US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. RICHMOND et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
U.S. BANK NATIONAL 	)
ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, 	)
ON BEHALF OF THE HOLDERS 	)
OF THE ASSET BACKED 	)
SECURITIES CORPORATION 	)
HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, 	)
SERIES NC 2005-HE8, ASSET 	)
BACKED PASS-THROUGH 	)
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 	)
NC 2005-HE8, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:21-cv-00208-JAW
)
ERIC RICHMOND, a/k/a ERIC H. 	)
RICHMOND, 	)
)
Defendant, 	)
)
and 	)
)
CITIMORTGAGE, INC., f/k/a 	)
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE, INC., 	)
)
Defaulted Party. 	)
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A pro se defendant moves for reconsideration of an order in his favor that the
court issued following a bench trial on a foreclosure count. 	For the most part, the
court rejects the motion for reconsideration. 	First, the defendant has not met the
standards for reconsideration under the law. 	Second, the defendant’s demand that
the court dismiss the foreclosure count with prejudice is contrary to Maine law.
Third, the defendant’s fears that the court’s factual findings will be presented to the
jury on the remaining counts of the complaint are baseless. 	Finally, so long as the
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pleading meets the requirements of the civil rule, the court will allow the defendant
to file an answer now more than five years after the lawsuit was filed but will not
allow him to assert affirmative defenses, which have been long since waived.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On November 10, 2025, Eric Richmond filed a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Local Rule 7(f) and request for oral argument. Def.’s Mot. for Recons. (w/
Prejudice, Non-Binding Scope, & Order Answer) Pursuant to Local Rule 7(f) and
Request for Oral Argument (ECF No. 239) (Def.’s Mot.). 	Mr. Richmond requests the
Court amend its October 27, 2025 findings of fact and conclusions of law in three
ways. Id. First, he asks the Court to amend its order dismissing without prejudice
U.S. Bank’s foreclosure count to dismissal with prejudice. Id. at 2-3. Second, he asks
that the Court strike all nonessential factual findings and legal conclusions related
to Plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring their foreclosure count. 	Id. at 3-4. 	Third, he
demands the Court confirm the discussion of the “remaining dispositive defects” will
have no preclusive effect on the jury trial on U.S. Bank’s remaining counts. Id. at 4-
5. Mr. Richmond also requests oral argument on his reconsideration motion. Id. at
1. Finally, Mr. Richmond seeks permission to file an Answer “de novo” to Plaintiff’s
July 29, 2021 complaint. Id. at 6.
On 	November 	12, 	2025, 	U.S. 	Bank 	filed 	their 	response, 	opposing 	Mr.
Richmond’s motion for reconsideration. 	Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Richmond’s Req. for
Permission to File Document and Underlying Mot. for Recons. (ECF No. 240) (Pl.’s
Opp’n). The Court must deny Mr. Richmond’s motion, U.S. Bank argues, because the
Court’s dismissal without prejudice is not based on a manifest error of fact or law,
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nor does Mr. Richmond identify any new evidence, previously unavailable, that puts
the Court’s reasoning into question. 	Id. at 3. 	U.S. Bank did not address Mr.
Richmond’s other arguments, nor did they object to Mr. Richmond’s request to file an
answer “de novo.”
On November 19, 2025, Mr. Richmond filed his reply, which, in addition to
reiterating his position, posits U.S. Bank’s failure to respond to most of the arguments
in his motion constitutes a concession that Mr. Richmond is correct. 	Def.’s Reply in
Support at 7, 15-16 (ECF No. 244) (Def.’s Reply). Accordingly, Mr. Richmond argues
the Court must therefore grant his motion for reconsideration. Id. In further support
of his argument for dismissing the foreclosure count with prejudice, Mr. Richmond
also complains of a footnote in U.S. Bank’s response explaining it has taken steps to
confirm assignment of the mortgage with hope to cure their lack of standing on their
foreclosure count, which Mr. Richmond argues is evidence U.S. Bank knew that the
2012 	mortgage 	assignment 	they 	relied 	on 	in 	their 	complaint 	was 	defective,
demonstrating 	U.S. Bank is “attempting to manufacture ‘better’ evidence” and has
engaged in bad faith and gamesmanship throughout this case.1 Id. at 3-7.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Standards for a Motion for Reconsideration
As the Court has previously explained, “[a] motion for reconsideration is
available under United States District Court for the District of Maine Local Rule 7(f)
1 	Mr. Richmond also replies with a new argument of laches, which the Court does not consider
because it was raised for the first time in his reply. See Hypertherm, Inc. v. American Torch Tip Co.,
Civil No. 05-cv-373-JD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67579, at *7 n.2 (D.N.H. Sep. 11, 2007).
