Renderos v. Baker et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ROXANA NOLASCO RENDEROS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NIKITA BAKER, et al.,
Defendants
Case No. 25-cv-3087-ABA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Roxana Nolasco Renderos is a citizen of El Salvador who, until she
was detained on September 16, 2025, by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) during a routine check-in, had resided in Maryland for approximately fifteen
years. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 16, 18. On December 26, 2024, an immigration judge granted Ms.
Nolasco Renderos withholding of removal as to El Salvador. Id. ¶ 17; ECF No. 1-1.
Following her September 16, 2025 detention, ICE served on her a Notice of Removal
stating that ICE “intends to remove you to Mexico,” and a Notice of Revocation of
Release stating, “Your case is under current review by the Government of Mexico for
third country removal.” ECF Nos. 10-4 & 10-7. Ms. Nolasco Renderos has filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking release from detention. ECF No. 1.
Because the Constitution prohibits “indefinite detention,” when the government
wishes to remove a noncitizen to another country, the applicable detention statute, 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), only authorizes detention after a 90-day removal period if removal
is “reasonably foreseeable.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689, 699 (2001). The two
documents cited above along with a renewed Notice of Revocation of Release constitute
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the only evidence in the record on the foreseeability of Ms. Nolasco Renderos’s removal
to Mexico. Ms. Nolasco Renderos argues that, because she is subject to a reinstated
order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) and thus is entitled to a reasonable
fear interview based on her assertion of fear of removal to Mexico and, upon any
negative determination, de novo review by an immigration judge—and because the
government has refused to provide her this process—the government has not shown
that a lawful removal is reasonably foreseeable. ECF No. 11 at 15–17; ECF No. 17. The
government argues that Ms. Nolasco Renderos is not entitled to this process with
regard to third country removals and that she has received all the process to which she
is entitled. ECF No. 20 at 8.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Ms. Nolasco Renderos
is entitled to the process laid out in 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31 and 1208.31, but the record at
present does not rise to the level of entitling Ms. Nolasco Renderos to a writ of habeas
corpus. However, should the government continue to refuse to provide Ms. Nolasco
Renderos with the process to which she is entitled, the Court finds that her removal will
no longer be reasonably foreseeable such that she will be entitled to release.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner Roxana Nolasco Renderos is a native and citizen of El Salvador. ECF
No. 1 ¶ 16; ECF No. 10-1 at 6. On May 7, 2010, Ms. Nolasco Renderos was apprehended
by U.S. Border Patrol after she illegally entered the United States near the Arizona
border. ECF No. 10-1 at 6. On May 10, 2010, Border Patrol issued and served her with a
Notice and Order of Expedited Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). ECF No. 10-
3 at 2. She was then removed back to El Salvador. ECF No. 10-1 at 7.
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Petitioner re-entered the United States illegally and was apprehended in
Maryland on October 18, 2011, at which time she was served with a Notice of
Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order of Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)
based on her previously executed 2010 removal order. ECF No. 10-1 at 7; ECF No. 11-1.
She expressed a fear of returning to El Salvador and was later released from custody on
an Order of Supervision. ECF No. 1 ¶ 16; ECF No. 10-1 at 7. There is no evidence that
Ms. Nolasco Renderos violated any of the terms of her Order of Release. ECF No. 1 ¶ 16;
ECF No. 11 at 2. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) did not
conduct her reasonable fear interview until March 3, 2015 (nearly four years after her
expression of fear) and the officer found that she had not established a reasonable fear
of persecution or torture in El Salvador. ECF No. 11 at 2; ECF No. 1-2. Upon request,
USCIS referred her case to an immigration judge for review and Ms. Nolasco Renderos
remained on supervised release. ECF No. 11 at 2. The immigration judge disagreed with
the USCIS officer’s findings and, on December 26, 2024, granted Petitioner
withholding of removal as to El Salvador. ECF No. 11; ECF No. 1-1.
