Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAN ALBERTO GIMENEZ
GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, et al.
Respondent.
Case No. 25-cv-13094
Honorable Shalina D. Kumar
Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS (ECF NO. 1)
I. 	Introduction
Petitioner Willian Alberto Gimenez Gonzalez (“Gimenez Gonzalez” or
“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, alleging that he is being unlawfully detained by the Respondents at
the North Lake Processing Center in Baldwin, Michigan in violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Due Process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See generally, ECF No. 1.
Respondents, who include Secretary of the United States Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Kristi Noem (“Noem”), United States
Attorney General, Pamela Bondi (“Bondi”), Executive Office for Immigration
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Review (“EOIR”), along with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
Detroit Field Office Director, Kevin Raycraft (“Raycraft”), argue that
Petitioner’s detention is not unlawful under the INA, specifically 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2), and does not violate his Due Process rights. Respondents also
urge the Court to refrain from deciding the merit of the petition until
Gimenez Gonzalez administratively exhausts his claims and to dismiss all
Respondents other than Raycraft. See generally, ECF No. 7.
The Court has reviewed the parties’ filings and is satisfied that the
issues have been adequately briefed thereby making a hearing
unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court grants Gimenez Gonzalez’s petition and orders Respondents to
provide him with a bond determination hearing1 within seven (7) days of
this Order, or otherwise release him.
1 According to Respondents, Gimenez Gonzalez was scheduled for a
master calendar and bond hearing on October 8, 2025. The parties did not
update the Court as to the outcome of that hearing, but the Court presumes
that, if the bond hearing was held, the immigration court would have
decided it was without jurisdiction to consider bond under § 1225(b)(2),
which mandates detention pending the conclusion of his removal
proceedings. In that event, the Court’s order for a bond determination
hearing should be considered an order for a bond redetermination hearing.
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II. 	Background
Petitioner is a Venezuelan citizen who arrived in the United States in
October 2023. ECF No. 1.2 Gimenez Gonzalez is an asylum seeker who
lived and worked in Chicago, Illinois until his arrest by ICE on September
12, 2025. That afternoon, Gimenez Gonzalez was stopped by ICE agents
while outside a barber shop in Chicago’s Little Village neighborhood with
his wife. Upon confirming his identity, he was immediately taken into
custody without explanation.
Gimenez Gonzalez was initially detained in Illinois but was
transferred the following day to North Lake Correctional Facility in Baldwin,
Michigan, where he remains in custody. According to the petition,
Respondents have not given Petitioner the opportunity to post bond or be
released on other conditions. Gimenez Gonzalez asserts that he has
consistently worked in construction and maintenance and is a member of
both a union and an Episcopal church in Chicago. Petitioner has no
criminal record beyond traffic violations and a trespassing charge that was
dismissed by the prosecutor.
2 Gimenez Gonzalez’s petition is the source of these facts. See ECF No. 1.
Respondents do not dispute them. See ECF No. 7.
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Petitioner’s Illinois counsel, believing Gimenez Gonzalez was still
being detained in Illinois, filed a habeas petition in the district court for the
Northern District of Illinois. That court transferred the petition to the
Western District of Michigan. Because the proper respondent for an
immigration-related habeas petition is the director for the ICE field office
where the detention facility is located, Gimenez Gonzalez’s first habeas
petition became procedurally defective upon transfer. Accordingly, he
voluntarily dismissed the Western District of Michigan petition and filed the
petition now before this Court.
III. 	Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Habeas relief may be granted when a person is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Federal district courts are limited in their relief under §
2241 when considering immigration cases. Morales Chavez v. Director of
Detroit Field Office, 2025 WL 2959617, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2025).
Although district courts may not grant habeas relief as to the underlying
immigration question, i.e., whether removal is proper, district courts may
review whether an alien is lawfully detained; the Attorney General and DHS
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immigration authority does not abrogate § 2241’s authority to grant the writ
within these bounds. See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 117 (2020) (describing habeas corpus as the appropriate remedy
to determine the legality of a person’s custody). As noted above, Petitioner
asserts that his detention pending the resolution of his removal
proceedings violates both the INA and the Fifth Amendment.
