PIETROSKI v. CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES LLC

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
PETER A. PIETROSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE
SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:25-cv-00425-SDN
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff Peter A. Pietroski is a mortgagor alleging unlawful debt collection
practices on the part of his mortgage servicer, Defendant Carrington Mortgage Services,
LLC (“Carrington”). Before the Court are: (1) Carrington’s first Motion to Strike and
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, portions of Mr. Pietroski’s original complaint, ECF No. 1;
and (2) Carrington’s renewed Motion to Strike, ECF No. 8, portions of Mr. Pietroski’s first
amended complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 7. For the following reasons, both motions are
DENIED.
I. 	Background1
In 2007, Mr. Pietroski2 acquired property in Winthrop, Maine (the “Property”),
and he has resided there ever since. FAC ¶¶ 6, 7. In 2009, he obtained a mortgage loan on
the Property, FAC ¶ 15, and this action arises from a long-running dispute over that loan.
Shortly after obtaining the mortgage loan, Mr. Pietroski became unable to afford his
1 These facts are derived from the first amended complaint. ECF No. 7.
2 While Mr. Pietroski is the sole named plaintiff in this action, the first amended complaint alleges he and
his partner, Francine Fuller, are co-borrowers on the mortgage loan and joint legal owners of the Property.
See ECF No. 7. For ease of reference, the Court refers only to Mr. Pietroski in this Order.
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
monthly payments. FAC ¶ 17. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Pietroski requested a loan
modification from GMAC Mortgage, LLC (“GMAC”), the then-servicer and owner of the
loan, but GMAC rejected his request, and the loan went into default. FAC ¶¶ 18, 53.
A. Loan Litigation History
Since the 2010 default, the mortgage loan has been the subject of multiple
proceedings in both federal and state court. In 2011, GMAC commenced a foreclosure
action against Mr. Pietroski in Maine state court, but it dismissed the suit the following
year. FAC ¶ 19. In 2013, GMAC again sued Mr. Pietroski in Maine state court to initiate
foreclosure; in 2015, GMAC dismissed the second foreclosure action due to standing
defects. FAC ¶¶ 20, 22.
Following a series of assignments, WVMF Funding, LLC (“WVMF”) became the
owner of the mortgage loan in 2017. FAC ¶¶ 23, 24. In February of the following year,
WVMF initiated a third foreclosure action against Mr. Pietroski in Maine state court. FAC
¶¶ 29–31. In May 2020, the state court entered judgment for Mr. Pietroski. FAC ¶ 34. In
June 2020, WVMF filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. FAC ¶ 35. Around
October 2020, while the motion was pending, WVMF sold the mortgage loan to
Wilmington Savings Fund, FSB (“Wilmington”), as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan
Trust I. FAC ¶ 36. Wilmington was not substituted as the plaintiff in the state court action.
FAC ¶ 37. In March 2021, the state court denied the motion to alter or amend the
judgment. FAC ¶ 38. The judgment in Mr. Pietroski’s favor became final in July 2021. FAC
¶ 39.
After the state court ruled in his favor, Mr. Pietroski sought a declaratory judgment
from 	this 	Court 	in 	October 	2021 	solidifying 	that 	he 	held 	title 	to 	the 	Property
unencumbered by the mortgage. FAC ¶ 43. Both WVMF and Wilmington were named as
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
defendants in the declaratory action. FAC ¶ 45. Wilmington filed a counterclaim seeking,
among other things, a declaratory judgment that the mortgage loan was still valid and
Wilmington owned the mortgage. FAC ¶¶ 46–48. In December 2024, following cross
motions for summary judgment, this Court entered an order granting summary judgment
in favor of Mr. Pietroski. FAC ¶¶ 49–50. In so doing, the Court declared: (1) the mortgage
is unenforceable; and (2) Mr. Pietroski holds title to the Property free and clear of the
mortgage encumbrance. FAC ¶ 51. Wilmington and WVMF appealed; as of early March
2026, the appeal remains pending. FAC ¶ 52.
B. Loan Servicer Conduct
Shifting back to 2020—in October of that year, Carrington began servicing the
mortgage loan. FAC ¶¶ 53, 62. Around that time, Carrington mailed a letter to Mr.
