COLEMAN v. MAUNEY et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
DEANNA COLEMAN and
AUGUSTINE PEREZ,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-cv-01127
CHASE MAUNEY,
Federal Probation Officer,
SHERIFF SAMUEL SCOTT PAGE,
Rockingham County Sheriff,
ADAM D MOSQUEDA,
DEA Task Force Officer,
J TEJEDA,
C T UNDERWOOD,
L S THOMPSON,
J REVIS,
Officer with the Reidsville Police Department,
CHRISTOPHER BERSCH,
Supervising United States Probation Officer, and
KEVIN BERGER
Commissioner of Rockingham County,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are Plaintiff Deanna Coleman’s pro se Objections to Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendations [ECF 57], filed March 4, 2026, and Motion for Relief from Judgment [ECF
59], filed by Plaintiffs Deanna Coleman and Augustine Perez on March 13, 2026. Defendant J.
Revis responded in opposition to the Motion for Relief from Judgment on April 3, 2026. [ECF 60].
Plaintiffs replied on April 8, 2026. [ECF 61]. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel
Disclosure of Insurance Information on April 13, 2026. [ECF 62]. On May 4, 2026, Chase Mauney,
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Christopher Bersch, and A.D. Mosqueda, together, and Defendant J. Revis, independently,
responded to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. [ECFs 63, 64]. Plaintiffs replied on May 11, 2026.
[ECF 66]. Also pending are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Replace Defendant Mark F. Richardson with
Lance Metzler, Rockingham County Manager [ECF 65], filed May 8, 2026, and a Notice to the
Court regarding Service of Summons [ECF 67], filed May 20, 2026.
I.
This action was previously referred to the Honorable Omar J. Aboulhosn, United
States Magistrate Judge, for submission of his Proposed Findings and Recommendations
(“PF&R”). Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn filed his PF&R on February 19, 2026. [ECF 55].
Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn recommended the Court dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint due to their
failure to effect service upon defendants since filing the Complaint on December 29, 2023. [Id.].
Ms. Coleman lodges a series of objections to the PF&R. First, Ms. Coleman objects
to the PF&R’s conclusion that she failed to provide new evidence as to her indigent status which
would qualify her to proceed in forma pauperis. [ECF 57 at 3]. Specifically, she explains there is
no change in her status as an indigent which should have qualified her for in forma pauperis status
from the outset. Additionally, she contends the PF&R “wrongly questions whether [she] complied
with Rule (d)(4). . . . Especially when the plaintiffs moved for an extension of time to serve
summons, because the Defendants failed to return a signed waiver.” [Id.].
Next, she contends the PF&R contradicts itself by acknowledging the returned
certified receipts but noting that Ms. Coleman has not asserted the Defendants were evading
service. [Id.]. She explains this is because no attempt has been made to serve the Defendants.0F
1 Ms.
1 Ms. Coleman also appears to raise a question about the meaning behind the PF&R’s statement
that “there is no evidence that Ms. Coleman ever attempted to effect personal service upon any of
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Coleman also asserts the PF&R “erroneously claims that waiting on [Mr.] Perez’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis had no bearing on her attempting to serve summons.” [ECF 57 at 3].
Ms. Coleman contends the reason Mr. Perez submitted his application to proceed in forma
pauperis was because Ms. Coleman was unable to afford the expense of service. Specifically, she
states “[Mr.] Perez’s circumstances would normally have assured the granting of his application,
and the Defendants would have been served. It was not unreasonable for her to wait.” [Id.].
Further, because Mr. Perez had to wait 11 months for the Court’s disposition on his
application, Ms. Coleman contends it “would not have made any difference” had she filed her own
application sooner. [Id. at 4]. She contends it is unreasonable for the Court to deny a prolonged
deadline because neither she nor Mr. Perez’s indigent statuses changed following disposition of
their applications. [Id.]. Accordingly, Ms. Coleman expresses concern that she “is being penalized
for her inability to pay the cost of serving summons because of her status of indigency.” [Id.]. She
contends it was the “Court’s extensive delay” that impacted Plaintiffs’ ability to serve summons.