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but only if based on a ‘manifest error of fact or law.’” Order Denying Mot. for Recons.
of Order Denying in Forma Pauperis Status and Reiteration of Cok Warning at 2 (ECF
No. 114) (quoting D. ME. L OC. R. 7(f)). “The granting of a motion for reconsideration
is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” 	Salmon v. Lang, 57
F.4th 296, 323 (1st Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). 	“The moving party ‘must either
clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence’
to warrant such relief.” 	Id. (citation omitted); see also Caribbean Mgmt. Grp. v.
Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d 35, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2020). 	Thus, the burden lies with Mr.
Richmond to prove his entitlement to reconsideration and any waived argument from
U.S. Bank is insufficient to automatically grant his motion’s requested relief. Id.
For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in
part Mr. Richmond’s motion for reconsideration. 	The Court denies Mr. Richmond’s
motion in so far as he seeks to alter the contents of the Court’s October 27, 2025
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Under Maine law, dismissal without prejudice
is required when the plaintiff lacks standing to bring a foreclosure claim. Moreover,
the factual findings and legal conclusions have no preclusive effect on U.S. Bank’s
remaining counts against Mr. Richmond, and the Court will not strike any factual
findings or legal conclusions from its order. Finally, the Court grants Mr. Richmond’s
request to file an answer to U.S. Bank’s complaint, although only for the limited
purpose of streamlining the upcoming trial, currently scheduled for January 5, 2026.
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B. 	When a Claimant Lacks Standing to Bring a Foreclosure Claim,
Dismissal without Prejudice is Proper as a Matter of Law
Mr. Richmond argues U.S Bank’s foreclosure claim must be dismissed with
prejudice. 	Def.’s Mot. at 2-3. 	Dismissal without prejudice, he contends, is legally
inappropriate where, as here, the court reached a merits-based determination that
the Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of its claim. 	Id. at 2. 	Furthermore,
Mr. Richmond avers dismissal without prejudice is an illusory remedy in this case,
because Plaintiff may prolong litigation by moving to vacate dismissal and then move
for default judgment based on Mr. Richmond’s failure to file an answer. 	Id. at 3.
Finally, Mr. Richmond argues that because proving ownership of the mortgage is
futile and because standing cannot be created retroactively, dismissal with prejudice
is required. Def.’s Reply at 1, 7.
Mr. Richmond is mistaken. 	“A plaintiff’s lack of standing renders that
plaintiff’s complaint nonjusticiable—i.e., incapable of judicial resolution.” 	Bank of
Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2015 ME 127, ¶ 8, 124 A.3d 1122 (citing Homeward
Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 2015 ME 108, ¶ 24, 122 A.3d 947). 	Contrary to Mr.
Richmond’s argument, in dismissing U.S. Bank’s foreclosure count for lack of
standing, the Court did not reach a merits-based determination. Moreover, the Court
did not find that it is impossible for U.S. Bank to prove ownership in the mortgage,
only that U.S. Bank failed to submit sufficient evidence at the bench trial to prove
they owned the mortgage. 	U.S. Bank N.A. v. Richmond, No. 2:21-cv-00208-JAW,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212727, at *38 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2025) (“U.S. Bank has failed
to prove its ownership of the mortgage . . . through a purported sale between New
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Century and [Credit Suisse First Boston]”). Because U.S. Bank failed to provide the
minimum necessary “documentary evidence to establish the details of the purported
sale,” id., the Court did not address the merits and dismissal without prejudice was
therefore appropriate.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has consistently held that a foreclosing
party’s failure to show the minimum interest required to raise a foreclosure claim
results in dismissal without prejudice for lack of standing. See Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas v. Kendall, Mem-25-54, 2025 Me. Unpub. LEXIS 55, at *1-2 (May
13, 2025); Greenleaf, 2015 ME 127, ¶¶ 6-9, 124 A.3d 1122; Gregor, 2015 ME 108, ¶¶
24, 26, 122 A.3d 947. In Kendall, a case with a nearly identical chain of title issue to
this case and for which the Court relied on heavily in its October 27, 2025 order, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court’s dismissal with prejudice for
lack of standing and remanded the case for the lower court “to enter judgment
dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of standing.” Kendall, 2025 Me. Unpub.
LEXIS 55 at *1-2 (emphasis supplied). 	Because U.S. Bank “failed to show the
minimum interest that is a predicate to bringing [a foreclosure] claim,” this Court
“properly disposed of the case by entering dismissal without prejudice.” 	Greenleaf,
2015 ME 127, ¶ 9, 124 A.3d 1122; accord Gregor, 2015 ME 108, ¶ 24, 122 A.3d 947.
Mr. Richmond’s additional arguments attempting to distinguish this body of
caselaw and that dismissal without prejudice is an illusory remedy are immaterial to
whether dismissal without prejudice was correct as a matter of law. 	The Court
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therefore denies his request to amend the Court’s October 27, 2025 findings of fact
and conclusions of law to dismiss U.S. Bank’s foreclosure count with prejudice.