During her ICE check-in on September 16, 2025, Petitioner’s order of release
was revoked, and she was served with a Notice of Removal stating that ICE “intends to
remove you to Mexico,” and a Notice of Revocation of Release stating, “Your case is
under current review by the Government of Mexico for third country removal.” ECF
Nos. 10-4 & 10-7. On September 17, 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, asserted her fear
of removal to any third country. ECF No. 1-7 at 5–6.1
1 The Court has previously found that Petitioner’s counsel’s email constituted Petitioner’s
expression of fear of removal to Mexico. ECF No. 16 ¶ 1.
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On September 17, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
seeking release from ICE custody. ECF No. 1 at 9. She alleges that her continued
detention by ICE violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Zadvydas (count 1) and due process (count 2). Id. at 6–9.
On October 1, 2025, Respondents filed a response to the petition and a motion to
dismiss. ECF No. 10. On October 8, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply brief in which she first
mentioned the government’s alleged failure to provide her with the reasonable fear
determination procedures pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31. ECF No. 11. Therefore, the
Court ordered Respondents to provide a status update on any reasonable fear interview
conducted. ECF No. 12. In its status report, the government stated that Ms. Nolasco
Renderos had not been granted a reasonable fear interview. ECF No. 13.
During a status conference on November 18, 2025, the government indicated its
willingness to provide Ms. Nolasco Renderos with a reasonable fear screening should
the Court so order but argued that a reasonable fear interview was not warranted. ECF
No. 15. The Court ordered the government to provide Ms. Nolasco Renderos with a
reasonable fear screening as the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the
applicability of 8 C.F.R §§ 208.31 and 1208.31. ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 2–3. A USCIS officer
conducted a “Third Country Removal Screening” on November 25, 2025, and
determined that Petitioner had “not established that it is more likely than not that [she]
will be persecuted or tortured in Mexico.” ECF No. 20-5. The Court then held a hearing
on December 5, 2025 on the habeas petition, the motion to dismiss, and the
applicability of the reasonable fear procedures to Ms. Nolasco Renderos. ECF No. 23.
Petitioner contends that because she is subject to a reinstated order of removal
and has expressed a fear of removal to Mexico, she is entitled to a reasonable fear
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interview (not just a “screening”) and, if the interview results in a negative finding, de
novo review by an immigration judge under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31 and 1208.31. ECF No. 17
at 2–10. She further argues that, because this process could, and did previously in her
case, take months or years, this means that she is not likely to be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future and thus should be released. Id. at 10–12.
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is lawful and her claim is
premature and thus should be dismissed. ECF No. 10-1 at 12–21. Respondents further
argue that third country removals are permitted and that 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31 and
1208.31 do not apply to these removals. ECF No. 20 at 7–8. Therefore, it contends that
Petitioner has been granted all of the process to which she is entitled and that her
removal to Mexico is imminent. Id. at 11–13. At no time has Petitioner requested that
the Court enjoin Respondents from removing her from the United States. But at the
December 5 hearing, Petitioner argued that removal prior to completing a reasonable
fear interview and immigration judge review would violate Petitioner’s rights under the
applicable regulations and due process.
II. 	Discussion
Ms. Nolasco Renderos requests an order releasing her from immigration
detention; that is the sole form of relief she seeks from this Court, at least at this time.
As explained below, regardless of whether Ms. Nolasco Renderos is within a six-month
period during which detention is “presumptively reasonable” under Zadvydas (the
applicability of which this Court need not decide), this Court must determine whether
removal is “reasonably foreseeable.” 533 U.S. at 699–701. The Court concludes that Ms.
Nolasco Renderos is entitled to the reasonable fear procedure outlined in 8 C.F.R. §§
208.31 and 1208.31, but that she has not shown an entitlement to release from
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detention at this time. Ms. Nolasco Renderos does raises substantial questions in that
regard, however, as continued refusal by the government to provide her with the process
to which she is entitled would make removal no longer reasonably foreseeable. As a
result, should the government refuse to provide her with the reasonable fear procedures
outlined in the regulations, the Court will order Ms. Nolasco Renderos’s immediate
release.
