Hood v. Capstone Logistics, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:22-CV-00292-MEO-DCK
TYLER HOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Capstone Logistics LLC’s
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Want of Prosecution or,
in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 87), Defendant’s Rule 72(a)
Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order (Doc. No. 61), Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure to Participate in Discovery or, in the Alternative, to
Compel Discovery and Award Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. No. 68), and Plaintiff Tyler Hood’s
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Substitute Class Representative (Doc. No.
71). For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to further adjudicate this matter. Accordingly, the Court will grant
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 87) and dismiss this case without prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Tyler Hood, a former employee of Defendant, claims that Defendant failed to
pay its workers minimum wage and overtime. (Doc. Nos. 1 ¶¶ 3–4; 23 ¶ 4). Hood filed
a Complaint on June 30, 2022, seeking to bring a collective action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as well as a class action under the North Carolina
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Wage and Hour Act. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 4–7). The putative collective action would include
Capstone employees throughout the United States, while the putative class action
would comprise only Capstone employees in North Carolina.
Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 55, 66.
After the parties had engaged in substantial motions practice, on January 29,
2025, Hood informed his Counsel that he “had received private medical news that
would make it nearly impossible for him to continue being the representative plaintiff
in this action.” (Doc. No. 73 ¶¶ 3, 8). On February 4, 2025, Hood “confirmed his
decision to withdraw as the representative plaintiff in this action” and signed a
declaration stating as such.
Id. ¶ 9. Hood’s declaration states, “[f]or multiple personal
reasons . . . I am unable to serve as the representative for the putative Class and
Collective. However, I wish to remain part of the putative Class and Collective.” (Doc.
No 73-1 ¶ 4). He continues: “I agree to be substituted by another representative
plaintiff, who has yet to be determined.”
Id. ¶ 5. On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff’s
Counsel communicated to Defendant’s Counsel that “[Hood] has decided that he can
no longer proceed as the class/collective representative” and that counsel was “in the
process of trying to identify a replacement representative” but that Hood “will not be
responding to discovery or attending [his] deposition.” (Doc. No. 70-8 at 4–5). When
Hood expressed his desire to withdraw as the representative plaintiff, there were no
other opt-in plaintiffs to the action.
On March 12, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure
to Participate in Discovery or, in the Alternative, to Compel Discovery and Award
Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. No. 68). One week later, on March 18, 2025, Plaintiff’s Counsel
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filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Substitute Class Representative,
requesting to substitute the named Plaintiff and leave to amend the complaint to
include that substituted plaintiff. (Doc. No. 71). Notably, Plaintiff had not yet
identified a substitute and requested the Court “grant him 30 days to identify and
evaluate an appropriate substitute representative plaintiff.”
Id. Nearly three months
later, in June 2025, two individuals consented to join the collective action as opt-in
plaintiffs. (Doc. Nos. 81-1; 82-1) (opt-in consent forms). In September 2025, a third
individual consented to join the collective action as an opt-in plaintiff. (Doc. No. 84-
1) (same).
On February 17, 2026, this case was reassigned to the undersigned. On April
6, 	2026, 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	second 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss—this 	time 	for 	lack 	of
subject-matter jurisdiction or want of prosecution or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. 	(Doc. 	No. 	87). 	Defendant 	argues 	the 	Court 	lacked 	subject-matter
jurisdiction over this matter once Hood, “as the sole named plaintiff, withdrew his
participation.” (Doc. No. 88 at 12).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” which “possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction.”
Id. (citations omitted). Subject-matter jurisdiction in federal
court exists primarily where a federal question is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or
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when the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal
of claims where the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit.
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by a litigant or the court
itself.
Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). “If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case or claim.
Adams v. Bain,
697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). In cases where the federal court has original
jurisdiction, the court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part 	of 	the 	same 	case 	or 	controversy 	under 	Article 	III 	of 	the 	United 	States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
the 	FLSA 	claim 	and 	declines 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	the
state-law claim.
A. Jurisdiction
Defendant argues that this Court should dismiss the action because the Court
lost subject-matter jurisdiction “when [Hood], as the sole named plaintiff, withdrew
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his participation” in favor of becoming a “non-participating” opt-in plaintiff. (Doc. No.
88 at 12, 15). Plaintiff’s Counsel responds that the Court has not lost subject-matter
jurisdiction because Hood and the three other individuals who provided opt-in
consent forms supply the jurisdictional hook necessary for the court to retain
jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 89 at 9–12). The Court agrees with Defendant.
The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201
	et seq., “establishes federal minimum-wage,
maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract.”
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 69 (2013). Further, the FLSA
“gives employees the right to bring a private cause of action on their own behalf and
on behalf of ‘other employees similarly situated’ for specified violations of the FLSA.”
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Specifically, the FLSA provides that “[a]n action to
recover the liability prescribed . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). In general, the
text of the FLSA makes clear that an FLSA claim must be maintained by at least one
individual.
The FLSA includes an “opt-in requirement.”
See Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon
& Rest. Inc., 880 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir. 2018). The opt-in requirement provides “[n]o
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Thus, a named plaintiff represents only himself
until another individual or individuals consent to join the action.
See Simmons v.
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United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, Hood was
the named plaintiff–and the only plaintiff in this action–when he chose to step down.
Hood’s desire to “remain part of the putative Class and Collective,” (Doc. No 73-1 ¶
4), provides an insufficient basis for the court to retain jurisdiction.
The cases Defendant relies on are persuasive. In
Smith v. ERJ Dining, LLC,
the plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, asserting claims under both the
FLSA and state minimum wage laws. No. 11-CV-2061, 2013 WL 1286674, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 28, 2013). After extensive litigation and seeking to certify her state-law
claims as a class action, the plaintiff “severed ties with her counsel.”
Id. at *2. Instead
of moving to withdraw from the case, the plaintiff’s counsel moved to substitute the
plaintiff as the named plaintiff and proposed class representative with another
putative class member who had not yet opted in to the FLSA claim.
Id. at *2–3. The
plaintiff’s counsel noted the plaintiff had “personal reasons for wanting to be
removed” but still wanted to pursue her claims as a class member.
Id. at *2. The
district court held that the court lost subject-matter jurisdiction on the date the
plaintiff 	severed 	ties 	with 	her 	counsel 	because 	the 	FLSA 	claim 	provided 	the
“jurisdictional hook” for the court, and the “FLSA claim [became] moot without a
plaintiff.”
Id. at *5. The court specified that “once the FLSA claim . . . transitioned
from a one-plaintiff claim to a no-plaintiff claim, neither Counsel nor any of the
putative collective action members had any role to play in advancing it in its present
form.”
Id. at *6;
see also Scully, 2015 WL 1527647, at *1–3 (granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the amended complaint because “there was no longer a ‘case or
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controversy’” without a plaintiff when the plaintiff, who was the only party plaintiff
in the case, withdrew consent to pursue his claim).
When Hood filed his Complaint, he asserted the FLSA claim on behalf of
himself and “all others similarly situated.” (Doc. No. 1). However, at the time Hood
alerted his Counsel to his desire to withdraw as the named plaintiff, no other
individuals had consented to opt in to the case. Therefore, the FLSA claim went “from
a one-plaintiff claim to a no-plaintiff claim.”
Smith, 2013 WL 1286674, at *6. Article
III demands that this Court “adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies,”
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990), and parties must maintain “the
necessary stake” throughout the course of the litigation,
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S.
692, 701 (2011). It was not enough for Hood to say he’d like to “remain part of the
. . . Collective” (Doc. No 73-1 ¶ 4) without maintaining that necessary stake as the
only named plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s Counsel attempts to save this case through substitution with the
2025 opt-in plaintiffs.1 But Counsel and opt-in plaintiffs are too late. These three
individuals cannot save the claim. Plaintiff relies on
Castillo to assert that “pre-
certification substitution of the representative is possible.” (Doc. No. 89 at 11)
;
Castillo, 2018 WL 3429936, at *3 (addressing pre-certification substitution). But in
Castillo, a substitution occurred immediately, whereas here, the substitute had yet
to be determined when Hood abandoned his role.
See (Doc. No. 73-1; Plaintiff’s Decl.
1 Plaintiff’s Counsel represents that the additional individuals who opted in to the
action in 2025 are “ready to take Mr. Hood’s place as the representative plaintiff as
soon as the Court grants leave to amend the complaint.” (Doc. No. 89 at 11).
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¶ 5) (“I agree to be substituted by another representative plaintiff,
who has yet to be
determined . . . .” (emphasis added)). Hood does not desire to continue to litigate his
claims as the named or representative plaintiff, and at the time he alerted Counsel
of his decision to withdraw, no other individual had joined Plaintiff’s suit. At that
moment, the Court was divested of jurisdiction over the FLSA claim. Therefore, from
that point forward, the Court did not have authority to adjudicate this matter.
Lacking jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the FLSA claim.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
In cases where the federal court has original jurisdiction, the court “shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
In other words, “[t]he federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims sharing a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal-law ones.”
Royal
Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31 (2025) (quoting
United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1996)). “A district court’s decision
whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had
original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556
U.S. 635, 639 (2009);
see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts
may decline to
exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	a 	claim . . . if . . . the 	district 	court 	has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). “The
district court’s exercise of discretion as to whether to remand a case to state court
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involves consideration of ‘principles of economy, fairness, convenience and comity.’”
Hartman v. Univ. of Md. at Balt., 595 F. App’x 179, 180 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)).
Hood’s only claim that raises a federal question is the FLSA claim, which the
Court is dismissing with this order. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 10). The Court, in its discretion,
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hood’s North Carolina Wage and
Hour Act claim. That claim is best reserved for the state court to decide. While the
Court recognizes the parties and the Court have already consumed significant time
and resources on the litigation of this case, the state-law issues have not been
extensively briefed before this Court. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim and dismisses it without prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or
Want of Prosecution or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 87) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.
2. 	The Clerk is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: May 20, 2026
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