B. Administrative Exhaustion
Respondents first argue that the Court should require Gimenez
Gonzalez to exhaust his administrative remedies before he is permitted to
proceed with his habeas petition.
No applicable statute or rule requires administrative exhaustion here.
See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4, ___ F. Supp. 3d
___ (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). When Congress has not mandated
exhaustion, the decision to require it is within the sound discretion of the
court. See Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013). Known
as prudential exhaustion, the court-made doctrine “must comport with the
statutory scheme and congressional intent.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Island Creek
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Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 747 (6th Cir. 2019) and Shearson, 725
F.3d at 593-94).
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to
generate a proper record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the
deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct
its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. But, even if prudential
exhaustion would otherwise apply, courts may waive such exhaustion if the
“pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture” or if the
petition presents a “legal question…fit for resolution and delay means
hardship.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594; Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term
Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000).
“The Sixth Circuit has not decided whether courts should impose
administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition
for unlawful mandatory detention.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3.
(citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2025 WL 2444114, at *8
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)). Consequently, courts within the circuit are split.
Compare id.; Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4-5; Sanchez Alvarez
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v. Noem, 2025 WL 2942648, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025); and Mejia v.
Woosley, 2025 WL 2933852, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2025) (declining to
enforce or excusing petitioners from prudential exhaustion) to Hernandez,
2025 WL2444114, at *8-10 and Villata v. Greene, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025) (imposing prudential exhaustion requirements).
The Court agrees with the majority of the district courts in this circuit
and around the nation in deciding not to enforce an exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement for these petitions. See Casio-Mejia v.
Raycraft, 2025 WL 2976737, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025) (collecting
cases). To start, all three of the factors the Court is to consider weigh
against imposing prudential exhaustion. First, the issues raised by the
habeas petition are purely legal questions and do not require the agency to
develop a record. See Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2952796,
at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). Further, a bond appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is not required for Gimenez Gonzalez’s due
process claim because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges.
See Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Finally, the BIA
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has conclusively rejected Petitioner’s argument, precedentially deciding3
that a noncitizen who has been present in the United States for a period of
years or decades without inspection or authorization is an “applicant for
admission” under § 1225(a)(1) and thus subject to mandatory detention
during removal proceedings under that section. See Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (2025); see also Casio-Mejia, 2025 WL 2976737,
at *4 (noting that Yajure Hurtado is binding on DHS and immigration courts,
but not on district courts). Accordingly, and as Respondents admit,
Gimenez Gonzalez is unlikely to obtain the relief he seeks through the
administrative process, and any appeal of bond determination to the BIA
will not preclude but merely delay the need for judicial review. Because
administrative review in this instance would be futile, and because every
additional day in unlawful detention presents a hardship for Petitioner, the
Court declines to impose an exhaustion requirement upon Gimenez
Gonzalez and will address the merits of his petition. See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
3 The BIA may designate a decision as precedential. BIA precedential
decisions “serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue
or issues.” 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(g)(2).
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C. Applicable INA Provision
Under the general provisions of the INA, an “alien who arrives at a
‘port of entry,’ i.e., a place where an alien may lawfully enter, must apply for
admission.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 108. Aliens who are detained trying
to enter elsewhere are treated similarly. Id.(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1),
(3)). However, “several classes of aliens are ‘inadmissible’ and therefore
‘removable.’” Id. at 107-08 (2020)(quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182,
1229a(e)(2)(A)).
The removal process provides for an evidentiary hearing before an
immigration judge, where the alien may challenge their removal, including
applying for asylum. Id. (internal citations omitted). Should their challenge
be rejected, the alien may appeal the removal order to the BIA and may
also be entitled to review in a federal court of appeals. Id. While his
removal proceedings are being litigated, the alien will generally be
detained. Id. However, the classification of the alien determines whether
that detention is mandatory or discretionary. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b)(2)(A) with 1226(a).
The interplay of these statutes, which both govern detention of
noncitizens pending removal proceedings, controls the outcome of the
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petition before the Court. Section 1225 governs the expedited removal
process and requires mandatory detention under its provisions, while §
1226 permits discretionary release from detention for certain aliens.
