Perrett v. Lindenwood University et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RYANN PERRETT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:25 CV 846 CDP
)
LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ryann Perrett is a former student-athlete who was a member of the
women’s hockey team at Lindenwood University. Perrett alleges that she was
harassed by her teammates on the basis of her heterosexual orientation and that
Lindenwood and its employees responded inadequately to her complaints. She brings
claims against Lindenwood and its employees for gender discrimination and
retaliation under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX), as well as state law claims for breach of
contract and negligence. For the reasons that follow, I will grant defendants’ motion
to dismiss all claims against defendants Jason Coomer, Rebecca Taylor, Katie Zingg,
Shelley Looney, and Kristi Kehoe. I will also grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the
breach of contract and negligence claims against Lindenwood. Perrett’s Title IX
claims against Lindenwood will proceed. Finally, I will order Perrett to show cause
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why her claims against the Doe defendants should not be dismissed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to timely serve them.
Facts and Background
In June 2025, plaintiff Ryann Perrett filed this action against defendants
Lindenwood University, Vice President for Intercollegiate Athletics Jason Coomer,
Director of Mental Health Services Rebecca Taylor, Associate Athletic Director
Katie Zingg, former Head Coach Shelley Looney, former Assistant Coach Kristi
Kehoe, ten John Does, and unspecified number of unidentified staff members from
Lindenwood University’s Mental Health Services. Without specifying which claims
are being asserted against which defendants, Perrett asserts Title IX claims for
discrimination (Count I) and retaliation (Count II), as well as state law claims for
breach of contract (Count III) and negligence (Count IV).
The complaint alleges the following facts: Perrett was a student-athlete who
joined the women’s hockey team at Lindenwood on a sports scholarship in August
2022. In the following months, Perrett experienced verbal harassment and
intimidation from her “teammates who viewed her talent and competitiveness as a
threat.” ECF #1, Complaint ¶ 16. She was “one of the few players who did not
identify as lesbian, which contributed to her being seen as an outsider by a dominant
social group of teammates and coaching staff who share that identity.” Id. ¶ 18. She
reported the harassment to coaches Looney and Kehoe, but no corrective actions were
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taken. Perrett suffered a knee injury that was misdiagnosed by Lindenwood’s staff in
October, and the delay in treatment worsened her condition. In November, one of
Perrett’s teammates falsely accused her of using racist language and other
misconduct. “The accusations made against Plaintiff arose in the context of social
exclusion based on her heterosexual orientation and her perceived difference from the
core group, further illustrating sex-based animus.” Id. ¶ 28. “Coaches continued to
retaliate by criticizing Plaintiff’s competitiveness, benching her without valid
reasons, and creating an environment where she felt unwelcome and isolated.” Id.
¶ 32. An unspecified “meeting occurred on November 22, 2022, but Mr. Coomer
failed to attend.” Id. ¶ 38. Perrett “submitted a written complaint, but the
administration failed to take meaningful steps to investigate or address her concerns.”
Id. ¶ 39. She was treated for severe depression and anxiety in November 2022, and
her mental and physical conditions led to a decline in her academic performance. In
March 2023, Perrett “experienced a sudden lack of interest from recruiters, indicating
that defamatory information about her had been shared.” Id. ¶ 44. As a result, her
reputation was damaged and her Division I opportunities were diminished. In April
2023, Perrett’s scholarship was revoked, which caused her to withdraw from
Lindenwood.
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Defendants move to dismiss Counts I and II as to the individual defendants and
Counts III and IV as to all defendants.1 Noting that it is unclear which claims apply
to which defendants, they argue that – to the extent Perrett intends to bring Counts I
and II against any of the individual defendants – those claims must be dismissed
because Title IX claims cannot be brought against school officials, teachers, and other
individuals. Defendants contend that the breach of contract claim fails because the
complaint does not identify any specific contractual provision or promise that they
are alleged to have violated. They assert that the negligence claim also fails because
the complaint does not provide support for the duties they allegedly breached. Perrett
opposes the motion to dismiss.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a motion
to dismiss, a court should assume the complaint’s factual allegations are true and
construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555-56 (2007). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Id. The factual
1 Defendants do not move to dismiss the Title IX claims against Lindenwood in Counts I and II.
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allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). A “pleading that merely pleads labels and conclusions, or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of factual
enhancement will not suffice.” Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817-18 (8th Cir.
