DOE v. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JANE DOE, 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	2:26-cv-00130-LEW
)
NORTHEASTERN 	)
UNIVERSITY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants 	)
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW
OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants—a university, two affiliated residential property
companies, and twelve employees of the university and businesses—breached contracts,
committed multiple torts against her, discriminated and retaliated against her based on a
disability, and conspired to deprive her of her civil rights. (Complaint, ECF No. 1). With
her complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees,
(Application, ECF No. 8), which application the Court granted. (Order, ECF No. 10.) In
accordance with the statute governing actions filed without the prepayment of fees, a
preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, for the reasons explained below, I
recommend the Court dismiss the matter unless Plaintiff amends the complaint to address
the deficiencies in the complaint discussed herein.
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915 is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for
individuals unable to pay the cost of bringing an action. 	When a party is proceeding
without prepayment of fees, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under §
1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective
defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be
granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the
benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). 	A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” 	Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A self-represented
plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the court must construe his complaint
‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.’” 	Waterman v. White Interior Solutions, No. 2:19-cv-00032-JDL, 2019 WL
5764661, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
“This is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to
state a claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 2 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
F ACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Plaintiff, a foreign national with a student visa, was admitted to a higher education
program at Defendant Northeastern’s (Northeastern) Roux Institute in Portland, Maine, and
she arrived in the United States on January 5, 2024. (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 49.) According to
Plaintiff, in connection with her application and enrollment, Northeastern represented that
certain funds and support services would be operative when she arrived in the United
States, but the funds were not available as Plaintiff expected. 	(Id. ¶ 49.) 	On January 8,
2024, a university official certified Plaintiff’s immigration-related I-20 form, which form
contained a financial section listing expected costs and funding, including a loan and a
scholarship. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 49.)
The loan funds referenced on the I-20 form were not disbursed until October 4,
2024, nine months after Plaintiff arrived. (Id. ¶ 49.) Because the student visa program did
not permit outside employment, Plaintiff experienced financial hardship between January
and October 2024, including food insecurity. (Id. ¶ 54.)
In February 2024, when two employee defendants met with Plaintiff, one of the
employees pressured Plaintiff to secure additional external loan funding and accused her
of entering the United States illegally and of fraudulently obtaining her student visa. (Id.
1 The facts are derived from Plaintiff’s complaint.
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 3 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
¶ 50.) 	The employee demanded that Plaintiff sign inaccurate financial attestations to be
used for a credit application, but Plaintiff refused. (Id. ¶ 51.)2
In the spring of 2024, Plaintiff was enrolled in two computer science courses at the
Roux Institute. (Id. ¶ 79.) Plaintiff asserts that one of the employee defendants was one
of her instructors, that the instructor lacked the proper credentials to teach the course, that
six weeks before the end of the term, the instructor told Plaintiff in front of another
employee that she should “prepare to fail,” that he refused to grade her submitted work,
and that he assessed Plaintiff a failing grade. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff asserts that the two other
employee defendants failed to address the situation properly. (Id. ¶¶ 79–80.)
Plaintiff complained in writing about the delay in disbursing her loan. 	(Id. ¶ 52.)
Plaintiff asserts that her account was sent to collections, but in August 2024, two other
employee defendants told Plaintiff that her account had not been referred to collections and
authorized a credit to Plaintiff’s billing account corresponding to the cost of spring and
summer 2024 housing and tuition. (Id.)
In September 2024, the university assigned Plaintiff to one bedroom of a two-
bedroom apartment in a building located at 144 State Street, Portland, Maine, which was
owned or operated by Defendant Redfern, LLC. (Id. ¶¶ 69–70.) A roommate was assigned
to the other bedroom in the unit. (Id.) Plaintiff requested immediate transfer because she
alleged that the single small non-operable window was below the natural light requirements
2 It is not clear from the complaint when the meeting occurred. Plaintiff alleges that it occurred six weeks
into her educational program, but she did not describe when the program began or specify when she started
attending classes.
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 4 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
under the city’s code, the closet was too narrow to accommodate standard clothes hangers,
and there was an insect infestation. (Id.)