[Id.]. Ms. Coleman asks the Court to reject the PF&R because “the Plaintiffs repeatedly asserted
that the reason they have not served the summons is that the Plaintiffs are indigent.” [Id.].
Additionally, Ms. Coleman contends it is not in the interest of justice for the PF&R
to reject “Plaintiff’s alternative suggestions for dismissal.” [Id.]. For example, she suggests “[t]he
Court could fashion a remedy for the Defendants’ failure to waive service of summons to avoid
unnecessary expenses, when the rule requires the Defendant to pay the cost of service for failing
to return a signed waiver.” [Id.]. Further, she suggests that the Court “direct the remaining
the remaining Defendants during the entirety of the pendency of this action[.]” [ECF 57 at 3]. She
states that “if this Court makes an exception, she is more than willing to serve the summons
herself.” [Id.]. Rule 4(c)(2) states “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may
serve a summons and complaint.” Thus, the PF&R’s reference to “personal service” means any
person eligible to effect service pursuant to Rule 4.
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Defendants to file an answer by a specified period or enter a default judgment because they were
on notice of that possibility by the waiver form if they failed to file an answer within 60 days.”
[Id.]. And, again, Ms. Coleman challenges the denial of Plaintiffs’ applications to proceed in forma
pauperis, specifically contending the Court failed to “specify[] the reasons for the denial as
required by law, so that the conclusory denials do not appear to be rooted in animus[.]” [Id.].
Ms. Coleman contends “[t]he blame for the impediment is misplaced.” [Id.].
Additionally, Ms. Coleman noted that following the mandate from our Court of Appeals in an
appeal related to the instant action, Plaintiffs would have the funds to cover the cost of service of
summons. [Id. at 5].1F
2 And, inasmuch as the waiver delivered to Defendants “warned the defendants
that if they failed to answer the complaint by the time specified therein, a default judgment may
be entered against them[,]” Ms. Coleman contends the remaining Defendants should be directed
to answer the complaint. Finally, Ms. Coleman contends the aforementioned, recently published
opinion from our Court of Appeals has a “significant impact. . . on the factual and legal conclusions
made in this case.” [Id.]. For all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Coleman asks the Court to reject the
PF&R.
II.
A. 	Objections to PF&R
Federal law provides that “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Samples v. Ballard, 860 F.3d 266, 272. Failure to
file timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo review and the Petitioner’s right to appeal
2 Inasmuch as Ms. Coleman sought to file service on May 20, 2026, it appears she now has
the funds to effect service. To the Court’s knowledge, she has nevertheless not done so.
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the Court’s order. See id.; see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (stating that review of a
magistrate judge’s factual or legal conclusions is not required as to those portions of the findings
or recommendation to which no objections are addressed); United States v. De Leon-Ramirez, 925
F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2019) (Parties may not typically “appeal a magistrate judge’s findings that
were not objected to below, as § 636(b) doesn’t require de novo review absent objection.”); Snyder
v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989). “Moreover, a general objection to a magistrate
judge's findings is not sufficient [to trigger de novo review] -- ‘a party must object to the
[magistrate's] finding or recommendation . . . with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert
the district court of the true ground for the objection.’” United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 428
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 626, 621–22 (4th Cir. 2007)); see
Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Courts have also held de novo review to be
unnecessary . . . when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court
to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.”).
1. Service Upon Defendants
Ms. Coleman contends the PF&R contradicts itself by acknowledging the returned
certified receipts but noting that Ms. Coleman has not asserted the Defendants were evading
service. [ECF 57 at 3]. She explains this is because no attempt has been made to serve the
Defendants. Ms. Coleman also asserts the PF&R “erroneously claims that waiting on [Mr.] Perez’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis had no bearing on her attempting to serve summons.”
