STATE OF MAINE et al v. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
STATE OF MAINE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,
et al.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:25-cv-00324-SDN
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court on Respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 15. For the reasons
that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Respondents’
motion. The Court maintains subject matter jurisdiction over the APA and constitutional
claims. Respondents’ motion to dismiss Counts IV and VI for failure to state a claim is
GRANTED, and Respondents’ motion to dismiss Count V for failure to state a claim is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND1
I. 	Facts
Plaintiffs the State of Maine and the Maine Department of Marine Resources
(“DMR”) (collectively 	“the State” or “the Plaintiffs”) sued the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), Laura Grimm, the Chief of Staff performing the
duties of Under Secretary 	of Commerce 	for Oceans and Atmosphere 	and NOAA
1 These facts are derived from the Complaint. See Gilbert v. Me. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 778 F. Supp.
3d 239, 247 (D. Me. 2025) (“recount[ing] the factual allegations as stated within that [] complaint for the
purpose of ruling on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss”).
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 1 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Administrator, the United States Department of Commerce, and Howard Lutnick, the
Secretary of Commerce (collectively “the Respondents”). ECF No. 1. The State challenges
NOAA’s decision to terminate a $9 million award to DMR for “Transformational Habitat
Restoration and Connectivity in Downeast Maine,” a project intended to restore tidal salt
marsh habitat and protect coastal infrastructure from flooding (“the Project”). Id. at ¶ 1.
In 2021, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (“IIJA”) and the Inflation
Reduction Act (“IRA”) appropriated funds to NOAA to promote coastal resilience and
habitat restoration. Id. at ¶ 16; see Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429, 1355 (2021) (IIJA); Pub.
L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022) (IRA). NOAA used a portion of these funds to
implement the Transformational Habitat Restoration and Coastal Resilience program
(“Coastal Resilience program”), aiming to “fund projects that support the overarching
goal of enhancing coastal resilience.” ECF No. 1-2 at 3–4. On June 10, 2024, DMR applied
for Project funding to replace a failing road crossing located in Washington County,
Maine, on the West Branch Pleasant River, elevate the road, and relocate water and septic
systems. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19. In response to this application, NOAA formally approved the
request and issued a Notice of Award (“the Award”) on August 15, 2024, allocating
$9 million in federal funds for the Project. Id. at ¶ 22; see ECF No. 1-4.
The 	Award 	application2 	establishes 	that 	NOAA 	funds 	recipients 	through
“cooperative agreements, as described in 2 C.F.R. § 200.1” and that “NOAA expects to be
substantially involved in many aspects of the awards.” ECF No. 1-2 at 12. This involvement
includes “collaborating on the scope of work, providing assistance with technical aspects
of the habitat restoration, reviewing and commenting on design plans, and reviewing
2 The application is entitled a “Notice of Funding Opportunity.” ECF No. 1-2 at 3.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 2 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
procurement materials.” Id. By issuing the Award, the agency committed a federal “share
of cost” of $9 million, while earmarking the recipient’s share of cost at $0. ECF No. 1-4 at
2. The Award forecast a four-year term, running from October 1, 2024, until September
30, 2028. Id.
On April 9, 2025, six months into the Project, DMR received a letter from the
Acting Director of NOAA’s Grants Management Division terminating the Award (“the
Letter”). ECF No. 1 at ¶ 36. The Letter stated NOAA was ceasing Project funding pursuant
to 2 C.F.R. § 200.340.3 Id.; ECF No. 1-1 at 2. The Letter further noted that as part of its
efforts “to streamline and reduce the cost and size of the Federal Government,” it was
“reprioritizing funding and staff to support only those activities directly related to its
current programmatic goals and mission priorities.” Id. NOAA concluded the Project was
no longer aligned with those goals and termination of the Award took effect immediately.
Id.
The State contends NOAA unlawfully terminated the Award to retaliate against
Maine for defying President Trump’s executive order prohibiting transgender girls from
participating in school sports—a conclusion the State grounds in President Trump’s own
public threats against Governor Mills and the sequence of federal actions that followed.
See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 23–35. The Complaint highlights President Trump’s statement to
Governor Mills that the State would not “get any federal funding” if the State did not
comply with an Executive Order prohibiting the participation of transgender girls in
3 Under 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4), a federal award may be terminated “[b]y the Federal agency or pass-
through entity pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Federal award, including, to the extent
authorized by law, if an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities.”
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 3 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
school sports. Id. at ¶ 26.4 On April 2, 2025, Governor Mills received a letter freezing U.S.
Department of Agriculture funds; the letter explicitly cited the State’s purported non-
compliance with the Executive Order. Id. at ¶¶ 30–32. One week later, on April 9, 2025,
DMR received the Letter from NOAA terminating the Award. Id. at ¶ 36.
The State brings six causes of action alleging that NOAA terminated the Award
illegally. First, the State brings three counts under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) alleging the termination was arbitrary and capricious (Count I), contrary to grant
termination regulations (Count II), and in excess of agency authority (Count III). See ECF
No. 1 at 16–20. Second, the Complaint asserts constitutional violations, specifically that
the Executive Branch usurped the legislative function and violated the separation of
powers and the Appropriations and Take Care Clauses (Count IV). Id. at 20–22. Finally,
the State asserts a violation of the Tenth Amendment (Count V), arguing the Respondents
terminated the Project to punish or coerce the State in response to the unrelated policy
dispute. Id. at 23.5 The State asks the Court to vacate NOAA’s actions and permanently
enjoin Respondents from terminating or otherwise impeding access to Project funds
without following all legally required procedures. Id. at 24–25.