Morales Chavez, 2025 WL 29596, at *3. Respondents contend that §
1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner, thereby subjecting him to mandatory
detention. ECF No. 7. Gimenez Gonzalez, however, maintains that
§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governs his removal proceedings and he is
thus entitled to a bond determination hearing. See ECF Nos. 1, 8.
Section 1225, titled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited
removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing,” provides that,
upon arrival, all applicants for admission must undergo screening by an
examining immigration officer, and if it is determined that the applicant for
admission “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the
applicant “shall be detained for” standard removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 1226, titled: “Apprehension and
detention of aliens,” provides for a discretionary detention framework, and
states, in relevant part: an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the
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arrested alien may remain detained or may be released on bond. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). Subsection (c) of § 1226 prohibits noncitizens who have been
charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or have admitted to committing
acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny,
shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime
that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person from being
released on bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Relevant here, noncitizens arrested
and detained under Section 1226 have a right to request a custody
redetermination (i.e., a bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge. Santos
Franco v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2977118, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025)
(citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)).
Gimenez Gonzalez contends that his continued detention is unlawful
because he was not released or provided with a bond hearing as required
by § 1226(a). Respondents argue that § 1226(a) does not apply, and that
he is lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2). As more than 30 district courts
have decided in “reviewing the statutory text, statutory history,
congressional intent, and statutory application for the last three decades,”
Gimenez Gonzalez’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Jimenez Garcia v.
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Raybon, 2025 WL 2976950, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025) (cleaned up)
(collecting cases).
This multitude of district courts has explained that § 1225(b)(2)
applies to arriving aliens undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at
the United States’ border or ports of entry, when they are seeking lawful
entry into the United States.” Sanchez Alvarez, 2025 WL 2942648, at *5. In
contrast, § 1226(a) applies to a noncitizen already residing within the
United States when apprehended and arrested. Jiminez Sanchez, 2025 WL
2976950, at *4 (quoting Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8).
This Court agrees with the majority viewpoint in finding that §
1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), applies to noncitizens such as Petitioner. Neither
DHS’s decision to upend 30 years of reasoned statutory interpretation, the
BIA’s precedential decision sustaining the DHS about-face, nor the
fractional minority of district court cases4 finding § 1225(b)(2) applicable to
noncitizens like Petitioner persuade the Court otherwise. See Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216; Chavez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2730228, ___ F.
4 Only two of at least 36 district courts to have addressed this issue have
held that § 1225(b)(2) applies to those in the same circumstances as
Petitioner. See infra, n. 5.
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Supp. 3d ___(S.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2025) (adopting Yajure Hurtado’s statutory
interpretation to find § 1225(b)(2) applicable to noncitizens long present in
the United States) and Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb.
Sep. 20, 2025) (concluding that aliens may be subject to both § 1225(b)(2)
and § 1226(a) and that DHS may choose which statute to rely upon in
detaining an alien subject to removal).
As previously noted, BIA decisions are not binding on the Court. Nor
is the Court bound by the aberrant holdings of the two outlying cases
concluding that § 1225(b)(2) applies rather that § 1226(a). These cases,
from out-of-circuit district courts, not only contradict cases within the same
district, compare Vargas Lopez, 2025 WL 2780351 to Garcia Jiminez v.
Kramer, 2025 WL 2374223 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025) and Jacinto v. Trump,
2025 WL 2402271 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 2025), or those from sister district
courts within the same state, compare Chavez, 2025 WL 2730228 to
Arrazola-Gonzalez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2379285 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025),
Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___ (E.D. Cal. Sep.
23, 2025) and Cordero Pelico v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2822876 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
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3, 2025), but also conflict with the growing number of decisions from district
courts nationwide.5
Gimenez Gonzalez has resided in the United States for two years
and was apprehended outside his neighborhood barber shop, not upon
arrival at the border or a port of entry. Thus, under § 1226(a), Petitioner is
5 See, e.g., Echevarria v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025);
Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025);
Lopez v. Hardin, 2025 WL 2732717 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 25, 2025); Puga v.