[Id.]. Specifically, she states “[Mr.] Perez’s circumstances would normally have assured the
granting of his application, and the Defendants would have been served. It was not unreasonable
for her to wait.” [Id.]. She contends it was the “Court’s extensive delay” that impacted the
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Plaintiffs’ ability to serve summons. [Id. at 4]. Ms. Coleman asks the Court to reject the PF&R
because “the Plaintiffs repeatedly asserted that the reason they have not served the summons is
that the Plaintiffs are indigent.” [Id.]. Additionally, she contends the PF&R “wrongly questions
whether [she] complied with Rule 4(d)(4). . . . Especially when the plaintiffs moved for an
extension of time to serve summons, because the Defendants failed to return a signed waiver.” [Id.
at 3].
As explained infra, the denial of Mr. Perez’s in forma pauperis status was based
specifically on whether the claims were cognizable and was not based on Plaintiffs’ indigent
statuses. The Court adopted the PF&R in March 2025. [See ECF 42]. The Court then referred the
matter anew to Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn for further proceedings as to Ms. Coleman’s
remaining claims. Inasmuch as these general conclusory statements do not alert the Court to the
grounds for the objection, they need not be considered and are OVERRULED.
2. Alternative Remedies
Next, Ms. Coleman contends it is not in the interest of justice for the PF&R to reject
“Plaintiff’s alternative suggestions for dismissal.” [Id.]. For example, she suggests “[t]he Court
could fashion a remedy for the Defendants’ failure to waive service of summons to avoid
unnecessary expenses, when the rule requires the Defendant to pay the cost of service for failing
to return a signed waiver.” [Id.]. Further, she suggests that the Court “direct the remaining
Defendants to file an answer by a specified period or enter a default judgment because they were
on notice of that possibility by the waiver form if they failed to file an answer within 60 days.”
[Id.]. And, again, Ms. Coleman challenges the denial of Plaintiffs’ applications to proceed in forma
pauperis, specifically contending the Court failed to “specify[] the reasons for the denial as
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required by law, so that the conclusory denials do not appear to be rooted in animus[.]” [Id.]. Ms.
Coleman has previously requested such alternatives for relief and the Court has repeatedly
addressed why these suggested remedies are inapplicable. [See ECF 55]. Again, Ms. Coleman fails
to point the Court to a specific error in the PF&R. Accordingly, the objections are OVERRULED.
3. Fourth Circuit Mandate
Additionally, Ms. Coleman asserted that once the mandate from our Court of
Appeals is returned in a case where she and Mr. Perez prevailed respecting a civil forfeiture matter,
she would have the funds to effect service. [Id. at 5]. That mandate has since issued and Ms.
Coleman asserts she now has the funds to serve process. Because the waiver delivered to
Defendants “warned the defendants that if they failed to answer the complaint by the time specified
therein, a default judgment may be entered against them[,]” Ms. Coleman contends the remaining
Defendants should be directed to answer the complaint. Finally, Ms. Coleman contends the
aforementioned appellate opinion has a “significant impact. . . on the factual and legal conclusion
made in this case.” [Id.].
For the reasons set forth in the following discussion of Ms. Coleman’s Motion for
Relief from Judgment, the opinion of Our Court of Appeals has no impact on the Court’s earlier
rulings. The constitutionality of the search in that case has no bearing on the Court’s earlier
dismissal of Defendants Chase Mauney, Christopher Bersch, Adam D. Mosqueda, and Local Law
Enforcement Official J.Revis. In fact, the Court referred the matter anew to Magistrate Judge
Aboulhosn specifically for consideration of Ms. Coleman’s claims against Defendants Berger,
Page, Tejeda, Underwood, and Cockman. [ECF 42 at 18]. Accordingly, Ms. Coleman’s objections
are OVERRULED.