II. 	Regulatory Framework
In the Letter, NOAA invoked 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a) as the basis for the termination
of funding, which provides that a federal agency may terminate an award to “to the extent
authorized by law, if an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency
4 See Transcript, Kevin Miller, Maine Faces Federal Investigation After Gov. Janet Mills Tells Trump, ‘See
You in Court,’ NPR (Mar. 2, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/03/02/nx-s1-5310653/maine-faces-
federal-investigation-after-gov-janet-mills-tells-trump-see-you-in-court [https://perma.cc/MV6C-5ED6].
5 The Court does not address the State’s standalone ultra vires claim (Count VI), which the State is no longer
pursuing. See ECF No. 25 at 7 n.3.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 4 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
priorities.” 2 C.F.R. ¶ 200.340(a)(4) (2024). The Office of Management and Budget’s
(“OMB”) guidance, issued alongside the 2024 amendments to the Federal Register, noted
that section 200.340(a)(4) allows a federal award to “include a term and condition
allowing termination 	by 	the Federal agency or pass-through entity, 	to the extent
authorized by law, if an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency
priorities.” Guidance for Federal Financial Assistance, 89 Fed. Reg. 30046-01, 30089
(Apr. 22, 2024). OMB further explained that it found “the final version of the guidance
provides greater clarity on the policy for termination of awards by the Federal agency or
pass-through entity by underscoring the need for agencies and pass-through entities to
clearly and unambiguously communicate termination conditions in the terms and
conditions of the award.” Id. The regulations also provide that upon initiating a
termination, “the Federal agency must provide the recipient with an opportunity to object
and provide information challenging the action.” 2 C.F.R. § 200.342 (2024). The Court
must 	now ascertain whether 	it may 	consider the 	State’s challenge to the 	Award
termination.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Respondents challenge the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and alternatively argue Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 15 at 1. “When faced with
motions to dismiss under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a district court, absent good reason
to do otherwise, should ordinarily decide the 12(b)(1) motion first.” Ne. Erectors Ass’n of
BTEA v. Sec’y of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 62 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir.
1995). In evaluating a jurisdictional challenge, the Court must credit the Plaintiffs’ well-
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 5 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
pleaded facts and indulge every reasonable inference in the Plaintiffs’ favor. Merlonghi v.
United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs faced with a subject matter
jurisdiction challenge carry the burden to demonstrate its existence. Johansen v. United
States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007). In evaluating whether the Plaintiffs have met their
burden of proof, the Court “may consider extrinsic materials and, to the extent it engages
in jurisdictional factfinding, is free to test the truthfulness of the plaintiff[s’] allegations.”
Dynamic Image Techs., Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2000).
A. APA Claims (Counts I, II, and III)
Courts evaluate subject matter jurisdiction generally on a claim-by-claim basis, so
the Court will first address Plaintiffs’ APA claims. See Jensen v. U.S. Nat’l Park Serv., 113
F. Supp. 3d 431, 434–35 (D. Mass. 2015) (evaluating claims separately for subject matter
jurisdiction). Respondents’ primary argument is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
the Plaintiffs’ APA claims because the dispute, at bottom, concerns the termination of a
grant and therefore sounds in contract, placing jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims
pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). ECF No. 15 at 1–2. The State disputes
that characterization, maintaining the Award is a cooperative agreement that lacks the
elements of a contract and jurisdiction is proper in this Court. ECF No. 25 at 7–8.
1. 	Waiver Under the APA
“It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as
it consents to be sued.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quotation
modified). Consequently, the extent of the Government’s consent to suit defines a court’s
jurisdiction to hear a case. See id. In the context of administrative challenges, the APA
provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, conferring a general cause of action
upon persons “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 6 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345
(1984). However, this waiver is not absolute. By its own terms, the APA’s waiver does not
apply “if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the
relief which is sought.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Furthermore, the waiver is restricted to claims
“seeking relief other than money damages” for which there is “no other adequate remedy
in a court.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. Here, the availability of the APA waiver hinges on
whether the State’s challenge to the grant termination is truly an administrative claim or,
as Respondents argue, a contract dispute that falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tucker Act.
As relevant here, the Tucker Act vests jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims
over “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added). Respondents assert
the Tucker Act requires this case to be heard in the Court of Federal Claims because the
Act impliedly bars relief for APA claims that sound in contract when brought in a federal
district court. ECF No. 15 at 1–2; see United Aeronautical Corp. v. U.S. Air Force, 80
F.4th 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Where a statute vests exclusive jurisdiction over a
category of claims in a specialized court (e.g., the Court of Federal Claims), it ‘impliedly
forbids’ an APA action brought in federal district court.”). As courts have observed, “[t]he
‘jurisdictional boundary’ between the Tucker Act and [the APA] is well-traversed by
litigants seeking relief against the federal government . . . [yet] the boundary’s precise
contours remain elusive.” Massachusetts v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 770 F. Supp. 3d 277,
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 7 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
292 (D. Mass. 2025) (“NIH I”) (quoting Suburban Mortg. Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urb. Dev., 480 F.3d 1116, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
The crux of the inquiry is whether this Court retains jurisdiction over the APA
claims or if the Tucker Act requires them to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims: in
essence, whether the Tucker Act expressly or impliedly bars application of the APA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity as it relates to the Award termination at issue.
