USA v. MOULTRIE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cr-00017-JAW
)
LYNEL MOULTRIE. 	)
)
ORDER ON GOVERNMENT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING
POTENTIAL ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
The government has filed a motion in limine to prevent the defendant from
asserting an entrapment defense at trial. After reviewing the law on the assertion of
entrapment defenses, the court agrees that the record does not appear to establish
the requisite elements for the assertion of an entrapment defense, but the court
declines to make a definitive ruling because it does not know what evidence will be
adduced at trial. Aside from confirming in this order the current state of the law of
entrapment in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court defers ruling
unless and until the issue is presented at trial.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 5, 2025, a federal grand jury issued a three-count indictment of
Lynel Moultrie, charging him with three instances of distribution of a controlled
substance, namely cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Indictment (ECF
No. 40). 	This case is scheduled for trial to commence on Thursday, March 12, 2026
through Friday, March 13, 2026. A jury was selected on March 2, 2026. Min. Entry
(ECF No. 124).
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
On February 20, 2026, the Government filed a motion in limine seeking to
prohibit the Defendant from mounting an entrapment defense. 	Gov’t’s Mot. in Lim.
Regarding Potential Entrapment Defense (ECF No. 106) (Gov’t’s Mot.). On March 3,
2026 the Defendant filed his opposition. 	Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. in Lim. as to
Entrapment (ECF No. 129) (Def.’s Opp’n). 	Later that day, the Government filed for
leave to file a reply, Mot. for Leave to File Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. in Lim.
Regarding Potential Entrapment Defense (ECF No. 130), which the Court granted.
Order (ECF No. 131). The Government filed the permitted reply on March 4, 2026.
Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. in Lim. Regarding Potential Entrapment Defense
(ECF No. 132) (Gov’t’s Reply).
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	The Government’s Motion
The Government moves in limine to preclude the Defendant from mounting an
entrapment defense and thus seeks to exclude testimony, argument, or references to
entrapment at any phase of trial, as well as prevent an instruction on entrapment
going to the jury. Gov’t’s Mot. at 1. According to the Government, the Defendant has
not met his threshold burden and thus should not be allowed to mount the defense.
B. 	The Defendant’s Opposition
The Defendant disagrees and argues that no rule or authority requires the
Defendant to make a satisfactory prima facie showing before introducing evidence or
arguing that he was entrapped. 	Def.’s Opp’n at 1. 	The Defendant argues the Sixth
Amendment “requires the Government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,
which includes disproving entrapment.” 	Id. at 2. 	The Defendant considers the
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Government’s request to be something like requiring a “dry-run” trial before the trial,
which “[t]he Government is not entitled to,” and further, “if there is insufficient
evidence of entrapment, then an entrapment instruction will not be given.” Id. at 3.
The Defendant also argues that he lacks information about the confidential
informant (CI), who introduced the Defendant to the UC, and as such, exculpatory
information may come to light: the Government may have been “’conned’ by their
confidential informant—a criminal who was trying to get out of more serious criminal
offense.” Id. at 2.
C. 	The Government’s Reply
Citing caselaw from the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the
Government argues that “pretrial motions seeking to preclude entrapment defenses
are now common in federal courts.” Gov’t’s Reply at 1-2.
As to the confidential informant, the Government argues the Defendant
seemingly suggests that more information may reveal that the CI induced the
Defendant. Id. at 2. According to the Government, not only has the Defendant failed
to support the speculative possibility that the CI induced the Defendant, even if the
Defendant could produce requisite showing of inducement, he must also provide a
requisite showing of his lack of predisposition. Id. at 3. Because the Defendant has
provided neither inducement nor lack of predisposition evidence, he cannot argue an
entrapment defense. Id.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To present an entrapment defense, a defendant must meet the burden of
production 	as 	to 	the 	two 	elements 	comprising 	the 	entrapment 	defense: 	“(1)
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
government inducement of the accused to engage in criminal conduct, and (2) the
accused’s lack of predisposition to engage in such conduct.” United States v. Sanchez–
Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d
809, 812 (1st Cir. 1988)). 	Only when the defendant has satisfied his “entry-level
burden of production as to both elements,” does the burden shift to the government
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no entrapment occurred. Id.; see also United
States v. Joost, 92 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In order to be entitled to an entrapment
instruction, the Defendant has the burden of producing some evidence on both
elements sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he was an ‘unwary
innocent’ rather than a ‘unwary criminal’”) (cleaned up). Moreover, the defendant is
entitled to a jury instruction on his entrapment defense only if he carries this entry-
level burden. Id.
