Williams v. Department of Public Safety - State of North Carolina - State Highway Patrol et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM
JONATHAN DANIEL WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )
OF PUBLIC SAFETY – STATE )
HIGHWAY PATROL; RANDY L. )
DEATON; BRANDON S. SMITH; )
HAROLD F. STINES, JR.; AARON C. )
AMMONS; and CHRISTOPHER W. )
COOK, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 41].
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff Jonathan Daniel Williams, a former North Carolina State
Trooper, commenced this action on December 28, 2023, alleging claims for
failure to provide a reasonable religious accommodation and retaliation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (“Title VII”); claims for failure to accommodate a disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 to 12117
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 15

2
(“ADA”); and claims for violations of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (“GINA”). [Doc. 1]. The
Plaintiff names as a Defendant “Department of Public Safety – State of NC -
- State Highway Patrol,” which the Court will refer to as the North Carolina
Department of Public Safety, or “DPS.”1 The Plaintiff also names as
Defendants his supervising officers: Randy L. Deaton; Brandon S. Smith;
Harold F. Stines, Jr.; Aaron C. Ammons; and Christopher W. Cook.2
On November 7, 2025, the Defendants filed the present motion,
seeking summary judgment as to all claims. [Doc. 41]. Thereafter, in
accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the
Court entered an Order advising the Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a
response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in which
evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 44]. On December 10,
2025, the Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition [Doc. 46], a Statement of
Material Facts [Doc. 47], a Statement of Disputed Material Facts [Doc. 48],
1 At all times relevant to this action, the North Carolina State Highway Patrol (“NCSHP”)
was a division of DPS. Effective July 1, 2025, the NCSHP began operating as an
independent state agency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-1705, as amended by 2024 N.C.
Sess. Laws 2024-57, § 3E.1(p), effective July 1, 2025.
2 The Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify whether these latter Defendants are sued in
their individual or official capacities.
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 15

3
and a number of exhibits [Docs. 49, 50]. On December 17, 2025, the
Defendants filed their Reply. [Doc. 51].
Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for adjudication.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “As the Supreme Court has
observed, ‘this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 519 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).
“Facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the case,
and a genuine issue exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc.,
968 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting News & Observer Publ’g Co. v.
Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010)). When
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not “weigh the
evidence or make credibility determinations.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop.
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 15

4
Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jacobs v. N.C. Admin.
Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015)). “Regardless of
whether he may ultimately be responsible for proof and persuasion, the party
seeking summary judgment bears an initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 522. If
this showing is made, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who
must convince the Court that a triable issue does exist. Id.
In considering the motion for summary judgment, the Court must view
the pleadings and materials presented in the “light most favorable” to the
nonmovant and must “draw all reasonable inferences” in the nonmovant’s
favor. Adams v. UNC Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 556 (4th Cir. 2011).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewing the forecasts of evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.
In 2021, the Plaintiff was employed as a North Carolina State Trooper,
assigned to Troop G, District G-5. [Doc. 49-2 at 32: Williams Decl. at ¶ 2].
On July 29, 2021, Governor Roy Cooper issued Executive Order No.
224, which implemented various measures to address the ongoing COVID-
19 pandemic. [See Doc. 45-1: Executive Order No. 224]. In accordance
with this Executive Order, on September 1, 2021, DPS issued DPS HR-600-
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 15

