Moore v. City of St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY MOORE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:25-CV-1470-SRW
)
CITY OF ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN 	)
POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of Plaintiff Dewey Barnett II, an inmate at
Southeast Correctional Center (SECC), for leave to commence this civil action without prepaying
fees or costs. ECF No. 3. The Court will grant the motion and assess an initial partial filing fee of
$12.00. Furthermore, after reviewing the pleadings in this matter, the Court will dismiss this action
for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel
and motion for hearing on subpoena will be denied as moot. ECF Nos. 2, 5.
Initial Partial Filing Fee
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison
account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account,
or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After
payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20
percent of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
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agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court
each time the amount in the account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner at Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional
Center in Bonne Terre, Missouri. ECF No. 1. In support of his motion to proceed without prepaying
fees and costs, Plaintiff submitted an inmate account statement showing average monthly deposits
of $33.70, and an average monthly balance of $60 over the six-month period prior to case initiation.
ECF No. 4. The Court finds that Plaintiff has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the
entire fee and will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $12, which is twenty percent of
Plaintiff’s average monthly deposits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An
action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial
experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded
facts but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court
should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone
v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even self-represented complaints must
allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d
1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged,
Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The Complaint
Plaintiff Anothony Moore brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of his civil rights. ECF No. 1. He names as defendants St. Louis Metropolitan Police
Department, as well as two of its officers, William Jenkerson and Michael Weber. Id.
Plaintiff’s claims arise from his arrest on August 7, 2005. Id. at 4. Plaintiff describes that
he had his hands in the air prior to his arrest when Defendant Jenkerson shot him. Id. The bullet
struck him in the shoulder. Id. Plaintiff further claimed Defendant Weber struck him in the head
after Plaintiff had been handcuffed. Id. Plaintiff attached multiple exhibits, including medical
records which showed a graze wound to the left shoulder as well as a head abrasion. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff accuses St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department of failure to train its officers and
accuses the officers of intentional malice. Id. at 8.
For injuries, Plaintiff describes damage from the bullet striking his shoulder, anxiety,
ADHD, loss of hair, mental anguish, and nerve irritation. Id. He requests actual damages of $1
million and punitive damages of $1.5 million. Id. at 13.
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Discussion
Plaintiff’s complaint arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because § 1983 provides no period of
limitation, the controlling limitation period is the most appropriate period provided by state law.
Buford v. Tremayne, 747 F.2d 445, 447-48 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). Section 1983 actions should be characterized as personal injury
claims for the purpose of applying the appropriate statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 276 (1985). Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of
limitations on personal injury claims. Sulik v. Taney Cnty., Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir.
2005); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000).
Based on the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint, his § 1983 claims are time-barred.
“Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may properly dismiss
an in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915[] when it is apparent the statute of
limitations has run.” Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992). In this case, Plaintiff’s
allegations are based alleged excessive force by the Defendants that occurred in 2005. This case
was filed on September 29, 2025. Based on a five-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims,
Plaintiff’s claims were filed about 15 years too late.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to commence this action
without prepaying fees or costs [ECF No. 3] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order,
Plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $12.00. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original
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proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel [ECF No. 2] is
DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for hearing on subpoena [ECF No.
5] is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims in this action are DISMISSED
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 28th day of January 2026.
CRISTIAN M. STEVENS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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