A. 	The applicability of the reasonable fear procedures
If a noncitizen “reenter[s] the United States illegally after having been
removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of
removal is reinstated from its original date.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Where the
government seeks to effectuate a person’s removal by reinstating a prior order of
removal (as opposed to obtaining a new order of removal), and where the person asserts
a “[r]easonable fear of persecution or torture,” the removal procedure is governed by 8
C.F.R. § 208.31, which applies to personnel of the Department of Homeland Security
(including USCIS), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31, which applies to the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which is part of the Department of Justice and includes
immigration judges. Those regulations for “aliens whose removal is reinstated under [8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)]” apply in parallel. They both provide that USCIS “has exclusive
jurisdiction to make reasonable fear determinations” and that EOIR “has exclusive
jurisdiction to review such determinations.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(a) & 1208.31(a).
Under those regulations, if DHS issues a “notice” that a person is subject to a
reinstated order of removal (as was issued to Petitioner in this case), see 8 C.F.R. §
208.31(b) (referring to “notice under § 241.8(b)”), and if that person “expresses a fear of
returning to the country of removal,” DHS must “refer[] to an asylum officer for a
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reasonable fear determination.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e)
(reiterating that “[i]f an alien whose prior order of removal has been reinstated under
this section expresses a fear of returning to the country designated in that order, the
alien shall be immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview to determine
whether the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture pursuant to § 208.31 of
this chapter”). Should the asylum officer find that the noncitizen has not established a
reasonable fear of persecution or torture, the officer must inquire whether the
noncitizen wishes for an immigration judge to conduct a de novo review and, if so, refer
the case to an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(e) & 1208.31(f)–(g). “Execution” of
any “reinstated order of removal” must “be administered in accordance with [Part 241 of
C.F.R. Title 8].” Id. § 241.8(f).
It is undisputed here that:
• 	in 2011, Ms. Nolasco Renderos’s 2010 order of removal was reinstated
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the statute governing “Reinstatement of
removal orders against aliens illegally reentering” (see ECF No. 10-1 at 7;
ECF No. 11 at 2; ECF No. 20-1);
• 	Respondents have detained Ms. Nolasco Renderos pursuant to that
reinstated removal order (see ECF No. 10-4 at 2; ECF No. 10-6 at 2; ECF
No. 17 at 3); and
• 	Ms. Nolasco Renderos was previously given the procedures outlined in 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.31 and 1208.31 based on her assertion of fear of removal to
El Salvador, which resulted in her withholding of removal as to El
Salvador (see ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 1-2; ECF No. 30 at 3).
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At this point, with Petitioner having obtained withholding of removal with
respect to El Salvador, Respondents seek to remove Petitioner to a different country:
Mexico. Petitioner has asserted that she fears she will be persecuted or tortured in
Mexico. ECF No. 1-7 at 3–6. Thus, the question before the Court is whether that same
procedure applies now that applied when Respondents sought her removal to El
Salvador. The answer is yes; the clear language of the three regulations that govern
reinstated removal orders (8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8, 208.31, and 1208.31) does entitle her to
that same procedure, namely a reasonable fear interview (not just a “screening”) and, if
negative, review by an immigration judge.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b), the reasonable fear determination procedure is
triggered “[u]pon issuance of a . . . notice under § 241.8(b) of this chapter that an alien is
subject to removal.” That “notice” is explicitly defined as notice that an officer has
“determine[d] that an alien is subject to removal under this section.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(b).
Under the plain language of §§ 208.31(b) and 241.8(b), Respondents are seeking to
remove Petitioner pursuant to the reinstated removal order. Respondents identify no
reason that the Notice of Revocation of Release or the Notice of Removal do not
constitute notice that Ms. Nolasco Renderos is once again subject to removal under her
reinstated removal order such that the procedure has been triggered.