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4. Indigent Status
Ms. Coleman also objects to the PF&R’s conclusion that she failed to provide new
evidence as to her indigent status which would qualify her to proceed in forma pauperis. [ECF 57
at 3]. Specifically, she explains there is no change in her status as an indigent which should have
qualified her for in forma pauperis status from the outset. [Id. at 3–5]. She contends “the PFR also
rejected reconsidering recommending that in forma pauperis be granted, or specifying the reasons
for the denial as required by law, so that the conclusory denials do not appear to be rooted in
animus, because the denials are also denying Plaintiffs' right to have meaningful access to the
Court.” [Id.]. Ms. Coleman contends the reason Mr. Perez submitted his application to proceed in
forma pauperis was because Ms. Coleman was unable to afford the expense of service.
Further, because Mr. Perez had to wait 11 months for the Court’s disposition as to
his Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees and Costs, Ms. Coleman contends it
“would not have made any difference” had she filed an application for her own application sooner.
[Id. at 4]. She contends it is unreasonable for the Court to deny a prolonged deadline for service
because neither she nor Mr. Perez’s indigent statuses changed following disposition of their
applications. [Id.]. Accordingly, Ms. Coleman expresses concern that she “is being penalized for
her inability to pay the cost of serving summons because of her status of indigency.” [Id.].
Ms. Coleman misunderstands the Court’s rationale for denial of Mr. Perez’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis. In the PF&R entered on January 31, 2025, Magistrate
Judge Aboulhosn proposed the Court deny Mr. Perez’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
inasmuch as Mr. Perez failed to state cognizable claims for relief. [ECF 32 at 54]. First, the Court
concluded Mr. Perez’s application did “not specifically allege[] concrete facts” sufficient to state
a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 relating to her allegations against Defendants
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Berger, Page, Tejeda, Underwood, Thompson, and Cockman. [Id. at 55–56]. Second, the Court
concluded Mr. Perez’s Monell claim could not succeed because those claims were essentially
claims against the Rockingham County Commission, and Mr. Perez had failed to establish a
custom or policy supporting municipal liability for the alleged conduct. [Id. at 56–57].
Additionally, Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn recommended the Court dismiss Mr. Perez’s § 1983
claims regarding unconstitutional searches and seizures. [Id. at 54–60]. Specifically, because Mr.
Perez had not shown the Court he had successfully invalidated his supervised release violations or
his state court convictions, he could not yet seek damages pursuant to § 1983. [Id.]. Accordingly,
the Court’s denial of Mr. Perez’s application was not based on his indigent status, but instead based
on the fact that the Complaint -- as pleaded -- failed to state cognizable claims for relief. [See ECF
32].
Ms. Coleman then waited until after the entry of the second PF&R to file another
request for in forma pauperis status for the limited purpose of service of summons. When the Court
denied Ms. Coleman’s later request to proceed in forma pauperis for the sole purpose of serving
summons, there had been no amendment of the complaint or change in circumstances related to
the disposition of Mr. Perez’s convictions. [See ECF 53]. Inasmuch as Ms. Coleman’s Motion for
Court Ordered Service of Summons included a supplemental request to proceed in forma pauperis
for the sole purpose of serving summons, the Court viewed this as a renewed request from
Plaintiffs, and not as an independent application by Ms. Coleman. [See ECF 51]. The Court had
previously denied a similar request by Mr. Perez as moot inasmuch as it had already rejected Mr.
Perez’s application to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs. [See ECF 44]. Additionally,
pursuant to Ms. Coleman’s May 20, 2026, letter to the Court, she contends she now has the
capacity to pay the cost of summons. Thus, any concern regarding review of her indigent status is
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now moot. Accordingly, inasmuch as Ms. Coleman objects to the PF&R based on its denial of the
prior application to proceed in forma pauperis, that objection is OVERRULED.
