MCKINNEY v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS) et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ANTONIO MCKINNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS), et al.,
Defendants.
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2:25-cv-00365-SDN
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
Petitioner Antonio McKinney sued Respondents the Maine Department of Health
and Human Services, some of its employees and attorneys, the judges of the Lewiston
District Court, the Lewiston District Court, the governor of Maine, two Lewiston police
officers, and two individuals Mr. McKinney alleges are the foster parents of his children.1
ECF No. 1. His claims in this case all relate to a child custody dispute which has been
ongoing since 2022. ECF No. 1 at 4. Mr. McKinney filed an application to proceed without
prepayment of fees, ECF No. 3, which the Court granted, ECF No. 6. As such, the
Magistrate Judge conducted a preliminary review of Mr. McKinney’s amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On September 25, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued
his Report & Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that this Court dismiss the action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ECF No. 21. Mr. McKinney
timely objected to the R&R. ECF No. 22.
1 Mr. McKinney’s amended complaint appears to remove the judges, the court, and the governor as
defendants. ECF No. 8.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I take all “[n]on-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint . . . as true.”
Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). Mr. McKinney filed
an amended complaint on July 18, 2025. ECF No. 8. Though his amended complaint
supersedes the initial complaint and does not include an affidavit, because Mr. McKinney
is pro se, I will consider the affidavit from the original complaint as part of the record on
this motion. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (reiterating that
courts must construe documents filed by pro se litigants liberally); ECF No. 1-3 (affidavit).
Mr. McKinney claims that on May 27, 2022, some of his children were taken from
him in Massachusetts and placed into foster care in Maine. ECF No. 1-3 at 1. Then, on
July 29, 2022, his newborn child was removed from his custody at Portland Hospital. Id.
at 2. Mr. McKinney claims that in both instances, he was not given notice of the pending
removals or an opportunity to contest the separation prior to his children being removed
from his custody. Id.
However, according to the affidavit attached to his original complaint, since that
time Mr. McKinney has been a party to state court custody proceedings. See id. He
attended a hearing in the state court custody matter in November 2022, where he invoked
his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Id. He claims the court in that proceeding
unlawfully “treated [his] silence as ‘interference’” and ruled against him. Id. He also states
that the appointed guardian ad litem and the assistant attorney general misrepresented
facts to the court in those proceedings and “failed to recommend placement with available
family members.” Id. Mr. McKinney claims “no legal justification has been produced for
the continued separation” of his children. Id.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. McKinney sued in this Court on July 15, 2025, and moved for a TRO and a
preliminary injunction on the same day. ECF Nos. 1, 4. On August 5, 2025, I denied his
motion for a TRO and his motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 11, to which he
subsequently objected, ECF No. 14. He also filed a motion to strike my August 5, 2025,
order. ECF No. 15. I construe both his “objection” and motion to strike together as
motions for reconsideration.2 On August 6, 2025, Mr. McKinney filed another motion for
a preliminary injunction, seeking a declaration that his constitutional rights had been
violated and a restoration of his parental rights. ECF No. 13. On August 21, 2025, he filed
a motion to change venue predicated on perceived judicial bias, ECF No. 18, which the
Magistrate Judge denied in an order dated September 8, 2025, ECF No. 20. On October
6, 2025, Mr. McKinney filed the instant objection to the September 25, 2025, R&R
recommending dismissal of his claims. ECF No. 22. In his objection to the R&R, Mr.
McKinney also renewed his motion to change venue due to judicial bias. See ECF Nos. 22,
23.
DISCUSSION
Because Mr. McKinney is proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 governs.
It provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines[,]”
among other things, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
2 Because I dispose of this case on jurisdictional grounds, I do not address Mr. McKinney’s motion for
reconsideration of my August 5, 2025, order, which is mooted by this Order. See In re Doughty, No. 1:25-
CV-00400, 2025 WL 2418668, at *3 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 2025) (“Because the Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that it lacks jurisdiction over [the] case, it also affirms the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that
the Court dismiss all other pending matters on this docket as moot.”).
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from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court may dismiss an action under
section 1915 of its own initiative “prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare
prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be
granted, the Court must assume the truth of all well-pled facts and give the plaintiff the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12. A complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A self-represented plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the
court must construe his complaint ‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Waterman v. White Interior Sols., No. 2:19-CV-
00032, 2019 WL 5764661, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94).
“To allege a civil action in federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege
that a defendant acted unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify
the manner in which the defendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law
affords a remedy.” Schiller v. Ferneld, No. 2:21-CV-00306, 2021 WL 5494517, at *1 (D.
