Sharon Annette Reid

1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
Sharon Annette Reid, 	) 	Chapter 7
) 	Case No. 25-10566
)
Debtor. 	)
___________________________________)
ORDER DETERMINING THAT MODERN RENT TO OWN VIOLATED THE AUTOMATIC
STAY AND AWARDING DAMAGES UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)
This 	case 	came 	before 	the 	Court 	for 	hearing 	on 	December 	9,
2025, 	on 	the 	motion 	for 	sanctions 	against 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	for
violations 	of 	the 	automatic 	stay 	filed 	by 	Sharon 	Annette 	Reid
(“Debtor”) 	on 	November 	10, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	49.1 	At 	the 	hearing,
Debtor 	and 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Administrator, 	John 	Paul 	Cournoyer,
1 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(1) provides that service may be made within the
United States by first class mail postage prepaid to “an individual . . . by
mailing the copy to the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode or where
the individual regularly conducts a business or profession.” 	Fed. R. Bankr. P.
7004(b)(1). 	The Contract identifies the lessor by the name and at the address
upon which the Debtor served, and because Modern Rent to Own appears to be doing
business as a sole proprietorship, service upon the place “where the individual
regularly conducts business” was proper under Rule 7004(b)(1).
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 15th day of January, 2026.
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appeared.2 	Debtor 	is 	proceeding 	pro 	se.3 	At 	the 	hearing, 	Debtor
presented unrebutted evidence showing that the automatic stay was
violated by Modern Rent to Own, and that these violations continued
with 	knowledge 	of 	Debtor’s 	bankruptcy, 	constituting 	willful
violations 	of 	the 	automatic 	stay, 	and 	that 	Debtor 	was 	injured 	as
a 	result. 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
Debtor has met her burden and is entitled to nominal and punitive
damages 	against 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	362 	and
Debtor’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The 	pleadings 	and 	testimony 	presented 	at 	the 	hearing
established 	the 	following 	facts. 	Debtor 	filed 	a 	petition 	under
chapter 7 of title 11 on September 2, 2025. 	ECF No. 1. 	Debtor’s
Schedule 	G 	lists 	lease-purchase 	agreements 	for 	one 	dinette 	table
and 	chairs, 	one 	couch 	and 	loveseat, 	one 	bedroom 	suite, 	and 	one
laptop, 	with 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own, 	located 	at 	407 	W 	Meadowview 	St.
Greensboro, 	N.C. 	ECF 	No. 	39, 	at 	11 	(the 	“Personal 	Property”).4
Debtor testified at the hearing that as of the petition date, she
2 An individual identifying himself as Will Cowper, store manager for Greensboro
Modern Rent to Own also attended the hearing. 	Mr. Cowper stated that Modern
Rent to Own is a sole proprietorship owned by Carlo Bargiogli. 	ECF No. 69, at
00:06:23-00:08:30. 	Mr. Cowper is neither the proprietor of Modern Rent to Own,
nor an attorney licensed to practice law. 	As such, he was not permitted to
represent Modern Rent to Own or Mr. Bargiogli at the hearing.
3 The Court must construe filings by pro se litigants liberally. 	See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
4 Modern Rent to Own is not registered to do business in North Carolina, and is
not a registered d/b/a.
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was 	current 	on 	these 	agreements 	(the 	“Contracts”). 	Ex. 	B. 	On
September 5, 2025, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center served a notice
regarding the No Proof of Claim Deadline on Modern Rent to Own at
the 	address 	listed 	on 	Debtor’s 	Schedule 	G. 	ECF 	No. 	15. 	Shortly
after 	the 	bankruptcy 	filing 	Debtor 	began 	receiving 	phone 	calls
from Modern Rent to Own. 	ECF No. 49, at 1. 	At the hearing, Debtor
testified 	that 	between 	the 	petition 	date 	and 	the 	date 	of 	the
hearing, Debtor received over one hundred voice calls from Modern
Rent to Own attempting to recover on Debtor’s prepetition debt or
repossess the Personal Property, at a rate of three to five phone
calls per day; and, that these phone calls were so consistent that
Debtor had no more space available to receive voicemails. 	ECF No.
69, at 00:10:44-00:11:06. 	Debtor also explained that she received
over fifty text messages. 	Id. at 00:11:06-00:11:20; see also Ex.
A.5 	As 	a 	result 	of 	these 	nonstop 	phone 	calls, 	Debtor 	testified
that 	she 	missed 	reminders 	and 	phone 	calls 	from 	doctors’ 	offices,
and importantly that, because she takes on childcare for additional
income and because she receives notice of this work by way of her
phone, 	she 	missed 	opportunities 	to 	work 	as 	a 	result 	of 	her 	full
voicemail. 	ECF 	No. 	70, 	at 	00:03:00-00:04:00. 	Debtor 	was 	also
distraught 	that 	these 	phone 	calls 	persisted 	even 	after 	she
5 The text messages follow the same format and appear to be automated; the texts
include the amount due, the number of days the debt was past due, and include
a link to pay for any past due debt. 	Ex. A.
