Baker v. Ghaith et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
On September 23, 2025, Richard Baker filed this action against Dr. Seleh
Ghaith and counselor Robert Hopkins for alleged violations of his First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1.) Baker’s allegations are not entirely
clear, but the Court gathers the following from his complaint and application to
proceed without prepayment of fees: Baker participates in, and receives medication
from, Star Center, Inc. (id. at PageID.5), an outpatient substance use treatment
program. See Star Center Inc., (Oct. 27, 2025), https://perma.cc/CB25-MJTT. He is
apparently required to pick up his medication from Star Center in person. (See ECF
No. 1, PageID.5.) But he has blood clots in his legs that make it difficult for him to
walk. (Id.) So after a recent surgery to address the blood clots (id.), Baker’s doctor
gave him a note to take to Star Center indicating his need for accommodations (id. at
PageID.11 (doctor’s orders appended)). Despite this directive, says Baker, Star Center
RICHARD BAKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. SELEH GHAITH and ROBERT
HOPKINS,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-13003
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT [1] AND
GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [2]
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failed to give him needed “medical take home” privileges, and Baker was “forced to
stand in line” to pick up his medication from the program. (Id. at PageID.5–6.)
The individuals Baker sues, Ghaith and Hopkins, both appear to be employees
of Star Center. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.2 (providing Star Center’s address as the
“address” for both Ghaith and Hopkins and identifying Ghaith as a doctor and
Hopkins as a “counselor”).) In addition to his claims that Star Center failed to
accommodate his medical needs, Baker adds concerns about his general treatment by
Ghaith and Hopkins. Baker accuses Ghaith and Hopkins of “favoritism,” noting that
“other clients only come in [to Star Center] once a month.” (Id. at PageID.7.) And
Baker claims that Hopkins “makes [Baker] talk to him about things [Baker] don’t
want to talk about under threat of [Baker] losing take home privileges.” (Id. at
PageID.5.)
Along with his complaint, Baker filed an application to proceed without
prepayment of costs (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons below, the Court grants Baker’s
application to proceed without prepaying fees and summarily dismisses his complaint
for failing to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I.
As an initial matter, the Court grants Baker’s motion to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 2.) Baker reports that he is unemployed and
relies on social security disability compensation as his sole source of income. (Id. at
PageID.13–14.) Appended to his application is a letter verifying that he receives a
monthly social security benefit of $1,098.60. (Id. at PageID.15.) He has no savings or
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assets. (Id. at PageID.14.) As such, the Court finds that he has made the required
showing of indigence. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
II.
When the Court grants an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, it has an
additional responsibility: screen the complaint and decide whether it “is frivolous or
malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
“fee assessment” and the required “screening process” may occur “in the same opinion
or order”), overruled on other grounds, LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th Cir.
2022). Although a pro se litigant is entitled to a liberal construction of his pleadings
and filings, see Cassaday v. Verizon Media Inc., No. 25-1237, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS
16682, at *4 (6th Cir. July 8, 2025) (citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 719, 712 (6th
Cir. 2004)), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–
71 	(6th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(holding 	that 	the 	dismissal 	standard 	for 	screening 	under
§ 1951(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as is used for motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
Baker filed this lawsuit using the Court’s general civil case complaint form.
(ECF 	No. 	1.) 	Therein, 	he 	claims 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction, 	alleging 	that
Defendants violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at
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PageID.4.) He seeks $500,000 in punitive damages and injunctive relief compelling
Defendants to “comply with all doctors orders submitted [by his] doctors past present
and future.” (Id. at PageID.6.)
The Court liberally construes Baker to be asserting a claim for money damages
and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See id. at PageID.5–6 (seeking
monetary relief)); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990)
(“Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of
action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere.”).
Under Section 1983, an individual can bring suit for a violation of federal
constitutional rights if he shows (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the federal
Constitution and (2) the deprivation was caused by a state actor. See Baynes v.
Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2015). Baker’s allegations fail to satisfy the
second prong.
Baker sues only private citizens. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982); Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 289 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ost rights
secured 	by 	the 	Constitution 	are 	protected 	only 	against 	infringement 	by
governments.” (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978))). Ghaith
and Hopkins appear to be individuals employed by Star Center, Inc.—not state
employees. (See generally ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Nor do any of Baker’s allegations permit
the inference that Ghaith or Hopkins’ private work at Star Center could be “fairly
attributed” to the state. See Bowman v. Merkley, No. 23-5638, 2023 WL 9186333, at
*1 (6th Cir. Dec. 26, 2023) (“A private entity may be deemed to be a state actor ‘under
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discrete circumstances . . . .’” (quoting Thomas v. Nationwide Child.’s Hosp., 882 F.3d
608, 612 (6th Cir. 2018)); see also Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir.
2001) (explaining that “acting under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983 means
that a defendant “exercised the power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law’”
(emphasis added)); cf. Doe v. Diocese of Covington, No. 23-151, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84827, 	at 	*11 	(E.D. 	Ky. 	May 	10, 	2024) 	(collecting 	cases 	and 	explaining 	that
government funding does not itself make an entity a state actor). Indeed, Baker has
made no allegations that Ghaith, Hopkins, or even Star Center (which is not named
as a defendant) are organs or agents of the state. See Thomas, 882 F.3d at 612 (citing
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)).
Because Baker fails to state a plausible claim for a relief under Section 1983,
this claim must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Baker raises no other
claim, thereby warranting dismissal of the complaint. See id.; See also Bowman, 2023
WL 9186333, at *1 (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and concluding, as to federal question jurisdiction, that “[plaintiff’s]
complaint did not imply a cause of action under § 1983 because she did not allege a
violation of any specific constitutional right or any government connection to the
defendants, who are private persons”).
III.
In sum, the Court GRANTS Baker’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
(ECF No. 2) and DISMISSES his complaint (ECF No. 1) without prejudice.
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SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 30, 2025
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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