C. 	The Contents of the Court’s October 27, 2025 Order Will Not Be
Admitted to the Jury
Next, 	Mr. 	Richmond 	demands 	the 	Court 	strike 	the 	“unnecessary” 	and
“extensive additional findings” from its October 27, 2025 order, the inclusion of which
he avers “actively prejudices the jury” with “harmful and incorrect statements of
Maine law.” Def.’s Mot. at 3. Specifically, Mr. Richmond contends (1) the Court erred
in finding the certified mail envelopes in evidence “satisfies the ‘first-class mail’
requirement for the Notice of Mortgagor’s Right to Cure under 14 M.R.S. § 6111”2;
(2) the Court’s “lengthy discussion regarding the required contents of a foreclosure
complaint and the applicable certification standard per [14 M.R.S. §] 6321” was
“unnecessary to the disposition and should be stricken”; (3) the Court’s determination
that U.S. Bank proved their interest in the promissory note is “a non-essential finding
that invades the province of the jury on the remaining counts”; and, finally, (4)
“[b]eyond the specific legal errors,” Mr. Richmond argues “the unnecessary discussion
and findings on witness testimony, especially without addressing credibility issues
raised by Defendant” “infringe[s] upon the jury’s role . . . to make its own independent
determinations” 	on 	U.S. 	Bank’s 	remaining 	counts 	against 	Mr. 	Richmond,
2 	The Court does not address Mr. Richmond’s error of fact argument on first-class mailing. Even
if he were correct, it would not change the outcome of the Court’s dismissal without prejudice for lack
of standing. It also need not be addressed, because, as explained below, the Court’s factual findings
in its October 27, 2025 order will not be submitted to the jury.
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“uninfluenced by factual findings from [the] separate, concluded” bench trial on U.S.
Bank’s dismissed foreclosure count. Id. at 3-5.
Mr. Richmond badly misconceives the status of this case, what the Court
decided, and what will be at issue before the jury. Although Mr. Richmond repeatedly
asserted that he had a right to a jury trial on U.S. Bank’s foreclosure action, he is
wrong. 	United States Bank Trust v. Menezes, No. 2:17-cr-66-GZS, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 158386, at *2 n.2 (D. Me. Sept. 27, 2017); see Kennebec Fed. S&L Ass’n v.
Kueter, 1997 ME 123, 695 A.2d 1201; Key Bank of Maine v. Levesque, Civil Action
Docket Nos. CV-93-491, CV-94-275, 1996 Me. Super. LEXIS 72, at *4, and *4 n.2 (Me.
Super. Mar. 4, 1996) (“Indeed, the law is overwhelming that a party has no right to a
jury trial in a foreclosure proceeding”) (citing cases). Although U.S. Bank asserted at
one point that there was no right to a jury trial for the remaining counts of breach of
note, 	breach 	of 	contract, 	quantum 	meruit, 	and 	unjust 	enrichment, 	the 	Court
addressed this issue in its October 27, 2025 order and concluded that a right to a jury
trial exists for at least two and probably three of these claims. Richmond, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 212727, at *53-56. Thus, the Court ordered the case set for jury trial in
January 2026. Id. at *56-57.
The essence of the right to a jury trial is the right to have the jury, not the
Court, decide the facts. To apply the facts the Court found in a bench trial to a jury
trial would violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on all legal claims.
Accordingly, because the Seventh Amendment preserves a party’s right to a jury trial
on all legal claims, a court’s determination of issues presented at a bench trial are not
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binding on a jury at a subsequent stage of the same case where the legal claims
remain at issue. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552-53 (1990). This
is particularly true in a case such as this one where U.S. Bank proceeded to trial only
on their foreclosure count, which is an equitable claim, before losing on foreclosure
and opting to proceed on their remaining counts, some of which are legal claims. See
Axelrod v. Phillips Academy, 74 F. Supp. 2d 106, 109 (D. Mass. 1999) (“this Court’s
ruling on the plaintiff’s equitable claim does not foreclose the plaintiffs from trying
their legal claims before a jury”). The contents of the Court’s October 27, 2025 order
therefore have no preclusive effect on the remaining counts to be presented to the
jury at trial. 	Thus, as far as the jury is concerned, it will know nothing about the
foreclosure count, the bench trial, this Court’s foreclosure decision, including its
factual findings and legal conclusions.
In that sense, Mr. Richmond is right that the jury “must be free to make its
own 	independent 	determinations, 	uninfluenced 	by 	factual 	findings 	from 	[the]
separate, 	concluded” 	bench 	trial. 	Def.’s 	Mot. 	at 	4. 	However, 	because 	those
determinations have no bearing on the remaining counts and cannot be presented to
the jury, the Court need not strike any findings of fact or legal conclusions from its
order ahead of the upcoming trial. 	The Court therefore denies Mr. Richmond’s
request to strike any so-called nonessential factual findings and legal conclusions.