This conclusion is confirmed by other language in 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. Subsection (f)
provides that the “[e]xecution of the reinstated order of removal and detention of the
alien shall be administered in accordance with this part.” Therefore, the execution of a
reinstated order of removal, not just the initial issuance of the reinstatement, must be
administered in accordance with § 241.8(e). Section 241.8(e), in turn, provides that,
upon a noncitizen subject to a reinstated order expressing a fear of removal to the
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country designated, “the alien shall be immediately referred to an asylum officer for an
interview to determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture
pursuant to § 208.31 of this chapter” (emphasis added). Although Petitioner’s original
order of removal, which has now been reinstated, was issued fifteen years ago, the
government is currently attempting to execute that order by seeking Petitioner’s
removal to a different country, Mexico. Reading 8 C.F.R. § 208.31 and § 241.8 to apply
only upon the initial issuance of a notice of reinstatement, as the government has
suggested, would leave § 241.8(f) without meaning. Reading the two regulatory
provisions together, it becomes clear that the right to the reasonable fear determination
procedure applies to the government’s attempt to execute Ms. Nolasco Renderos’s
reinstatement removal order by removing her to Mexico.
Petitioner also points out that although §§ 208.31(a) and 1208.31(a) refer to a
“fear of returning to the country of removal” (emphasis added), those regulations still
apply when the government seeks removal to a “third” country, i.e. a country different
from the person’s country of origin. ECF No. 17 at 4–7. The government does not argue
that the “returning” language limits the application of the regulation – and for good
reason because, in context, the DHS and EOIR regulations clearly apply whenever a
person asserts a fear of being sent to the country to which the government seeks the
person’s removal. As a textual matter, the regulations themselves repeatedly refer to
“reasonable fear” of removal without suggesting that such relief is only available if the
person has a fear of persecution or torture in the country from which they arrived. See,
e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b) (“[A]n alien described in paragraph (a) of this section shall be
referred to an asylum officer for a reasonable fear determination.”); 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c)
(“The alien shall be determined to have a reasonable fear of persecution if the alien
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establishes a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his
or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(f) (“If the asylum officer determines that the alien has not
established a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, the asylum officer shall inform
the alien in writing of the decision.”). And those regulations implement the withholding
of removal and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) statutes, which both prohibit the
government from removing a person to any country where, for example, “the alien’s life
or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A); see Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”),
Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681, codified as note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
In other words, Congress has prohibited the Executive Branch from removing
persons to any country where they are likely to be tortured or persecuted on protected
grounds (such as religion, political opinion, etc.), and the regulations that implemented
those statutory protections in the context of reinstated orders of removal have selected a
procedure for adjudicating such claims: a reasonable fear interview followed by, if
negative and upon request, immigration judge review. Although some of the language in
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(a) and 1208.31(a) suggests that the drafters of those regulations were
focused on the scenario where immigration authorities seek to removal a person to the
same country they arrived from (i.e. “returning” them to that country), as opposed to the
until-now far-less-common scenario where immigration authorities seek removal to a
third country, in context the procedures set forth in those regulations clearly apply to
the latter, i.e., where prior removal orders are “reinstated” but the country that DHS
proposes to send the person is a “third” country.
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Beyond the textual grounds discussed above, interpreting § 208.31 as
inapplicable to third country removals would lead to absurd results. Petitioner argues
that “Respondents’ interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.31 reads a gap into the regulatory
framework that would allow the government to carry out third country removals without
affording the noncitizen who expresses fear any procedures.” ECF No. 17 at 7–8.
Although Respondents contend that this was the regulatory gap that the DHS March
Guidance was intended to fill, ECF No. 20 at 8 & ECF No. 10-2, that argument assumes
there was in fact a regulatory “gap.” There is no such gap, for the reasons discussed
above. And regardless, Respondents fail to show why Congress or the agencies that
promulgated the implementing regulations described above intended that a person in
Ms. Nolasco Renderos’s position would be entitled to less process now than she was just
one year ago when her withholding of removal based on a reasonable fear determination
was issued. Respondents’ reading would also interpret the regulations as requiring a
noncitizen to predict every country to which the government may try to remove them in
the future—despite there only being one country of removal designated at that point—or
otherwise lose the right to the reasonable fear determination process if another country
is designated later. Congress cannot have intended this result when it enacted the
withholding of removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), or CAT, FARRA. And DHS and
DOJ cannot have intended this result when they promulgated 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8, 208.31
and 1208.31.