Around the same time, Plaintiff evidently began attending classes in Boston,
Massachusetts, where Northeastern’s main campus is located, rather than at Northeastern’s
Roux Institute, in Portland. (Id. ¶ 53.) Because she could not secure housing in Boston,
she had to commute twelve to eighteen hours each week. (Id.) Plaintiff informed one of
the employee defendants that she was experiencing significant stress from the commuting,
but the employee took no action to support Plaintiff. (Id.)
On December 2, 2024, Plaintiff fell at the apartment building, sustained a traumatic
brain injury (TBI), and sought emergency care. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 58, 100.) On December 3, 2024,
Plaintiff notified her academic advisor, professors, and university housing management of
the injury and provided a medical note prescribing bedrest. 	(Id. ¶ 60.) 	Plaintiff had
extensive bruising on her right side, had difficulty standing without support, experienced
dizziness if she walked more than a short distance, had fluctuating vision and eye strain,
and had difficulty concentrating without disproportionate effort. 	(Id. ¶ 58.) 	Plaintiff
contends that university officials should have conducted a welfare check and activated
support systems, including directing her to appropriate medical facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 63.)
On December 20, 2024, Plaintiff requested temporary disability accommodations
from the university’s Disability Access Services for permission to take one of her exams
remotely or in a location closer to her Portland residence. (Id. ¶ 82.) When the disability
office denied the requests, Plaintiff was required to travel from Portland to Boston and sit
for the examination with a bandaged leg and post-concussive symptoms. (Id.)
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 5 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff submitted other documentation and formal
disability accommodation requests through the university’s Disability Access Services.
(Id. ¶ 61.) Plaintiff did not describe the accommodations she requested, but she asserts that
her medical provider “prescribe[ed] housing stability as medically necessary” during
recovery from the TBI. (Id.)
Plaintiff began coordinated neurological care at the nearest medical center on
January 31, 2025. (Id. ¶ 63.) An MRI and a neurological evaluation confirmed a traumatic
brain injury and post-concussive deficits in processing speed, memory, executive function,
and attention. 	(Id. ¶ 59.) 	Because 144 State Street is located a short walk from a major
medical facility, Plaintiff’s medical “providers viewed housing stability at that address as
medically necessary to ensure continuity of her neurological treatment[.]” (Id. ¶ 64.) One
of the employee defendants granted a housing accommodation in writing. (Id.)
At or around the same time, in late 2024 or early 2025, there was some kind of
“incident” involving a threat and Plaintiff and her roommate. (Id. ¶ 86–87.) The roommate
filed a police report and sent photographs of Plaintiff’s kitchen utensils after being
encouraged to do so by two of the employee defendants. (Id. ¶ 86.) On February 24, 2025,
Plaintiff’s roommate moved out of the apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 85.) On February 28, 2025,
the roommate withdrew from participation in the disciplinary process because she had
already moved out and saw no reason to engage further in the process. (Id. ¶ 89.)
On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff requested reduced housing fees under a university
policy for unexpected medical expenses. (Id. ¶ 85.) On the same date, Plaintiff requested
a transfer to the empty room. (Id. ¶ 70.) Plaintiff asserted that the other room would reduce
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 6 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
her housing costs and the additional natural light from a larger window was needed for her
TBI recovery. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff implies that the housing fee reduction request was later
denied, but she did not allege when the denial occurred or who was involved in the decision.
Plaintiff alleges that the room transfer request was later denied, but she did not allege when
the denial occurred or who was involved in the decision. (Id.)
On March 5, 2025, two employee defendants provided other internal university
authorities with their views of what constituted an armed and dangerous tenant, and the
university initiated disciplinary charges against Plaintiff for having dangerous weapons and
for endangering behavior. (Id. ¶¶ 86–87, 89.) On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff received notice
that the Office of Student Conduct and Conflict Resolution had opened a disciplinary
investigation based on the alleged conflict with the former roommate. (Id. ¶ 85.)
On March 10, 2025, the housing office at the university sent Plaintiff a notice to
vacate setting an April 30, 2025, move-out date. (Id.) On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission (MHRC).3 	(Complaint ¶ 139.)
Northeastern suspended enforcement of the notice to vacate while the MHRC proceeding
was active. (Id. ¶ 140.) Plaintiff withdrew the MHRC complaint on September 16, 2025.
(Id.)
A different employee defendant oversaw the disciplinary proceedings, which
Plaintiff asserts were conducted improperly. 	(Id. ¶ 91.) 	In August 2025, the employee
found insufficient information to establish that a threat had existed and found Plaintiff not
3 Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the complaint or describe the subject or content of the complaint.
