Mills v. City of St. Louis, Missouri et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
THEODA E. MILLS, J R ., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-01219-MTS
)
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This 	matter 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Appoint 	Counsel.
Doc. [32]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 	Upon review and consideration of the
Motion, the Court will deny it. A pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to
have counsel appointed in a civil case. 	Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794
(8th Cir. 2006); accord Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2018) (Barrett, J.).
This is true even for cases presenting “employment discrimination claims.” 	See Ivey v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). 	A district court
may choose to appoint counsel in a civil case, though, if the court is “convinced that an
indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim . . . and where the nature of the
litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the assistance of
counsel.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018).
Here, Plaintiff has not established that he is indigent and unable to afford counsel.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Indeed, he prepaid the filing fee in full. Cf. id. § 1915(a)(1).
And, in any event, this employment discrimination case appears to be “one in which a
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contingent fee arrangement is feasible.” See Hudak v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d
105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming denial of motion for appointment of counsel); see
also Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“It is
simply not true that the suits of individuals are generally financed by their personal
means.”). 	If Plaintiff has trouble hiring an attorney to represent him in this case, it
probably speaks more to the likelihood of his success than his indigency. See McSean v.
Chamberlain, 4:23-cv-1225-MTS, 2025 WL 2591642, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2025).
Besides that threshold issue, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient explanation
showing an appointed attorney is appropriate in this case. 	See Phillips, 437 F.3d at 794;
see also Carter v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t Med. Dep’t, 558 F. App’x 919, 923
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (noting that a district court should only appoint counsel to
an indigent plaintiff “in exceptional circumstances”).1 	When determining whether to
appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors such as the
legal and factual complexity of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to investigate the
facts and present his claim, and the existence of conflicting testimony. Phillips, 437 F.3d
at 794.
This case is not unusually complex, factually or legally. 	See Kayhill v. Unified
Govern. of Wyandotte, 197 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding that the “factual and
1 Plaintiff directs the Court to Zekert v. FieldWorks, LLC, 4:20-cv-0471-RWS, 2020 WL
1666489, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 3, 2020), claiming that the court appointed counsel after finding
the pro se litigant faced significant difficulty navigating procedural rules and that the legal issues
were complex. 	A review of the docket in that case, though, shows the court did not appoint
counsel there. This instance is yet another example of Plaintiff misrepresenting case law to the
Court. See Doc. [26].
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legal issues” in a case involving a former employee’s allegations of race, religion, sex,
national origin, and disability discrimination were “not complex”). And—aside from the
serious instances where he provided the Court with fake case law—Plaintiff has shown
that he is able to present his allegations and arguments to the Court.2 	Indeed, Plaintiff
indicates that he as a doctorate degree; he should be more than capable of litigating this
case himself. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that
determining a plaintiff’s competence to litigate his own case involves consideration of
“the plaintiff’s literacy, communication skills, [and] educational level”); 	Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1993) (similar).
For all these reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc.
[32], is DENIED. Plaintiff’s filings remain due on December 16, 2025. 	See Doc. [25],
[26], and [31].
Dated this 10th day of December 2025.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 Plaintiff cites the pending Show Cause Order as among the reasons the Court should appoint
him an attorney. 	But the Court will not reward Plaintiff for his misbehavior. 	Cf. Saudi v.
Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting a party should not be able
to “capitalize on his noncompliance with the court’s rules”).
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