USA v. MOULTRIE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cr-00017-JAW
)
LYNEL MOULTRIE. 	)
)
ORDER ON GOVERNMENT’S MOTION IN LIMINE AS TO DEFENDANT’S
PRIOR CONVICTION
Finding that a criminal defendant’s prior conviction for trafficking in prison
contraband is relevant to the present drug distribution charges but potentially
unduly prejudicial, the Court dismisses without prejudice the government’s motion
in limine, which requests a pretrial determination allowing use at trial of the
defendant’s prior conviction and the underlying facts. The court requires government
counsel to approach the bench and obtain a definitive ruling before mentioning either
the prior conviction or the underlying conduct to the jury or seeking to introduce these
facts into evidence.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 5, 2025, a federal grand jury issued a three-count indictment of
Lynel Moultrie, charging him with three instances of distribution of a controlled
substance, namely cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Indictment (ECF
No. 40). The Defendant was arrested and charged after he allegedly sold drugs to an
undercover agent on three different occasions. 	This case is scheduled for trial to
commence on Thursday, March 12, 2026 through Friday, March 13, 2026. Notice of
Hr’g (ECF No. 97). A jury was selected on March 2, 2026. Min. Entry (ECF No. 126).
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On February 9, 2026, the Government filed a motion in limine seeking to
introduce evidence at trial of the Defendant’s 2023 state conviction. 	Gov’t’s Mot. in
Lim. as to Def.’s Prior Conviction (ECF No. 101) (Gov’t’s Mot.). On February 24, 2026,
the Defendant filed his opposition. 	Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. in Lim. as to Def.’s
Prior Conviction (ECF No. 109) (Def.’s Opp’n).
II. 	STATEMENT OF FACTS
With a jury selected and trial looming in this criminal case, the Government
moves in limine for a pretrial ruling authorizing the admission of what it contends is
evidence of the Defendant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). Gov’t’s Mot. at 1-9. The Government says that Mr. Moultrie was convicted of
trafficking in prison contraband, when he was found to possess cocaine, the same
controlled substance he is now charged with, in his rectum during a jail strip search.
The parties refer to the date of this event differently. The Government refers
to the conviction as a 2023 conviction. 	Gov’t’s Mot. at 1 (“The United States of
America moves in limine to admit evidence of Defendant Lynel Moultrie’s prior state
2023 conviction for trafficking in prison contraband, as well as evidence underlying
that conviction”). The Defendant refers to the conviction as a 2020 conviction. Def.’s
Opp’n at 2 (“From this 2024 offense, the Government seeks to admit evidence of a
2020 conviction involving possession of cocaine at the Cumberland County Jail on the
theory that it proves intent and knowledge, and common plan or scheme”).
Neither party submitted evidence of the criminal judgment confirming the date
of the conviction. The Government says that on May 7, 2020, a Portland Police Officer
stopped a vehicle on Congress Street in Portland. 	Gov’t’s Mot. at 1-2. Mr. Moultrie
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was sitting in the front passenger seat and when he stepped out of the vehicle, the
officer noticed a plastic bag with a white substance inside on the seat where Mr.
Moultrie had been sitting. 	Id. at 2. 	The officer believed that the bag contained
cocaine base. Id. Mr. Moultrie reached for the plastic bag and attempted to run away
from the officer, and the officer tackled him to the ground. 	Id. 	Ultimately law
enforcement arrested Mr. Moultrie and transported him to the Cumberland County
Jail. Id. At the jail, Mr. Moultrie was strip searched and a plastic bag with cocaine
was found in his rectum. 	Id. 	This bag was filled with smaller bags that had been
tied off in a style known as Dominican ties. Id.
On December 11, 2020, a state grand jury indicted Mr. Moultrie for trafficking
in prison contraband. Id. at 1. Mr. Moultrie received a deferred disposition for this
charge on July 18, 2022. 	Id. 	Mr. Moultrie, however, was unable to successfully
complete the deferred disposition, and it was terminated on December 12, 2023. Id.
