DORN v MAINE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION OFFICIALS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
SCOTT DORN, 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	2:25-cv-00646-JAW
)
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF 	)
OF CORRECTIONS OFFICIALS, 	)
)
Defendants 	)
)
ORDER ON RECOMMENDED DECISION AND OBJECTION
After de novo review, the court affirms a magistrate judge’s recommendation
that the court rejects an inmate’s request for a preliminary injunction to require a
state department of corrections to provide an inmate with a kosher diet prepared by
a kosher kitchen due to an absence of evidence in the record.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
On December 29, 2025, Scott Dorn, an individual in the custody of the Maine
Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed a complaint against the “commissioner of
MDOC, the Warden of the facility where Plaintiff is housed, and any staff involved”
alleging he had been denied kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment and seeking a
preliminary injunction directing the Defendants to provide him kosher meals. Compl.
at 1 (ECF No. 1); Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 2). 	On January 20, 2026, the
Defendants filed a response in opposition to Mr. Dorn’s motion for preliminary
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injunction. 	Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl. Dorn’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 4)
(Def.’s Opp’n). On January 23, 2026, Mr. Dorn filed a motion to proceed without the
prepayment of fees, Appl. to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Aff. (ECF No.
5), which the Magistrate Judge granted the next day. Order Granting Mot. to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs (ECF No. 6).
On February 26, 2026, the United States Magistrate Judge performed a
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and recommended the Court
deny Mr. Dorn’s motion. 	Recommended Decision on Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (ECF
No. 7) (Rec. Dec.). 	Mr. Dorn objected to the Recommended Decision on March 18,
2026. Pl.’s Objs. to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision (ECF No. 11) (Pl.’s
Obj.). 	On April 1, 2026, the Defendant responded. 	Def.’s Resp. to Pl. Dorn’s Obj. to
Report and Recommended Decision (ECF No. 13) (Def.’s Resp.).
B. 	The Allegations in the Complaint
In Mr. Dorn’s complaint, he alleges that he is an incarcerated person at the
MDOC. Compl. at 1. He states that he has followed a kosher diet for all his life as a
part of his sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. However, he says that since entering
the MDOC, he has been denied kosher meals daily. 	Id. 	Mr. Dorn alleges that he
attempted to file a grievance based on the denial of his religious diet, but MDOC
rejected the grievance as untimely despite the fact MDOC’s denial of his kosher diet
was ongoing. 	Id. 	Mr. Dorn states that he attempted to appeal the denial of his
grievance, but he was told he could not appeal. Id. Mr. Dorn claims that in denying
him kosher meals, MDOC is violating his First Amendment right to free exercise of
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religion and the Fourteen Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act under
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Id.
C. 	The Motion for Preliminary Injunction
With his complaint, Mr. Dorn filed a motion for preliminary injunction, asking
the Court to order MDOC to provide him with kosher meals. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at
1. Mr. Dorn says that MDOC’s denial of kosher meals constitutes irreparable harm
and he asks the Court to issue a preliminary injunction, requiring MDOC to provide
Mr. Dorn with kosher meals. Id. Mr. Dorn also maintains that the balance of harms
favors him because providing a kosher diet to him imposes a minimal burden on
MDOC 	and 	it 	is 	in 	the 	public 	interest 	to 	accommodate 	his 	religious 	dietary
restrictions. Id.
D. 	MDOC’s Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction
In its opposition, MDOC argues that Mr. Dorn has not been forced to choose
between his religious diet and adequate nutrition. 	Def’s. Opp’n at 2-3. 	MDOC
explains that it accommodates inmates with kosher dietary restrictions by offering
kosher meals, such as meals that do not contain pork or kosher compliant vegetarian
meals. Id. at 3. Mr. Dorn has been free to select kosher meals from the alternatives
MDOC offers. 	Id. 	MDOC contends that, to the extent that Mr. Dorn is requesting
kosher compliant meals prepared off-site and brought into the correctional facility,
courts have declined to order prisons to provide a meal plan that is too expensive to
provide. Id. at 3-4.