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 7 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
responsible for dangerous weapons or for endangering behavior, but the employee required
Plaintiff to complete a Living with a Roommate module. (Id.)4 Plaintiff alleges that the
requirement operated as a sanction and a registration block preventing her from enrolling
in courses for subsequent semesters. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff appealed; another employee found
factual inaccuracies and concluded that the investigation should be reassigned, but the
directive was ignored. 	(Id. ¶ 92.) Plaintiff completed the module under protest in
November 2025 so that the registration block would not prevent her from registering for
spring classes. (Id. ¶ 94.)
In October 2025, Defendant Redfern and one of the university employee defendants
conducted a health and safety inspection of the apartment. (Id. ¶ 93.) Plaintiff allowed the
Redfern employee to enter, but Plaintiff refused entry to the university housing office
employee. (Id.) The inspector found no issues or problems. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the
inspection result refutes the university’s prior assertion of a safety risk. (Id.)
In November 2025, Northeastern asserted that the scholarship previously listed on
her immigration-related I-20 form had been canceled due to a campus transfer. (Id. ¶ 56,
185.) 	Plaintiff contends that the decision was unlawful or improper because she had
insufficient notice and because it was listed on the I-20 form signed by a university
employee. (Id. ¶ 56–57.)
4 Plaintiff alleges that she was “exonerate[ed] on all serious charges,” (id. ¶ 144), and while Plaintiff might
also dispute other aspects of the employee’s findings, Plaintiff does not appear to allege that the employee
found no violations or no basis to require the training module.
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 8 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff alleges that the heat in the apartment unit ceased
operating for six days. 	(Id. ¶ 72.) 	Someone entered the apartment unannounced on
December 15, 22, and 23, 2025. (Id. ¶¶ 153, 213.) On December 18, 2025, the Redfern
employee defendant issued Plaintiff a notice to vacate. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 73.) On December 21,
2025, the city code enforcement office sent Defendant Redfern a remediation order
concerning “habitability violations,” (id. ¶ 157), but Plaintiff does not allege any details
regarding the content of the communication. On December 22, 2025, Plaintiff wrote to the
city 	code 	enforcement 	office 	requesting 	an 	unannounced 	inspection 	because 	she
maintained that conditions changed temporarily when notice had been given to the property
manager. 	(Id. ¶ 74.) 	On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order in Cumberland County Superior Court and had a hearing scheduled for
later that month. (Id. ¶ 75.)
On January 12, 2026, using a master key, two employee defendants entered the
apartment without Plaintiff’s consent. (Id. ¶ 76.) Defendant Redfern deactivated Plaintiff’s
key fob access number mere minutes after the entry. (Id.) Defendant Redfern reactivated
Plaintiff’s key fob access later that day after some interaction with the city’s code
enforcement office. (Id.) Around 11:00 p.m. on January 13, 2026, Plaintiff returned to the
apartment and found that her key fob access had again been deactivated. (Id.) On January
14, 2026, three of the employee defendants and other individuals under their direction
entered the apartment and removed some or all of Plaintiff’s personal property. (Id. ¶¶ 35,
77.) 	Plaintiff was given a bag with some of her personal items and medication, but
according to Plaintiff, the bag did not contain all the medication that she needed. 	(Id. ¶
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 9 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
77.) 	One of the employees asserted that their actions were not an eviction, but Plaintiff
contends that the entry and conduct of the employees amounted to an unlawful eviction
without a judicial order. (Id. ¶ 76.) Plaintiff did not allege whether or how long before she
regained access to the apartment, or whether or how long before other items of her property
were returned to her.5
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and alleges a conspiracy to violate her right to
equal protection of the laws and privileges and immunities under the laws motivated by
disability-related animus. 	Because there was no state action involved in the alleged
conspiracy, the claim fails because the alleged rights protect against government action and
are not one of two rights the Supreme Court has recognized as protected against purely
private action: “the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude and
the right of interstate travel[.]” 	Snyder v. Talbot, 836 F. Supp. 19, 25 (D. Me. 1993).
Furthermore, “the disabled are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes.” Toledo
v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). Finally, even if such a claim could proceed,
the complaint lacks sufficient facts to suggest a conspiracy or agreement or the requisite
animus among the identified persons.