5
04, a department-wide policy addressing vaccines, testing requirements, and
requests for accommodation. [Doc. 45-3: DPS Policy DPS-HR-600-04].
This policy specifically required all DPS employees—including state
troopers—to either be vaccinated or be subjected to regular “accepted
diagnostic testing” for COVID-19. [Id. at 4-5]. The policy defined “accepted
diagnostic testing” as including “an antigen or molecular test (nucleic acid
amplification test [NAAT] or RT-PCR) authorized by the Food and Drug
Administration” [Id. at 1] and required unvaccinated employees to produce
a negative COVID-19 test result from an approved testing site within the last
seven days before the beginning of their shift. [Id. at 5]. The DPS policy
provided that workers could submit requests for a reasonable
accommodation to the policy’s requirements “due to a sincerely held religious
belief, a medical condition, or other reason.” [Id. at 10].
The Plaintiff initially complied with the DPS policy, submitting to nasal
swab testing on September 4 and September 16, 2021. [See Doc. 49-2 at
34: Williams Decl. at ¶¶ 10-17; Doc. 45-8 at 1-2: Test Results]. After the
second test, however, the Plaintiff became “convicted spiritually that what
[he] had done was wrong” and that the nasal swab testing “went against [his]
conscience and beliefs.” [Doc. 49-2 at 34: Williams Decl. at ¶ 16]. The
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 15

6
Plaintiff did not submit to any further nasal swab testing after September
2021. [Id. at ¶ 17].
Throughout late September, October, and November 2021, the Plaintiff
spent significant time in prayer, reading Scripture, and seeking spiritual
counsel. [Id. at 35 ¶ 18]. Specifically with respect to nasal swab testing, the
Plaintiff learned more about the chemical used on nasal swab tests, “which
further violated [his] conscience.” [Id. at ¶ 21]. He also spoke to family
friends, fellow troopers, and his brother (who is also a minister), all of whom
“helped [him] process and strengthen [his] conviction that [he] could not
submit to invasive testing.” [Id. at ¶ 22]. By early October, the Plaintiff “knew
firmly in [his] heart that nasal swab testing was morally and spiritually wrong
for [him].” [Id. at ¶ 23].
On November 10, 2021, one of the Plaintiff’s supervisors, the
Defendant Sergeant Christopher W. Cook (“Sergeant Cook”), texted the
Plaintiff, asking when he had last uploaded a COVID test result in the
district’s tracker system. [Doc. 45-7: Cook Decl. at ¶ 4]. The Plaintiff did not
reply to the text, as he was in the middle of a traffic stop. [Doc. 49-2 at 36:
Williams Decl. at ¶ 28]. Sergeant Cook then called the Plaintiff and asked
him when he had last uploaded a test result. The Plaintiff replied that it had
been “a while.” [Id. at ¶ 29]. Sergeant Cook told the Plaintiff to “get up” with
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 15

7
another trooper and get COVID tested, to which the Plaintiff said, “Okay.” [Id.
at ¶ 30].
On November 18, 2021, Sergeant Cook texted the Plaintiff while the
Plaintiff was on vacation to remind him to upload his test results. [Doc. 45-
7: Cook Decl. at ¶ 4]. The Plaintiff responded that he was going to send an
email advising that he would no longer submit to weekly tests. [Id.]. On
November 21, 2021, Sergeant Cook phoned the Plaintiff to follow up on the
testing and informed him that if he did not comply with the DPS testing policy,
the disciplinary process would begin. [Id.].
On November 22, 2021, the Plaintiff submitted a religious
accommodation request. [Doc. 45-4: Religious Exemption Form].
Specifically, the Plaintiff stated, in pertinent part, that “the administration of
vaccines such as Covid-19 vaccine and repetitive invasive testing such as
Covid19 Testing, [was] contrary to [his] sincerely held religious beliefs.” [Id.
at 1].
The following day, on November 23, 2021, a personnel complaint was
initiated against the Plaintiff for failure to comply with Executive Order 224.
[Doc. 45-9: Barger Decl. at ¶ 3].
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 15

