Minges v. Berrien, County of et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
BARBARA MINGES, 	Case No. 	1:23-cv-01308
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
COUNTY OF BERRIEN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant Wellpath’s
motion to dismiss based upon the May 1, 2025, United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Texas final confirmation order discharging and releasing
claims against Wellpath. 	(ECF No. 77.) 	Wellpath argues that the claims asserted
by Plaintiff should be dismissed with prejudice based upon the Bankruptcy Court’s
final order. 	Plaintiff argues that the claim against Wellpath is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy because it is based upon a “willful and malicious injury by the debtor.”
(ECF No. 80, PageID.750.)
Plaintiff, Barbara Minges, filed this lawsuit as personal representative of the
estate of Nicholas Jaeger. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	She alleges that when Jaegar was arrested
and placed in the Berrien County Jail on April 6, 2022, he was withdrawing from
heroin. 	(Id., PageID.5.) 	Plaintiff sues Defendants Berrien County; Wellpath, LLC
(Wellpath); Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) Thomas, who is employed by Wellpath;
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Deputy Jane Doe and Deputy Justin Williams. 	(Id., PageID.3-4.) 	Plaintiff alleges
that Jaegar did not receive proper care while he was going through heroin withdrawal
despite his obvious need for medical care, and, as a result, that he died on April 7,
2022. 	As Plaintiff alleges, Wellpath contracted with Berrien County to provide
health care for Berrien County Jail inmates. 	(Id., PageID.4.) 	Plaintiff alleges that
Wellpath assigned Defendant LPN Thomas to the jail. 	(Id.)
II. 	Analysis
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if plaintiffs
do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
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the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” 	Id.
Plaintiff brings a Monell claim against Defendant Wellpath. 	Monell v. Dep’t.
of Soc. Servs. Of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 	Liberally construing
Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Wellpath failed to “properly supervise,
monitor and train its . . . staff so as to monitor and supervise the jail’s prisoners so
they would detect serious medical conditions.”1 	(Id., PageID.18.) 	Plaintiff alleges
that 	Defendant 	Wellpath 	“breached 	these 	duties 	via 	its 	policies, 	procedures,
regulations, customs and/or lack of training and thus exhibited a reckless indifference
toward its prisoners” by “failing to staff the jail with competent medical personnel”
and by failing to have adequate policies and procedures in place for prisoners
experiencing withdrawal symptoms. 	(Id., PageID.19.)
On May 1, 2025, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Texas entered an Order Confirming the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
1 	The only Wellpath staff member identified by Plaintiff is LPN Thomas, and
Plaintiff has not identified a Wellpath policy, custom, or procedure that violated
Jaegar’s rights. 	LPN Thomas is not seeking dismissal from this action based upon
the Bankruptcy Court final order.
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Reorganization of Wellpath Holdings, Inc. and Certain Debtors Affiliates. (ECF No.
77-1.) 	The order discharges Wellpath’s debt that arose before May 1, 2025.
The order provided in part that:
any Holder of a Claim against or Interest in the Debtors that did not
check the “Opt Out” box on the applicable Ballot or Opt Out Form or
otherwise objected to the Third-Party Release, returned in advance of
the Voting Deadline (or within 60 days after the Confirmation Date for
incarcerated 	individuals), 	would 	be 	deemed 	to 	have 	expressly,
unconditionally, generally, individually, and collectively consented to
the release and discharge of all Claims and Causes of Action against the
Debtors . . . .
(ECF No. 77-1, PageID.605-606.)
Wellpath argues that because Plaintiff failed to opt out or object, her claims
against Wellpath must be dismissed under the terms of the Bankruptcy Court
confirmation order. 	Plaintiff does not argue otherwise but, instead, argues that the
claim she asserts against Wellpath cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.2
Under 11 U.S.C. § 1141, the confirmation of a plan “discharges the debtor from
any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation.” 	11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
However, exceptions exist for various intentional torts. 	Relevant here, a bankruptcy
2 	District Courts from this Circuit that have decided this issue have reached
various conclusions. 	See Huffman v. Williams, 2025 WL 2522965 (W.D. Ken. Sept.