The dispositive jurisdictional question in resolving this issue is whether the claims
are, at their core, contractual in nature. See Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[A]n action against the United States which is at its essence a contract
claim lies within the Tucker Act and [] a district court has no power to grant injunctive
relief in such a case.”); Massachusetts v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 164 F.4th 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2026) (“NIH II”) (holding challenges to NIH’s indirect cost-rate policy were properly
brought under the APA notwithstanding downstream effects on grant payments); R.I.
Coal. Against Domestic Violence v. Kennedy, 812 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (D.R.I. Oct. 23,
2025) (applying Megapulse to APA challenge regarding federal grant award). Although
the State seeks equitable relief and a declaration that Respondents violated the APA, the
form of relief alone does not determine the proper forum. See Suburban Mortg. Assocs.,
480 F.3d at 1124 (“We have cautioned litigants that dressing up a claim for money as one
for equitable relief will not remove the claim from Tucker Act jurisdiction and make it an
APA case.”).
With those principles in view, the Court turns to whether the Tucker Act “impliedly
forbids” the relief the State seeks by channeling its claims to the Court of Federal Claims.
In the parlance of the Tucker Act, where the source of the relief sought is “money-
mandating,” it invokes the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction. Lummi Tribe of the
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 8 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
Lummi Rsrv. v. United States, 870 F.3d 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In other words, the
Tucker Act “has been interpreted to require that a plaintiff seeking to invoke the court’s
jurisdiction must present a claim for ‘actual, presently due money damages from the
United States.’” Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. United States, 160 F.3d 714, 716
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969)). The Court of Federal
Claims generally can only award monetary relief. See Massie v. United States, 226 F.3d
1318, 1321 	(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Except in strictly limited 	circumstances, there is no
provision in the Tucker Act authorizing the Court of Federal Claims to order equitable
relief.”) (citation omitted)); King, 395 U.S. at 4 (“[C]ases seeking relief other than money
damages from the Court of Claims have never been ‘within its jurisdiction.’”). On the other
hand, it is well-understood that a plaintiff may pursue prospective and equitable relief in
federal district court. See id. at 4–5.
The 	Supreme 	Court 	reaffirmed 	this 	jurisdictional 	framework 	in 	Bowen 	v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988), and recently confirmed its continued force in
Department of Education v. California, 604 U.S. 650, 651 (2025) (per curiam). See
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905 (“The Claims Court does not have the general equitable powers
of a district court to grant prospective relief. Indeed, we have stated categorically that ‘the
Court of Claims has no power to grant equitable relief.’”) (quotation modified)); Dep’t of
Educ., 604 U.S. at 651 (“[A] district court’s jurisdiction ‘is not barred by the possibility’
that an order setting aside an agency’s action may result in the disbursement of funds.”)
(quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at 910)).
Respondents contend two recent decisions from the Supreme Court’s emergency
docket control here and require the case to be sent to the Federal Claims Court. In
Department of 	Education v. California, 	the Court held the 	district 	court lacked
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 9 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
jurisdiction under the APA to compel payment of money from the federal government
after the termination of several education grants. 604 U.S. at 651. In its brief four-
paragraph per curiam opinion, the Court concluded the “APA’s limited waiver of
immunity does not extend to orders ‘to enforce a contractual obligation to pay money,’”
effectively rejecting the district court’s injunction that blocked the termination of the
grants and required payment of past-due obligations. Id. (quoting Great-W. Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002)).
In the other case Respondents cite, National Institutes of Health v. American
Public Health Association, NIH adopted a policy barring funding for certain categories,
including those based on diversity, equity, and inclusion. See NIH II, 164 F.4th at 11. The
district court set aside the policy and the resulting grant terminations as unlawful under
the APA. See id. NIH then sought a stay from the Supreme Court, which resulted in a one-
paragraph emergency order granting the stay application in part and denying in part. See
National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association (“APHA”), 606
U.S. __, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025) (mem.). In her controlling concurrence,6 Justice Barrett
wrote that, consistent with Department of Education, “the District Court likely lacked
jurisdiction to hear challenges to the grant terminations,” as those claims “belong in the
Court of Federal Claims.” Id. at 2661 (Barrett, J., concurring). Yet she also concluded that
“the District Court was likely correct to conclude that it had jurisdiction to entertain an
APA challenge to the guidance,” drawing a line between disputes over specific grant
6 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.”) (quotation modified)). In NIH II, the First Circuit treated Justice Barrett’s concurrence in APHA
as controlling under the Marks doctrine and relied on it to distinguish between challenges to individual
grant terminations (which belong in the Court of Federal Claims) and challenges to NIH’s generally
applicable guidance (which are properly brought under the APA in district court). See 164 F.4th at 12.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 10 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
terminations and challenges to NIH’s policy-level guidance documents governing grant
terminations across the agency. Id.; see also id. at 2663 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
Whether or not brief orders issued from the emergency docket carry binding force,
decisions control only where their reasoning applies to analogous circumstances. The
threshold question here, then, is whether APHA and Department of Education arose
from comparable circumstances—specifically, whether those cases involved the same type
of agreement at issue in this case. Neither case involved a genuine dispute over the nature
of the underlying agreements, which in those cases were indisputably grants employing
“co-sharing 	method[s] 	of 	funding,” 	not 	self-styled 	cooperative 	agreements.