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explained 	to 	a 	representative 	of 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	that 	she 	had
filed for bankruptcy. 	Id. at 00:01:00-00:02:00. 	Debtor testified
to 	the 	emotional 	and 	physical 	toll 	that 	these 	consistent 	and
“harassing” 	phone 	calls 	took 	on 	her. 	Id. 	at 	00:03:00-00:04:00;
ECF No. 71, at 00:00:00-00:01:30.
On October 31, 2025, Debtor testified that she spoke directly
with a representative of Modern Rent to Own and indicated that she
had 	filed 	a 	case 	under 	chapter 	7 	of 	title 	11. 	ECF 	No. 	69, 	at
00:11:25-00:12:10. 	The representative explained that even if the
Debtor had filed for bankruptcy, his job was to continuously call
anyone 	whose 	account 	was 	not 	current, 	including 	Debtor. 	ECF 	No.
70, 	at 	00:11:30-00:12:00. 	The 	employee 	directed 	Debtor 	to 	email
documentation of her bankruptcy to the store at Store125@mrto.com
and to speak to someone in management. 	Id. at 00:12:10-00:12:22.
Debtor testified that she emailed the store at the email above and
that 	she 	called 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	to 	speak 	with 	the 	store’s
manager the following day. 	Id. at 00:12:22-00:12:30. 	On November
6, 	2025, 	Debtor 	spoke 	with 	Will 	Cowper, 	store 	manager 	for
Greensboro Modern Rent to Own, and informed him personally of the
pending bankruptcy proceeding. 	Id. at 00:12:50-00:13:20. 	Cowper
indicated that the store had received notice of Debtor’s bankruptcy
proceeding, 	nevertheless 	he 	had 	spoken 	with 	another 	manager 	who
informed him that the automatic stay did not apply to Modern Rent
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to Own.6 	Id. at 00:13:15-00:13:50. 	Debtor argues that Modern Rent
to Own violated the automatic stay, and that the violations caused
her damages that were sufficiently egregious to support a finding
of 	punitive 	damages 	under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 362(k)(1). 	Modern 	Rent 	to
Own did not appear at the properly noticed hearing, or otherwise,
and presented no fact or argument on its behalf.
DISCUSSION
Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	had 	knowledge 	of 	Debtor’s 	bankruptcy 	and
Debtor’s 	possessory 	interest 	in 	the 	items 	subject 	to 	the 	lease-
purchase 	agreement. 	Therefore, 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	repeatedly
violated the automatic stay by calling and texting with knowledge
of 	Debtor’s 	bankruptcy. 	The 	number 	of 	calls 	and 	texts 	were
excessive and intentionally harassing. 	For the reasons discussed
below, 	these 	actions 	were 	sufficiently 	willful, 	and 	Debtor 	is
entitled to recover damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
The 	automatic 	stay 	is 	the 	fundamental 	protection 	given 	to
debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.7 	It provides a debtor with the
necessary 	breathing 	room 	to 	operate 	and 	function 	without
harassment 	or 	fear 	of 	losing 	property 	while 	organizing 	an
overwhelming amount of debt. 	See In re Weatherford, 413 B.R. 273,
283 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2009). 	The filing of a petition under 11 U.S.C.
6 Neither Carlo Bargiogli [owner of Modern Rent to Own], nor counsel for Mr.
Bargiogli or Rent to Own appeared at the hearing.
7 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
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§ 	301 	“operates 	as 	a 	stay, 	applicable 	to 	all 	entities, 	of 	. 	. 	.