2, 2025) (dismissing Wellpath after taking judicial notice of the Wellpath bankruptcy
confirmation order); Poronto v. Hoist, 2025 WL 2700601 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2025)
(recognizing that the Wellpath bankruptcy discharge renders the collection of a debt
owed by Wellpath as unenforceable, but allowing the case to proceed against
Wellpath as a nominal party solely for the determination of liability); Carr v.
Wilkerson, 2025 WL 2656043 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2025) (noting that if the Plaintiff
had failed to opt out, the claims would be released and dismissed by the Court);
Gregory 	v. 	M.D.O.C., 	2025 	WL 	2466029 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	Aug. 	26, 	2025) 	(denying
Wellpath’s motion to dismiss without prejudice based upon bankruptcy confirmation
order because too many questions were left unanswered in the motion).
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cannot discharge a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
entity . . . .” 	11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that her claim against Wellpath is for a willful
and malicious injury that cannot be discharged by bankruptcy. 3 	(ECF No. 80,
PageID.750.)
3 	In its reply brief, Wellpath argues (1) that only the Bankruptcy Court can
decide issues of dischargeability, and (2) that Plaintiff has missed her opportunity to
do so before that court. 	(ECF No. 86, PageID.782.) 	Wellpath is likely correct on
both points. 	Section 523(c)(1), shown below, requires a creditor to ask “the court” to
determine whether a debt specified in Section 523(a)(6) is dischargeable.
Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor shall
be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6)
of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to
whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court
determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph
(2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1).
Case law relating this dischargeability determination indicates that “the
Court” referenced in Section 523(c)(1) is the Bankruptcy Court, and that it has
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to this issue. 	See In re Moncur, 328 B.R. 183, 189
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (The history of the enactment of the original exclusive
jurisdiction provision in 1970 and the manner in which it was carried forward into
the Bankruptcy Code indicate that the reference to “the court” in § 523(c)(1)
contemplates a bankruptcy court before which a bankruptcy case involving the debtor
is pending at the time the decision is rendered); In re Gianopolous, 584 B.R. 598, 605
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Pursuant to § 523(c)(1), the bankruptcy court has exclusive
jurisdiction 	to 	determine 	the 	dischargeability 	of 	the 	intentional 	tort 	debts”);
Hendrickson v. Setty-O’Connor, No. 3:22-CV-2930-S-BN, 2024 WL 5171621, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-2930-S-
BN, 2024 WL 5173314 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2024) (“Although the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction over all § 523 issues, the exceptions to discharge over which the
bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction are those defined in § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and
(a)(6)).
Further, it appears that Plaintiff has missed her opportunity to make this
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“[W]illful means deliberate or intentional.” Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610,
615 (6th Cir. 1986). 	“‘Malicious’ means in conscious disregard of one’s duties or
without just cause or excuse; it does not require ill-will or specific intent to do harm.”
Id. (citation omitted). 	Under this section, “nondischargeability takes a deliberate or
intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.”
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Jaeger 	arrived 	at 	the 	Berrien 	County 	Jail 	with
withdrawal symptoms but “jail staff and LPN Karen Thomas deliberately ignored
these signs and broke protocol, and failed to check [Jaeger’s] vitals and provide him
his withdrawal medication in the last hours of his life.” 	(ECF No. 80, PageID.748.)
Plaintiff asserts that Jaeger was placed in an observation cell and was supposed to
be checked every 30 minutes and provided withdrawal medication twice per day.
(Id.) 	Jaeger’s condition worsened and Defendants Williams, and Doe ignored
requests for help from other inmates. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff disputes Defendant Thomas’s
claim that during the evening of April 6, 2022, Jaeger was administered withdrawal
argument to the Bankruptcy Court. 	Rule 4007(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
gives a creditor 60 days after the first Section 341 meeting to file a complaint under
Section 523(c). 	Wellpath represents that the first Section 341 meeting took place on
Jan. 7, 2025. 	(ECF No. 86, PageID.782.) 	Thus, it is too late for Plaintiff to litigate
this issue.
As noted above, these issues were raised in the reply brief, meaning Plaintiff
has not had a chance to weigh in. 	In the remainder of this R. & R., the undersigned
will address the merits of the dischargeability issue. 	But the Court could grant
Wellpath’s motion on grounds (1) that Plaintiff’s sole opportunity to obtain an
exception to bankruptcy discharge was through the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas, where the Wellpath bankruptcy was proceeding, and (2)
that Plaintiff missed her opportunity to do so.