8
The Plaintiff received a letter from DPS denying his religious exemption
request on December 23, 2021.3 [Doc. 45-11 at 3: Verified Response to
Request for Admission (RFA) No. 2; Doc. 45-5: DPS HR Letter]. With respect
to the Plaintiff’s objection to vaccination, DPS noted in this letter that weekly
testing was offered as an alternative to vaccination. [Doc. 45-5: DPS HR
Letter at 3]. With respect to the Plaintiff’s objection to nasal swab testing,
DPS stated in this letter that Executive Order 224 and the DPS policy both
“accommodate non-invasive saliva tests.” [Id.]. As such, DPS stated, the
Plaintiff’s request to be exempted from weekly testing was denied. [Id.].
The Plaintiff determined that saliva testing would not violate his
religious convictions and thus began saliva testing on December 30, 2021.
[Doc. 49-2 at 37: Williams Decl. at ¶ 41; Doc. 50 at 4: COVID-19 Test Report
dated 12/31/21]. He submitted to saliva testing again on January 10, 2022
and January 18, 2022. [Doc. 49-2 at 37: Williams Decl. at ¶ 41; Doc. 50 at
7-8: COVID-19 Test Reports dated 1/12/22 and 1/20/22]. Any gaps in the
Plaintiff’s testing were due to appointment availability; saliva testing required
3 The letter is dated December 7, 2021. [Doc. 45-5: DPS HR Letter]. While the Plaintiff
acknowledged in an interview with internal affairs on December 10, 2021, that he had
heard from a supervisor that his religious exemption request had been denied [Doc. 45-
10: Audio of 12/10/21 Interview], the Plaintiff states that he did not receive the letter until
December 23, 2021. [Doc. 45-11: Verified Response to Request for Admission (RFA) No.
2]. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Plaintiff was made aware of the
availability of non-invasive saliva testing until the receipt of this letter on December 23,
2021.
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 15

9
scheduled appointments, and at times there were no available slots within
the required seven-day window. [Doc. 49-2 at 37: Williams Decl. at ¶ 43].
The Plaintiff uploaded each of his saliva test results to the DPS tracker
system.4 [See id. at ¶¶ 41-42; Doc. 45-11 at 4: Verified Response to RFA
No. 3].
On January 24, 2022, DPS terminated the Plaintiff’s employment on
the grounds that “[a]s of December 29, 2021,” the Plaintiff had “failed to
provide either documentation of fully vaccinated status, or weekly test results
. . . as required.” [Doc. 45-6: Separation Notice at 3].
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Title VII Claims
1. Individual Defendants
As an initial matter, the Plaintiff cannot sustain claims under Title VII
against his supervisors in their individual capacities. Individual defendants
do not qualify as “employers” for the purpose of Title VII. Lissau v. So. Food
Svc., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1988). As such, Title VII does not
provide a cause of action against the individual Defendants named in this
4 The Defendants deny having a record of any further test results after January 10, 2022.
[See Doc. 45 at 4]. However, they have not offered any forecast of evidence on this point.
In any event, at this juncture, the Court must accept the Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence as
true.
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 15

10
action in their individual capacities. See Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F. App’x
366, 368 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, all of the Plaintiff’s claims under Title
VII against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities are hereby
dismissed.
Further, to the extent that the Plaintiff attempts to assert Title VII claims
against his supervisors in their official capacities, such claims are duplicative
of his claims against DPS. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985). Accordingly, all of the Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII against
Defendants Deaton, Smith, Stines, Ammons, and Cook in their official
capacities are also dismissed.
2. Religious Accommodation Claim
Title VII prohibits discrimination “against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s . . . religion . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prove a
prima facie religious accommodation claim, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he
or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment
requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; (3) he or she
was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment
requirement.” Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. Of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 10 of 15

11
(2nd Cir. 1985)). If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case,
“the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it could not reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff's religious needs without undue hardship.” EEOC
v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Plaintiff’s religious accommodation claim fails because the
Plaintiff’s religious objections were adequately accommodated. While the
Plaintiff asserted religious objections to the vaccine requirement, the DPS
policy allowed for regular testing in lieu of vaccination. To the extent that the
Plaintiff also objected to the invasive nature of nasal swab testing, that
objection also was reasonably accommodated by DPS providing the option
for saliva testing, which did not require any type of invasive procedure.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s religious accommodation claim must be
dismissed.
3. Retaliation
To prove a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the employment action. Coleman v. Md. Ct. of App.,
626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). “After the prima facie showing is made,
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 11 of 15

