OLSZEWSKI et al v. HUTCHINS et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ROBERT OLSZEWSKI, JR., et ux., 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	1:24-cv-00209-JAW
)
BARRY HUTCHINS, individually and as 	)
former selectman, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTORNEY OLIVER WALTON AND
DRUMMOND WOODSUM
Because the plaintiffs have not shown a violation of the ethical rules nor any
actual prejudice, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify defendants’
attorney and the law firm serving as counsel for defendants.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2024, Robert and Julie Olszewski (Plaintiffs), husband and wife,
filed a lawsuit against Barry Hutchins, individually and as former selectman, and
the town of Dover-Foxcroft, Maine (the town), alleging that Mr. Hutchins and the
town (collectively, Defendants) violated their federal and state constitutional rights.
Compl. Including Req. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1) (Compl.).
More specifically, the Olszewskis claimed that Mr. Hutchins and the town violated
Mr. Olszewski’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, Article One, Section 6-A of the Maine Constitution, the Maine
Human Rights Act, and the Maine Tort Claims Act by retaliating against him for
public advocacy. 	Id. at 9. 	Mr. Olszewski sought compensatory damages and a
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
preliminary injunction, and Ms. Olszewski sought damages for loss of consortium.
Id. at 10. On August 2, 2024, before the lawsuit had been served on the Defendants,
the Olszewskis filed an amended complaint. 	Pls.’ First Am. Compl. Including Req.
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 5) (Am. Compl.).
On 	August 	5, 	2024, 	Attorney 	Jeana 	M. 	McCormick 	of 	the 	law 	firm 	of
Drummond Woodsum entered her appearance on behalf of each Defendant, Notice of
Appearance (ECF No. 6), and on August 12, 2024, each Defendant waived service of
process, Waiver of Serv. (ECF Nos. 7, 8). On October 2, 2024, the Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) (Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss). 	On October 23, 2024, the Olszewskis filed their opposition to the
motion to dismiss. Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 13). On November
6, 2024, the Defendants filed a reply to the Plaintiffs’ opposition. 	Defs.’ Reply in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14).
On February 19, 2025, Chief Judge Lance Walker, who had been originally
randomly assigned the case, issued an order of recusal. 	Order of Recusal (ECF No.
15). 	On the same day, the case was randomly assigned to this Judge. 	On July 29,
2025, the Court issued a seventy-one-page order granting the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the federal claims and dismissing without prejudice the remaining state
claims, Order on Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) (Dismissal Order), and on the same
day, a judgment of dismissal without prejudice was issued. J. of Dismissal (ECF No.
19).
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Between 	August 	and 	December 	of 	2025, 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	a 	motion 	for
consideration and for leave to file an amended complaint1, a motion to disqualify
counsel, and a motion to disqualify the presiding judge.2 	This order concerns the
second motion. 	Mot. to Disqualify Att’y Oliver Walton and Drummond Woodsum
(ECF No. 26) (Pls.’ Disqualification Mot.).
On November 12, 2025, Attorney Jeana M. McCormick moved to withdraw her
appearance on behalf of the Defendants, Mot. to Withdraw Appearance (ECF No. 24),
which the Magistrate Judge granted the next day. Order (ECF No. 25). On November
12, 2025, Attorney Oliver M. Walton of the law firm of Drummond Woodsum entered
his appearance on behalf of the Defendants. Notice of Appearance (ECF No. 23).
On November 16, 2025, the Plaintiffs moved to disqualify Attorney Walton and
the 	law 	firm 	of 	Drummond 	Woodsum 	as 	counsel 	for 	the 	Defendants. 	Pls.’
Disqualification Mot. 	On December 5, 2025, the Defendants opposed the motion to
1 	On August 25, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an
amended complaint. Pls.’ Mot. and Mem. in Support to Recons. Order and J. Date[d] July 29, 2025
and for Leave to Amend the First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 20). On September 15, 2025, the Defendants
filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration and motion to amend complaint. Defs.’ Opp’n
to Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration and for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 21). On September
28, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed their reply. 	Pls.’ Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Recons, and
Alteration of the Ct.’s Dismissal of Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. (ECF No. 22).
2 	On December 2, 2025, the Plaintiffs moved for my recusal from this case. Pls.’ Mot. for Recusal
of Judge Woodcock and Ancillary Relief in Form of Vacating or Reversal of Dismissal Order date[d]
July 29, 2025 (ECF No. 27). On December 11, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed a corrected version of their
recusal motion. Pls.’ Mot. for Recusal of Judge Woodcock and Ancillary Relief in Form of Vacating or
Reversal of Dismissal Order date[d] July 29, 2025 corrected page alignment (ECF No. 29) (bold in
original entry). On December 23, 2025, the Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs’ motion for my recusal.
Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Recusal (ECF No. 30). On December 28, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed their
reply to Defendants’ opposition. Pls.’ Reply to Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Recuse Hon. Judge A. Woodcock
(sic) (ECF No. 31).
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
disqualify. 	Defs.’ 	Opp’n 	to 	Pls.’ 	Mot. 	to 	Disqualify 	(ECF 	No. 	28) 	(Defs.’
Disqualification Opp’n). The Plaintiffs did not file a reply.
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	The Plaintiffs’ Motion
The Plaintiffs argue that Drummond Woodsum cannot represent both Mr.
Hutchins, in his individual and official capacity, and the town of Dover-Foxcroft
because 	the 	parties 	have 	materially 	different 	and 	adverse 	positions. 	Pls.’
Disqualification Mot. at 5. 	In support of the contention that the Defendants are
adverse, 	the 	Plaintiffs 	point 	to 	the 	possibility 	of 	divergent 	interests 	and 	the
“reasonably foreseeable” differences in strategy for each client. Id. at 6.
B. 	The Defendants’ Opposition
The Defendants oppose the Olszewskis’ motion, arguing that the Olszewskis
“fail to cite or address the correct legal standard to disqualify counsel, and they
cannot meet the applicable standard.” 	Defs.’ Disqualification Opp’n at 1. 	Applying
the first prong of the applicable standard, the Defendants argue that their continued
representation by Drummond Woodsum “will not result in any violation of an ethical
rule” as no rule prohibits “the joint representation of co-defendants in litigation.” Id.
Applying the second prong, the Defendants argue the “Plaintiffs have not shown any
conceivable prejudice – let alone concrete harm – to themselves from [Drummond
Woodsum’s] joint representation of Mr. Hutchins and the Town.” Id. at 3.
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
When determining whether disqualification is warranted, this Court follows
the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine. 	See D. ME. LOC. R. 83.3(d); Concordia Partners, LLC v. Ward, No. 2:12-CV-
138-GZS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109540, at *1 (D. Me. Aug. 6, 2012). Thus, this Court
applies Maine law.
In Maine, the Law Court has held that disqualification of an attorney is
appropriate only where the moving party produces evidence supporting
two findings: (1) “continued representation of the nonmoving party by
that party’s chosen attorney results in an affirmative violation of a
particular ethical rule” and (2) continued representation by the attorney
would result in “actual prejudice” to the party seeking that attorney’s
disqualification. Morin v. Maine Educ. Ass’n, 2010 ME 36, [¶ 9-10,] 993
A.2d 1097, 1100. 	As the party moving for disqualification, Defendant
“has the burden of showing the grounds for disqualification.” Casco N.
Bank v. JBI Assocs. Ltd., 667 A.2d 856, 859 (Me. 1995). 	Any order
disqualifying an attorney must include “express findings of that ethical
violation and resulting prejudice.” Morin, [2010 ME 36, ¶ 11, 993 A.2d
1097].
Concordia Partners, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109540 at *1-2; see also Sea Salt, LLC v.
Bellerose, No. 2:18-CV-00413-JAW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84072, at *2-3 (D. Me. May
13, 2020) (citing same standard); In re Zak, No. 2:17-MC-00192-JHR, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 222937, at *7 (D. Me. Nov. 19, 2017) (same); Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit No. 21, No.
2:11-CV-25-DBH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16700, at *2-3 (D. Me. Feb. 7, 2013) (same).
A. 	Applicable Rules of Professional Responsibility
To prevail on a motion for disqualification, the moving party must provide
evidence of “an affirmative violation of a particular ethical rule” under the Maine
Rules of Professional Conduct. Morin, 2010 ME 36, ¶ 9, 993 A.2d 1097.
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Rule 1.10 of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct provides, “[w]hile lawyers
are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule[] 1.7 . . . .”
M.R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a). Rule 1.7, which covers conflicts-of-interest with current
clients, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict-of-interest.
A concurrent conflict-of-interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client would be directly adverse to
another client, even if representation would not occur in the same
matter or in substantially related matters; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients 	would 	be 	materially 	limited 	by 	the 	lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person
or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict-of-interest
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer would be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client; and
(2) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
M.R. Prof. Conduct 1.7. 	Rule 1.7 thus defines a concurrent conflict-of-interest, but
also provides a means by which clients can consent notwithstanding the conflict-of-
interest.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Under Maine law, the Plaintiffs, as the moving party, bear the burden to
produce evidence supporting first, that Drummond Woodsum’s representation of the
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Defendants “results in an affirmative violation of a particular ethical rule” and
second, that Drummond Woodsum’s continued presence would result in “actual
prejudice” to the Plaintiffs. Morin, 2010 ME 36, ¶¶ 9-10, 993 A.2d 1097. Because the
Plaintiffs have not shown a violation of the ethical rules nor any actual prejudice, the
Court denies the Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify Attorney Walton and Drummond
Woodsum as counsel for the Defendants.