any 	act 	to 	obtain 	possession 	of 	property 	of 	the 	estate 	or 	of
property 	from 	the 	estate 	or 	to 	exercise 	control 	over 	property 	of
the 	estate; 	[and] 	any 	act 	to 	collect, 	assess, 	or 	recover 	a 	claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
. 	. 	. 	.” 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	362(a)(3), 	(6). 	Even 	a 	debtor’s 	mere
possessory 	interest, 	absent 	any 	legal 	interest, 	is 	protected 	by
the 	automatic 	stay. 	In 	re 	Salov, 	510 	B.R. 	720, 	729 	(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 	2014) 	(collecting 	cases). 	To 	enforce 	that 	fundamental
protection, 	§ 	362(k)(1) 	provides 	that 	“an 	individual 	injured 	by
any willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual damages,
including 	costs 	and 	attorneys’ 	fees, 	and, 	in 	appropriate
circumstances, 	may 	recover 	punitive 	damages.” 	11 	U.S.C. 	§
362(k)(1). 	To 	establish 	a 	claim 	under 	§ 	362(k)(1), 	the 	moving
party must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the
creditor 	violated 	the 	automatic 	stay; 	(2) 	the 	violation 	of 	the
stay was willful; and (3) the willful violation caused the debtor
some injury. 	Cf. In re Clayton, 235 B.R. 801, 806 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
1998) 	(discussing 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	362(h), 	amended 	by, 	11 	U.S.C. 	§
362(k)(1) 	(Pub. 	L. 	No. 	109-8)). 	For 	an 	act 	to 	be 	willful, 	“the
creditor need not act with specific intent but must only commit an
intentional 	act 	with 	knowledge 	of 	the 	automatic 	stay.” 	In 	re
Ennis, No. 14-02188-5-SWH, 2015 WL 6555392, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
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Oct. 28, 2015) (quoting In re Strumpf, 37 F.3d 155, 159 (4th Cir.
1994), rev’d on other grounds, 516 U.S. 16 (1995)).
I. 	Modern Rent to Own had actual knowledge of Debtor’s bankruptcy
case and willfully violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362.
The 	postpetition 	sending 	of 	invoices 	or 	attempts 	to 	collect
or repossess on a prepetition debt is a violation of the automatic
stay. 	In re Lyle, 662 B.R. 229, 234 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2024) (citing
In 	re 	Robinson, 	No. 	06-10618-SSM, 	2008 	WL 	4526183, 	at 	*3 	(Bankr.
E.D. 	Va. 	Sept. 	29, 	2008). 	“[N]umerous 	courts 	have 	found 	that
sending bills for prepetition debts, even without threats to sue,
is a violation of the automatic stay.” 	Robinson, 2008 WL 4526183,
at 	*3. 	Given 	the 	broadness 	of 	the 	automatic 	stay, 	“[a]s 	a
practical 	matter, 	the 	stay 	will, 	in 	most 	situations, 	enjoin 	a
creditor 	from 	sending 	letters 	and 	other 	correspondences 	to 	the
debtor.” 	In re McCarthy, 421 B.R. 550, 565 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009).
Communications 	intended 	to 	collect, 	assess 	or 	recover 	a 	claim
against 	a 	debtor 	amount 	to 	willful 	violations 	once 	a 	creditor
learns, 	or 	is 	otherwise 	put 	on 	notice, 	of 	debtor’s 	bankruptcy
filing; similar intentional actions taken thereafter are “willful”
violations of the stay under § 362(k), Lyle, 662 B.R. at 235, and
a 	good 	faith 	mistake 	of 	law 	or 	fact, 	as 	to 	the 	effect 	of 	the
automatic stay, will not shield a creditor who willfully violates
it. 	See Clayton, 235 B.R. at 808 (concluding that “[k]nowledge of
the existence of an active bankruptcy case need not be communicated
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through 	formal 	notification 	of 	the 	filing 	of 	a 	petition”); 	see
also In re Hamrick, 175 B.R. 890, 893 (W.D.N.C. 1994) (explaining
that 	a 	willful 	violation 	occurs 	when 	“‘[t]here 	is 	ample 	evidence
in 	the 	record 	to 	support 	the 	conclusion 	that 	[the 	creditor] 	knew
of 	the 	pending 	petition 	and 	intentionally 	attempted 	to 	[continue
collection procedures] in spite of it.’” (alterations in original)
(quoting 	Budget 	Serv. 	Co. 	v. 	Better 	Homes 	of 	Virginia, 	Inc., 	804
F.2d 289, 292-93 (4th Cir. 1986))).
Upon 	the 	commencement 	of 	the 	case, 	Debtor 	had 	a 	possessory
interest in the Personal Property, and that interest is protected
by 	the 	automatic 	stay. 	See 	Salov, 	510 	B.R. 	at 	729. 	Modern 	Rent
to Own’s repeated phone calls and text messages were in violation
of 	the 	automatic 	stay. 	See 	Robinson, 	2008 	WL 	4526183, 	at 	* 	3.
Debtor 	credibly 	testified 	that, 	shortly 	after 	the 	petition 	date,
Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	began 	its 	harassing 	phone 	calls, 	and 	that 	the
demands 	for 	payment 	by 	Rent 	to 	Own 	in 	each 	of 	these 	phone 	calls
made 	clear 	to 	Debtor 	that 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	was 	attempting 	to
collect 	a 	debt 	under 	the 	prepetition 	lease 	directly 	from 	Debtor.
Debtor’s unrebutted testimony and the record8 indicate that Modern
8 On September 5, 2025, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center served a notice regarding
the No Proof of Claim Deadline on Modern Rent to Own at the address listed on
Debtor’s schedule G. 	ECF No. 15.