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medication. 	(Id., PageID.749.) 	The next, morning she allegedly refused to provide
medication leading to Jaeger’s death. 	(Id.)
Plaintiff does not explain how Wellpath caused a willful and malicious injury.
Plaintiff only argues that the individual defendants’ action or inaction led to Jaeger’s
death. 	A municipality is not subject to § 1983 liability “for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents.” 	Kovalchuk v. City of Decherd, 95 F.4th 1035, 1038 (6th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 	Instead,
the municipality can only be held liable “for [its] own illegal acts.” 	Id. 	(alteration
in original) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). 	Where a
municipal employee harms a private party, that party must show that the employee’s
unconstitutional conduct stems from a municipal “policy or custom.” 	Coleman v.
Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’s, 130 F.4th 593, 599 (6th Cir. 2025).
There are four recognized avenues for a plaintiff to establish a municipality’s
policy or custom: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment;
(2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the
existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a
custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” 	Burgess v. Fischer,
735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d
426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). 	“Even after showing an unlawful policy or custom, a
plaintiff must also demonstrate a direct causal link between the policy and the
alleged constitutional violation in order to show that the municipality’s deliberate
conduct 	can 	be 	deemed 	the 	‘moving 	force’ 	behind 	the 	violation.” 	Jones 	v.
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Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 482 F. Supp. 3d 584, 597 (W.D. Ky. 2020)
(quoting Spears, 589 F.3d 249 at 256 (cleaned up)).
In Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth
Circuit held that if “no constitutional violation by the individual defendants is
established, 	the 	municipal 	defendants 	cannot 	be 	held 	liable 	under 	§ 	1983.”
Generally, if no constitutional violation can be attributed to an individual municipal
actor, it is unlikely that the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right at all.
North v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 754 F. App’x 380, 390 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2018). 	More
recently, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “in certain unusual circumstances, a
municipality might be liable for a constitutional violation even in the absence of a
liable individual.” 	Hart v. Hillsdale Cnty., Michigan, 973 F.3d 627, 645 (6th Cir.
2020); Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 900 (6th Cir. 2018). 	A Monell claim
against a municipality may proceed without a claim against an offending officer, so
long as it remains consistent with a finding of a constitutional violation. 	Stucker v.
Louisville Metro Gov’t, No. 23-5214, 2024 WL 2135407, at *6 (6th Cir. May 13, 2024).
There exists “scenarios when no officer may have acted unconstitutionally, but the
municipality has nonetheless inflicted constitutional harm of a victim – such as a lack
of action due to the failure to train, or where there are systematic problems with the
health care system in the County jail.” 	Grote v. Kenton Cnty., 85 F. 4th 397, 414 (6th
Cir. 2023).
First, Plaintiff has failed to identify a Wellpath specific policy, custom, or
procedure that violated Jaeger’s rights. 	Second, Plaintiff has not set forth any
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factual allegations to explain how Wellpath failed to train any of its employees or how
the failure to train violated Jaeger’s rights. 	And most importantly, Plaintiff has not
alleged or shown that a Wellpath policy, custom, or procedure, or lack of training of
its 	employees 	resulted 	in 	a 	willful 	and 	malicious 	injury 	caused 	by 	Wellpath.
Plaintiff would have to show that Wellpath willfully and maliciously either created a
policy, custom, or procedure, or failed to train its employees in a manner that caused
injury to inmates. 	Plaintiff makes no attempt to even make such a connection and
only focuses on the alleged actions or inactions of the individual Defendants.
Plaintiff does not even make an argument that Defendant Wellpath took willful and
malicious action. 	The Court must, of course, view the facts and the allegations in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 	Nevertheless, the failure to even
allege such conduct on behalf of Wellpath is fatal to Plaintiff’s argument that her
claim cannot be discharged by the bankruptcy confirmation order.
III. 	Recommendation
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant
Defendant Wellpath’s motion to dismiss based upon the May 1, 2025, United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas final confirmation order
discharging and releasing claims against Wellpath.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
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constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	November 5, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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