Benjamin Douglas Morris

1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
In re: 	)
)
BENJAMIN DOUGLAS 	) 	Case No.: 	12-12886-JDW
MORRIS, 	)
)
Debtor. 	) 	Chapter 11
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART THE
UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. # 175)
AND DENYING DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(DKT. # 201)
This matter came before the Court on the
United States’ Motion for
Summary Judgment1 (the “IRS’s Motion”) filed by creditor United States of
America, on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) and the
Debtor’s
1 (Dkt. # 175).
____________________________________________________________________________
The Order of the Court is set forth below. The case docket reflects the date entered.
____________________________________________________________________________
SO ORDERED,
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Judge Jason D. Woodard
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Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment2 	(the 	“Debtor’s 	Motion”) 	filed 	by 	debtor
Benjamin Douglas Morris.
At a status conference held on August 22, 2025, the parties agreed that
the sole issue to be decided at this stage is whether the automatic stay under
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) remained in effect after the closure of debtor’s bankruptcy
case.3 The issue arises because on October 31, 2014, the debtor filed a motion
to close his chapter 11 case for “administrative purposes.” 	That motion was
granted, and the bankruptcy case was closed on December 16, 2014. 	The
debtor never sought to reopen his case to obtain a discharge. 	After the case
was closed, the IRS initiated several collection actions against the debtor for
prepetition trust fund recovery penalties. The debtor contends that the IRS’s
collection efforts violated the automatic stay, which he contends remained in
effect following the closure of the case. 	The IRS argues that the stay was
terminated when the case was closed.
Having 	considered 	the 	parties’ 	stipulated 	facts, 	the 	docket, 	the
arguments, and relevant law, the Court concludes that the IRS’s Motion is due
to be granted in part, and the Debtor’s Motion is due to be denied, because the
automatic stay terminated when the case was closed. 	It follows that the IRS
cannot be sanctioned for violating the stay when no stay existed.
2 (Dkt. # 201).
3 (Dkt. # 190).
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I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157(a), and
1334, and the
	United States District 	Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi’s Order of Reference of Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings Nunc
Pro Tunc dated August 6, 1984. 	This is a core proceeding as set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O).
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment 	should 	be 	granted 	“if 	the 	pleadings, 	depositions, 	answers 	to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”4 	The party seeking
summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating to the court the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.5 “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor
of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law. An
issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable [fact-finder] to
return a verdict for the non-moving party.”6 	All reasonable doubt as to the
4
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c));
see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056
and 9014(c)(1).
5
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
6
Ginsberg 1985 Real Estate P’ship v. Cadle Co., 39 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
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existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the
moving party.7
Here, 	the 	parties 	have 	filed 	cross-motions 	for 	summary 	judgment,
shifting the burden to each movant on its motion.8 	The parties have also,
however, stipulated to the material facts necessary to decide each motion,
leaving no other material facts for the court to find at this stage.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement and this Court’s Order dated August
25, 2025,9 the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts10 to serve as the
evidence the Court will consider in deciding the limited issue here. 	The Joint
Stipulation of Facts is reproduced below verbatim:
It is hereby stipulated by and among the parties through
their respective counsel [of] record as follows:
1. 	On July 13, 2012, Benjamin Douglas Morris (“Debtor”
or “Morris”) filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. (Dkt. # 1).
2. 	The bar date for a governmental unit to file a proof of
claim was January 9, 2013. (Dkt. # 16).
3. 	On August 10, 2012, the IRS filed Proof of Claim 1-1
setting 	forth 	an 	unsecured 	priority 	claim 	in 	the 	amount 	of
$78,996.07 for federal income tax liabilities for tax years 2010 and
2011.
See Claim 1-1. This amount was based on estimates because
Morris had not yet filed his returns for these tax years.
See id.
7
Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 1980).
8
Duval v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 722 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2013).
9 (Dkt. # 190).
10 (Dkt. # 197).
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4. 	Once the 2010 and 2011 federal income liabilities were
assessed, 	the 	IRS 	filed 	an 	Amended 	Proof 	of 	Claim 	1-2 	on
September 6, 2012, adjusting the balances of Debtor’s outstanding
federal income tax liabilities for tax years 2010 and 2011 to $0.00.
See Claim 1-2.
5. 	On 	April 	14, 	2014, 	Debtor 	filed 	its 	Disclosure
Statement (Dkt. # 89), which the Court approved on August 4,
2014. (Dkt. # 104); (Dkt. # 105).
6. 	On July 22, 2014, Debtor filed its First Amended Plan
of Reorganization (the “Plan”) to pay claims over 60 months (Dkt.
