WILLIS v. WILLIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ANNA FERNANDEZ WILLIS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00333-LEW
)
RILEY HERBERT WILLIS, III, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
ORDER
Plaintiff Anna Fernandez Willis brought this action against Defendant Riley Herbert
Willis, III, in connection with an assault that she alleges he perpetrated against her in 2023.
When Defendant failed to appear or respond to the Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff moved
this Court for default judgment (ECF No. 9). In reviewing that motion, I became aware of
irregularities pertaining to service of process and jurisdiction, and ordered Plaintiff to show
cause as to why the default that had been previously entered by the clerk should not be
vacated (ECF No. 12). 	Following an evidentiary hearing on service and jurisdictional
issues and having reviewed Plaintiff’s responsive submissions, I am unable to avoid the
conclusion that the Complaint should be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of
personal jurisdiction.1
1 At the hearing on this matter, I heard testimony from the employee of the county jail in which Defendant
is incarcerated about how process was served on Defendant. 	That testimony revealed several
inconsistencies between the manner in which Defendant was served and what is required by the jail’s policy.
These inconsistencies are somewhat concerning to me, but because I conclude that this Court is not the
proper forum for this case, I will not comment on the service issues further.
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“Before granting default judgment, the Court has ‘an affirmative duty’ to ensure that
it has jurisdiction ‘over both the subject matter and the parties.’” Strike 3 Holdings, LLC,
v. Doe, 757 F. Supp. 3d 99, 103 (D. Mass. 2024) (citation omitted); see also Est. of Ungar
& Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority, 325 F. Supp. 2d 15, 45 (D.R.I.
2004) (collecting cases); Stephen S. Gensler, 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules & Commentary §
55:17 (June 2025 Update) (“Before entering a default judgment, the court may—and
maybe 	must—satisfy 	itself 	that 	it 	has 	personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	absent
defendant”). The purpose of this inquiry is “[t]o avoid entering a default judgment that can
later be successfully attacked as void.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). “A
default judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is void[.]” Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21,
23 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Value Based Consultants, LLC v. Ring MD USA, Inc., No. 24-
cv-1596, 2025 WL 2848578 at *3 (D.P.R. Oct. 8, 2025) (“Whereas it remains true that, as
a 	general 	rule, 	‘a 	district 	court 	has 	no 	authority, sua sponte, 	to 	dismiss 	for 	lack
of personal jurisdiction’—the First Circuit has recognized a carve-out as it pertains
to default judgment.”) (citing Pilgrim Badge & Label Corp. v. Barrios, 857 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir. 1988)).
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff and Defendant, who are married, resided
together in Alabama in August 2023, when Defendant attacked Plaintiff by dousing her in
accelerant and setting her on fire. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 8, 9, 13. Plaintiff now resides in Maine.
Compl. ¶ 6. 	Defendant is currently incarcerated in Alabama, awaiting trial on criminal
charges related to this incident. 	Compl. ¶¶ 14-16. 	To establish this Court’s jurisdiction
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over the Defendant, Plaintiff points to Maine’s long-arm statute, which provides for
jurisdiction over non-residents “doing or causing a tortious act to be done, or causing the
consequences of a tortious act to occur within this State,” 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(2)(B), “to
the extent authorized by [due process],” Connolly v. Doucette, 909 A.2d 221, 223 (Me.
2006). Due process imposes three requirements: (1) that “Maine has a legitimate interest
in the subject matter of the litigation,” (2) that “the defendant, by his or her conduct,
reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine,” and (3) that a Maine court’s
exercise of jurisdiction “comports with traditional notions of fairplay and substantial
justice.” Id.; see also Bickford v. Onslow Mem. Hosp. Found., Inc., 855 A.2d 1150, 1154-
55 (Me. 2004).
It is the second of these that gives me pause. This prong “requires an examination
of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” 	Connelly, 909 A.2d at 224. 	The
Defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct took place in Alabama, where both he and Plaintiff
resided at the time, and where he is presently incarcerated. 	The only tether that ties this
case to Maine is Plaintiff’s decision to move here subsequently. Defendant could not have
been “on notice that [he] was injuring a Maine resident,” because Plaintiff was not a Maine
resident when she was injured. Bickford, 855 A.2d at 1156.
Plaintiff argues that litigation in Maine was foreseeable to Defendant because of the
nature of the assault and Plaintiff’s longstanding family ties to Maine—in other words, that
Defendant should have known that his assault would result in serious, long-term medical
consequences for Plaintiff, and that she would return to Maine following the assault to seek
the care and support of her family. But “[t]he commission outside the forum state of an act
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that has consequences in the forum state is by itself an isufficent contact where all the
events necessary to give rise to a tort claim occurred outside the forum state.” Bickford,
855 A.2d at 1155-56 (internal citation omitted). 	Similarly, “[c]ontacts that result solely
from ‘the unilateral activity of another party’ do not satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement.” Murphy v. Keenan, 667 A.2d 591, 594 (Me. 1995) (quoting Heliocopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)). 	And while Plaintiff’s
family ties to Maine may have made it foreseeable that she would experience some of the
lasting consequences of her injuries here, “‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” Murphy, 667 A.2d at
595 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)).
Without anything more to connect the Defendant to this forum, I cannot conclude that he
“could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Maine.”2 	Bickford, 855 A.2d at
1156.
I am sympathetic to the significant medical and financial obstacles that have led
Plaintiff to file this action in Maine, instead of Alabama. But the hardship that litigating
this case outside of Maine may bring for Plaintiff does not bear upon the sufficiency of
“the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” Connelly, 909 A.2d at 224 (emphasis
added). The injuries that Plaintiff alleges she has suffered at Defendant’s hands are severe
and extensive, and she has every right to seek their vindication—in the proper forum.
2 Because I have so concluded, I do not reach the third prong—“whether jurisdiction over [Defendant]
would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” Connelly, 909 A.2d at 225—
which is ordinarily the defendant’s burden to demonstrate, see id. at 223.
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For these reasons, this matter is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability
to pursue these claims in a court that has jurisdiction to hear them.
SO O RDERED .
Dated this 24th day of March, 2026.
/S / Lance E. Walker
CHIEF U.S. D ISTRICT JUDGE
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