Massachusetts v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 770 F. Supp. 3d 277, 288 (D. Mass. 2025); see
California v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 3d 72, 78–79 (D. Mass. 2025) (describing
the respective grant programs). Whether the Tucker Act applies to the Award turns on
whether 	the 	Award 	constitutes 	a 	contract, 	and 	that 	same 	question 	determines
whether APHA and Department of Education are on point.
2. 	Existence of a Contract
The mere fact that an Award is labeled a “cooperative agreement” does not resolve
whether it constitutes a government contract for purposes of the Tucker Act.7 See San
Antonio Hous. Auth. v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 425, 463 (2019) (“[A]ny contract,
including a cooperative agreement, could fall within [the Court of Federal Claims’]
7 According to 31 U.S.C. § 6305, “[a]n executive agency shall use a cooperative agreement as the legal
instrument reflecting a relationship between the United States Government and a State, a local government,
or other recipient when (1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value to [that
entity] to carry out a public purpose . . . instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or
services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government; and (2) substantial involvement is
expected between the executive agency and the [counterparty] when carrying out the activity contemplated
in the agreement.”
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 11 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
jurisdiction so long as the contract contains the four required elements . . . .”).8 The
Federal Circuit recognizes the existence of a government contract when four elements are
present: “(1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) offer and acceptance; (3) consideration;
and (4) a government representative having actual authority to bind the United States.”
Columbus Reg’l Hosp. v. United States, 990 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs
do not dispute the existence of offer, acceptance, and governmental authority, but
contend the cooperative agreement lacks sufficient consideration. ECF No. 25 at 10–11.
“[I]n the context of government contracts,” the Federal Claims Court9 has explained
“consideration must render a benefit to the government, and not merely a detriment to
the contractor.” Metzger, Shadyac & Schwarz v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 602, 605 (1987).
The benefit rendered to the government “must be ‘tangible’ and ‘direct,’ rather than
‘generalized’ or ‘incidental.’” Am. Near E. Refugee Aid v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 703
F. Supp. 3d 126, 132 (D.D.C. 2023) (quoting St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 134
Fed. Cl. 730, 736 (2017), aff’d on other grounds, 916 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
Courts have likewise recognized the existence of consideration where plaintiffs
“agreed to comply with an array of requirements attached to the receipt, use, and
distribution of the grant money,” Columbus Reg’l, 990 F.3d at 1340, or where recipients
“collect, maintain, and provide data to [the government] about program performance and
effectiveness,” Vera Inst. of Just. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 805 F. Supp. 3d 12, 29 (D.D.C.
2025).
8 A federal district court may rely on Court of Federal Claims decisions in determining where jurisdiction is
proper under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., R.I. Coal. Against Domestic Violence, 812 F. Supp. 3d at 188–89.
9 In 1992, Congress renamed the U.S. Claims Court to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. See Pub. L. 102–
572, title IX, § 902(a), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 12 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
Here, 	the 	Award 	expressly 	disallows 	granularized 	requirements 	beyond
semiannual progress reports required by federal regulation. See ECF No. 1-2 at 15
(“[F]unds are not included within this solicitation to support monitoring and research-
focused 	projects. 	Effectiveness 	monitoring 	examines 	how 	well 	the 	project
performs . . . .”); ECF No. 1-4 at 10 (“[Interim semiannual] [r]eporting requirements are
described in 2 C.F.R. Sec. 200.328-.330, 	and 2 CFR Part 170 . . . .”); see also Urb.
Sustainability Dirs. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. CV 25-1775, 2025 WL 2374528,
at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (“While the awards set out specific expectations and
requirements—for instance, the award recipient must provide performance reports and
comply with other reporting obligations, audit requirements, prohibitions on using funds
in ways that contradict the law, restrictions on use of funds for certain non-essential
items, procurement standards, and so forth—those obligations on the recipients reflect
conditions on the awards and do not constitute ‘direct benefit[s]’ to the government.”)
(quoting St. Bernard Par., 134 Fed. Cl. at 735)). The minimal requirements the Award
imposes may “advance the agency’s overall mission,” but that alone is not sufficient to
create a direct benefit to the Government. Hymas v. United States, 810 F.3d 1312, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Nor does the cooperative agreement otherwise evince any other mutual
intent to contract through the imposition of binding obligations running to the United
States. Cf. Columbus Reg’l, 990 F.3d at 1339 (“[T]he language of the agreement itself
speaks in terms of binding obligations, not aspirations.”).