“Proof that a letter properly directed was placed in a post office
creates a presumption that it reached its destination in usual time
and was actually received by the person to whom it was addressed.”
Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed.
861 (1932); see also Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.11 (16th Ed. 2014)
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Rent to Own received notice of the commencement of the bankruptcy
case 	such 	that 	these 	violations 	were 	willful. 	Debtor 	testified
that 	on 	at 	least 	four 	occasions–September 	5, 	2025; 	October 	31,
2025; 	November 	1, 	2025; 	and 	November 	6, 	2025–she 	provided 	actual
notice of her bankruptcy case to representatives of Modern Rent to
Own, and that the representatives acknowledged that Modern Rent to
Own 	was 	independently 	aware 	of 	Debtor’s 	bankruptcy. 	See 	ECF 	No.
69, 00:12:22-00:13:20. 	The rate of these repeated calls and texts
were 	harassing, 	and 	when 	considered 	in 	light 	of 	the 	fact 	that
Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	indicated 	it 	was 	aware 	of 	Debtor’s 	bankruptcy
and only attempted to recover the property after weeks of repeated
notices, 	these 	calls 	sufficiently 	establish 	that 	Modern 	Rent 	to
Own 	did 	not 	intend 	to 	collect 	the 	property, 	but 	instead 	intended
to 	coerce 	and 	harass 	the 	Debtor 	to 	pay 	a 	prepetition 	debt.9
(noting 	that 	courts 	have 	held 	that 	“Rule 	9006(e) 	creates 	a
rebuttable presumption that the paper mailed was received by the
party to whom it was sent”). 	“This presumption may only be overcome
by evidence that the mailing was not actually accomplished and the
mere denial of receipt is insufficient.” 	In re Warren, 532 B.R.
655, 662 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2015).
In re Franklin, 614 B.R. 534, 545 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2020).
9 In this case, the chapter 7 trustee did not move to assume or reject the lease
for the Personal Property under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) and thus the lease was
deemed rejected as of November 1, 2025. 	A rejection is treated as a breach of
the 	lease 	that 	took 	place 	immediately 	prior 	to 	filing 	of 	the 	bankruptcy
petition. 	See In re Miller, 247 B.R. 224, 226 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.), aff'd sub
nom. Chateau Communities, Inc. v. Miller, 252 B.R. 121 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff'd
sub nom. In re Miller, 282 F.3d 874 (6th Cir. 2002), and aff'd sub nom. In re
Miller, 282 F.3d 874 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 365.09[1],
at 	365–72 	(Lawrence 	P. 	King 	ed., 	15th 	ed., 	1999)). 	As 	this 	is 	a 	no 	asset
chapter 	7 	case, 	the 	Personal 	Property 	was 	not 	necessary 	for 	Debtors’
reorganization and any rejection gave rise to a prepetition claim for damages
to Modern Rent to Own as an unsecured creditor. 	11 U.S.C. § 365(g). 	Each text
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Moreover, 	accompanying 	the 	repeated 	demands 	for 	payment 	and
notices 	of 	default, 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	stated 	to 	Debtor 	that 	it
intended 	to 	schedule 	a 	pickup 	of 	the 	Personal 	Property. 	Id. 	at
00:13:50-00:14:05. 	These circumstances indicate a willful effort
to 	induce 	Debtor 	to 	pay 	a 	prepetition 	obligation, 	or 	to 	exercise
control over property of the estate. 	A mistake of law or fact as
to what constitutes property of the estate, and by extension what
interests 	are 	protected 	by 	the 	automatic 	stay, 	does 	not 	excuse 	a
violation. 	Hamrick, 	175 	at 	893.10 	These 	actions 	taken 	together
message Debtor received was intended to induce repayment under the terms of the
Contracts; 	each 	text 	message 	included 	the 	amount 	owed, 	the 	number 	of 	days
payment was late, and a method by which Debtor could repay the debt. 	See Ex.
B. 	Thus, the messages and their context in this case establish by unrebutted
evidence that Modern Rent to Own was not simply threatening mere repossession
of its collateral if the lease payments were not made but further was attempting
to coerce Debtor to pay a pre-petition obligation. 	As such, these actions also
were in violation of the automatic stay. 	11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6); see In re
McCarthy, 421 B.R. 550, 567 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009) (finding a violation of the
stay where a single phone call and letter to the debtor were intended to coerce
the debtor to pay a prepetition debt and therefore violated the automatic stay).