B. 	Motion for Relief from Judgment
Ms. Coleman has filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment arising from the
Plaintiffs’ appeal in the civil forfeiture action where the Government sought forfeiture of certain
funds seized during the searches at issue in the instant matter. [ECF 58]. As noted, our Court of
Appeals held recently in a civil forfeiture proceeding that the search of Ms. Coleman’s residence
at Teal Drive was unconstitutional, reversing a decision not rendered by the Undersigned. See
United States v. Perez, 167 F.4th 709 (4th Cir. 2026). There, the Court considered whether the
terms and conditions of Mr. Perez’s probation permitted the warrantless search of property he
owned but at which he did not reside, explaining:
With this background for probationary searches in mind, we find the search of Teal
Drive unconstitutional for two reasons, each rooted in the protection of Coleman's
Fourth Amendment rights as a third-party occupant. First, we conclude that the
officers were not permitted to search Teal Drive merely based on Perez’ ownership
of that property because Coleman resided there as a tenant. And second, we
conclude that the officers were required to have probable cause to believe that Perez
also resided at Teal Drive before initiating a probationary search of Coleman's
home, and they did not meet that standard here.
Perez, 167 F.4th at 717. While this holding was limited specifically to the search of Teal Drive,
Ms. Coleman contends the ruling impacts the Court’s earlier decisions as to all Defendants and all
claims. [See ECF 58].
“Rule 60(b) affords relief only from a judgment, order, or proceeding which is
final.” Fayetteville Inv'rs v. Com. Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1469 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis
in original); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment (“The
addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ emphasizes the character of the judgments, orders or
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proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not
brought within the restrictions of the rule. . . .”). Final orders adjudicate and resolve all claims as
to all parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Kiviti v. Bhatt, 80 F.4th 520, 530 (4th Cir. 2023)
(“[A]n order dismissing fewer than all the claims against a defendant is not final.”).
Because the Court has not yet adjudicated all claims brought by Plaintiffs, the Court
will construe Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion as a Rule 54(b) motion to reconsider. Fayetteville
Inv'rs, 936 F.2d at 1469–70. Rule 54(b) governs “any order or decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties.”
Pursuant to this rule, an interlocutory order “may be revised at any time before the entry of a
judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b); see also Fayetteville Inv'rs, 936 F.2d at 1469 (“An interlocutory order is subject to
reconsideration at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment.”).
The power to reconsider or modify interlocutory orders is “committed to the
discretion of the district court.” Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514–15
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)
(noting that “every order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the
district judge”)). That discretion is not subject to the “heightened standards for reconsideration”
governing final orders. Am. Canoe, 326 F.3d at 514–15; see also Fayetteville Inv'rs, 936 F.2d at
1473 (“Interlocutory orders ... are left within the plenary power of the Court that rendered them to
afford such relief from them as justice requires.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, “a
court may revise an interlocutory order under the same circumstances in which it may depart from
the law of the case: (1) ‘a subsequent trial produc[ing] substantially different evidence’; (2) a
change in applicable law; or (3) clear error causing ‘manifest injustice.’” Carlson v. Bos. Sci.
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Corp., 856 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Canoe, 326 F.3d at
515). While this standard is similar to that applicable to Rule 59(e) motions, “it departs from such
standard by accounting for potentially different evidence discovered during litigation as opposed
to the discovery of ‘new evidence not available at trial.’” Id. (quoting Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat.
Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)).
In her Motion, Ms. Coleman asks the Court “for an order setting aside its prior
dismissal of the Federal Defendants Chase Mauney, Christopher Bersch, Adam D. Mosqueda, and
Local Law Enforcement officials J.Revis [sic] and the remaining Defendants who failed to answer
the Complaint.” [ECF 58 at 1]. Plaintiffs contend that the same officers who were dismissed in the
March 2025 Memorandum Opinion and Order were the officers who conducted the searches found
unconstitutional in Perez. [Id.]. Accordingly, they assert the “intervening decision constitutes a
legal mistake and an extraordinary circumstance, rendering the continued application of the
dismissal inequitable and justifying relief under Rule 60(b).” [Id.]. And “the Doctrines of
Collateral Estoppel and the [l]aw of the case require this Court to apply the Fourth Circuit’s ruling
and reinstate the dismissed Defendants.” [Id.].