A. 	Drummond 	Woodsum’s 	Representation 	Presents 	No 	Ethical
Violation
Drummond Woodsum’s continued representation of the Defendants violates no
ethical rule. On the contrary, it is expressly authorized by the rules. Rule 1.7 of the
Maine Rules of Professional Conduct covers conflicts-of-interest with current clients,
declaring “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict-of-interest” and defining a concurrent conflict of interest as
follows:
(1) 	the representation of one client would be directly adverse to
another client . . .; or
(2) 	there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients would be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client . . . .
M.R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(1)-(2). 	Rule 1.7 thus defines a concurrent conflict-of-
interest but also provides a means by which clients can consent notwithstanding the
conflict-of-interest. 	The conflict can be waived, save some inapplicable exceptions,
where “(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer would be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; and (2) each affected
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” Id. at 1.7(b)(1)-(2).
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
Under 	Rule 	1.7, 	both 	here 	and 	generally, 	parties 	can 	consent 	to 	joint
representation in civil matters. 	See id. at 1.7, cmt. (23) (“[C]ommon representation
of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of
paragraph (b) are met”). 	As the Defendants point out, “[c]ourts across the country
have regularly agreed that joint defense may be proper in § 1983 claims against
municipalities and individual municipal officials.” 	Defs.’ Disqualification Mot. at 4-
5, 5 n.2 (citing cases). In general, courts have not disqualified the same counsel from
representing a municipality and a municipality’s employee. Waggoner v. Marsh, No.
25-cv-00254-JFH-SH, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148922, at *4-11 (N.D. Ok. Aug. 4,
2025); Nolan v. City of N.Y., 754 F. Supp. 3d 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2024); Billewicz v.
Town of Fair Haven, No. 5:22-cv-73, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164427, at *8-9 (D. Vt.
Aug. 11, 2022); Rascon v. Brookins, No. CV-14-00749-PHX-JJT, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38058, at *5-9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017); Granberry v. Byrne, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118293, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2011) (“[A]s a matter of policy, the joint
defense of individual officers/actors and their employing governmental agencies in
§ 1983 actions remains a common and accepted practice within the Third Circuit”).
Even if there is a potential conflict between the town of Dover-Foxcroft and Mr.
Hutchins, based on the Plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Hutchins acting in his personal
as opposed to official capacity, this potential is “insufficient for disqualification” when
the Defendants have pursued a “unified theory of defense.” Rascon v. Brookins, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38058, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017); Vargas v. City & Cnty. of
Honolulu, No. 19-00116-LEK-WRP, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272868, at *9 (D. Hi. Dec.
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
10, 2020). As the district court in Rascon wrote, “[e]ven circuits following strict rules
regarding 	Monell3 	liability 	disqualification 	require 	disqualification 	of 	counsel
representing both an individual officer and the municipal employer in § 1983 cases
only where counsel acts in a way that is actually against the officer’s interest.” 	In
Waggoner, the district court observed that “[u]ntil Plaintiffs demonstrate that these
potential conflicts have matured into actual ones, the Court declines to employ such
a drastic measure as disqualifying counsel and depriving the defendants of their
representatives of choice.” Furthermore, to require that “governmental entities and
their 	individual 	employees 	obtain 	separate 	counsel 	in 	all 	such 	cases 	would
unnecessarily complicate the litigation process at the unwarranted expense of
taxpayers.” Granberry, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118293, at *13.
Here, both the town and Mr. Hutchins have presented a “unified theory of
defense.” On October 2, 2024, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of
both Defendants on the same grounds. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1-19. Even if a
conflict in joint representation could perhaps appear if the case progressed further,
for example if it neared trial, the general rule is that a court should not disqualify
counsel unless and until the potential conflict hardens into an actual conflict. Here,
given the fact that the Court granted the motion to dismiss for both Defendants, the
possibility that the possible conflict will in fact become a real conflict is remote and
speculative.