At that time a sentence of eighteen months was imposed, all but forty-eight hours
suspended, and a two-year term of probation was imposed. Id. Mr. Moultrie filed a
post-conviction review of the conviction, which was denied on January 12, 2026. Id.
III. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	Government’s Motion
The Government moves in limine to admit evidence of the Defendant’s prior
2023 conviction for trafficking in prison contraband as well as evidence underlying
the conviction to prove knowledge, the existence of a common plan or scheme, and to
rebut any defense of innocent involvement by the Defendant. Gov’t’s Mot. at 1.
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B. 	Defendant’s Opposition
The Defendant disagrees and argues evidence of the 2020 conviction and the
underlying facts should be excluded. 	Def.’s Opp’n at 1. 	The Defendant considers
evidence of the 2020 conviction and the underlying facts too remote in time, too
dissimilar to the present allegations, unfairly prejudicial, and thus inadmissible. Id.
at 2.
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARD1
A. 	Relevance
“[E]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” F ED. R. EVID. 401. Courts should generally admit relevant
evidence unless directed otherwise by the United States Constitution, a federal
statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court. F ED. R. EVID. 402. However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” F ED. R. EVID. 403.
B. 	Rule 404(b) Evidence: Prior Bad Acts
Federal 	Rule 	of 	Evidence 	404(b) 	generally 	makes 	inadmissible 	evidence
regarding a defendant’s prior crime, wrong, or act when used to prove the defendant’s
1 	The Government has not argued that Mr. Moultrie’s conviction for trafficking in prison is
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, and the Court has not discussed Rule 609’s
applicability, if any.
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character such that on a particular occasion the defendant acted in conformity with
that character. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1); United States v. Carbone, 110 F.4th 361,
388 (1st Cir. 2024) (“Rule 404(b) prohibits the prosecution from introducing ‘evidence
that is extrinsic to the crime charged’ solely ‘for the purpose of showing villainous
propensity.’” (quoting United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2012)).
However, Rule 404(b) allows the admission of character evidence for other permitted
purposes, such as proving motive or opportunity. F ED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). In criminal
cases, the government must provide reasonable notice in writing before trial to the
defendant that it intends to offer evidence subject to Rule 404(b) “so that the
defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it,” including by articulating the use that
the government believes is permitted by the Rule and reasoning that supports its
position. F ED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3).
Upon adequate notice, the government’s proposal “to introduce evidence of a
defendant’s prior criminal conduct is subject to a two-part test.” 	United States v.
Henry, 848 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2017). “First, the evidence must have ‘special relevance’
to an issue in the case” and “must not include ‘bad character or propensity as a
necessary link in the inferential chain.’” United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113,
118 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir.
1996)). 	Specially relevant evidence is permitted when it is admitted “for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 	F ED. R. E VID. 404(b)(2). 	“If the
prior-bad-acts evidence is relevant only for the forbidden propensity inference, then
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the evidence is inadmissible under Rule 404(b)(1) and the inquiry ends.” 	United
States v. García-Sierra, 994 F.3d 17, 29 (1st Cir. 2021). Otherwise, the court moves
to step two, the application of Rule 403, which requires the probative value of the
evidence to substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.; see also United
States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that Rule 404(b)
“incorporates sub silentio the prophylaxis of Federal Rule of Evidence 403”). 	The
First Circuit has repeatedly “cautioned that when prior-bad-acts evidence is offered
to prove something relevant to the crime charged such as a defendant’s motive for the
crime, ‘courts must be on guard to prevent the motive label from being used to
smuggle forbidden evidence of propensity to the jury.’” 	Carbone, 110 F.4th at 388
(quoting Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 120).
V. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The Date of Conviction
Based on facts proffered by the Government, the Court concludes that Mr.
Moultrie’s conviction took place on July 18, 2022, based on conduct that occurred on
May 7, 2020. The Government says that Mr. Moultrie was indicted on December 11,
2020 for trafficking in prison contraband; trafficking in prison contraband is Class C
crime under Maine law. 	See 17-A M.R.S. § 757(3). 	Maine law allows persons who
plead guilty to a Class C, D, or E crime to consent to a deferred disposition. 	17-A
M.R.S. § 1348. To be eligible for a deferred disposition, however, a person must plead
guilty to the crime. 	17-A M.R.S. § 1348-A. 	Consistent with Maine law, under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, a diversionary disposition counts as a sentence,
so long as the diversionary disposition results from an admission of guilt. 	U.S.S.G.