# 101). The Plan contained language in Article IX, Jurisdiction of
the Court, that states in part that the Court retains jurisdiction for
“determination of all causes of action, controversies, disputes and
conflicts, 	whether 	or 	not 	subject 	to 	action 	pending 	as 	of 	the
Confirmation date, between the Debtor and any party, including,
but not limited 	to, 	the 	right 	of 	the 	Debtor 	to 	recover 	assets
pursuant to the provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code.”
7. 	The 	Court 	entered 	its
	Order 	Confirming 	First
Amended Plan of Reorganization (the “Confirmation Order”) on
October 20, 2014. (Dkt. # 114).
8. 	The 	Debtor 	did 	not 	receive 	a 	discharge 	upon
confirmation of the Plan. The Confirmation Order contains an
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED paragraph that states
“that the Debtor shall be granted a discharge only upon completion
of all payments under the Plan. The bankruptcy case may be
closed, for administrative purposes, before all payments are made
in 	order 	to 	avoid 	further 	United 	States 	Trustee 	fees. 	Upon
completion of all payments under the Plan, Debtor’s counsel shall
so notify the Court that payments have been completed and the
discharge shall thereupon be granted.”
9. 	The 	Confirmation 	Order 	contains 	an 	ORDERED,
ADJUDGED 	AND 	DECREED 	paragraph 	that 	states 	“that
subsequent to the entry of this Order, the Court shall retain
jurisdiction relating to this case as provided under the Plan,
including, without limitation, jurisdiction over all disputes arising
out of the Plan. In addition, the Court shall retain jurisdiction for
the administration and adjudication of objections to claims and the
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allowance 	of 	claims 	during 	the 	course 	of 	the 	Chapter 	11
proceeding, including any and all claims against the Debtor that
arose prior to and during the course of this Chapter 11 proceeding
herein in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Plan and
the Order Confirming the Plan of Reorganization.”
10. 	On October 31, 2014, Debtor filed a Motion to Close
Chapter 11 Case. (Dkt. # 119). The Court granted this motion on
December 16, 2014, by entering its Order Granting Motion to Close
Chapter 11 Case (the “Closing Order”) (Dkt. # 130). The Court
entered its
Final Decree/Order Closing Case (All Chapters) (the
“Final Decree/Order Closing Case”) that closed the bankruptcy
case on the same day. (Dkt. # 132).
11. 	The Closing Order states in part that the “Court will
retain jurisdiction over the Debtor with respect to the filing of his
Monthly Operating Reports (through the date the case is closed)
and payment of his fees due to the Office of the United States
Trustee (also through the date of closing); and any other matters
of 	administration 	which 	have 	not 	yet 	been 	resolved 	by 	the
Bankruptcy Court or otherwise concluded.”
12. 	BNC notice of the Order Granting Motion to Close
Chapter 11 Case and of the Order Closing Case was sent to
interested parties on December 18, 2014.
See (Dkt. # 133); (Dkt. #
134).
13. 	On August 27, 2024, the Debtor filed his
Motion to
Reopen Chapter 11 Case (the “Motion to Reopen”). (Dkt. #138).
14. 	On 	October 	8, 	2024, 	the 	United 	States 	filed 	its
Response (Dkt. #145) to the Debtor’s Motion to Reopen.
15. 	On October 16, 2024, the Court held a hearing on the
Debtor’s Motion to Reopen.
See (Dkt. # 139). On October 18, 2024,
the Court ultimately entered its
Order Reopening Case (Dkt. # 146)
that reopened this Chapter 11 case.
16. 	On January 29, 2025, the Debtor filed his
Motion to
Enforce Automatic Stay and for Sanctions (the “Motion to Enforce
Automatic Stay”) (Dkt. #149) against the IRS.
17. 	On April 14, 2025, the United States filed its
Response
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in 	Opposition 	(Dkt. 	#162) 	to 	the 	Debtor’s 	Motion 	to 	Enforce
Automatic Stay.
18. 	On July 28, 2025, the United States filed its
Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 175) (the “United States’ Motion for
Summary Judgment”). The United States’ Motion for Summary
Judgment included 	a statement of undisputed material 	facts,
exhibits, and a memorandum brief in support. (Dkt. ## 175-1, 175-
2, 175-3, 175-4).
19. 	On August 20, 2025, the Debtor filed his
Opposition
and 	Response 	to 	the 	United 	States’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment, his memorandum brief in support, his response to the
United States’ statement of undisputed material facts, and an
attorney declaration. (Dkt. ## 181, 182, 183, 184, and 185).
20. 	On August 29, 2025, the United States filed its
Reply
in Support of the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(the “United States’ Reply”). (Dkt. # 196). The United States Reply
included a Response to Debtor’s Statement of Facts. (Dkt. # 196-
1).