10 As explained in Franklin:
In Taggart v. Lorenzen, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1795, 1802, 204
L.Ed.2d 129 (2019), the Court determined that mere knowledge of the
discharge 	order 	and 	the 	undertaking 	of 	an 	intentional 	act 	in
violation 	of 	the 	discharge 	injunction 	were 	insufficient 	to
establish 	contempt 	under 	§§ 	105(a) 	and 	524. 	Nevertheless, 	a
creditor's subjective belief that its conduct was not contemptuous
will not shield it from liability if that belief was not objectively
reasonable. 	Id. 	Therefore, 	a 	creditor 	will 	not 	be 	liable 	for
contempt 	of 	the 	discharge 	injunction 	if 	it 	were 	“objectively
reasonable” 	for 	a 	creditor 	to 	believe 	that 	such 	actions 	did 	not
violate the court's order. 	Id.
Franklin, 614 B.R. at 546 n.19. 	Some courts have held that the Taggart standard
applies 	to 	requests 	for 	contempt 	sanctions 	for 	a 	willful 	violation 	of 	the
automatic 	stay. 	See, 	e.g., 	In 	re 	Moo 	Jeong, 	No. 	6:19-BK-10728-WJ, 	2020 	WL
1277575, at *6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2020); cf. Franklin, 614 B.R. at 546
n.19 	(“the 	Court 	in Taggart expressly 	did 	not 	reverse 	the 	prior 	settled 	law
enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in cases such as Budget Serv. Co., and courts
should 	not 	extrapolate 	from 	Supreme 	Court 	opinions 	in 	a 	manner 	that 	is
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demonstrate Modern Rent to Own’s willful violation of the automatic
stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (k).
II. 	Debtor 	was 	injured 	by 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own’s 	violation 	of 	the
automatic stay and is entitled to damages.
Having determined that willfully violated the automatic stay,
the Court will consider whether Debtor “suffered some compensable
injury 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the 	violation.” 	In 	re 	Preston, 	333 	B.R.
346, 	350 	(Bankr. 	M.D.N.C. 	2005). 	Section 	362(k)(1) 	permits 	a
debtor to recover actual damages when a creditor willfully violated
the automatic stay. 	11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (“an individual injured
by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall
recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and,
in 	appropriate 	circumstances, 	may 	recover 	punitive 	damages”);
Franklin, 	614 	B.R. 	at 	548 	(“[t]he 	Court 	has 	no 	discretion 	to
withhold 	an 	award 	of 	compensatory 	damages, 	including 	costs 	and
attorneys’ 	fees, 	when 	the 	automatic 	stay 	is 	willfully 	violated”)
(citation 	omitted). 	The 	burden 	is 	on 	the 	debtor 	to 	establish
damages by a preponderance of the evidence, and the award “must be
founded 	on 	concrete, 	non-speculative 	evidence.” 	In 	re 	Ojiegbe,
539 B.R. 474, 479 (Bankr. D. Md. 2015) (quoting In re Seaton, 462
B.R. 582, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011)).
inconsistent with settled circuit law”). 	In this case, even if the Taggart
standard applies, it was not “objectively reasonable” for Modern Rent to Own to
believe that its repeated and harassing postpetition collection efforts did not
violate the automatic stay.
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a. Actual and Compensatory Damages
Debtor 	requests 	that 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	pay 	the 	costs 	of
filing 	and 	serving 	this 	motion, 	including 	transportations 	costs,
among other things. 	ECF No. 49, at 4. 	As this Court has previously
explained “actual damages” is a broad umbrella term including, but
not 	limited 	to, 	lost 	time 	damages, 	out-of-pocket 	expenses, 	and
emotional damages. 	Franklin, 614 B.R. at 548; see also Skillforce,
Inc. 	v. 	Hafer, 	509 	B.R. 	523, 	534 	(E.D. 	Va. 	2014). 	Even 	absent
concrete 	actual 	damages, 	a 	court 	may 	still 	award 	nominal 	damages
for 	concrete 	but 	unspecified 	injuries 	resulting 	from 	a 	violation
of the stay. 	See, e.g., Lyle, 662 B.R. at 237 (granting $25.00 in
nominal 	damages 	for 	each 	invoice 	making 	a 	demand 	on 	the 	debtor’s
bankruptcy estate and $75.00 in damages for travel costs). 	At the
hearing, 	Debtor 	presented 	unrebutted 	evidence 	that 	the 	constant
phone calls from Modern Rent to Own left Debtor unable to receive
voicemails 	and 	were 	so 	constant 	that 	she 	missed 	opportunities 	to
work as a result. 	ECF No. 70, at 00:03:00-00:04:00. 	Debtor also
testified that Modern Rent to Own’s collection efforts and attempts
at 	repossession 	caused 	her 	significant 	mental 	anguish 	that 	made
effectively 	administering 	her 	case 	difficult. 	ECF 	No. 	69, 	at
00:03:00-00:04:00; 	ECF 	No. 	71, 	at 	00:00:00-00:01:30. 	Although
this 	distress 	was 	evident 	based 	on 	Debtor’s 	testimony 	at 	the
hearing, 	Debtor 	did 	not 	provide 	any 	specific 	evidence 	as 	to
emotional 	distress 	damages. 	It 	is 	likely 	that 	Debtor’s 	actual
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damages 	are 	more 	significant 	than 	the 	evidence 	presented 	at 	the
hearing 	given 	the 	unrelenting 	efforts 	of 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	to
repossess 	the 	Personal 	Property, 	the 	cost 	of 	transportation 	to
court 	to 	litigate 	the 	instant 	motion, 	and 	service 	costs, 	among
other 	things. 	Nevertheless, 	there 	is 	insufficient 	evidence 	to
specifically 	quantify 	compensatory 	damages 	to 	ameliorate 	these
harms, 	as 	such 	the 	Court 	will 	grant 	nominal 	damages 	to 	Debtor 	in
the 	amount 	of 	$1.00 	as 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own’s 	collection 	efforts
interfered with Debtor’s ability to access her voicemail, schedule
opportunities 	to 	work, 	and 	made 	the 	Debtor 	miss 	important
notifications 	and 	reminders 	from 	Debtor’s 	doctor’s 	office. 	ECF
No. 69, at 00:10:44-00:11:06.