Plaintiff also asserts a related claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which “extends
liability to those who knowingly failed to prevent conspiracies under § 1985.” Maymi v.
5 Plaintiff did not allege when or whether she moved elsewhere. 	Plaintiff refers to the “January 12-14
lockout,” which could suggest that her loss of access to the apartment and her personal property was limited
to those days or could also suggest a progressive loss of access starting on January 12 and completing and
becoming permanent on January 14.
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 10 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 515 F.3d 20, 31 (1st Cir. 2008). 	Because the § 1985 claim
fails, and “[b]ecause a § 1986 claim must be predicated upon a valid § 1985 claim,”
Plaintiff cannot proceed on the § 1986 claim. Grendell v. Maine, No. 1:19-cv-00419-JDL,
2020 WL 3895765, at *5 (D. Me. July 10, 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that one of the employee defendants violated the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) by disclosing her private educational information to
employees of the housing companies. 	Even assuming the disclosure was improper, the
claim fails because Plaintiff has no enforceable cause of action for the alleged violation.
The statute only provides for enforcement by the Secretary of Education and does not
contain an express or implied private right of action or rights that can be enforced through
§ 1983. See Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002).
The main federal claims in the complaint include an allegation of disability
discrimination. 	Plaintiff claims the university and housing entities failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation for her disability after the December 2024 injury and retaliated
against her for requesting accommodations in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA),
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.6 There are several apparent obstacles to Plaintiff proceeding with the claims.
To state a reasonable modification/accommodation claim, a Plaintiff must show:
(1) the plaintiff is a person with a disability, (2) the defendant is covered by one of statutes;
6 Although the different disability discrimination statutes have somewhat different wordings, courts often
address them together when more than one applies because the “standards are generally the same under all
three statutes[.]” Friedman v. Central Maine Power Co., No. 2:20-cv-00237-JDL, 2021 WL 1234638, at
*2 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2021).
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 11 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
(3) the defendant has a discriminatory policy or practice in effect; (4) the plaintiff requested
a reasonable modification in that policy or practice which would have afforded the plaintiff
access to the goods, services, or program; (5) that the modification was necessary to afford
that access; and (6) that the defendant refused to modify the policy or practice. Dudley v.
Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 307–08 (1st Cir. 2003).
As alleged, 	the disability discrimination statutes apply 	to the organizational
defendants. 	Plaintiff also described symptoms and impacts to life activities immediately
following the December 2024 injury and thus plausibly alleges a disability at that time.
Plaintiff alleges several requests for modifications to policies or practices, but more facts
are 	likely 	required 	to 	satisfy 	the 	plausibility 	standard 	for 	each 	requested
modification/accommodation.7 	Moreover, while there could be some obstacles that
Plaintiff would need to address to proceed on her claim, as discussed below, the form of
the complaint makes it difficult to assess on initial review whether Plaintiff can plausibly
show that any of the declined requests was reasonable and necessary.
Plaintiff also alleges a disability retaliation claim. To proceed on such a claim under
the familiar burden shifting approach, (1) a plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in
7 Plaintiff alleges (1) a request related to “housing stability” that was granted in late 2024 or early 2025 and
again in September 2025 but then denied in December 2025, (2) a December 2024 request for remote testing
that was denied, (3) a March 2025 request for reduced housing fees under a university program for
unexpected medical bills that was denied, and (4) a March 2025 request to transfer to a room in the
apartment for more natural light. The first request is the most prominent throughout the complaint but the
least defined—the complaint does not specify what policy ordinarily governed the housing situation nor
precisely what modification Plaintiff requested. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255–
56 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying an accommodation, and of demonstrating
that the accommodation allows [equal access]”).
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 12 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
protected conduct, he or she was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and there
was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action; (2) the
burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation
for the adverse action; and (3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
proffered legitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning that the defendant was motivated
by a retaliatory animus. 	D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir.
2012). 	The First Circuit instructs that the prima facie case is not “a rigid pleading
standard,” Rae v. Woburn Public Schools, 113 F.4th 86, 109 (1st Cir. 2024) (quotation
marks omitted), but the burden shifting framework and the prima facie case “may be used
as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.” 	Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-
Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013).