3 	Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
The Plaintiffs’ first argument to the contrary is that Drummond Woodsum’s
representation of Mr. Hutchins “in his individual personal capacity and in his official
capacity is inherently conflicted because the potential defenses are materially
adverse and mutually exclusive.” 	Pls.’ Disqualification Mot. at 5. 	That is, in the
hypothetical where the “Town will defend that Hutchins conduct was ultra vires” and
therefore and “actual or implicit approval” of Mr. Hutchins conduct and therefore a
“breach of fiduciary duty to the citizens by the Town.” Id. (alteration original). The
Defendants state that this argument “assumes the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, which
Defendants vigorously dispute” and is a speculative “assertion of an ethical violation.”
Defs.’ Disqualification Mot. at 6. On the facts before the Court, there is no showing
that the Defendants’ interests diverge, and the Plaintiffs offer nothing more than
speculative argumentation.
Second, the Plaintiffs argue “it is reasonably foreseeable that strategy in this
case, may differ greatly for each client” which they further argue is a presumed
conflict under Rule 1.7. Id. The Plaintiffs are wrong. Not only do the Plaintiffs raise
a particularly speculative issue—that Drummond Woodsum may have a different
strategy for each Defendant in the case—that is not a clear “affirmative violation of
a particular ethical rule,” it is also a misstatement of the Rule. Morin, 2010 ME 36,
¶ 9, 993 A.2d 1097. Even if there were a conflict of interest due to an adverse interest
or material limitation, the clients can consent to joint representation. See M.R. Prof.
Conduct 1.7(b)(1)-(2). See Rascon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38058, at *8 (“Defendants
are presumed to be appraised of the potential conflict”).
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
Likewise, the Plaintiffs’ argument that Drummond Woodsum’s concurrent
representation “necessarily involves use of privileged information obtained from
clients who have materially different and adverse positions” fails for the same
reasons. 	Pls.’ Disqualification Mot. at 5. 	As discussed, the Court rejects the
contention that Mr. Hutchins and Dover-Foxcroft have materially different or
adverse interests and the Court considers the Plaintiffs argumentations entirely
speculative, rather than a clear “affirmative violation of a particular ethical rule.”
Morin, 2010 ME 36, ¶ 9, 993 A.2d 1097.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that continued representation of Defendants by Drummond Woodsum
results in an affirmative violation of any rule.
B. 	Drummond 	Woodsum’s 	Representation 	Does 	Not 	Result 	in
Actual Prejudice to the Plaintiffs
Drummond Woodsum’s continued representation of the Defendants does not
result in actual prejudice to the Plaintiffs. “The Maine Law Court has held that ‘the
moving party must [also] point to the specific, identifiable harm’ he will suffer absent
disqualification.” 	Concordia Partners, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109540 at *21 (citing
Morin, 2010 ME 36, ¶ 10, 993 A.2d 1097).
Here, the Plaintiffs sole claim of prejudice is that Drummond Woodsum’s joint
representation “may . . . prejudice Plaintiffs” when it comes “to possible motions to
attach assets and effects of insurance coverage on the merits and as applicable to
defense, in respect to mediation, settlement negotiations, etc.” Pls.’ Disqualification
Mot. at 7. 	The Court takes Plaintiffs argument to be that Drummond Woodsum’s
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
joint representation on behalf of both the town of Dover-Foxcroft, Maine and Mr.
Hutchins, individually and as former selectman of the town, potentially makes it
harder for the Plaintiffs to recover money—either by prevailing on any of the
remaining state claims or through a successful settlement.
Not only is Plaintiffs vague and singular mention of “prejudice” speculative
rather than a specific and identifiable harm, but it is also a conceivable outcome even
if both Mr. Hutchins and the town of Dover-Foxcroft had separate counsel. In other
words, a potentially less favorable litigation payout is possible with or without
disqualification. 	Furthermore, the Plaintiffs appear to be under the misimpression
that the Defendants have filed crossclaims against each other. Pls.’ Disqualification
Mot. at 7 (stating the case “involves the assertion of a claim by one client against
another client represented by the same lawyer in the same actual pending litigation”).
However, as the Defendants pointed out, “[n]o cross-claims have been asserted
between Mr. Hutchins and the Town, nor is there currently any reasonable basis to
anticipate such claims being made.” Defs.’ Disqualification Opp’n at 7. The Plaintiffs
do not face actual prejudice just because the Defendants’ interests are aligned.
Thus, 	the 	Court 	alternatively 	concludes 	that 	the 	Plaintiffs’ 	request 	for
disqualification is denied because the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the actual prejudice
prong of Morin.
V. 	CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Attorney Oliver Walton
and Drummond Woodsum (ECF No. 26).
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 28th day of January, 2026
Case 1:24-cv-00209-JAW Document 33 Filed 01/28/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>