REARDON v. USA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
NATHAN REARDON, 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	1:25-cv-00540-JAW
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW
OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the federal government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, seeking relief for injuries and property loss that he
sustained while he was in federal custody. (Complaint, ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff also filed a
motion to proceed without prepayment of fees, which motion the Court granted. (Motion,
ECF No. 5; Order, ECF No. 7.) 	In accordance with the statute governing actions filed
without 	the 	prepayment 	of 	fees, 	a 	preliminary 	review 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	is
appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Following a review of Plaintiff’s allegations, I recommend the Court dismiss the
matter.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Between April 2022 and December 2022, Plaintiff was in federal custody at the
Hancock County Jail. While in federal custody, he “experienced severe pain and injury to
his left shoulder.” 	(Complaint ¶ 6.) 	Plaintiff made “repeated complaints,” but staff
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allegedly “failed to evaluate or treat his shoulder injury properly.” (Id. ¶ 7.) In December
2022, Plaintiff was transferred to a federal prison in Pennsylvania. The medical condition
persisted. The medical staff in the prison obtained an x-ray, but Plaintiff alleges that the
condition “required soft tissue evaluation,” an MRI, and/or an orthopedic evaluation. (Id.
¶ 9.)
Plaintiff was released from prison in May 2023. Despite Plaintiff’s requests for the
return of a medical device and items of clothing he was wearing when he first entered
prison, the Bureau of Prisons has not returned the property or compensated him for the
property. According to Plaintiff, the personal property was worth approximately $500.
L EGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915 is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for
individuals unable to pay the cost of bringing an action. 	When a party is proceeding
without prepayment of fees, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under §
1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective
defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
“A self-represented plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the court must
construe his complaint ‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Waterman v. White Interior Sols., No. 2:19-cv-00032-
JDL, 2019 WL 5764661, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551
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U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic
facts sufficient to state a claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).
D ISCUSSION
The FTCA waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity and makes it liable
“for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment,” to the extent that “the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
Plaintiff evidently intended to assert a medical malpractice claim based on the
alleged failings of the medical staff at the prison in Pennsylvania.
Because medical malpractice is a form of negligence, to state a prima facie
cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate the elements of negligence: a
duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the
physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and
the damages suffered were a direct result of harm.
Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 589 Pa. 183, 199 (2006) (quotation marks
omitted).1
1 The staff members at the Hancock County Jail are not federal employees, and under the FTCA
independent-contractor exception, “the United States cannot be held liable for the negligence of employees
of government contractors whose daily operations are not closely supervised by United States officials.”
Thiersaint v. DHS, 85 F.4th 653, 663 (1st Cir. 2023) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2671); see also United States
v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814–15 (1976) (“In [Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973)] this Court held
that employees of a county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to a contract with the Federal Bureau
of Prisons were not federal employees or employees of a federal agency; thus, the United States was not
liable for their torts”).
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Plaintiff’s substantive claim consists of the conclusory allegation that medical
providers failed to treat him properly. 	Because Plaintiff provided few, if any, details
regarding the injury, symptoms, or communications to the medical staff, there is no
plausible basis for a finding that the medical providers breached their duty of care by
ordering an x-ray rather than an MRI or an orthopedic evaluation. Furthermore, because
Plaintiff does not allege that federal officials caused the shoulder injury, and because
Plaintiff does not explain what occurred after the medical investigation/treatment in prison,
there are no facts to establish causation and harm. In other words, even if other diagnostic
tests were medically warranted, and even if Plaintiff intended to allege a legal harm based
on the current condition of his shoulder, he has alleged no facts from which a fact finder
could plausibly infer that an MRI or orthopedic evaluation would have alleviated the
suffering or otherwise made a material difference in remedying Plaintiff’s shoulder injury.
See A.G. by & through Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2013)
(applying plausibility inquiry to all elements of negligence claims and discussing cases
supporting 	dismissal 	when 	there 	are 	insufficient 	factual 	allegations 	to 	support 	the
conclusory allegation that the alleged negligence caused the alleged injury).
Plaintiff’s personal property claim also fails. First, a plaintiff may not file a claim
in district court without first filing an administrative notice of claim and exhausting the
administrative process through a final denial or six months of inaction. 	28 U.S.C. §
2675(a). 	Plaintiff alleged that he filed an administrative notice regarding the negligence
claim, which administrative claim was denied, but Plaintiff does not allege that he filed an
administrative notice or exhausted the administrative process for the personal property
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claim. Second, an FTCA claim is barred if the administrative claim was not filed within
two years of the date on which it accrued or if the lawsuit was not filed within six months
of the administrative denial. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Because Plaintiff’s personal property
claim evidently occurred in May 2023, the deadline to file an administrative claim has
passed. 	Finally, even if Plaintiff’s claim was properly exhausted and filed timely, his
property claim would still fail because FTCA claims may not be based on the detention of
property by law enforcement, including prison officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c); Adekoya v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 08 CIV. 5912 (AKH), 2009 WL 874196, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s claim relates to property that was lost or damaged in a prison storage
facility, and the FTCA may not be used for claims arising from the detention of property
by law enforcement officers”).
C ONCLUSION
After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, I recommend
the Court dismiss the matter.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 13th day of January, 2026.
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