At the same time, the First Circuit described as “modest” the defendant’s
burden of production on the two prongs of the defense. 	United States v. Pérez-
Rodríguez, 13 F.4th 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 814). 	The
First Circuit wrote that this rule “is in keeping with the ‘general proposition [that] a
defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there
exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.’” 	Id. at 18-19
(quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988)). 	Moreover, in analyzing
whether a defendant has met his burden, “the court must construe the evidence in
the light most favorable to the defendant.” 	Id. at 19. 	An entrapment instruction is
required if the evidence, viewed in this charitable fashion, “furnishes an arguable
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
basis for application of the proposed rule of law.” Rodriguez, 814 F.2d at 814 (quoting
United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 1987)). In other words, the record
must contain evidence that makes the entrapment theory “plausible” or “superficially
reasonable.” 	United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1998)). 	The First
Circuit has emphasized, “[t]his is not a very high standard to meet.” Id.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
At this point, Mr. Moultrie has not shown there is at least some evidence of
improper governmental inducement and lack of predisposition required to raise an
entrapment defense.
A. 	Improper Inducement
The 	Defendant 	has 	not 	produced 	the 	requisite 	evidence 	of 	improper
government inducement. 	“To demonstrate inducement, a defendant must show not
only that the government provided the Defendant with the opportunity to commit the
crime, but also the existence of a ‘plus’ factor that raises concerns of ‘government
overreaching.’” United States v. Vasco, 564 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961-62 (1st Cir. 1994)). 	Overreaching is indication
“through such conduct as intimidation, threats, dogged insistence, excessive pressure
or exploitation of a noncriminal motive.” Id.
Based on the Government’s submission, such governmental overreaching does
not appear to be present in this case. 	As the Government recitation of the
circumstances of the three controlled purchased by the UC demonstrates, see Gov’t’s
Mot. at 2-13, “[n]either the CI nor the UC used any intimidation, issued any threats,
engaged in ‘dogged insistence,’ or inappropriately attempted to elicit sympathy from
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Defendant.” 	Id. at 16. 	More to the point, it is the Defendant’s burden to produce
some evidence of improper inducement—not the Government’s.
In his opposition, the Defendant suggests that the CI may prove to have
“peddled” “falsehoods.” 	Def.’s Opp’n at 2. 	Even if this is true, the Defendant’s
“burden, though modest . . . requires more than self-serving assertions.” 	United
States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 2008). 	The Defendant must provide
“some hard evidence” of inducement. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 815. As the Government
points 	out, 	the 	CI’s 	“criminal 	history 	has 	no 	bearing 	on 	whether 	there 	was
inducement 	brought 	to 	bear 	on 	Defendant 	or 	whether 	Defendant 	lacked 	a
predisposition to commit the criminal acts that were committed in this case.” Gov’t’s
Mot. at 3. 	Nor has the Defendant shown “that any improper inducement was then
leveled at Defendant himself—a necessary step in a third-party entrapment defense.”
Id. at 3.
B. 	Lack of Predisposition
Because the Defendant has not provided any evidence of inducement, the Court
need not determine whether the Defendant has provided evidence of his lack of
predisposition to the charged crime. 	Nonetheless, the Court briefly considers the
issue.