b. Punitive Damages
Debtor 	also 	requests 	an 	award 	of 	undetermined 	punitive
damages for Modern Rent to Own’s intentional misconduct. 	ECF No.
49, at 4. 	Punitive damages are awarded where a creditor’s conduct
rises 	to 	the 	level 	of 	“‘egregious, 	vindictive 	or 	intentional
misconduct.’” 	Lyle, 662 B.R. at 238 (quoting Clayton, 235 B.R. at
811). 	“Punitive 	damages 	are 	appropriate 	where 	the 	creditor’s
actions 	‘demonstrate 	a 	disdain 	for 	the 	financially 	vulnerable
customers 	it 	purports 	to 	serve 	and 	an 	utter 	disregard 	for 	the
automatic 	stay.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Franklin, 	614 	B.R. 	at 	542; 	see
also 	In 	re 	Johnson, 	No. 	15-50053, 	2016 	WL 	659020, 	at 	*5 	(Bankr.
W.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2016) (awarding punitive damages of $100.00 per
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phone 	call 	for 	540 	phone 	calls 	made 	to 	the 	debtors 	over 	a 	six-
month period in violation of the automatic stay, for a total award
of 	$54,000.00); 	cf. 	Lyle, 	662 	B.R. 	at 	238 	(declining 	to 	award
punitive 	damages 	where 	the 	creditor’s 	communications 	did 	not
“support 	a 	finding 	of 	callous 	disregard 	for 	the 	stay”). 	Thus,
punitive 	damages 	are 	appropriate 	where 	a 	creditor 	has 	acted 	with
“‘actual knowledge’ that it was ‘violating [a] federally protected
right 	or 	with 	reckless 	disregard 	of 	whether 	he 	was 	doing 	so.’”
Franklin, 614 B.R. at 549 (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jones,
391 B.R. 577, 608 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2008)).
Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own’s 	conduct 	in 	this 	case 	was 	in 	reckless
disregard of the stay and warrants punitive damages. 	According to
Debtor’s 	testimony, 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	received 	at 	least 	four
notices 	of 	Debtor’s 	bankruptcy, 	with 	the 	first 	notice 	served 	on
September 9, 2025. 	ECF No. 15. 	The collection attempts persisted
even 	after 	Debtor 	specifically 	informed 	a 	representative 	and
Cowper of her case and Modern Rent to Own was entirely dismissive
of Debtor’s filing. 	Since the petition date, Debtor has received
over 	100 	phone 	calls 	at 	a 	rate 	of 	three 	to 	five 	calls 	per 	day,
leaving 	her 	voicemail 	constantly 	full. 	ECF 	No. 	69, 	at 	00:10:44-
00:11:06. 	Because 	these 	actions 	persisted 	despite 	receiving
notice 	of 	the 	bankruptcy 	filing, 	these 	actions 	demonstrate 	a
reckless 	disregard 	for 	the 	automatic 	stay. 	As 	such, 	the 	Court
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will 	impose 	punitive 	damages. 	In 	Franklin, 	the 	court 	explained
that:
When 	determining 	the 	appropriate 	amount 	of 	punitive
damages, 	courts 	“aim 	at 	‘deterrence 	and 	retribution.’”