In St. 	Bernard Parish, 	the Court of Federal Claims considered 	whether a
cooperative agreement between the United States Government and a local parish to
remove sediment after Hurricane Katrina constituted a contract. See 134 Fed. Cl. at 732.
The court held the agreement lacked consideration because it conferred no direct benefit
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 13 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
on the United States. Id. at 736. Although the project would result in “restoration of a
natural resource and a reduction in the amount of emergency funds that the Government
would spend in future flooding emergencies,” that type of “generalized benefit is the
hallmark of a money grant from the government to a locality for a worthy project that
would have an incidental benefit to the government.” Id. Thus, the cooperative agreement
could not be construed as a contract and the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act. Id.
Respondents urge this Court to distinguish the case at hand from St. Bernard
Parish, 	claiming 	that 	“specific 	benefits 	would 	flow 	to 	the 	government” 	from
improvements to the West Branch River Crossing. ECF No. 28 at 10. That crossing is
owned by the Maine Department of Transportation and partially funded with federal
money, and Respondents speculate that structural repairs would ultimately save the
federal government costs by not having to fund future improvements to the crossing. See
id. at 10, 10 n.7. Yet Respondents never explain how this daisy-chain of potential cost-
savings amounts to anything more than the kind of incidental, generalized benefit the
court rejected in St. Bernard Parish. Cf. Anchorage v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 709, 713
(2015) (treating a cooperative agreement as a contract where it provided direct benefits
to the government in the form of service fees, enhancement of access to a military base,
and areas and facilities for government use). Indeed, Respondents identify no “direct
benefits” sufficient to establish consideration. See Am. Ctr. for Int’l Lab. Solidarity v.
Chavez-DeRemer, 789 F. Supp. 3d 66, 87–91 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding no consideration
under the Tucker Act where the government could identify no direct or tangible benefits).
That lack of direct benefit counsels against finding consideration here.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 14 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
Because the Award lacks direct, tangible benefits running to the United States, it
is not a contract for the purposes of the Tucker Act, and the Act’s exclusive jurisdiction
over contract claims is not triggered.
3. 	APHA and Department of Education
Respondents nevertheless argue Department of Education and APHA deprive this
Court of jurisdiction notwithstanding the Award’s noncontractual character. See ECF No.
15 at 8–14. This Court recognizes the Supreme Court’s statement in Department of
Education that “the APA’s limited waiver of immunity does not extend to orders ‘to
enforce a contractual obligation to pay money’ along the lines of what the District Court
ordered [t]here.” Dep’t of Educ., 604 U.S. at 651 (quoting Great-W., 534 U.S. at 212)
(emphasis added). But the reasoning in Department of Education necessarily assumes
that the grants at issue were contracts, a jurisdictional prerequisite the Court reached
without considering whether different grant agreements might fall outside the Tucker Act.
See Vera, 805 F. Supp. at 28–29 (“It would be foolhardy to assume that the Supreme
Court [in Department of Education] did not at least implicitly consider whether the
grants at issue were contracts in the first place.”); Urb. Sustainability, 2025 WL 2374528,
at 	*17 	(“[T]he 	Supreme 	Court’s 	jurisdictional 	determination 	[in 	Department 	of
Education] seemingly assumed that the grants in that case were subject to Tucker Act
jurisdiction, 	without 	considering 	whether 	different 	grant agreements may 	not be
contracts falling within the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction.”).
In APHA, Justice Barrett’s controlling concurrence likewise distinguished between
claims that seek to enforce alleged contractual rights to payment—properly heard in the
Court of Federal Claims—and APA challenges to NIH’s policy-level guidance governing
grant terminations across the agency, which may proceed in district court. See APHA, 145
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 15 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

16
S. Ct. at 2662 (Barrett, J., concurring). Department of Education and APHA—when read
together—confirm that the APA’s waiver does not extend to suits to enforce contracts for
money, 	but they 	do not answer 	the antecedent question 	of whether a particular
instrument is a contract at all.
Under the circumstances of the specific cooperative agreement at issue here, the
Court 	finds 	the 	Award 	is 	significantly 	distinguished 	from 	the 	contractual 	grant
terminations underlying these two cases. The Supreme Court stated in Bowen that “[t]he
fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to another is not a
sufficient reason to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’” 487 U.S. at 893.
Department of Education did not overrule Bowen, and Bowen remains directly on point,
as it fully encompasses the question of whether a “cooperative endeavor” between the
Government and a participating state entity is money-mandating for purposes of the
Tucker Act. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 883. This Court, therefore, is bound to apply Bowen in
this instance. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53 (1998) (The Supreme
Court’s “decisions remain binding precedent until [it] see[s] fit to reconsider them,
regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing
vitality.”); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(“If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [lower courts] should follow the
case which directly 	controls, leaving 	to th[e] [Supreme] Court the prerogative 	of
overruling its own decisions.”).
4. 	Relief Sought
Having 	determined 	the Award is not 	a contract and that 	Bowen 	remains
controlling, the Court turns to the nature of the relief sought. The State does not seek
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 16 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

17
money damages, nor does the Award provide for them. See generally ECF No. 1-2.
Instead, the State asks the Court to vacate the termination of the Award and enjoin
Respondents from further disallowing access to the Project’s funds. ECF No. 1 at 24–25.