Pietroski notifying him that it had become the loan’s servicer. FAC ¶ 76. By that point, the
loan had been in default for around ten years. Also in October 2020, Carrington began
mailing 	“Monthly 	Mortgage 	Statements” 	to 	Mr. 	Pietroski. 	FAC 	¶ 	62. 	These
communications asserted that monthly principal, interest, and escrow payments were
owed on the mortgage loan. Id. Through June 2021, these monthly statements were
mailed directly to Mr. Pietroski. FAC ¶ 77. He alleges this correspondence was improper
because Carrington possessed knowledge of the declaratory judgment in Mr. Pietroski’s
favor and knew that he was represented by an attorney in the foreclosure matter. See FAC
¶¶ 73, 77, 91. In addition, Mr. Pietroski contends these monthly statements, which
threatened potential foreclosure and acceleration, were false or misleading because they
did not accurately describe Carrington’s legal rights. See FAC ¶¶ 89–91. After June 2021,
these monthly statements were mailed to Mr. Pietroski’s counsel. FAC ¶ 89.
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Additionally, in May 2022, Mr. Pietroski alleges Carrington directly mailed him a
“Notice of Right to Cure” letter, which stated $16,252.10 was required to cure the default
and warned that failure to cure could result in acceleration of the debt and sale of the
property. FAC ¶ 86. Mr. Pietroski further alleges that on eight occasions between June 11,
2021, and September 13, 2025, Carrington delivered letters by personal carrier to the
Property. FAC ¶ 78. These letters identified the mortgage loan account number, requested
Mr. Pietroski contact Carrington to seek a resolution for the default, and warned that
Carrington might pursue the options available to it if Mr. Pietroski did not make contact.
Id. Mr. Pietroski contends these deliveries occurred despite Carrington’s knowledge that
he was represented by counsel and persisted after Carrington received written objection
from his attorneys requesting that it cease directly communicating with Mr. Pietroski and
physically entering the Property. FAC ¶¶ 80–91. Mr. Pietroski further alleges that at least
some 	of 	the 	letters 	delivered by 	personal 	carrier 	occurred 	after 	Carrington 	sent
correspondence to Mr. Pietroski’s attorneys acknowledging that its system had been
updated to cease telephone and written communication with Mr. Pietroski except as
required by law. FAC ¶¶ 87–88.
C. Procedural Posture
Against that backdrop, Mr. Pietroski commenced this action against Carrington in
August 2025. ECF No. 1. On September 25, 2025, Carrington filed its first Motion to Strike
and Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the complaint. ECF No. 6. Two weeks later, Mr.
Pietroski filed his first amended complaint. ECF No. 7. And in late October 2025,
Carrington renewed its Motion to Strike the first amended complaint. ECF No. 8.
Mr. Pietroski’s first amended complaint asserts five counts related to Carrington’s
communication in connection with debt collection, alleging violations of: (1) 15 U.S.C.
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
§ 1692c—communications with Plaintiff while he was represented by counsel (Count I);
(2) 32 M.R.S. § 11012(1)(B)—improper communication with Plaintiff (Count II); (3) 15
U.S.C. § 1692d—harassment or abuse (Count III); (4) 32 M.R.S. § 11013(1)—harassment
or abuse (Count IV); and (5) 14 M.R.S. § 6113—breach of the Maine mortgage servicer
duty of good faith (Count V). See ECF No. 7 at 20–25.
II. 	Discussion
A. First Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss Original Complaint
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a “party may amend its pleading once as
a matter of course no later than: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) . . . 21 days after service
of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),
whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Here, Mr. Pietroski was entitled to amend
his complaint once as matter of course within the twenty-one days after Carrington served
its first Rule 12 motions; because Mr. Pietroski filed his amended complaint within that
time period, amendment was proper and the amended complaint becomes “the operative
complaint without judicial intervention.” Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 95
(1st Cir. 2008); see Kolling v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 347 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2003)
(the “amended complaint completely supersedes [the] original complaint, and thus the
original complaint no longer performs any function in the case”); Howard v. IDEXX
Distrib. Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00079, 2020 WL 4435093, at *1 (D. Me. July 5, 2020), report
and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2020 	WL 	4432367 	(D. 	Me. 	July 	31, 	2020)
(recommending motion to dismiss be deemed moot when “plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint as of right in response to that motion, superseding the original complaint”).
