CAMPOS v. STAMPER et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JUNIOR AMORIM CAMPOS, 	)
)
Petitioner 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-00140-LEW
)
DERRICK STAMPER, et al., 	)
)
Respondents 	)
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is Petitioner Junior Amorim Campos’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (ECF No. 1). 	Petitioner seeks release from immigration detention. 	Respondent
Derrick Stamper, Chief Patrol Agent of the Houlton Sector, U.S. Border Patrol, and the
other federal respondents oppose the Petition. 	For the following reasons, the Petition is
granted and habeas relief is ordered as outlined in the conclusion of this Order.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a national of Brazil. 	According to his Petition, which is verified,
Petitioner 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	between 	ports 	of 	entry 	without 	inspection
approximately 15 years ago. 	He has resided in Maine most recently. 	He has no known
criminal history.
On March 10, 2026, Customs and Border Patrol arrested Petitioner. Since that time,
Petitioner has been detained in Fort Fairfield. 	Petitioner asserts that ongoing detention
without an opportunity for release on conditions or bond violates the Immigration and
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Nationality Act, the Due Process Clause, a standing order of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,
2025 WL 3687757, No. 1:25-cv-12664 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2025), which granted relief to
a class of persons subject to detention pending removal proceedings, and an increasingly
long line of judicial decisions issued in this Court.1 Petitioner also complains that nobody
with authority over his detention has ever evaluated his circumstances to determine
whether it is appropriate to release him pending removal proceedings, presumably because
Respondents purport to lack the authority to do so under administrative precedent,
specifically Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sept. 5 ,2025).
On March 20, 2026, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 12) that
directed the Respondents to address the merits of the Petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. In
their Response (ECF No. 13), Respondents maintain that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention pending the completion of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),
citing Yajure Hurtado, but acknowledge that that assertion is contrary to local precedent.
Because that is Respondents’ position, Respondents have not produced any evidence
suggesting that they ever exercised any discretion in regard to the initial custody
determination or that they ever issued a warrant to authorize ongoing detention.
1 The scope of the relief awarded in Guerrero Orellana extends to mandatory detentions of similarly
situated noncitizens under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) “who are either detained within Massachusetts or
subject to the jurisdiction of an immigration court in Massachusetts.” 2025 WL 3687757, at *1 (D. Mass.
Dec. 19, 2025). Petitioner is under the jurisdiction of the Chelmsford, Massachusetts Immigration Court.
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DISCUSSION
The lawfulness of immigration detention is subject to review by, and unlawful
detention is subject to remedy in, a United States District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The exercise of jurisdiction over this matter is proper because it presents a challenge to the
lawfulness 	of 	detention 	and 	does 	not 	otherwise 	challenge 	the 	underlying 	removal
proceedings. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003); Kong v. United States, 62
F.4th 608, 614 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021). The Petitioner must prove illegal detention by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 2025 WL 1420131, at *7 (D.
Minn. 2025) (collecting authority).
Based 	on 	the 	factual 	assertions 	contained 	in 	the 	verified 	Petition 	and 	the
Respondent’s failure to oppose any of the factual assertions, I find that Petitioner has
resided in the United States for years, after entering the United States without admission
or inspection, and that Petitioner lacks a criminal record that would require his detention
during removal proceedings. 	Given these circumstances and based on the district court
decisions discussed in the parties’ submissions—precedent that they and the Court are well
aware of concerning multiple recent habeas petitions, injunctions, and writs granted in this
Court2—I conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that Respondents have misapplied the Immigration and Nationality Act by subjecting
2 See, e.g., Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, 2:25-cv-00437-SDN, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sept. 22, 2025);
Bermeo Sicha v. Bernal, 25-cv-00418-SDN, 2025 WL 2494530 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2025).
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Petitioner to mandatory detention throughout the entire pre-removal period, under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b), rather than exercising discretion on the matter of detention, under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a).3 	In so doing, Respondents have disregarded this Court’s precedent instructing
that initial detention determinations are necessary within 48 hours of arrest and that, if
detention is to be continued, a warrant must also issue. See, e.g., Perez Yepez v. Stamper,
No. 1:26-cv-00113-JAW, 2026 WL 765350, at *8 (D. Me. Mar. 18, 2026); Castillo
Gonzalez v. Stamper, No. 1:26-cv-00120-JAW, 2026 WL 751992, at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 17,
2026); Makuiza v. Wesling, No. 2:26-cv-00044-LEW, 2026 WL 252400 (D. Me. Jan. 30,
2026). 	Continued detention in the absence of an initial detention determination upon
issuance of an administrative warrant followed by a custody redetermination hearing before
in immigration judge will lead inexorably to a due process violation in derogation of rights
articulated by the First Circuit in Hernandez Lara, 10 F.4th at 41, given the similarity of
circumstance between petitioner Hernandez Lara and Petitioner Amorim Campos.4 	See
3 The Immigration and Nationality Act “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking
admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) [and] also authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and
(c).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). As an alien who entered the United States without
inspection at the border, Petitioner is not properly deemed to be “seeking admission” and his detention is,
consequently, governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See, e.g., Guerrero Orellana, 2025 WL 3687757, at *7.
4 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. am. V. 	The Fifth Amendment applies to aliens facing removal
proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). In Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, the First Circuit held
that “due process requires the government to either (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that [an
alien] poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence that she poses a
flight risk” in order to impose detention throughout the period of removal proceedings, including appeals.
10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). That conclusion rested on a Mathews v. Eldridge due process analysis for
a non-criminal alien who unlawfully entered the United States without being processed at the border. Id.
at 27-35. Like Hernandez-Lara, Petitioner entered the United States illegally by evading inspection at the
border and thereafter took up residence. 	Based on Hernandez-Lara, the preexisting law in this Circuit
requires Respondents to afford a noncitizen like Petitioner access to a discretionary detention regime on
due process grounds.
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Bernardo-Rodrigues v. Hyde, No. 2:25-cv-00553-LEW, 2026 WL 370863, at *3 (D. Me.
Feb. 	10, 	2026) 	(finding 	treatment 	of 	similarly 	situated 	habeas 	petitioner 	was 	not
substantially justified from a due process perspective and that Respondents’ reliance
on Yajure Hurtado has always been in tension with the teaching of Hernandez-Lara).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED
(ECF No. 1). It is HEREBY ORDERED that Respondents will promptly exercise, within
48 hours of this order, their initial custody discretionary authority, treating Petitioner as a
noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b), and either release
Petitioner from custody on personal recognizance, subject to reasonable conditions, or else
continue detention pursuant to an administrative warrant. If detention is continued based
on an exercise of administrative arrest authority, pursuant to a warrant, Respondents will
provide Petitioner with a detention hearing before an immigration judge within 14 days of
this Order, at which hearing the burdens of justifying detention will be placed on
Respondents in accordance with Hernandez Lara.
This order has no effect on any decision to institute removal proceedings by proper
notice or, if the determination is based on valid grounds in the future, to re-arrest and detain
Petitioner pursuant to legitimate process.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24 th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Lance E. Walker
Chief U.S. District Judge
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