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MDOC also states that Mr. Dorn’s request for preliminary injunction should
be denied because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1999e(a). Id. at 4. MDOC observes
that its grievance policy requires an inmate to grieve a practice “within ten days of
when the policy, procedure, practice, or condition of confinement first affected the
resident.” Id. 4 n.2 (quoting Attach. 3, MDOC Policy 29.1, Adult Resident Grievance
Process General at 6). MDOC points out that the United States Supreme Court has
upheld similar agency procedural requirements for the filing of grievances. Id. (citing
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91 (2006)).
MDOC maintains that Mr. Dorn has not demonstrated irreparable harm
because he is currently allowed access to a kosher diet within MDOC. Id. at 5.
Finally, MDOC argues that the balance of the equities favors the denial of the
motion for preliminary injunction because the costs and administrative burden on
MDOC, which would be borne by the public, is not justified in light of MDOC’s current
accommodation for those requiring a kosher diet. Id. at 5-6.
E. 	The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision
Pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Magistrate
Judge recommended that the Court deny Mr. Dorn’s motion for a preliminary
injunction. 	Rec. Dec. at 1. 	After reviewing the applicable legal standards, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that Mr. Dorn was not likely to succeed on the merits of
his complaint and therefore recommended that the Court deny his motion for
preliminary injunction. Id. at 2-6.
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II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	Scott Dorn’s Objection
Mr. Dorn objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommended decision on several
grounds. 	Pl.’s Obj. at 3-9. 	Mr. Dorn argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly
applied the Eighth Amendment standard of “substantial burden” to his claim under
the RLUIPA. Id. at 3. Instead, he contends, the proper standard is the “substantial
burden” 	test 	under 	the 	RLUIPA, 	which 	“exists 	when 	the 	government 	places
substantial pressure on the adherent to modify behavior and violates sincerely held
beliefs.” Id. at 5. Mr. Dorn explains that for food to be kosher, it must be prepared
in 	a 	kosher 	kitchen 	to 	prevent 	cross-contamination 	and, 	therefore, 	“MDOC’s
alternative meals remain religiously forbidden.” Id.
In 	his 	objection, 	Mr. 	Dorn 	points 	to 	MDOC 	spending 	on 	“non-essential
recreational amenities,” which in his view undercuts MDOC’s cost argument. Id. at
7. 	Furthermore, he asserts that other prison systems accommodate the need for a
kosher diet by purchasing “sealed, certified kosher meals.” 	Id. at 7. 	Mr. Dorn also
contends that MDOC provides special meals for other inmates of other faiths. Id. at
7-8.
Mr. Dorn reiterates that he is subjected to irreparable harm because he is
forced to choose between obeying his religious principles and basic nutrition. 	Id. at
8.
Finally, Mr. Dorn argues that the balance of equities favors the granting of the
motion for preliminary injunction. Id. at 9.
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B. 	Maine Department of Corrections’ Response
MDOC argues that Mr. Dorn is attempting in his objection to raise arguments
not previously raised before the Magistrate Judge and urges the Court to reject his
attempt to “retroactively bolster his claims after receiving the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommended Decision.” Def.’s Resp. at 3-4. Next, MDOC contends that
the Court should reject Mr. Dorn’s alternative meal plan because its costs would be
extraordinarily expensive. Id. at 4-5.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	De Novo Review of the Recommended Decision
Mr. Dorn filed a timely objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended
Decision, and the Court thus “shall make a de novo determination of those portions
of the . . . recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). At the same time, the Court is “only obliged to perform
de novo review of disputed portions of the report and recommendation.” United States
v. J.C.D., 861 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2017). Under this standard, the Court reviews factual
findings for clear error, Phinney v. Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1999), and gives plenary review to pure questions of law. PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel,
Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2010). 	Finally, the District Court is not required to
review facts, issues, and arguments not presented to the Magistrate Judge. Borden
v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Singh v.
Superintending Sch. Committee, 593 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Me. 1984)) (“Parties
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must take before the magistrate [judge], not only their best shot, but all of their
shots”) (quotation omitted).
B. 	Preliminary Injunction Standard
Preliminary injunctions are “issued to protect plaintiff from irreparable injury
and to preserve the court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the
merits.” 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT , ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K AY K ANE, F EDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL P ROCEDURE § 2947, at 121 (2d ed. 1995). “[Injunctive relief] is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right.” 	Peoples Fed.
Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Voice of
the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011)).
A judge should use the authority to grant such injunctive relief “sparingly.” 	Mass.
Coal. of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def. Agency & Office of Emergency
Preparedness, 649 F.2d 71, 76 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981).
The standard for issuing a preliminary injunction is provided by traditional
equity doctrines. Aftermarket Auto Parts Alliance, Inc. v. Bumper2Bumper, Inc., Civil
No. 1:12-cv-00258-NT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143685, *3 (D. Me. Oct. 4, 2012); 11A
WRIGHT , MILLER & K ANE § 2942, at 37. To determine whether to issue a preliminary
injunction a court must analyze four factors:
1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for
irreparable harm [to the movant] if the injunction is denied; (3)
the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the
nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the
movant if no injunction issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the
court’s ruling on the public interest.
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Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration
in original) (quoting Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004)).
“The party seeking [an injunction] bears the burden of establishing that these
four factors weigh in its favor.” 	Id. at 18. 	Ultimately, “trial courts have wide
discretion in making judgments regarding the appropriateness of such relief.”
Francisco Sánchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2009); accord
Arbojet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci. Advancements, 749 F. 3d 168, 171 (1st Cir.
2015).
“The sine qua non of this four-part inquiry is likelihood of success on the
merits: if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed in his
quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.” New Comm Wireless
Servs., Inc., v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Sindicato
Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2012) (confirming
that this factor is “the most important part of the preliminary injunction assessment”)
(quoting Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2007)).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
The Court agrees with the Defendants that Mr. Dorn significantly elaborated
on his position during the objection and therefore violated the rule that requires a
litigant to present all facts, issues, and arguments to the Magistrate Judge that are
later asserted in the objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recommended decision. The
recommended decision could be affirmed on this basis alone. 	However, given Mr.
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Dorn’s pro se status and the significance of the religious issues involved, the Court
turns to the merits of his objection.
From 	this 	Court’s 	perspective, 	the 	problem 	in 	Mr. 	Dorn’s 	demand 	for
preliminary injunction is that there are simply not enough facts in the record to
demonstrate that he is entitled to the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction.
As Mr. Dorn has mentioned in his objection, the Court assumes that to be kosher
requires more than that the person avoid certain foods and extends to the way
animals 	are 	slaughtered 	and 	food 	is 	prepared, 	and 	it 	appears 	that 	MDOC’s
alternative of offering non-pork and vegetarian alternatives does not fully comply
with kosher requirements.
But this does not end the discussion. 	To grant a motion for preliminary
injunction, 	the 	Court 	must 	“balance” 	the 	“relevant 	impositions”, 	namely 	“the
hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant
if no injunction issues.” 	Esso Standard 	Oil, 445 F.3d at 17-18. 	The Court
understands the imposition on Mr. Dorn’s exercise of religion and takes it seriously.
But there is no evidence in this record about the nature of the hardship on MDOC.
To require MDOC either to build and maintain a separate kosher kitchen or to
purchase certified kosher meal packets for observant inmates would impose some
hardship on MDOC in terms of cost and execution, but there is no evidence in this
record what that hardship would be. 	The fact that other prison systems purchase
sealed kosher packets means that it would be possible to provide fully kosher meals
to inmates at MDOC, yet it still says nothing about the cost of doing so to MDOC. To
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grant the motion for preliminary injunction would be to speculate on the impact on
MDOC and, as the burden to demonstrate his right to a preliminary injunction rests
with Mr. Dorn, his failure of proof is fatal to his motion for preliminary injunction.
In making this determination based on the state of the record, the Court need
not address Mr. Dorn’s arguments about whether the Eighth Amendment standard
of “substantial burden” differs from the “substantial burden” test under the RLUIPA
because his motion for preliminary injunction fails in any case.
V. 	CONCLUSION
The Court reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended
Decision, together with the entire record. Having made a de novo determination of
disputed portions of the report and recommendation, the Court affirms the
Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge over Mr. Dorn’s objections and
denies the motion for preliminary injunction. Thus, consistent with the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation and for the same reasons set forth in the recommended
decision and set forth herein, the Court AFFIRMS Recommended Decision on
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 7) and DENIES Scott Dorn’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of July, 2026
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