Accordingly, Carrington’s first Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, the
original complaint, ECF No. 1, are DENIED AS MOOT.
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
B. Renewed Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint
Before responding to a pleading, a party may move to strike “an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(f). A matter is immaterial if it has no bearing on the parties’ claims for relief or
defenses. McGlauflin v. RCC Atl. Inc., 269 F.R.D. 56, 58 (D. Me. 2010). Similarly, an
impertinent matter is that which does not pertain to, and is not necessary to resolve, the
issues in question. U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. as Tr. for LSF9 Master Participation Tr. v. King,
No. 1:19-cv-00119, 2020 WL 3064423, at *1 (D. Me. June 9, 2020). If the challenged
material is “so connected with the subject matter of the suit that it might be deemed to
present a question of law or fact that the district court is obligated to hear and determine,”
the Court cannot strike it as impertinent. Burnett v. Ocean Props. Ltd., No. 2:16-cv-
00359, 2017 WL 1331134, at *7 (D. Me. Apr. 11, 2017) (quoting McGlauflin, 269 F.R.D. at
58). Moreover, motions to strike are generally disfavored and should be denied unless “it
is clear that the challenged matter has no possible bearing on the parties’ dispute.” McKay
v. Fay Servicing, LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00361, 2024 WL 3738302, at *3 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2024).
Ultimately, the decision to deny a motion to strike lies within the Court’s sound discretion.
See Manning v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2013).
Pursuant to Rule 12(f), Carrington moves to strike various portions of the first
amended complaint. Specifically, Carrington requests the Court strike paragraphs 17,
18–25, 30–31, 33–42, 46–52, 63–64, 67–68, 70–72, and 92, contending the allegations
contained therewithin are “irrelevant.” See ECF No. 8 at 3–4. Carrington asserts these
challenged paragraphs are not at issue in the instant case, concern events that predate
Carrington servicing Mr. Pietroski’s loan, or a combination thereof. See id. at 2–4. Mr.
Pietroski maintains the allegations found in these thirty-six paragraphs are relevant to his
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
asserted claims because they provide crucial background information for his various
causes of action and requested remedies. ECF No. 10 at 2–5.
The Court agrees with Mr. Pietroski. Carrington fails to show how the paragraphs
it moves to strike have “no possible bearing on the parties’ dispute.” See McKay, 2024
WL 3738302, at *3. The challenged paragraphs describe the factual history of the
mortgage loan’s origination and transfer of servicing and ownership rights, see FAC
¶¶ 18–25, 36; Mr. Pietroski’s default and attempts to address the delinquency, see FAC
¶¶ 17–21; and the series of foreclosure actions and related court proceedings that concern
the enforceability of the mortgage and the legal status of Mr. Pietroski’s purported debt
before and during Carrington’s involvement, FAC ¶¶ 19—20, 22–25, 30–31, 33–42,
46–52, 63–64, 67–68, 70–72, and 92. These “challenged allegations provide relevant
background information” leading up to the filing of the instant case and are helpful to
understanding and assessing Mr. 	Pietroski’s asserted claims. Mr. Catling v. York Sch.
Dep’t, No. 2:19-cv-00110, 2019 WL 3936386, at *5 (D. Me. Aug. 20, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4455986 (D. Me. Sept. 17, 2019). Moreover,
Carrington fails to demonstrate how it will be prejudiced by the inclusion of any of the
challenged factual allegations. See Mr. Catling, 2019 WL 3936386, at *5 (“Rule 12(f)
motions are not typically granted without a showing of prejudice to the moving party.”
(quoting Sheffield v. City of Bos., 319 F.R.D. 52, 54 (D. Mass. 2016)); Wilmington Tr.,
Nat’l Ass’n v. Howe, No. 2:21-cv-00278, 2022 WL 1522247, at *4 (D. Me. May 13, 2022).
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Carrington’s renewed Motion to Strike. ECF
No. 8.
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
III. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Carrington’s first Motion to Strike and Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 6, the original complaint, ECF No. 1, are DENIED AS MOOT, and
Carrington’s renewed Motion to Strike, ECF No. 8, the first amended complaint, ECF
No. 7, is DENIED.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 10th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT J UDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00425-SDN Document 12 Filed 03/10/26 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>