Charity 	v. 	NC 	Fin'l 	Solutions 	of 	Utah, 	LLC 	(In 	re
Charity), 	Case 	No. 	16-31974-KLP, 	Adv. 	P. 	No. 	16-03121-
KLP, 2017 WL 3580173, at *18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. August 15,
2017) (quoting Saunders v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C.,
469 	F.Supp.2d 	343, 	348 	(E.D. 	Va. 	2007), aff'd 	sub
nom. Saunders v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. of Va., 526
F.3d 	142 	(4th 	Cir. 	2008)). 	In 	taking 	aim 	at 	these
purposes, courts should consider “three guideposts”: (1)
“the 	degree 	of 	reprehensibility” 	of 	the 	creditor's
conduct; 	(2) 	“the 	ratio 	between 	punitive 	and
compensatory 	damages”; 	and 	(3) 	the 	amount 	of 	punitive
damages awarded in other comparable cases as compared to
the 	actual 	damages 	suffered 	in 	such 	cases. 	Charity,
2017 	WL 	3580173, 	at 	*18. 	The 	reprehensibility 	of 	the
creditor’s 	conduct 	is 	assessed 	in 	light 	of 	evidence 	of
the 	creditor’s 	“‘indifference 	to 	or 	[] 	reckless
disregard’ for the rights of others, whether the target
of 	the 	conduct 	was 	financially 	vulnerable 	and 	whether
the 	conduct 	involved 	repeated 	actions.” 	Id. 	at 	*19
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003)).
Where actual damages are low, the ratio of actual damages
to 	punitive 	damages 	“has 	less 	significance” 	because 	a
simple 	multiple 	of 	actual 	damages 	“‘would 	utterly 	fail
to serve the traditional purposes underlying an award of
punitive damages, which are to punish and deter.’” 	Id.
(quoting Saunders, 526 F.3d at 154). 	The amount awarded
should 	deter 	both 	the 	creditor 	and 	others, 	and 	should
motivate the creditor “to devote the resources necessary
to 	correct 	the 	deficiencies 	in 	its 	bankruptcy
procedures.” 	Id. at *20.
In re Franklin, 614 B.R. at 549-50.
Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own’s 	conduct 	was 	repetitive 	and 	reckless
justifying 	a 	moderate 	damage 	award 	under 	the 	first 	guidepost.
Because 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	continued 	to 	attempt 	collection 	of
Debtor’s 	pre-petition 	obligation 	dozens 	of 	times 	outside 	the
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Bankruptcy 	Court 	despite 	its 	knowledge 	of 	the 	bankruptcy, 	these
actions were taken with a reckless disregard to the automatic stay.
Modern Rent to Own did not appear at the properly noticed hearing
and 	provided 	no 	explanation 	as 	to 	why 	these 	actions 	continued,
further 	demonstrating 	its 	cavalier 	attitude 	toward 	the 	automatic
stay 	and 	the 	authority 	of 	this 	Court. 	Debtor 	has 	health 	issues,
cares 	for 	her 	grandchild, 	and 	struggles 	with 	little 	household
income. 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own’s 	actions 	are 	consistent 	with 	the
callousness 	necessary 	to 	support 	a 	moderate 	award 	of 	punitive
damages under the first guidepost.
Actual 	damages 	awarded 	in 	this 	case 	are 	low, 	not 	because 	of
the 	actual 	damages 	were 	minimal, 	but 	because 	Debtor 	as 	an
unrepresented 	party 	failed 	to 	sufficiently 	quantify 	the
significant 	effects 	of 	the 	harassment. 	Thus, 	limiting 	punitive
damages 	to 	any 	multiple 	of 	actual 	damages 	in 	this 	instance 	would
fail to serve the purposes for imposing punitive damages, and the
Court will give this guidepost less weight.
Courts have awarded significant punitive damages where actual
damages 	were 	small, 	and 	when 	circumstances 	demonstrate 	that
creditors 	“‘simply 	ignored 	the 	automatic 	stay.’” 	Franklin, 	614
B.R. 	at 	550 	(quoting 	In 	re 	Johnson, 	2016 	WL 	659020, 	at 	*5); 	see
also 	Charity, 	2017 	WL 	3580173, 	at 	*20. 	For 	example, 	in 	Johnson,
the debtors were awarded $54,000.00 in punitive damages calculated
at 	$100.00 	per 	phone 	call 	for 	540 	calls 	made 	to 	debtors 	over 	a
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six-month 	period 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	automatic 	stay. 	2016 	WL
659020, 	at 	*5. 	In 	In 	re 	Burns, 	the 	Court 	awarded 	$2,500.00 	in
punitive 	damages, 	and 	$35,711.78 	in 	total 	damages, 	where 	the
creditor 	continued 	making 	phone 	calls 	to 	the 	debtor 	about 	her
delinquent 	account, 	the 	debtor 	warned 	the 	creditor 	about 	her
pending 	bankruptcy, 	and 	the 	creditor 	chose 	to 	move 	forward 	with
repossession 	despite 	those 	warnings. 	503 	B.R. 	666, 	680 	(Bankr.