Me. Nov. 21, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-CV-00306, 2021 WL
5815820 (D. Me. Dec. 7, 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“[A] federal court is under an unflagging duty to ensure that it has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the cases it proposes to adjudicate.” Am. Policyholders Ins. Co. v.
Nyacol Prods., Inc., 989 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1st Cir. 1993). Thus, contrary to Mr. McKinney’s
assertion that it is inappropriate to weigh in at this juncture, see ECF No. 22 at 3, I must
consider whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the asserted claims. In Younger v.
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Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny, the Supreme Court announced that federal
courts are required, “in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, to refrain from
interfering with certain state proceedings.” Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185,
189 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45).
Abstention can be appropriate in state child custody proceedings such as the one
at issue here. See, e.g., Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 709 (1st Cir. 1986);
Friends of Child., Inc. v. Matava, 766 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1985). In Friends of Children,
the claim was, as here, brought as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a
constitutional violation for the state’s failure to approve certain custodial visits. Id. at 36.
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction on the
ground of abstention, noting that “the fact that ‘family law’ is at issue here makes
‘abstention’ particularly appropriate.” Id. at 37. Similarly, in Malachowski, the First
Circuit explained that “since the field of domestic relations involves local problems
peculiarly suited to state regulation and control, a suit whose substance involves domestic
relations cannot ordinarily be maintained in a federal court.” 787 F.2d at 709.
When boiled down, Mr. McKinney’s claim here is a demand for custody of his
children. See ECF No. 8 at 3 (“These Lewiston officers also cooperated with DHHS agents
to unlawfully search for and remove Plaintiff and family members from custody, without
proper judicial authorization or due process, thereby violating Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.”). Mr. McKinney’s “attempt to obtain a federal imprimatur for the [state] court’s
order 	cannot, for 	purposes of the 	domestic 	relations 	exception, be 	meaningfully
distinguished from a de novo determination of [his] rights to custody, which clearly falls
within the narrow jurisdictional exception.” Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844 (1st Cir.
1981).
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Moreover, 	Mr. 	McKinney 	has 	not 	alleged 	facts 	which 	would 	constitute
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to overcome Younger. See Sirva, 794 F.3d at 192
(listing exceptions when abstention would be inappropriate, such as “when a state
proceeding is brought in bad faith,” “if the state forum provides inadequate protection of
federal rights,” or “when a state statute is ‘flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions’” (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 53)). The record does not
suggest that the state custody action was brought in bad faith. See McLeod v. Me. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 229 F.3d 1133, 2000 WL 869512, at *1 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Appellant has
not . . . alleged an injury that is different ‘than that incidental to every [child protection]
proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.’” (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 47)). And
the Court “should not exert jurisdiction if the plaintiffs ‘had an opportunity to present
their federal claims in the state proceedings.’” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425 (1979)
(quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977)) (emphasis in Moore); see also Bain v.
MacDonald, No. CV 24-13229, 	2025 WL 1069586, 	at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2025)
(“Younger abstention is even appropriate where litigants ‘claim violations of important
federal rights, as long as the federal claims can be ‘raised and resolved somewhere in the
state process.’” (first quoting In re Justs. of Superior Ct. Dep’t of Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d
11, 17 (1st Cir. 2000); then quoting Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27,
36 (1st Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in Bain)). Although Mr. McKinney did not testify at the
state custody proceeding because he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, see ECF No.
1-3 at 2, the conclusory allegations in his amended complaint do not demonstrate that he
was precluded from participating or 	otherwise 	asserting 	his own claims in those
proceedings. In fact, he says that he raised objections in “multiple hearings” based on the
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children. ECF No. 1 at 4.
Were this Court to hear Mr. McKinney’s claims on the merits, the federal action
could very well interfere with the state custody action. See McLeod, 229 F.3d at 1
(“Appellant’s argument that her federal action would not interfere with the state action is
unsupported by detailed argument and is inherently unpersuasive; the conduct of parts
of the same controversy 	in federal court, after a state proceeding has begun, is an
interference with the state proceeding.”). Abstention therefore is appropriate.
Because this case is disposed of on jurisdictional grounds, I need not address Mr.
McKinney’s 	other outstanding motions. 	See ECF Nos. 13 	(motion for preliminary
injunction), 14 (motion for reconsideration of order denying preliminary relief), 15
(motion to strike order denying preliminary relief), 23 (renewed motion for change of
venue).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I AFFIRM the Magistrate Judge’s September 25, 2025,
Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 21, and DISMISS Mr. McKinney’s claims without
prejudice, ECF No. 8.
S O ORDERED.
Dated this 3rd day of November, 2025.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT J UDGE
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