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§ 4A1.2(f). The bottom line is that once Mr. Moultrie pleaded guilty on July 18, 2022
and consented to the diversionary disposition, he would be deemed under both state
and federal 	law 	to have 	been 	convicted of 	the 	crime 	of 	trafficking 	in 	prison
contraband. Thus, the Court uses July 18, 2022 as the date of conviction and May 7,
2020 as the date Mr. Moultrie committed the conduct that led to the conviction.
B. 	Step One
The Defendant was charged with three instances of distribution of a controlled
substance to an undercover agent. Indictment. The Defendant allegedly distributed
drugs to a confidential informant or undercover MDEA special agent on four
occasions in February and March of 2024 and allegedly possessed, with the intent to
distribute, cocaine that was recovered inside his residence pursuant to an executed
search warrant in March of 2024. 	Gov’t’s Mot. at 3. 	The Government anticipates
presenting evidence that on four of these five occasions, “the drugs were packed in
several smaller ‘Dominican ties,’ which were in turn packaged within a single clear
plastic bag.” Id. at 3.
Previously, the Defendant was convicted for trafficking in prison contraband
following a 2020 incident in which drugs were recovered from the Defendant’s rectum
following a strip search at the Cumberland County Jail, where the Defendant was
being processed after fleeing from a traffic stop on suspicion of drug possession. 	Id.
at 1-2. The recovered drugs were contained in a “plastic bag [which] was filled with
smaller plastic bags, which in turn were described as ‘Dominican ties’—the twisted,
torn-off corners of plastic bags used by drug traffickers to package drugs.” Id. at 2.
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The Government seeks to use “[t]he [2022] conviction and underlying facts”
because they “are highly relevant to establish that Defendant had the requisite intent
and knowledge for the charged crimes as well as rebutting any argument or claim
that 	Defendant 	was 	innocently 	present 	during 	the 	charged 	distributions 	and
possessions.” 	Gov’t’s Mot. at 6. 	The Government believes the 2022 conviction and
underlying facts “are also relevant to establish a common plan or scheme by
Defendant” as “[t]here exists a striking similarity between the packaging of the
cocaine in his 202[2] conviction and the packing in the present case.” Id.
The Defendant, however, argues that the 2022 conviction “is not only remote
in time—almost 4 years—but is also very different than the present charged offenses”
given 	that 	the 	Defendant 	was 	convicted 	of 	possession—not 	distribution—of
contraband in custody. 	Def.’s Opp’n at 2. 	The Defendant believes “introduction of
this evidence would be unfairly prejudicial and would lead to a ‘mini-trial’ over
whether the Defendant merely possessed cocaine in May 2020, to which he pleaded
guilty, or was engaged in uncharged trafficking or distribution of cocaine in May
2020.” 	Id. 	As for the packaging, the Defendant argues the similarities are of
“negligible, probative value” because “[v]irtually all of the controlled substances that
reach users are packaged in a similar manner.” Id. at 3.
The First Circuit has emphasized that the admission of prior bad acts evidence
must have “‘special’ relevance—that is, evidence relevant for a non-propensity-based
purpose, 	‘such 	as 	providing 	motive, 	opportunity, 	intent, 	preparation, 	plan,
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knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” United States v. De La
Cruz-Feliciano, 786 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting F ED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)).