As thoroughly discussed by Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn in the January 2025
PF&R, the dismissal of the Bivens claims against Defendants Mauney, Bersch, and Mosqueda
centered on the inapplicability of Bivens to the facts in the instant case. [See ECF 32]. Taking into
consideration the fact that the Perez decision found the search of Ms. Coleman’s house
unconstitutional, the Bivens analysis remains the same. Specifically, as Magistrate Judge
Aboulhosn explained:
Although Bivens implied a damages remedy under the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has made clear that Bivens does not extend to all Fourth
Amendment claims. Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102, 140 S.Ct. at 743 (“A claim may
arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a
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claim in a case in which damages remedy was previously recognized.”) The
undersigned acknowledges that both the claims in Bivens and the instant action
arise from an allegedly unreasonable search, but this similarity does not end the
inquiry. “Courts do not define a Bivens cause of action at the level of ‘the Fourth
Amendment’ or even at the level of ‘the unreasonable-searches-and-seizures
clause.’” Annappareddy, 996 F.3d at 134 (quoting Cantu v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414,
422 (5th Cir. 2019)); also see Mays, 70 F.4th at 202. Further, the instant case differs
from Bivens in meaningful ways. In Bivens, the Supreme Court held the plaintiff
had an implied cause of action for damages he incurred after agents from the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered plaintiff’s apartment, performed a warrantless
search, arrested plaintiff for alleged narcotics violations, “manacled petitioner in
front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the entire family.” Bivens,
403 U.S. at 389, 396-97. Unlike Bivens, Plaintiffs do not claim the use of excessive
force or an unconstitutional arrest during the search. See Logsdon v. U.S. Marshal
Service, 91 F.4th 1352, 1355(10th Cir. 2024) (“The [Supreme] Court has said in
effect that almost any difference between the case at hand and the three [Bivens]
precedents can justify rejecting a cause of action.”); Bulger, 62 F.4th at 137 (“The
Supreme Court has warned lower courts to act with utmost hesitation when faced
with actions that do not fall precisely under Bivens.”) (emphasis added); Wickline
v. Cumberledge, 2024 WL 4340045, *3 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 27, 2024) (“Courts must
. . . scrutinize every last detail of a prospective Bivens claim, nitpicking it for even
a single “meaningful difference” between it and the Supreme Court’s three Bivens
actions.”) In Bivens, none of the defendants were United States Probation Officers,
no plaintiff was on supervised release, no plaintiff was subject to a supervised
release 	condition 	allowing 	warrantless 	searches, 	there 	was 	no 	question 	of
supervisory 	liability, 	or 	allegations 	of 	a 	conspiracy between 	United 	States
Probation Officers with local authorities. . . . Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims against
Defendants Mauney and Bersch are meaningfully different because such involves
a “new category of defendant.” To the extent Plaintiffs assert a Fourth Amendment
claim against Defendants Mauney and Mosqueda involving the alleged improper
search and seizure conducted pursuant to a search warrant, such a claim also
presents a new context because Bivens involved a warrantless search. The Fourth
Circuit has recognized that the existence of a warrant fundamentally alters a case
because “the Fourth Amendment sharply distinguishes between with warrant and
warrantless searches.” Annappareddy, 996 F.3d at 135-36. Clearly, “Fourth
Amendment claims for with-warrant searches are governed by different legal
standards than warrantless searches.” Wickline, 2024 WL 4340045, at *4 (citations
omitted). Thus, the existence of a search warrant creates a “new context” for
purposes of Bivens. Cain v. Rinehart, 2023 WL 6439438, *3 (6th Cir. July 2023);
also see Wickline, 2024 WL 4340045, *4 (“Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim
here would thus revolve around different legal and factual issues than Bivens. That
is enough to present a new context.”).