While Respondents characterize the State’s requests 	as a contractual demand for
payment, the State in fact seeks equitable relief to vindicate its statutory rights—
specifically, a declaration that the termination is unlawful under the APA. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (providing courts “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that
violates the APA’s substantive standards). Such relief is “precisely the relief that is
afforded—indeed, required—by and routinely granted under the APA.” S. Educ. Found. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 784 F. Supp. 3d 50, 64 (D.D.C. 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-5262,
2025 WL 2793138 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 2025) (quotation modified).
To reiterate, Bowen held “[t]he fact that a judicial remedy may require one party
to pay money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as ‘money
damages.’” 487 U.S. at 893. Accordingly, the Court concludes that while Plaintiffs seek
vacatur of the Award’s termination—an act that may ultimately obligate Respondents to
continue funding the Project—the financial consequence of that relief does not transform
this administrative dispute into a contract action.
The requested injunction is purely equitable: it would set aside an allegedly illegal
grant termination unless and until the Respondents conduct a constitutionally compliant
process. The injunction is a mandate for legal compliance, not a claim for money damages.
See Pacito v. Trump, 169 F.4th 895, 929 (9th Cir. 2026) (maintaining jurisdiction in
district court where, “[u]nlike the grantees in Department of Education and [APHA],
Plaintiffs do not seek backpay of funds or a guarantee of continued funding”); cf. Dep’t of
Educ., 604 U.S. at 650–51 (reversing district court order that specifically required the
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 17 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

18
Government “to pay out past-due grant obligations and to continue paying obligations as
they accrue”).
In sum, the lack of consideration, the claims’ statutory basis under the APA, and
the Court of Federal Claims’ inability to provide prospective equitable relief all confirm
the Award is, “at its essence,” noncontractual. Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court joins the well-reasoned consensus of numerous other federal
courts that have addressed this precise issue in the wake of Department of Education and
APHA. See, e.g., S. Educ. Found., 784 F. Supp. 3d at 64; Climate United Fund v. Citibank,
N.A., 778 F. Supp. 3d 90, 111 (D.D.C. 2025); La. Delta Serv. Corps v. Corp. for Nat’l &
Cmty. Serv., No. CV 25-378, 2025 WL 1787429, at *22 (M.D. La. June 27, 2025); Green
& Healthy Homes Initiative, Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 788 F. Supp. 3d 676, 696 (D. Md.
2025); Widakuswara v. Lake, 2025 WL 1288817, at *12 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2025) (Pillard,
J., dissenting), vacated after reh’g en banc, 2025 WL 1521355, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 28,
2025) (vacating the panel’s prior decision “for the reasons explained by Judge Pillard” in
her dissent); Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Duffy, No. 25-CV-1413, 2026 WL 588117, at *32
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2026); Pacito, 169 F.4th at 929–30.10
The core function of the federal courts is to “independently identify and respect
[congressional] delegations of authority, police the outer statutory boundaries of those
delegations, and ensure that agencies exercise their discretion consistent with the APA.”
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 404 (2024). When the threshold issue
is whether an agency acted within its congressionally delegated power, the APA vests the
authority to resolve that dispute in the federal district courts—not the Court of Federal
10 The Court has considered all cases cited in Plaintiffs’ and Respondents’ notices of supplemental authority.
See ECF Nos. 31, 32. As such, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file supplemental authority is moot. ECF No.
32.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 18 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

19
Claims. Indeed, Respondents’ interpretation would create a jurisdictional vacuum: the
District Court would lack authority to vacate the action, while the Court of Federal Claims
would be powerless to provide the equitable relief to remedy the alleged illegality.
Accepting Respondents’ position would effectively insulate a significant category of
agency action from meaningful judicial oversight—a result at odds with the “strong
presumption” favoring judicial review of administrative action. Mach Mining, LLC v.
EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015).
Because jurisdiction over these claims is proper in this Court, Respondents’ motion
to dismiss Counts I, II, and III for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED.
B. Constitutional Claims (Counts IV and V)
The State brings two constitutional claims: the first asserting violations of the
Appropriations and Take Care Clauses and separation of powers principles (Count IV),
and the second asserting a violation of the Tenth Amendment (Count V). ECF No. 1 at
20–23. Respondents argue these claims are merely “dressed up” versions of the grant
termination issue and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to the Tucker Act. See ECF No. 15 at 2.
The Court disagrees. The source of the rights Plaintiffs seek to vindicate is the
Constitution—specifically, the principle “that the Constitution gives Congress, not the
Executive Branch, exclusive power over spending,” Harris Cnty., Tex. v. Kennedy, 786 F.
Supp. 3d 194, 205 (D.D.C. 2025), and the prohibition against the Executive Branch
unduly coercing states through conditional fund disbursement, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (“NFIB”).
Despite Respondents’ characterization, these claims are based fundamentally in
the Constitution and are independent of the Award’s specific provisions. Plaintiffs assert
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 19 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

20
the Executive Branch overstepped its bounds by unilaterally altering congressional
appropriations and attempting to punish Maine for an unrelated policy dispute. See ECF
No. 1 at 20–23. The merits of these arguments are not subsumed by the existence—or lack
thereof—of a contract, because resolving 	them does not require an analysis of the
cooperative agreement itself. See R.I. Coal. Against Domestic Violence, 812 F. Supp. 3d
at 189 (rejecting a Tucker Act challenge where constitutional claims required a “review of
the relevant statutes and regulations, not an analysis of any current or prospective grant
agreements”).