The Court concludes that the Government has the stronger position. As they
put it, the “Defendant’s [2022] conviction for trafficking in prison contraband has
special relevance” because “[t]he First Circuit recognizes ‘Rule 404(b)(2) specifically
permits the admission of a prior conviction to prove intent, and [has] upheld the
admission of prior drug dealing by a defendant to prove a present intent to
distribute.’” 	Gov’t’s Mot. at 5 (citing United States v. Henry, 848 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2017) (collecting cases)). Although, as the Defendant points out, the prior conviction
does not require trafficking, only possession of contraband while in official custody,
courts have allowed evidence of prior possession to prove intent or knowledge of
distribution. United States v. Awer, 502 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (D.R.I. 2007). Further,
“[t]he other bad act need not be identical to the crime charged so long as it is
sufficiently similar to allow a juror to draw a reasonable inference of probative
knowledge or intent.” United States v. Landrau-Lopez, 444 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2006).
That the 2022 conviction involved underlying conduct from 2020 is also not
disqualifying because that time frame is not too remote to inform the Defendant’s
intent and knowledge in the present charges. Id. (finding convictions between eight
and thirteen years old admissible because they were probative of the defendant’s
intent and knowledge). 	Likewise, Court also agrees with the Government that the
prior conviction can rebut a defense of innocent involvement, if raised by the
Defendant. 	Gov’t’s Mot. at 5; United States v. Landry, 631 F.3d 597, 602 (1st Cir.
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2011) (noting that the First Circuit and others, “have admitted evidence under Rule
404(b) to rebut a defense of innocent involvement”).
As to the drug packaging, “Dominican ties” could be probative of drug
distribution. Even if “[v]irtually all of the controlled substances that reach users are
packaged in a similar manner,” Def.’s Opp’n at 3, evidence that the Defendant had
multiple packets of narcotics in the form of “Dominican ties” could be probative of
distribution. 	See United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 128 F.4th 358, 360 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2767, 222 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (2025) (discussing a detective’s
testimony that “Dominican ties are ‘fairly typical of drug packaging’ and consistent
with distribution”); United States v. Marenghi, 896 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D. Me. 1995),
aff’d, 109 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing a detective’s observation of “Dominican
ties” as “bags [the detective] knew to be often knotted in a particular manner to hold
drugs”).
Here, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	evidence 	of 	the 	prior 	conviction 	and
circumstances underlying the prior conviction have special relevance to all the
permitted uses under Rule 404(b). 	Evidence of the conviction and underlying facts
have 	special 	relevance 	regarding 	Mr. 	Moultrie’s 	“motive, 	opportunity, 	intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 	De
La Cruz-Feliciano, 786 F.3d at 89 (quoting F ED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)). 	This evidence
would be especially strong on issues of knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, and
lack of accident, but the evidence would have special relevance to Mr. Moultrie’s
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, and plan.
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C. 	Step Two
Concluding that the Government has satisfied Step One in demonstrating the
proposed evidence is relevant under 404(b), the Court is obligated to consider whether
this evidence would unfairly prejudice the Defendant and to exclude the evidence if
its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 	F ED. R.
EVID. 403. 	“Unfair prejudice ‘speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant
evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.’” United States v. DiRosa, 761 F.3d 144, 153 (1st Cir.
2014) (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)).
On this record, the Court does not have enough information to rule pretrial
whether evidence of the 2022 conviction and underlying facts would be properly
admissible. 	First, the Court does not know whether Mr. Moultrie is going to assert
an “innocent involvement” defense. 	See Landry, 631 F.3d at 603. 	If the defense
contends in argument, cross-examination, or its own witnesses that the Government
has not proven that he was “innocently caught up” in the charged events, evidence of
his prior involvement with drugs could well become much more probative than
prejudicial. 	United States v. Agramonte-Quezada, 30 F.4th 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2022)
(affirming the admission of prior acts when the defendant asserted the “blind mule”
theory of defense); United States v. Colon Ledee, 772 F.3d 21, 36 (1st Cir. 2014).
Second, the Court does not know if Mr. Moultrie is going to take the stand and
deny his involvement. If so, depending on his testimony, the Court may allow cross-
examination of Mr. Moultrie’s prior bad act. For example, in United States v. Moon,
802 	F.3d 	135 	(1st 	Cir. 	2015), 	the 	First 	Circuit 	upheld 	the 	district 	court’s
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determination that the defendant had “opened the door to the government’s cross-
examination about the events leading to the conviction” because the defendant’s
account 	had 	the 	potential 	to 	create 	a 	false 	impression 	of 	the 	underlying
circumstances. Id. at 146.