The Court considers the following factors when assessing whether a defendant
was predisposed to commit the charged crime:
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the initial
suggestion 	of 	criminal activity was made 	by the Government; 	(3)
whether the defendant was engaged in the criminal activity for profit;
(4) whether the defendant showed reluctance to commit the offense,
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
which was overcome by the governmental persuasion and (5) the nature
of the inducement or persuasion offered by the Government.
Gamache, 156 F.3d at 9-10. The Government points out that all but one of the factors
clearly favor finding that the Defendant lacks predisposition. 	Gov’t’s Mot. at 19-23.
Based on the evidence now before it, the Court agrees with the Government.
First, the character and reputation of the Defendant suggests that he had prior
serious drug involvement. 	Id. at 19-20. 	Second, the Government “concedes that it
approached Defendant to engage in a drug transaction” yet the Defendant “created
the conditions which caused the Government to approach him.” Id. at 20-21. While
this is the factor that is strongest for the Government, the Court finds that the
Defendant has not shown any evidence or argument on the matter. 	Third, the
Defendant’s own statements suggest that he was engaged in the drug sales for profit,
stated he did not want to ruin his “investment.” Id. at 21. Fourth, the Defendant has
not demonstrated he showed any reluctance to commit the offense. 	While the
Defendant at times postponed his meeting time with the UC, the Court did not
identify any express reluctance to execute the drug sales. Id. at 22. Fifth, the Court
agrees with the Government that there was “nothing untoward regarding the
inducement provided to Defendant to commit the charged offenses” because “[t]his
was, in all respects, a run-of-the-mill drug sting using a CI and a UC” and “[t]here
were no promises of incredible returns on investment, nor were there any threats
made for refusing to participate.” Id.
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
C. 	A Premature Ruling
The problem with issuing a definitive in limine ruling pretrial is that the Court
cannot know what evidence will be adduced at trial, and “[o]nce the defendant meets
his burden of production, entrapment becomes a question of fact for the jury.” Pérez-
Rodríguez, 13 F.4th at 19. 	The First Circuit explained that “[a] defendant does not
need to introduce his own evidence to meet this burden.” 	Id. (citing Rodriguez, 858
F.2d at 813). 	A defendant may rely on “evidence adduced during the government’s
case” or “any probative material in the record.” 	Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at
813). The proof may be “circumstantial rather than direct.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez,
858 F.2d at 813). If there are factual disputes in the record, the court is not permitted
to “weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or resolve conflicts in the
proof.” 	Id. (quoting Gamache, 156 F.3d at 9). 	If the parties argue competing
inferences, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the defendant’s
entrapment theory. Id. Ultimately, if “a reasonable jury could view the evidence as
establishing that defendant was entrapped . . . [the defendant] [i]s entitled to an
entrapment instruction.” 	United States v. Teleguez, 492 F.3d 80, 84 (1 st Cir. 2007).
“Determining whether government conduct has crossed the line into improper
inducement or whether a person was predisposed to commit an offense are delicate
questions of fact for the jury to sort out.” 	Pérez-Rodríguez, 13 F.4th at 19 (citing
United States v. Acosta, 67 F.3d 334, 338 (1st Cir. 1995)). 	In Pérez-Rodríguez, the
First Circuit stressed that “a judge should not hesitate to send the question to the
jury if there is even ambiguous evidence of entrapment.” Id.
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
Even though other trial courts have ruled on the availability of entrapment
defenses before trial, to do so in this case seems ill-advised. In this order, the Court
has summarized the current state of the law on entrapment in the First Circuit,
which may assist counsel for the Government and for Mr. Moultrie, but the Court
declines to rule definitively pretrial and will await the evidence presented at trial to
determine whether the entrapment defense may be raised.
V. 	CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Government’s Motion in Limine
Regarding Potential Entrapment Defense (ECF No. 106).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 9th day of March, 2026
Case 2:25-cr-00017-JAW Document 136 Filed 03/09/26 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>