Where the “source of the rights upon which the plaintiff bases its claims” is
constitutional, it is appropriate for the district court to hear the claims in the first
instance. Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968; see Vera, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 25 (retaining
jurisdiction over separation of powers, Spending, Appropriations, and Take Care Clauses
claims related to a terminated grant). As other courts have recognized, “the mere presence
of a contract in relation to a [separation of powers] claim is not enough to deprive this []
district court of jurisdiction over the claim.” Harris Cnty., 786 F. Supp. at 205; see also
Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 783 F. Supp. 3d 236, 243 (D.D.C. 2025) (holding that
because the source of the right was the Constitution and not the cooperative agreement,
the claim was not “essentially a contract action”) (quotation modified)).
Because these 	claims turn 	on constitutional 	limits 	rather 	than contractual
obligations, the Court has jurisdiction to consider Counts IV and V. This portion of
Respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED.
II. 	Failure to State a Claim (Counts IV and V)
Having confirmed its subject matter jurisdiction over the constitutional claims in
Counts IV and V, the Court turns to Respondents’ alternative argument that these counts
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 20 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

21
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See ECF No. 15 at 18; Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court follows a two-
step approach. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st
Cir. 2012). First, it “isolate[s] and ignore[s] statements in the complaint that simply offer
legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements.” Id. Second,
taking the well-pleaded factual content as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court determines whether those facts plausibly support a claim
for relief. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011)
(discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007)).
A. Violations of the Separation of Powers and the Appropriations and
Take Care Clauses (Count IV)
Plaintiffs’ first constitutional claim asserts that only Congress may exercise the
power of the purse, see ECF No. 1 at 20–22; consequently, because the Award funds have
already been appropriated, the Executive cannot unilaterally terminate the project and
refuse to spend the money. See Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180, 185
(D.C. Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs contend that NOAA’s termination of the Award violates the
separation of powers, the Appropriations Clause, and the Take Care Clause11 because the
Executive Branch may not “unilaterally amend, cancel, undermine, or otherwise decline
to execute duly enacted Congressional appropriations.”12 ECF No. 1 at ¶ 75; see U.S.
11 The Court also notes that Take Care Clause claims are rarely recognized as an independent mechanism
for affirmative relief in this context. See Arizona v. Mayorkas, 600 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1011 (D. Ariz. 2022)
(“It appears that . . . no court has ever held that the Take Care Clause provides a mechanism to obtain
affirmative relief against the President or other executive branch officials.”) (collecting cases).
12 For the purposes of this Order, the Court treats the separation-of-powers principles underlying the
Appropriations and Take Care Clauses as coextensive.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 21 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

22
Const. art. II, § 3 (The Executive shall “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”);
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”). Respondents counter that Plaintiffs’
argument merely restates their APA claim in constitutional garb—asserting only that the
agency has exceeded its statutory authority. ECF No. 15 at 19.
To 	resolve 	this 	dispute, 	the 	Court 	must 	evaluate 	the 	boundary 	between
congressional spending power and executive administration. See Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008). As a threshold matter, because agencies are “creatures of
statute,” they possess “only the authority that Congress has provided them.” NFIB, 595
U.S. at 117. When Congress appropriates money for specific purposes, the Executive
Branch generally must spend it.13 See Train v. City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35, 42–44 (1975).
This principle is codified in the Impoundment Control Act and the Anti-Deficiency Act,
which prohibit executive officers from holding appropriated funds in reserve except in
narrow, specified circumstances. See Anti-Deficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat.
929 (1982) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1512) (prohibiting executive officers from holding
appropriated funds in reserve except in certain circumstances); 2 U.S.C. § 683 (ICA).
Thus, when “previously appropriated money is available for an agency to perform a
statutorily mandated activity,” an agency cannot refuse to carry out that mandate. In re
Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
However, a distinction exists between an executive refusal to spend appropriated
funds at all and an agency’s discretionary decision to re-allocate funds among different
grantees. While the Executive cannot refuse to spend appropriated funds without
13 The Court assumes without deciding that these constitutional constraints apply equally to subordinate
executive agencies like NOAA as they do to the President. See In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 22 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

23
congressional approval, Congress ordinarily leaves agencies with broad discretion to
administer those funds pursuant to statutory guidelines. See Harris Cnty., 786 F. Supp.
3d at 208. To state a separation-of-powers claim in this context, Plaintiffs must plead
facts showing that Congress specified the exact manner in which these funds must be
spent—rendering the spending non-discretionary—and that the Executive has effectively
“repealed” that spending through inaction. Id. at 211.
Plaintiffs argue that terminating the Award functioned as a blanket refusal to
spend the money appropriated for the West Branch River project. See ECF No. 25 at 22.
Respondents, however, assert that they do not intend to impound the funds, but rather
intend to re-obligate them to other projects under the Coastal Resilience program. ECF
No. 15 at 19. The facts alleged in the Complaint favor the Respondents’ characterization.