[ECF 32 at 45–47]. As discussed supra, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs alleged violations against Defendants Mauney,
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Bersch, and Mosqueda in their official capacities. [ECF 42 at 15]. Such a dismissal is not affected
by the constitutionality of the search of Teal Drive. Thus, the Court need not review dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. For similar reasons, the Court of Appeals’ decision has no effect on the
§ 1985 and § 1986 claims. Dismissal there was based on the Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the
Defendants had engaged in a conspiracy. [ECF 32 at 52–54]. The constitutionality of the search
at Teal Drive has no impact on whether Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the elements of conspiracy
in their complaint. Thus, relief from that holding is unwarranted.
Among other things, Ms. Coleman specifically pled in her complaint that
“Defendants DEA-TFO Mosqueda, Tejeda, Underwood and Thompson, in their individual and
official capacity, knowingly, with malice did separate nefarious conspiracy to ran-sack the Teal
Drive residence, while executing the search warrant.” [ECF 1 ¶ 12]. She also alleged conspiracy
regarding the Teal Drive search against Defendant Mauney. [Id.]. Inasmuch as her claims against
Defendants Tejeda, Underwood, and Thompson remain active, the Court need only address
whether dismissal of Defendants Mosqueda and Mauney remains appropriate considering our
Court of Appeals’ holding as to the constitutionality of the search of Teal Drive.
Upon review of the Court’s earlier decisions, there is no reason to reinstate
defendants Mosqueda or Mauney. Their dismissal rested on the (1) inapplicability of Bivens --
even considering the alleged unconstitutionality of the search, (2) the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction relating to the § 1983 claims, inasmuch as Plaintiffs alleged claims against defendants
in their official capacities, and (3) Plaintiffs’ failure to properly allege the elements of conspiracy.
[See ECFs 32, 42]. Inasmuch as the dismissal of these defendants did not rest on whether the search
of Teal Drive was constitutional, the Perez holding does not have any impact on the Court’s earlier
decisions. Accordingly, the Motion for Relief from Judgment is DENIED.
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C. 	Timely Service of Summons
Inasmuch as Perez was published after Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn filed the PF&R
recommending dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the Court will address whether it serves
the interests of justice to again extend the deadline to permit Ms. Coleman to effect service on the
remaining Defendants -- specifically inasmuch as the ruling in Perez provided the return of certain
funds to Ms. Coleman. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court--
on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without
prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified
time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the
time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Our Court of Appeals has held that a showing of good cause requires the
Court to permit amendment of the deadline, while a lack of good cause makes extension of the
deadline discretionary. Gelin v. Shuman, 35 F.4th 212, 220 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[A] district court
possesses discretion to grant the plaintiff an extension of time to serve a defendant with the
complaint and summons even absent a showing of good cause by the plaintiff for failing to serve
the defendant during the 90-day period provided by the Rule[.]”). Inasmuch as the Perez decision
does not impact the outcome of prior rulings, the Court finds no change in the status of the PF&R’s
findings as to good cause.
Additionally, as discussed in the Court’s earlier decision, “[m]ore than two years
have passed since the filing of the Complaint, and the Plaintiffs have shown exquisite familiarity
with both the governing rules of procedure and our Court of Appeals’ precedent.” [ECF 53 at 4].
However, the Court recognizes Ms. Coleman’s concerns regarding (1) consideration of her
application to proceed in forma pauperis, and (2) the recent change in her indigent status as a result
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of the Perez ruling. Accordingly, the Court finds it serves the interests of justice to permit Ms.
Coleman to serve the remaining defendants no later than October 1, 2026.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion for Relief from Judgment
[ECF 58], SUSTAINS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Ms. Coleman’s Objections [ECF 57],
declines to adopt the PF&R [ECF 55], and ORDERS the case be REFERRED anew to Magistrate
Judge Aboulhosn under the terms of the original referral order to address the Motion to Compel
[ECF 62] and Motion to Replace Defendant. [ECF 65].
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit a copy of this written opinion and order
to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.
ENTER: September 18, 2026
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