21. 	The Debtor was a principal of Dalphis Holdings, LLC.
22. 	On October 21, 2014, the IRS assessed trust fund
recovery penalties (“TFRP”) pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6672 against
Morris as a responsible officer of Dalphis Holdings, LLC for tax
period ending December 31, 2010, in the amount of $151,289.42.
23. 	On March 2, 2015, the IRS assessed against Morris
TFRPs 	pursuant 	to 	26 	U.S.C. 	§ 	6672 	against 	Morris 	as 	a
responsible officer of Dalphis Holdings, LLC for tax period ending
December 31, 2011, in the amount of $337,416.14.
24. 	The Form 4340 for Debtor’s 2010 TFRP liabilities
contains entries of a “legal/bankruptcy proceeding” on July 13,
2012, and “legal/bankruptcy proceeding no longer pending” on
June 27, 2019.
25. 	Between October 2019, and June 2024, the IRS took
several 	collection 	actions 	to 	collect 	the 	TFRP 	liabilities 	from
Debtor.
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26. 	Debtor’s counsel submitted a letter by fax to the IRS
dated December 16, 2021, arguing that IRS actions to collect
Debtor’s TFRPs violated the automatic stay.
27. 	The Debtor also filed various notices of appeal which
were never completely or fully addressed, and in some in instances,
not addressed at all.
28. 	There has been no Final Decree other than the one this
Court entered on December 16, 2014.11
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
When 	a 	debtor 	files 	a 	bankruptcy 	case 	under 	chapter 	11 	of 	the
Bankruptcy Code,12 section 362(a) provides an automatic stay that generally
“prevents creditors from taking any collection actions against the debtor or the
property of the debtor’s estate for pre-petition debts.”13 Unless the bankruptcy
court grants relief from the stay, the stay remains in effect until the property
at issue “is no longer property of the estate” or “until the earliest of— (A) the
time the case is closed; (B) the time the case is dismissed; or (C) . . . the time a
discharge is granted or denied.”14
The 	debtor 	asserts 	that 	“although 	the 	Plan 	payments 	have 	been
completed for some time now, the Debtor has not received a discharge and, as
a result, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 remain in full force
11
Id.
12 “Bankruptcy Code” refers to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory
references herein are to the Bankruptcy Code.
13
Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 2008).
14 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1)-(2);
see also Sosebee v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 701 F.3d 1012, 1025 (5th
Cir. 2012).
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and effect.”15 The debtor is correct that he has not received a discharge because
he never sought a discharge. 	More importantly, the debtor overlooks the
remainder 	of 	section 362(c)(2), 	which 	provide 	other 	trigger 	points 	for
termination of the stay, the earliest of which applies.16 	Applying the plain
language of section 362(c)(2)(A) to the Joint Stipulation of Facts,17 the earliest
trigger point occurred when debtor’s case was closed, on the debtor’s own
motion, on December 16, 2014.18 The automatic stay terminated on that day.
The 	debtor 	further 	argues 	that 	despite 	his 	case 	being 	closed, 	the
automatic 	stay 	remained 	in 	effect 	because 	“[t]his 	case 	was 	closed 	for
administrative purposes only, so the automatic stay provisions remained in
effect 	after 	closing, 	the 	automatic 	stay 	has 	remained 	in 	effect, 	and 	the
automatic stay remains in effect now.”19 The term “administrative closure” is
not recognized in the Bankruptcy Code, but courts, including this Court, have
sometimes allowed debtors to close cases to avoid paying U.S. Trustee (“UST”)
fees between confirmation and when a case is ripe for a discharge after
completion of plan payments.20 	The debtor cites to no case law to support his
15 (Dkt. # 202, p. 7).
16 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).
17 (Dkt. # 197).
18 (Dkt. ## 119, 132); 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(A).
19 (Dkt. # 202, p. 7).
20
See, e.g., In re Kerley, No. 09-43154-JJR11, 2011 WL 5330667, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Nov.