Accordingly, based on both the text and intent of the statutes and regulations at
issue, Ms. Nolasco Renderos is entitled to the reasonable fear determination procedure,
including a reasonable fear interview by an asylum officer and, if a negative
determination, de novo review by an immigration judge.
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B. 	Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim
Ordinarily, when an individual is issued a final order of removal, that person
must be removed from the country within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Under §
1231(a)(6), the government is permitted to continue to detain individuals who are
deemed “inadmissible” beyond the removal period, or it may release them under
specified terms of supervision. Id. § 1231(a)(6); see also id. § 1182 (identifying
categories of immigrants who are “inadmissible”).
But a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). Thus,
although § 1231(a)(6) does not contain an explicit limit on the length of detention in
those circumstances, the Zadvydas Court held that, in light of constitutional due
process protections with respect to deprivations of liberty, the statute must be read to
“contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation, the application of which is subject to
federal-court review.” Id. at 682. Zadvydas established that determining whether
detention under particular circumstances is authorized requires deciding “whether the
detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.” Id. at
699. A habeas court “should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id.
To help “guide lower court determinations” on whether removal is “reasonably
foreseeable” and to “limit the occasions when courts will need to make them,” the
Supreme Court held that six months of post-removal-order detention is “presumptively
reasonable.” Id. at 700–01. But this presumption is not a conclusive bar. “Although the
Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention,
it did not preclude a detainee from challenging the reasonableness of his detention
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before such time.” Cruz Medina v. Noem, 794 F. Supp. 3d 365, 375 (D. Md. 2025)
(hereinafter, “Cruz Medina I”) (quoting Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d
387, 395 (D.N.J. 2025)). “During the six-month period, ‘[t]he presumption of
reasonableness is the default,’ and the government ‘bears no burden to justify
detention.’ But if a petitioner ‘claim[s] and prove[s] ... that his removal is not
reasonably foreseeable’—including during the six-month period—the petitioner ‘can
overcome that presumption’ and detention is no longer authorized.” Id. (quoting
Munoz-Saucedo, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 397).
Here, the government alleges, and Petitioner does not appear to dispute, that
Ms. Nolasco Renderos is “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 because she is present in
the U.S. without a valid visa, permit, or other suitable entry or travel document. See
ECF No. 10 at 13; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i). Petitioner argues that, because she must
be afforded the protections provided in 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31, 1208.31, and 241.8, her
removal is not reasonably foreseeable until and unless Respondents have exhausted
those procedures. ECF No. 17 at 10–12. Petitioner also argues that her removal is not
reasonably foreseeable as the government has not provided evidence that it has
“contacted the Mexican government, that the Mexican government is actively
considering Petitioner’s case, that the Mexican government will in fact provide
Petitioner the requisite documents to enter Mexico, or that there is even a relationship
between the United States and Mexico to place third country deportees.” Id. at 12–13.
1. 	Delay in removal due to reasonable fear determination
procedures
In Vasquez Castaneda v. Perry, the Fourth Circuit held that the petitioner who
was subject to a reinstated order of removal and was undergoing withholding-only
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proceedings under CAT had not shown that his removal was not significantly likely to
occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. 95 F.4th 750, 758 (4th Cir. 2024). In coming
to that conclusion, the court stated that “the clear takeaway from Demore [v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510 (2003)] and Jennings [v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)] is that ‘Zadvydas
should not be expanded beyond the context of the indefinite and potentially
permanent detention involved there.’” Id. at 757 (quoting Miranda v. Garland, 34
F.4th 338, 361 (4th Cir. 2022)). Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that continued detention
pending the completion of withholding-only proceedings that had been voluntarily
initiated by the petitioner were not of the type of “indefinite and potentially permanent”
detention at issue in Zadvydas because withholding-only proceedings have an ending
point. Id. The court did note that, although the petitioner’s withholding-only
proceedings had gone on longer than most, there was no indication that the delay in the
proceedings was attributable to anything other than “ordinary litigation processes.” Id.
at 758 & n.7. This suggests that if delays in the withholding-only proceedings are caused
by something other than “ordinary litigation processes,” then a different outcome may
be warranted.