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D. 	The Court Will Allow Eric Richmond to File an Answer
Mr. Richmond requests permission to file an answer on his own behalf within
twenty-one days of this Court’s order.3 Id. at 5. Allowing him to do so, Mr. Richmond
contends, removes uncertainty around the presentation of evidence, jury instructions,
and the ultimate resolution of the remaining claims. 	Id. 	Mr. Richmond further
stipulates that if permitted to file his answer, it should not be construed as an
amendment to, or an adoption of, any prior pleading filed by the Court on his behalf.
Id. Nor should filing his own answer constitute a waiver of any issues, objections, or
rights he has previously raised or preserved in this case. Id.
The Court will allow Mr. Richmond to file an answer to U.S. Bank’s July 29,
2021 complaint. 	However, given the length of time the case has been pending and
the approaching trial, the Court has shortened the time for Mr. Richmond to file an
answer from 21 to 14 days, so that the Court may assess and resolve any issues that
may arise from the late filing of his answer. 	The Court refers Mr. Richmond to the
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires him to admit, deny,
or state that he is without knowledge as to each allegation. F ED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
The Court will not allow Mr. Richmond to assert any affirmative defenses,
however. 	The failure to assert affirmative defenses in an answer constitutes a
waiver. 	Here, U.S. Bank filed its complaint on July 29, 2021, Compl. (ECF No. 1),
3 	Technically, Mr. Richmond’s motion to file answer is not properly placed in his motion for
reconsideration because he has never asked to file an answer, and the Court has never denied him a
request to do so. Instead, Mr. Richmond is requesting a motion for leave to file late answer, though
under the name of a motion for reconsideration. As Mr. Richmond has moved on this issue, U.S. Bank
has responded, and Mr. Richmond has replied, the question of whether he will be allowed to file an
answer has been fully briefed. 	The Court will therefore rule on the motion under the motion for
reconsideration rubric, even though it is a motion for leave to file late answer.
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and Mr. Richmond not only refused to file an answer but adamantly refused to comply
with repeated court orders that he do so, until the Court entered a general denial of
the allegations on his behalf so that a scheduling order could issue, and the case move
forward. 	See Conjugal Partnership v. Conjugal Partnership, 22 F.3d 291, 400 (1st
Cir. 1994) (“Generally speaking, failure to plead an affirmative defense results in a
waiver of the defense and the exclusion of all evidence relevant to it”). To allow Mr.
Richmond to assert affirmative defenses five years after his answer was due and after
the completion of a bench trial on one count and on the eve of a jury trial on other
counts would run the potential of reopening discovery and would be grossly unfair to
U.S. Bank. See Mello v. Arruda, C.A. No. 23-479JJM, C.A. No. 23-480JJM, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 212196, at *15-16 (D.R.I. Oct. 28, 2025) (denying request to amend
pleadings on the brink of trial).
Thus, the Court forewarns Mr. Richmond. 	In his filings, Mr. Richmond
demands the right to file his answer de novo. The Court is not certain what he means
by de novo in this context; however, to be clear, Mr. Richmond’s answer may not delay
the resolution of this case; he is not entitled to a scheduling order or discovery upon
filing his answer. 	The purpose of filing his answer is simply to alleviate the
uncertainty concerning “the presentation of evidence, jury instructions, and the
ultimate resolution of the remaining claims” at the upcoming trial. Def.’s Mot. at 5.
The Court also reminds Mr. Richmond that he may not posit any scurrilous
allegations, personal attacks, or similar provocations in his answer. See F ED. R. CIV.
P. 12(f) (A court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
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immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter”); U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. King, No.
1:19-cv-00119-JDL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100816, at *2-5 (D. Me. June 9, 2020);
Barth v. United States, No. 2:18-cv-00201-JAW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188660, at *6-
7 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2018).
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court therefore GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Eric Richmond’s
Motion for Reconsideration (w/ Prejudice, Non-Binding Scope, & Order Answer)
Pursuant to Local Rule 7(f) and Request for Oral Argument (ECF No. 239). The Court
denies Mr. Richmond’s motion in so far as he seeks to amend or strike the contents
of the Court’s October 27, 2025 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ECF No.
235). The Court also denies his request for oral argument on his motion. The Court
grants his motion in so far as he requests to file an answer to U.S. Bank’s July 29,
2021 Complaint (ECF No. 1) but DENIES his request insofar as he is seeking the
right to assert affirmative defenses with his answer. 	The Court ORDERS Mr.
Richmond to file an answer no later than fourteen days from the date of this order.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of November, 2025.
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