Unlike the Government’s attempt in Sierra Club v. Trump to “reprogram” funds for a
purpose never authorized by Congress (a border wall), the funds here remain within the
Coastal Resilience program for which they were appropriated. Cf. 929 F.3d 670, 694 (9th
Cir. 2019). The program allows for generalized funding for habitat restoration, and the
State admits in its Complaint that “NOAA has continued to fund . . . projects outside of
Maine” under the same program. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 42. Because the program’s funding is
open-ended, there is no indication that NOAA’s decision to re-obligate money to other
coastal projects constitutes a unilateral amendment of a congressional appropriation.
Rather, it appears to be an exercise of administrative discretion—even if, as Plaintiffs
allege, that discretion was exercised unlawfully under the APA. Nor does this case
resemble the “coercive” funding withdrawals found unconstitutional in other contexts.
This is not an attempt to withdraw all federal funding from a state to achieve an unrelated
policy goal, see City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018), nor an
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 23 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

24
attempt to completely abolish a federal agency, see Rhode Island v. Trump, 810 F. Supp.
3d 283, 310 (D.R.I. 2025). Because the State has not pleaded facts establishing that NOAA
will leave the funds unspent or use them for a purpose unauthorized by the appropriations
statute, its separation-of-powers claim fails.
Finally, 	the 	Court is 	mindful that 	constitutional 	claims 	predicated on 	the
termination of federal funds are often better characterized as “the stuff of APA litigation.”
Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 786 F. Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D. Mass. 2025).
As the Supreme Court has noted, not every executive action in excess of statutory
authority is ipso facto a violation of the Constitution. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,
472 (1994). Plaintiffs’ core grievance is that the Executive Branch exceeded its statutory
authority by terminating the Project without following proper administrative standards.
Because this case can be resolved on statutory grounds under the APA, the Court declines
to reach the grave and delicate constitutional 	questions 	raised 	in Count IV. See
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The Court has frequently called attention to the ‘great gravity and delicacy’ of its
function 	in 	passing 	upon the 	validity 	of 	an act 	of 	Congress . . . .”). 	Accordingly,
Respondents’ motion to dismiss Count IV is GRANTED.
B. Violation of the Tenth Amendment (Count V)
Plaintiffs’ second constitutional claim alleges NOAA terminated the Award in
impermissible retaliation against the State for Governor Mills’s policy position, thereby
violating 	the Tenth 	Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 23. 	Respondents characterize the
termination as mere “[m]ild encouragement by the federal government to effect state
policy changes” that does not run afoul of the Constitution. ECF No. 15 at 22.
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 24 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

25
“States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States.” New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). Under the Tenth Amendment, the federal
government is barred from infringing on state sovereignty by unduly coercing a state to
adopt a federal regulatory scheme. Id. This prohibition applies whether the government
“directly commands” a state to regulate or “indirectly coerces” a state to adopt a federal
policy through the threat of financial loss. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 578.
Respondents argue that withdrawing the $9 million Award is only minimally
coercive because the sum equals “less than [0].045%” of Maine’s annual budget. ECF No.
15 at 23. This argument, however, misapprehends the governing law in two ways. First,
the relevant measure of coercion is not restricted to a percentage of the state’s overall
budget; the loss of a significant portion of a specific, long-standing program’s funding can
also be coercive. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (evaluating the loss
of “5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs”); but
see NFIB, 567 U.S. at 582 (finding coercion where the threatened loss exceeded “10
percent of a State’s overall budget”). Here, the record is silent as to what percentage of the
Maine DMR’s specific restoration budget the Award comprises. See generally ECF No. 1.
Second, and more importantly, Respondents misconstrue Plaintiffs’ burden at this
stage of the litigation: Plaintiffs must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The precise point at which financial
inducement becomes a “gun to the head” remains undefined. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 581; see
id. at 642 n.24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting 	in part) (“But how is a court to judge whether only 6.6% of all state
expenditures is an amount States could or would do without?”) (quotation modified)).
Plaintiffs allege “NOAA’s termination of the Project grant will have a significant impact
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 25 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

26
on Plaintiffs’ efforts to restore the ecosystem services and natural functions of the fresh
and saltwater habitats in the West Branch Pleasant River and to improve coastal resilience
in an underserved region.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 45. Whether the Award termination crosses the
line into impermissible inducement is a factual question the Court cannot resolve at the
motion to dismiss stage. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 25-CV-01350, 2026 WL
145874, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026) (declining to dismiss a Tenth Amendment claim
where the plaintiffs plausibly suggested that losing the given funding would “cripple their
ability to deliver critical services to their communities”) (quotation modified)).
Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs have pleaded a plausible Tenth Amendment
claim. Respondents’ motion to dismiss as to Count V is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Respondents’ motion to dismiss Counts
I, II, III, IV, and V for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED. Respondents’
motion to dismiss Count IV and Count VI for failure to state a claim is GRANTED, and
those claims are hereby DISMISSED. Respondents’ motion to dismiss Count V for
failure to state a claim is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file supplemental
authority (ECF No. 32) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
S O ORDERED.
Dated this 14th day of April, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT J UDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00324-SDN Document 33 Filed 04/14/26 Page 26 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>