4, 2011) (“[A]lthough ‘administrative closing’ is not a concept set out anywhere in the Code
and Bankruptcy Rules, it has been embraced by some courts as an expeditious means of
circumventing the problematic issue of when a case is ‘fully administered’ for purposes of
closing an individual chapter 11 debtor’s case prior to the entry of discharge in an effort to
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position that the automatic stay remained in effect post-closure. 	By contrast,
many courts have concluded that an administrative closing terminates the
stay.21 The debtor must take the good with the bad. While closure of the case
relieves the debtor of the expense of UST fees, it also terminates the automatic
stay.22
At times, some courts have fashioned equitable remedies to preserve the
automatic stay after an administrative closure, but those cases required an
affirmative stay extension by those courts.23 The leading example comes from
In re Mendez where the court exercised its power under section 105(a) to close
the case for administrative purposes, while preserving the automatic stay, to
“afford the debtor relief from his ongoing obligation to pay UST fees and not
cause more harm than good.”24 The
Mendez court explicitly acknowledged that
the automatic stay would have been terminated by section 362(c)(2)(A) but for
boost the Debtor’s cash flow by avoiding quarterly fees.”);
In re Necaise, 443 B.R. 483, 493-
94 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2010) (holding an individual Chapter 11 debtor may close their
bankruptcy case subject to it being re-opened after the completion of plan payments in order
for the Debtor to request entry of a discharge order);
In re Johnson, 402 B.R. 851, 857-58
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009) (holding that considering a lack of any objections from creditors, an
individual Chapter 11 debtor may close their bankruptcy case prior to discharge to avoid
paying quarterly fees to the U.S. Trustee).
21
See, e.g., In re Houlik, 481 B.R. 661, 669-70 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012) (finding the automatic
stay terminated under § 362(c) when the case was closed for administrative purposes);
accord
In re Mendez, 464 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011);
In re Kerley, 2011 WL 5330667, at *2;
9A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3022.04 (16th ed. 2025) (“Some courts have observed that closing
a chapter 11 case is a mere administrative act. There are, however, several consequences of
case closure that should be kept in mind. First, closure terminates the automatic stay. . ..”).
22
In re Houlik, 481 B.R. at 669-70.
23
In re Mendez, 464 B.R. at 66.
24
Id.
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the additional court-issued order continuing the stay under section 105(a).25
No such affirmative grant of a court-ordered stay was requested here or
ordered by the Court.
Finally, 	the 	debtor 	argues 	that 	the 	stay 	was 	preserved 	by 	the
Confirmation 	Order 	and 	Closing 	Order.26 	But 	neither 	of 	those 	orders
referenced the automatic stay, let alone contained an affirmative ruling that
the stay would remain in effect. 	In the Closing Order, the Court did “retain
jurisdiction 	over 	the 	Debtor 	with 	respect 	to 	. 	. 	. 	any 	other 	matters 	of
administration which have not yet been resolved by the Bankruptcy Court or
otherwise concluded.”27 But a retention of jurisdiction is not a preservation of
the stay. 	Courts always have the power to enforce their own orders,28 and a
retention of jurisdiction confirms that this Court may continue to interpret and
enforce the Confirmation Order.29 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that bankruptcy courts retain subject matter jurisdiction
to protect a debtor’s rights under the Bankruptcy Code after a bankruptcy case
is closed, but this principle has never been interpreted to expand the automatic
25
Id.
26 (Dkt. ## 114, 130).
27 (Dkt. # 130, p. 2).
28
In re RE Palm Springs II, L.L.C., 106 F.4th 406, 413 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Federal courts have
the ‘unquestionable power to enforce [their] own decrees.’”) (quoting
Vikas WSP, Ltd. v. Econ.
Mud Prods. Co., 23 F.4th 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2022)).
29 (Dkt. # 114).
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stay beyond closure.30 Such a rule would arguably leave the automatic stay in
effect for perpetuity. 	That is not the purpose of the stay, it is the purpose of
the discharge injunction31—which the debtor never sought nor obtained.
V. CONCLUSION
The plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) and supporting case law make
clear that termination of the automatic stay is triggered by the earliest time
the case is closed, dismissed, or when a discharge is granted or denied.32 The
Joint Stipulation of Facts33 show the case closing was the earliest trigger to
occur, so the automatic stay terminated when debtor’s case was closed on
December 16, 2014.34 	The IRS cannot be sanctioned for the collection actions
between October 2019 and June 2024 because the automatic stay was no longer
in effect.35 Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, 	ADJUDGED, 	and 	DECREED 	that 	the
	United 	States’
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART in that the automatic
stay terminated when the bankruptcy case closed, and the IRS cannot be
sanctioned for the collection actions between October 2019 and June 2024. The
30
See In re Burch, 835 F. App’x 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2021);
In re Galaz, 841 F.3d 316, 322 (5th
Cir. 2016);
In re Craig’s Stores of Tex., Inc., 266 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2001);
In re Bradley,
989 F.2d 802, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1993).
31
See In re Coho Res., Inc., 345 F.3d 338, 343-44 n.16 (5th Cir. 2003).
32 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(A)-(C).
33 (Dkt. # 197).
34
Id.
35
In re Houlik, 481 B.R. at 669-70 (“Thus, any stay of actions against the [debtors] terminated
when their case was closed. . ..”).
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Debtor’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. A status conference will
be SCHEDULED by separate order to discuss any remaining issues in this
adversary proceeding.
##END OF ORDER##
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