2010) (citation modified); see also Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585,
594 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In addition, some factual allegations may be so indeterminate
that they require ‘further factual enhancement’ in order to state a claim.”).
Discussion
As an initial matter, the complaint does not specify – and I cannot
discern – which claims Perrett is asserting against which defendants. All of Perrett’s
claims and prayers for relief refer to a single defendant that appears to be
Lindenwood. The complaint contains no factual allegations regarding Taylor and
Zingg and a few vague allegations regarding Coomer, Looney, and Kehoe. ECF #1
¶¶ 22, 38, 49. Perrett’s opposition to the motion to dismiss does not clarify matters
because it focuses on Lindenwood and does not meaningfully discuss the individual
defendants. But regardless of which claims apply to which defendants, the complaint
fails to state a claim against any of the five individual defendants, and it fails to state
claims for breach of contract and negligence against Lindenwood for the reasons that
follow.
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I. 	Counts I and II – Title IX
Defendants do not seek to dismiss Perrett’s Title IX claims against
Lindenwood, but they do move to dismiss the Title IX claims against the individual
defendants. While Perrett appears to acknowledge in her opposition that her Title IX
claims are properly pled only against Lindenwood, she argues that the individual
defendants should not be dismissed because they were involved in the alleged
misconduct and are necessary for Perrett to prove her case against Lindenwood. But
Perrett need not name Coomer, Taylor, Zingg, Looney, or Kehoe as defendants to
make factual allegations regarding their conduct in the complaint. To the extent
Perrett intends to assert her Title IX claims against the individual defendants, those
claims must be dismissed because school officials are not the recipients of federal
funds. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999)
(joining those circuits holding that school officials may not be sued under Title IX
because they do not receive federal funds); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555
U.S. 246, 257 (2009) (explaining that Title IX “has consistently been interpreted as
not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals”).
II. 	Count III – Breach of Contract
While other jurisdictions have held that a contractual relationship exists
between a student and a university based on a student’s enrollment or a university’s
manuals and policies, Missouri courts have not. See Lucero v. Curators of Univ. of
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Mo., 400 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he parties have not cited, nor has
our research uncovered, any case law in Missouri that expressly finds the existence of
a contractual relationship between a student and a university.”). Even assuming that
a contractual relationship between Perrett and Lindenwood could exist under
Missouri law, Perrett has not adequately alleged any specific promise or obligation
that Lindenwood failed to honor.
Not every dispute between a student and a university is amenable to a breach of
contract claim. Lucero, 400 S.W.3d at 5. Rather, “to assert a breach of contract
claim against a university, a student plaintiff must point to an identifiable contractual
promise that the university defendant failed to honor.” Id. (citation modified). This
means that “the complaint must, at minimum, cite the contractual provision allegedly
violated. Generalized allegations of a contractual breach are not sufficient.” Gillis v.
Principia Corp., 832 F.3d 865, 872 n.11 (8th Cir. 2016). “Thus, a complaint fails to
state a claim for breach of contract if it does not set out the claimant’s rights or the
defendant’s obligations under the contract. Id. (citation modified). “Vague
references to unspecified ‘agreements’ are insufficient to state a claim for breach of
contract.” Id. (citing Reitz v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d 870, 884 (E.D.
Mo. 2013)).
Perrett asserts that her breach of contract claim is based on representations in
Lindenwood’s student-athlete handbook, athletic department policies, and the
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scholarship offer that she accepted, but she has not cited any contractual provision
that was allegedly violated, nor has she even submitted copies of the documents she
claims are contracts. See Gillis, 832 F.3d at 872 n.11 (“[T]he complaint must, at
minimum, cite the contractual provision allegedly violated.”). The complaint alleges
only that those documents “promised an educational and athletic environment that
would be free from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, and guaranteed access
to appropriate medical treatment, equipment, and mental health services.” ECF #1
¶ 66. This generalized allegation fails to state a claim for breach of contract because
it does not set out Perrett’s rights or Lindenwood’s specific obligations under the
contract. See Gillis, 832 F.3d at 872 n.11. Further, the alleged statements “cannot
constitute the basis for a breach of contract claim” because they “do not constitute
specific promises, but rather are aspirational in nature.” Lucero, 400 S.W.3d at 6.
Therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim for breach of contract against
Lindenwood. The complaint also fails to state a claim for breach of contract against
the individual defendants because it contains no allegations suggesting that any of
them had a valid contract with Perrett. See Lucero, 400 S.W.3d at 5 (breach of
contract elements).
III. 	Count IV – Negligence
Under Missouri law, “the general elements of negligence are: (1) a legal duty
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant;
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(3) proximate cause; and (4) injury to the plaintiff.” Campbell v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
697 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Thornburg v. Fed. Express Corp., 62
S.W.3d 421, 427 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001). Whether a duty exists is a question of law.
Pearson v. Logan Univ., 937 F.3d 1119, 1127 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Lopez v. Three
Rivers Elec. Coop., 26 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Mo. 2000) (en banc)). Missouri courts have
consistently rejected the contention that simply enrolling in a university creates a
legal duty of care to support a negligence claim. Nickel v. Stephens College, 480
S.W.3d 390, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). “As a general rule, a college does not owe a
duty to protect its students.” Pearson, 937 F.3d at 1127 (citing Nickel, 480 S.W.3d at
401 n.8. (acknowledging a “very narrow exception” in cases where a “special
relationship” exists between a school and a student when “one party entrusts another
for protection and relies upon that party to provide a place of physical safety”)).
The complaint alleges that “Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiff, a
student-athlete under its care, to provide a safe and inclusive educational and athletic
environment, to respond appropriately to allegations of misconduct, to provide access
to medical and mental health care, and to ensure compliance with its own published
policies and standards.” ECF #1 ¶ 70. In her opposition, Perrett does not point to any
recognized exception to the general rule that a university does not have a duty to
protect its students, and she cites no Missouri case finding such an exception under
similar circumstances. I also have found no authority from Missouri that would
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support finding a duty to support a negligence claim in this case. See Nickel, 480
S.W.3d at 401 (refusing to recognize a duty to support a negligence claim where the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant college’s administrative decision to issue her a
medical withdrawal due to mental health issues breached a duty that “exists simply
by virtue of the university-student relationship”). Thus, the complaint fails to state a
negligence claim against Lindenwood. To the extent Perrett intends to bring her
negligence claim against the individual defendants, her claim fails because the
complaint contains no factual allegations indicating that any of the individual
defendants breached a specific duty to Perrett. See Campbell, 697 S.W.3d at 42
(negligence elements).
IV. 	Doe Defendants
Perrett was required to serve all defendants within 90 days after she filed her
complaint, which means that proof of service was due on or before September 8,
2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). John Does 1-10 and the unidentified Lindenwood
University Mental Health Services Personnel remain unserved in this case, and the
time to effect service on them has passed. See United Pentecostal Church Int’l, Inc.
v. Doe, No. 4:25-CV-00327-MTS, 2025 WL 1663983, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 12,
2025) (Rule 4(m)’s service period applies to Doe defendants). I will therefore order
Perrett to show cause why her claims against the unserved John Does 1-10 and
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Lindenwood University Mental Health Services Personnel should not be dismissed
under Rule 4(m) for her failure to timely effect service of process on them.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, I will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss
without prejudice Counts I through IV as to the individual defendants, as well as the
breach of contract and negligence claims brought against Lindenwood in Counts III
and IV. Counts I and II will proceed against Lindenwood. Perrett must show cause
why her claims against the unserved John Does 1-10 and Lindenwood University
Mental Health Services Personnel should not be dismissed for failure to timely effect
service.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [12] is
GRANTED. Counts I through IV are DISMISSED as to defendants Jason Coomer,
Rebecca Taylor, Katie Zingg, Shelley Looney, and Kristi Kehoe. Counts III and IV
are DISMISSED as to defendant Lindenwood University.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Ryann Perrett shall show cause
within ten (10) days of the date of this Order why her claims against John Does
1-10 and Lindenwood University Mental Health Services Personnel should not be
dismissed for failure to timely effect service of process under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m).
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This case will be set for a Rule 16 scheduling conference by separate order.
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 22nd day of January, 2026.
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