To show that she engaged in protected conduct, Plaintiff cites her accommodation
requests. 	Courts 	have 	held 	that 	reasonable 	disability-related 	requests 	for 	policy
modifications 	can 	constitute 	a 	protected 	activity 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	disability
discrimination statutes. Akerson v. Pritzker, No. CV 12-10240-PBS, 2021 WL 2295522,
at *8 (D. Mass. June 4, 2021). 	The investigation of misconduct, the alleged failure to
voluntarily take affirmative steps to assist Plaintiff, and the denials of her requests for fee
waivers and other accommodations would likely not satisfy the adverse action requirement,
see Shervin v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc., 804 F.3d 23, 50 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting
that adverse actions occur when there is significant conduct sufficient to deter a reasonable
person from reporting discrimination); Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 162 F.4th 1296, 1315 (11th Cir. 2025) (reasoning that if denial of accommodation
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 13 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
requests were adverse action, there would be no difference between retaliation claims and
reasonable modification claims), but the alleged lockout from her apartment and the
`imposition of a disciplinary sanction are likely sufficient. As noted above, there are few
alleged 	facts 	upon 	which 	a 	factfinder 	could 	plausibly 	infer 	that 	a 	reasonable
accommodation request was the but-for cause of the discipline or lockout.8 The form and
nature of the complaint make it difficult to assess on preliminary review whether Plaintiff
can plausibly show the requisite causal connection.
Rule 8(a)(2) specifies that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief[.]” Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.
No technical form is required.” Rule 12(f) authorizes motions to “strike from a pleading
8 Temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse action can support a plausible inference of
causality, but it must be very close, Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Department of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir.
2004), and even close proximity can be insufficient “particularly if the larger picture undercuts any claim
of causation.” Cordero Ayala v. United States Postal Service, No. CV 20-1239 (MEL), 2024 WL 2199005,
at *12 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2024) (quoting Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003) (nested
quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff alleges that much of the improper conduct against her occurred up to a
year before she experienced any disability. After she experienced the injury, Defendants granted the most
prominent accommodation request identified in the complaint—the unspecified housing stability request.
Plaintiff made the remote testing request in December 2024 and the room transfer request in March 2025,
while the discipline was not imposed until August 2025, and the lockout did not occur until January 2026.
Plaintiff alleges a closer temporal proximity between her complaints to city code enforcement and the
lockout, but while complaints regarding violations of state laws or local ordinances could perhaps be
protected under state law, they are not considered bases for an action under the FHA. See Kummerow v.
Ohawcha.org, No. 21-CV-635-WMC, 2022 WL 873599, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 24, 2022) (“the [FHA]
does not authorize plaintiff to sue defendants in federal court for claims related to the habitability of the . .
. apartment. Instead, landlord-tenant law is traditionally the province of the states, meaning that plaintiff
may have a remedy in state court, or in a state or federal administrative proceeding, concerning the
conditions of his dwelling, but not in federal court”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Atterbury v.
Sanchez, No. CV 11-4932 SI, 2012 WL 3638571, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (“A landlord’s actions
that are based on a tenant’s complaints” about property conditions “are not actionable as discrimination
under the FHA”).
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 14 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
“When a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the
court has the power, on its own initiative or in response to a motion by the defendant, to
strike any portions that are redundant or immaterial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), or to dismiss
the complaint.” 	Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). The justification
for enforcing some degree of brevity and clarity through Rule 8(d) and Rule 12(f) is that
when “[t]he complaint is prolix, disjointed, [or] replete with legal conclusions,” it “‘places
an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it[.]’” 	Miranda v.
United States, 105 F. App’x 280, 281 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1281, at 522 (2d ed. 1990)).
Plaintiff’s filing generates Rule 8 concerns. The pleading consists of 103 pages with
270 numbered paragraphs, many of which paragraphs are relatively lengthy and cover
several topics or events that allegedly occurred across multiple days.9 	Of the facts that
Plaintiff provided, many are difficult to locate and understand because they are not in
sequential order and include legal conclusions and arguments. 	Unless Plaintiff were to
amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies, it would be appropriate for the Court to order
amendments or dismiss the complaint on that basis alone. 	See U.S. ex rel. Garst v.
Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that pleadings
9 Courts have also dismissed complaints without prejudice “for failure to comply with Rule 10(b) where
the complaint contains lengthy, disorganized paragraphs[.]” Rosen v. Lieberman, No. CV167341JLLJAD,
2018 WL 3159873, at *1 (D. N.J. Jan. 31, 2018) (quotation marks omitted).
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 15 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

16
must be concise and straightforward so that courts and adverse parties do not expend
disproportionate resources searching for the few allegations that might matter).
The face of the complaint also raises jurisdictional questions and prudential
obstacles to proceeding in federal court at this time because Plaintiff has evidently been
pursuing another lawsuit in state court “to review precisely the conduct now at issue.”
(Complaint ¶ 75.) Plaintiff alleges that she filed a lawsuit in Cumberland County Superior
Court in January 2026 and that she had a hearing scheduled on a motion for a temporary
restraining order. If the lawsuit is still pending, it would likely be appropriate for the Court
to dismiss the matter without prejudice based on the abstention doctrine of Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).10 	If the state court
10 Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given them, but they
are permitted to abstain in limited exceptional circumstances for reasons of “wise judicial administration
that counsel against duplicative lawsuits.” Jimenez v. Rodriguez-Pagan, 597 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 2010)
(internal quotations omitted). Courts examine the following non-exhaustive factors:
(1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res; (2) the [geographical]
inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation;
(4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state or federal law
controls; (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the parties’ interests; (7) the
vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim; and (8) respect for the principles
underlying removal jurisdiction.
Rio Grande Community Health Center, Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2005). Federal courts
ordinarily do not exercise jurisdiction where a party attempts to raise claims in federal court based on the
party’s dissatisfaction with the course of a parallel state court case:
In our view, it would be unthinkable that every time a state . . . court defendant became
dissatisfied with that court’s provisional resolution of some issue and there was [federal
subject matter jurisdiction], it could rush over to the federal courthouse in the hope of
obtaining a more favorable determination. Such a practice, if ordinarily permitted, would
complicate and fragment the trial of cases, as well as cause friction between state and
federal courts.
Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gil, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 309–10 (1st Cir. 1986).
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 16 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

17
proceeding has reached final judgment, this Court would likely lack subject matter
jurisdiction over some or all of Plaintiff’s claims under the doctrine of Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983),11 and preclusion principles might bar some or all of the relief Plaintiff
seeks.12
While dismissal is warranted for three of Plaintiff’s alleged federal claims, because
the complaint raises potential threshold barriers to Plaintiff’s ability to proceed in this
Court, and because the form of the complaint makes it difficult to complete the preliminary
review process for the disability discrimination and retaliation claims, permitting Plaintiff
the opportunity to amend the complaint before the Court determines whether dismissal of
the entire matter is warranted would be appropriate.13
11 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). In general, “the proper forum for challenging an
unlawful state court ruling” is the state appellate system followed by a petition for review by the United
States Supreme Court. Davison v. Government of Puerto Rico-Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d
220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
12 The general rule of issue preclusion “is that when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.” B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015) (quotation marks and
modifications omitted). Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, when a later suit “arise[s] from the same
transaction . . . or involves a common nucleus of operative facts” as an earlier suit, “the earlier suit’s
judgment prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to
the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Lucky Brand
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020) (cleaned up).
13 Plaintiff also alleges many contract-related claims, tort claims, and other state law claims. While there
could be similar obstacles to proceeding on some or all the claims, I have not analyzed those issues because
if the federal discrimination and retaliation claims are dismissed, the Court would not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the alleged state law claims. See Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177
(1st Cir. 1995) (“As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiff’s federal claims at the
early stages of a suit, well before the commencement of trial, will trigger the dismissal without prejudice
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 17 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>

18
C ONCLUSION
After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, for the
reasons explained above, I recommend the Court dismiss the matter unless, on or before
May 15, 2026, Plaintiff amends the complaint to address adequately the deficiencies in the
complaint identified herein. 	Plaintiff, therefore, may file an amended complaint on or
before May 15, 2026. 	If Plaintiff files an amended complaint on or before May 15, the
Court will assess whether Plaintiff has through the amended complaint alleged any
actionable claims.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 22nd day of April, 2026.
of any supplemental state-law claims”). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint that contains enough facts
for the Court to discern a plausible federal claim, the Court will then conduct a preliminary review of the
state law claims.
Case 2:26-cv-00130-LEW Document 13 Filed 04/22/26 Page 18 of 18 PageID #:
<pageID>