S.D. Miss. 2013).
In this case, Debtor seeks an award of punitive damages in an
unspecified amount to deter Modern Rent to Own’s collection efforts
in 	the 	future 	given 	the 	harassing 	collection 	methods 	employed 	by
Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	in 	this 	instance. 	The 	Court 	does 	not 	have
precise evidence as to how many phone calls or text messages were
received 	by 	the 	Debtor 	after 	notice 	was 	received 	of 	Debtor’s
filing. 	But, 	Debtor 	credibly 	testified 	that 	these 	phone 	calls
were 	received 	at 	a 	rate 	of 	three 	to 	five 	calls 	per 	day, 	ECF 	No.
69, 	at 	00:10:44-00:11:06, 	meaning 	that, 	in 	addition 	to 	numerous
text 	messages, 	Debtor 	received 	approximately 	one 	hundred 	phone
calls 	from 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	between 	September 	9, 	2025, 	the 	day
on 	which 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Noticing 	Center 	mailed 	the 	No 	Proof 	of
Claim 	Deadline 	to 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own, 	and 	November 	10, 	2025, 	the
day she filed the instant motion. 	ECF No. 49. 	Moreover, Debtor’s
conversation with the representative on October 31, 2025, suggests
that it is Modern Rent to Own’s policy to contact anyone behind on
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their 	payments 	even 	if 	they 	have 	filed 	for 	bankruptcy. 	ECF 	No.
70, at 00:12:40-00:13:00. 	Having considered Modern Rent to Own’s
conduct as set forth herein, and in consideration of the guideposts
set forth by the Supreme Court and other courts for determinations
of punitive damages under § 362(k), this Court will impose punitive
damages 	of 	$5,000.00 	for 	the 	phone 	calls, 	messages, 	and 	other
reckless and harassing actions by Modern Rent to 	Own.11 	A lesser
amount 	would 	be 	insufficient 	to 	deter 	Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own’s
persistent practices given the conduct outlined herein.
NOW, 	THEREFORE, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED, 	ADJUDGED, 	and 	DECREED
as follows:
1. 	Debtor is awarded actual damages in the amount of $1.00
against Modern Rent to Own as compensatory damages.
2. 	Debtor 	is 	awarded 	punitive 	damages 	against 	Modern 	Rent
to Own in the amount of $5,000.00.
3. 	Within 	seven 	(7) 	business 	days 	of 	the 	entry 	of 	this
Order, Debtor is directed to serve a copy of this Order by United
States mail to Modern Rent to Own at the business address.
11 The total amount of damages is twice the amount Debtor allegedly owes on the
underlying 	contractual 	obligations; 	the 	Court 	considered 	these 	amounts 	when
assessing the punitive damage awards because the actual damages in this case
were failed to provide a meaningful guidepost. 	See Franklin, 614 B.R. at 552
n.24. 	(explaining 	that 	maintaining 	a 	reasonable 	ratio 	between 	the 	punitive
damages imposed and the underlying debt may provide for an appropriate guidepost
where 	a 	ratio 	to 	actual 	damages 	would 	otherwise 	unreasonably 	undermine 	the
Court’s ability to impose punitive damages).
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4. 	Within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this Order,
Modern 	Rent 	to 	Own 	is 	DIRECTED 	and 	REQUIRED 	to 	pay 	$5,001.00 	to
Debtor.
5. 	The Court retains full and continuing jurisdiction over
the interpretation and enforcement of this Order, notwithstanding
any dismissal of the bankruptcy case.
6. 	The Court will conduct a compliance hearing on February
19, 	2026, 	at 	9:30 	a.m. 	in 	Courtroom 	1, 	Second 	Floor, 	101 	S.
Edgeworth Street, Greensboro, NC 27401 to determine whether Modern
Rent to Own has complied with this Order. 	If the amounts have not
been 	paid 	in 	full 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	compliance 	hearing, 	Modern
Rent 	to 	Own 	and 	Carlo 	Bargiogli 	shall 	appear 	and 	show 	cause 	why
they 	should 	not 	be 	held 	in 	contempt. 	Contempt 	sanctions 	may
include further monetary relief being entered against Modern Rent
to Own and Carlo Bargiogli.
[END OF DOCUMENT]
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Parties to be Served
25-10566
John Paul Hughes Cournoyer
Bankruptcy Administrator 	Via CM/ECF
Samantha K. Brumbaugh
Chapter 7 Trustee 	Via CM/ECF
Sharon Annette Reid
1183 University Drive #105-205
Burlington, NC 27215
ALAMANCE-NC
Sharon Annette Reid
A-1 1212 Collins Drive
Burlington, NC 27215
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