12
the burden then shifts to the employer to show that its purportedly retaliatory
action was in fact the result of a legitimate nonretaliatory reason. If the
employer makes this showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut
the employer's evidence by demonstrating that the employer's purported
nonretaliatory reasons were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 328 (4th Cir. 2018)
(internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
the Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of retaliation. He submitted a
religious exemption request on November 22, 2021. The following day, a
personnel complaint was filed against him. The Plaintiff was subsequently
terminated from his employment for his failure to comply with the DPS testing
requirements “as of December 29, 2021,” even though the Plaintiff did not
receive written notice of DPS’s decision on his religious exemption request
(and the availability of non-invasive testing) until December 23, 2021 and he
substantially complied with the testing requirements once he received that
notification. Under these circumstances, the Plaintiff has presented a
sufficient forecast of evidence to show that DPS’s purported nonretaliatory
reasons for termination were merely a pretext for discrimination. Accordingly,
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 12 of 15

13
DPS’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim is denied.
B. Disability Discrimination Claims
To prove a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff
must first show that he is a qualified individual with a disability. Wilson v.
Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, the Plaintiff has
failed to present any forecast of evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that he has a disability within the meaning of the statute. As such,
the Plaintiff’s claim for the failure to accommodate under the ADA must be
dismissed.
C. GINA Claims
Under GINA, it is an unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire
. . . or otherwise to discriminate against any employee . . . because of genetic
information with respect to the employee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–1(a)(1).
“Genetic information” is defined as “information about (i) such individual's
genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and
(iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such
individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A). A “genetic test,” in turn, is defined as
“an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites,
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 13 of 15

14
that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000ff(7)(A).
The Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of evidence to support his
GINA claims. Specifically, the Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence
that he was subjected to improper “genetic testing” or otherwise
discriminated against because of his “genetic information.” Courts have held
that COVID-19 tests do not analyze genetic information and therefore do not
constitute “genetic testing” within the meaning of the statute. See Russo v.
Patchogue-Medford School Distr., No. 22-CV-01569 (HG) (SIL), 2024 WL
149131, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024) (collecting cases), aff’d, 129 F.4th 182
(2d Cir. 2025). Moreover, courts have held that COVID-19 vaccines are not
“genetic information” and therefore do not implicate GINA. See Millwood v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 8:23-cv-6004-DCC-KDW, 2024 WL 3666446, at *10
(D.S.C. June 14, 2024) (discussing cases). As such, the Plaintiff’s GINA
claims must be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted with respect to the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
Randy L. Deaton, Brandon S. Smith, Harold F. Stines, Jr., Aaron C. Ammons,
and Christopher W. Cook, and these Defendants are hereby dismissed with
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 14 of 15

15
prejudice from this action. The Motion is further granted with respect to the
Plaintiff’s religious accommodation claim under Title VII and his claims under
the ADA and GINA, and such claims are dismissed with prejudice. The
Motion is denied with respect to the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Title VII
as asserted against the North Carolina Department of Public Safety/North
Carolina State Highway Patrol.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 41] is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
with respect to the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Randy L. Deaton,
Brandon S. Smith, Harold F. Stines, Jr., Aaron C. Ammons, and Christopher
W. Cook, and these Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
from this action. The Motion is further GRANTED with respect to the
Plaintiff’s religious accommodation claim under Title VII and claims under the
ADA and GINA, and such claims are also DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Motion is DENIED with respect to the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under
Title VII as asserted against the North Carolina Department of Public
Safety/North Carolina State Highway Patrol.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 12, 2026
Case 1:23-cv-00366-MR-WCM Document 52 Filed 01/12/26 Page 15 of 15