Third, the Court is concerned about how the Government intends to introduce
this evidence. 	As Mr. Moultrie points out, although labeled, Trafficking in Prison
Contraband, 17-A M.R.S. § 757, Maine law does not require that the incarcerated
person actually traffic contraband to be convicted. See State v. Bonney, 427 A.2d 467,
469 (Me. 1981) (“The offense of which the defendant was convicted, although entitled
‘trafficking in prison contraband’ does not include as a necessary element of the
State’s proof ‘trafficking’ as defined in 17-A M.R.S. § 1101(17). The offense is proven
when it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant, 2) a person
in official custody, 3) intentionally, 4) possessed contraband”). 	Thus, if the jury is
presented with evidence that Mr. Moultrie was convicted of trafficking in prison
contraband, the jury might well be misled into concluding that Mr. Moultrie had
previously been convicted of a trafficking offense in the same drug he is currently on
trial for possessing with the intent to distribute, when in fact he was convicted of
possession of cocaine while in jail.
Fourth, although there may well be evidence that the so-called Dominican ties
demonstrate drug trafficking, there may be countervailing evidence that Dominican
ties are an exceedingly common way to package cocaine, thus the fact there were
Dominican ties could be as consistent with personal use as with dealing.
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Fifth, the Government says that Mr. Moultrie possessed 7.2 grams of crack
cocaine at the Cumberland County Jail in 2020, but a jury would not know the
significance of that drug quantity. 	In other words, evidence would have to be
presented (and perhaps challenged) as to whether 7.2 grams of crack cocaine is an
amount consistent with personal use or drug dealing.
Sixth, returning to the title of the 2022 conviction, if admitted, the jury would
learn that Mr. Moultrie was not merely convicted of a prior offense involving cocaine
as prison contraband, but they would also learn that Mr. Moultrie’s conviction took
place while he was in jail, and raises the possibility that the jury will use this evidence
as character evidence against him. 	Even though a limiting instruction might cure
the prejudice that would otherwise render inappropriate the introduction of prior-
bad-acts evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1996)
(stating that “[t]he district court minimized any prejudicial impact of the prior drug
dealing evidence by instructing the jury, contemporaneously and again in its final
instructions, about the proper use of prior bad act evidence”), the evidence would beg
for a complicated explanation as to why he was in jail, whether he was prosecuted
and convicted of the crime for which he was arrested, and the relationship between
his arrest and his conviction.
Seventh, given these issues, the Court is concerned about the prospect of a trial
within a trial to properly describe the significance of Mr. Moultrie’s prior bad act
leading to a conviction. 	Again, if Mr. Moultrie takes the stand, the calculus would
change, depending on what he says. 	But at this point, the Court cannot rule
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definitively on the admissibility of the proffered prior bad acts evidence. 	Thus, the
Court rules that the Government must not mention this evidence in its statements to
the jury or seek to introduce the evidence without first approaching the Court at
sidebar and obtaining a final ruling.
Finally, in a separate filing, the Government has filed a motion to exclude Mr.
Moultrie’s attempt to assert an entrapment defense during trial. Under First Circuit
law, “[f]or a defendant ‘to be entitled to an instruction on entrapment, the record must
show some hard evidence of both government inducement’ of the criminal conduct
‘and the defendant’s lack of predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct.’” United
States v. Sandoval, 6 F.4th 63, 100 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. González-
Pérez, 778 F.3d 3, 11 (1st Cir. 2015)). If Mr. Moultrie is allowed to present evidence
on an entrapment defense, his prior conduct could become relevant to demonstrate
his predisposition, and the Rule 403 analysis would have to be recalculated. 	See
United States v. Pérez-Rodriguez, 13 F.4th 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2021) (“As for the first factor,
the character or reputation of the defendant, the evidence might include prior
criminal convictions for similar offenses”).
VI. 	CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Government’s Motion in Limine as
to Defendant’s Prior Conviction (ECF No. 101).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 9th day of March, 2026
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