents the discretionary and strategic decision of trial counsel after consideration
of the law and facts, which Strickland calls “virtually unchallengeable.”
Second, as regards McCroskey’s multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
rooted in her own sexual trauma and history of mental health issues—including her admission
to one or more state mental hospitals—the record in this case plainly indicates that the Court
knew of and considered such trauma and history in imposing its sentence. See (ECF No. 70).
These claims do not surmount either prong of the Strickland test. Third, McCroskey’s allegation
that her counsel failed to obtain a plea agreement or any type of proffer from the Government
is factually insufficient because the Government explicitly declined to offer a plea deal in this
case. (ECF No. 114 at 8.) Fourth, McCroskey’s claims that her trial counsel did not argue
about sentencing disparity nor object to preponderance findings fail to satisfy Strickland. As
above, these decisions represent strategic decisions made by a criminal defense attorney.
Nothing in the § 2255 motion creates any speculation that such decisions were objectively
unreasonable. Indeed, to the allegation of sentence disparity, the Government’s Response to
the § 2255 motion (ECF No. 114) aptly notes that numerous Courts of Appeals have upheld
similar sentences to McCroskey’s for similar criminal behavior.3 Therefore, even if trial counsel
had raised a disparate sentence argument, such an argument would have failed. Stated simply,
McCroskey is not entitled to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 688 F.3d 523, 536–37 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding 290-
year sentence for producer of child pornography); United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219–
21 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding 100-year sentence for sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old girl,
and creation of pornographic images of the victim); United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 511–
13 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding sixty-five year sentence for man who had sexual intercourse with
his girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter while the girlfriend videotaped it).
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 11 of 15

12
II. 	Judicial or Prosecutorial Misconduct or Bias
Second, McCroskey claims that there was judicial and prosecutorial misconduct and
bias in her sentencing, and that this misconduct and bias entitle her to relief under § 2255.
(ECF No. 108 at 5.) She particularly claims misconduct and bias in that: (1) the “Court failed
to make findings of fact as to whether comments/diagnoses were correct, which may have
altered 	Judge’s 	sentencing”; 	(2) 	the 	“[g]overnment 	made 	inflammatory 	and 	malicious
comments at sentencing, in which publicly humiliated and demeaned Petitioner by doing more
than necessary to adhere to the goal at sentencing and violated the 6th [A]mendment right to
be judged and adjudicated fairly”; (3) the “[g]overnment submitted character evidence that
should not have been allowed as it prejudiced the judge and changed the outcome at
sentencing”; (4) the “[g]overnment glossed over many [§] 3553 factors, such as disparities,
history, and characteristics of defendant, and types of sentences available”; and (5) the
“[g]overnment 	reached 	an 	unreasonably 	long sentence 	after 	overweighing one 	factor,
protection of the public, while under weighing others, including mental health, difficult
childhood, need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, or that defendant was a special
needs student.” (Id.)
As the Government has aptly noted in its Response (ECF No. 114), claims of judicial
misconduct or bias can be raised on direct appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68
(1982). However, if a defendant fails to raise such a claim on appeal, it is improper to raise the
issue for the first time through a § 2255 motion. Id.; Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504; Bousley, 523 U.S.
at 622. As a result of McCroskey’s failure to raise this contention on direct appeal, she must
show satisfy a two-part “cause and actual prejudice” test set forth by the United States
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 12 of 15

13
Supreme Court in Frady. 456 U.S. at 167–68. McCroskey fails to establish any bias of this Court
in comments made on the record during the May 18, 2023, sentencing hearing, which were
based on McCroskey’s admitted conduct.
With respect to alleged prosecutorial misconduct or bias, those claims could have been
raised on direct appeal and are now procedurally barred. However, even if McCroskey had
raised this issue, she fails to satisfy her heavy burden. There simply is no proffer of evidence
that any misconduct of Government counsel infected the sentencing in this case “‘with
unfairness.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). Nothing in McCroskey’s § 2255 motion shows cause or actual
prejudice. The conclusory allegations of “inflammatory and malicious comments” by the
Government, see (id. at 5), are not supported by any factual material which could show cause
or prejudice. Further, as regards prejudice, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit already deemed this Court’s imposition of an eighty-year sentence to be both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. McCroskey, 2024 WL 1596670, at *1. McCroskey’s
claim of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct is procedurally barred and does not provide
entitlement to habeas relief under § 2255.
III. 	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors
McCroskey’s final proffered ground for relief under § 2255 is simply that the Court
should redo its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and impose a different, lesser
sentence. (ECF No. 108 at 6.) As noted above, a petitioner may not use a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to “‘circumvent a proper ruling . . . on direct appeal.’” Dyess, 730 F.3d at 360
(quoting Linder, 552 F.3d at 396). Additionally, a petitioner may not “recast, under the guise
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 13 of 15

14
of collateral attack, questions fully considered by [the Court of Appeals on direct appeal].”
Boeckenhaupt, 537 F.2d at 1183.On direct appeal in this case, McCroskey asked the Fourth
Circuit to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors. McCroskey, 2024 WL 1596670, at *1. The Court of
Appeals “decline[d] [her] invitation,” thus considering and denying her request. McCroskey is
therefore barred from raising the § 3553(a) factors as a path to relief here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, McCroskey’s § 2255 Motion is DENIED. Rule 11(a) of
the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts provides
that the district court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final
order adverse to the applicant” on a § 2255 motion. A certificate of appealability may issue if
the applicant has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). When a district court dismisses a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds without
reaching the merits of the constitutional claim, an applicant must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists “would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional 	right 	and . . . whether 	the 	district 	court 	was 	correct 	in 	its 	procedural
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When a district court rejects constitutional
claims on the merits, an applicant satisfies the standard by demonstrating that “‘jurists of
reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of [the] constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.’” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
327 (2003)). McCroskey has not made either requisite showing. The Court, therefore, declines
to issue a certificate of appealability.
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 14 of 15

15
A separate Order follows.
Date: January 6, 2026
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge
/s/
Case 1:22-cr-00220-RDB Document 115 Filed 01/06/26 Page 15 of 15