In Sagastizado Sanchez v. Noem, the court first held that the only way the
government could lawfully remove the petitioner to Mexico, the third country at issue
in that case, was by providing him with the procedures provided for in 8 C.F.R. §
1208.31. -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2957002, at *10–12, 16 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025).
After five weeks had passed after that court’s initial order (nine and a half weeks having
passed since the petitioner had first expressed a fear of removal to Mexico) and the
government had still not provided any indication of an intent to provide the petitioner
with the process required to remove him to Mexico or any other third country, he was
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essentially being held indefinitely and, therefore, was entitled to a grant of his habeas
petition and release from detention. Sagastizado Sanchez v. Noem, Case No. 5:25-cv-
00104, slip op. at 18–19 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing Escalante v. Noem, Case No.
9:25-cv-00182, 2025 WL 2206113, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025)) (holding that a six-
week delay in providing the petitioner with his procedures pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
208.31 created a long overdue delay such that there was not a significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future).
Here, Ms. Nolasco Renderos is entitled to the protections of 8 C.F.R. § 208.31,
and yet the government has not yet initiated these procedures. When a person is
seeking withholding of removal and the procedures to which the person is entitled are
ongoing, the normal delay associated with those procedures cannot, at least standing
alone, give rise to a Zadvydas claim. See Vasquez Castaneda, 95 F.4th at 758. But here,
Respondents have refused to follow the procedures required by the governing
regulations, and it is that refusal that is the source of delay in the adjudication of
Petitioner’s claim. This does not necessarily entitled Petitioner to immediate release,
but it does entitle her to an order that the government either (a) follow the procedures
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for reasonable fear claims set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31, 1208.31, and 241.8, or (b)
release her from detention.2
III. 	Conclusion and Order
For the reasons explained above, the Court hereby:
1. 	FINDS that Petitioner is entitled to the procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§
208.31 & 1208.31, including a reasonable fear interview and, if negative,
immigration judge de novo review of that determination;
2. 	ORDERS that by 5:00 p.m. ET on January 14, 2026, Respondents shall
either (a) REFER Petitioner to an asylum officer for a reasonable fear
interview or (b) RELEASE Petitioner from ICE custody;
3. 	ORDERS that, if Respondents refer Petitioner’s case to an asylum officer for
a reasonable fear interview, and if such interview and determination is not
complete by 5:00 p.m. ET on January 28, 2026, Respondents SHALL
RELEASE Petitioner from ICE custody no later than that time and date;
4. 	ORDERS that any release of Petitioner from detention shall be under the
same conditions governing her previous release;
2 Because the Court reaches this conclusion, it need not decide whether Respondents are
required to show that Mexico has agreed to accept her, or whether such acceptance is
required. The only evidence in the record of Mexico’s consideration of Ms. Nolasco
Renderos’s case is from a fill-in-the-blank form stating that ICE “intends” to remove her to
Mexico, ECF No. 10-7 at 2, the initial Notice of Revocation of Release indicating that her
“case is under current review by the Government of Mexico for third country removal,” ECF
No. 10-4 at 2, and the revised Notice of Revocation of Release indicating that ICE “ha[s]
provided [her] notice that steps are being taken to secure [her] third-country removal to
Mexico,” ECF No. 22-1 at 1. But even if Mexico has conveyed a willingness to accept Ms.
Nolasco Renderos, or if such acceptance is not required, she is entitled to release if the
government refuses to provide her with a reasonable fear interview and, if that
determination is negative and if requested, review by an immigration judge.
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5. 	ORDERS that the parties SHALL FILE a status report regarding the status
of Petitioner’s detention and any removal proceedings by 12:00 p.m. ET on
January 15, 2026 and, if necessary, by 12:00 p.m. ET on January 29, 2026;
and
4. 	ORDERS that the Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter to enforce
compliance with this Order.
Date: January 7, 2026 	/s/
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-03087-ABA Document 26 Filed 01/07/26 Page 17 of 17