Ass’t Field Office Director, 2025 WL 2938369 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025);
Mariano Miguel v. Noem, 2025 WL 2976480 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025);
Alejandro v. Olson, 2025 WL 2896348 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); Giron
Reyes v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2712427, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (N.D. Iowa Sep.
23, 2025); Helbrum v. Olson, 2025 WL 2840273 (S.D. Iowa Sep. 30, 2025);
Barerra v. Tindall, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 19, 2025); Kostak v.
Trump, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Chogllo Chafla v.
Scott, 2025 WL 2688541 (D. Me. Sep. 22, 2025); Maldonado de Leon v.
Baker, 2025 WL 2968042 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2025); Sampiao v. Hyde, 2025
WL 2607924, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025); Maldonado v.
Olson, 2025 WL 2374411, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025);
Vazquez v. Feeley, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sep. 17, 2025); Jimenez v.
FCI Berlin, 2025 WL 2639390, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___ (D.N.H. Sep. 8, 2025);
Zumba v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2753496 (D.N.J. Sep. 26, 2025); Salazar v.
Dedos, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sep. 17, 2025); Hyppolite v. Noem,
2025 WL 2829511 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 2025
WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer,
2025 WL 1953796 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025); S.D.B.B. v. Johnson, 2025
WL 2845170 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2025); Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara,
2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); Gonzalez Martinez v. Noem,
2025 WL 2965859 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); Quispe v. Crawford, 2025
WL 2783799 (E.D. Va. Sep. 29, 2025); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 2025 WL
278499, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (W.D. Wash. Sep. 30, 2025).
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entitled to a discretionary bond determination hearing. And because
Gimenez Gonzalez has been detained without having received such a
hearing, he is in federal custody in violation of federal law. Thus, his
habeas petition will be granted, and Respondents will be directed to
provide Gimenez Gonzalez with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) on or
before November 3, 2025, or otherwise release him.
D. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process
Given that this Court is granting the relief Petitioner requests based
on its interpretation of the applicability of § 1226(a), the Court will decline to
decide the merits of Gimenez Gonzalez’s due process claim. See Pizarro
Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8. If Respondents do not provide Gimenez
Gonzalez with a bond determination hearing or release him by November
3, 2025, he may renew his Fifth Amendment Due Process claim.
E. 	Proper Respondents
Finally, Respondents contend that only Petitioner’s immediate
custodian, here Raycraft, is a proper respondent in this habeas case. See
Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit concluded in Roman that “the immediate custodian rule generally
applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners.” 340 F.3d at 322. But it also
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noted possible exceptions to this rule. Sanchez Alvarez, 2025 WL 2942648,
at *9 (quoting Roman, 340 F.3d at 322).
Detained aliens may be transferred to detention facilities in other
districts, and such transfers may be used to deny aliens any meaningful
opportunity to seek habeas relief. Id. (quoting Roman, 340 F.3d at 326).
Thus, courts have allowed an alien to “name a respondent other than his
immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such
as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the
event of a transfer.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 326.
To ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this Court’s
grant of habeas relief and order that Petitioner receive a bond hearing or,
alternatively, be released even if Petitioner is transferred out of the district
under Raycraft’s control, the Court will not dismiss Attorney General Bondi
as a Respondent to these proceedings. See Sanchez Alvarez, 2025 WL
2942648, at *9; see also Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp. 2d. 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (transfer of immigration detainees under the control of the Attorney
General).
IV. Conclusion
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For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS Gimenez Gonzalez’s
petition for habeas relief. ECF No. 1.
To that end, the Court ORDERS:
1. Respondent Raycraft to provide Gimenez Gonzalez with a bond
hearing under § 1226(a) on or before November 3, 2025, or otherwise
release him; and
2. Respondent Raycraft to file a status report to certify compliance
with this order on or before November 5, 2025. The status report shall
detail when Gimenez Gonzalez was released or when his bond hearing
occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and—if bond was denied—the
reasons for the denial.
The Court further ORDERS that Respondents Raycraft and Bondi will
remain respondents in this action, but all other Respondents are
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Shalina D. Kumar
SHALINA D. KUMAR
United States District Judge
Dated: October 27, 2025
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