Gray v. Charlotte Secondary School Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:23-CV-00347-MEO-DCK
MARKAYLE GRAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
CHARLOTTE SECONDARY SCHOOL
INC. AND CHARLOTTE SECONDARY
SCHOOL INC.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Charlotte Secondary School,
Inc. (the “School”), and Board of Directors of Charlotte Secondary School, Inc.’s (the
“Board”), Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 34). For the reasons explained
below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Markayle Graye initiated this lawsuit on June 12, 2023.1 (Doc. No. 1).
Plaintiff brings two claims: (1) race discrimination in violation 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983 against the Board; and (2) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) against the School. (Doc. No. 1 at 9–
11). On May 30, 2024, Judge Conrad adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
1 Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the School with the EEOC on March
14, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 10). The EEOC dismissed the charge and issued Plaintiff a
right-to-sue letter on March 20, 2023. (Doc. No. 1-1).
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and denied the Board’s motion to dismiss.2 (Doc No. 25). On March 7, 2025,
Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 34). On December
19, 2025, this case was reassigned to this Court. On April 23, 2026, this Court heard
arguments on the motion.3
A. The School
The School is a public charter school located in Charlotte, North Carolina. (Doc.
No. 35-1; Ms. Rock Decl. ¶ 4). As a public charter school, the School is required to
comply with various federal laws and state testing requirements.	
Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
Specifically, the School must comply with certain legal requirements to provide
accommodations to students consistent with those students’ individualized education
plans.
Id. ¶ 4.4
The School utilizes an Employee Handbook (Doc. No. 43-2), which contains the
following relevant provisions:
• “This Handbook is a collection of policies and in no way represents a
contract of employment. All Charlotte Secondary School employees
2 The School did not file a motion to dismiss. The Board argued in its motion to dismiss
that under	
Monell, Plaintiff cannot establish the Board’s liability. The M&R
concluded that Plaintiff alleged the Board authorized the termination, thus satisfying
a ratification theory of
Monell liability. (Doc. No. 24 at 7). Neither party objected to
the M&R and the Board did not renew this argument on summary judgment.
3 After the hearing, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. No. 53).
This notice does not comply with LCvR 7.1(j), nor does it provide the Court with new
authority. Rather, Plaintiff refers to portions of Ms. Rock’s deposition transcript
previously available to him to further his arguments. Nevertheless, consideration of
this notice does not change the Court’s analysis.
4 The School must comply with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, requiring schools and
teachers to provide accommodations to students consistent with their Individualized
Education Plan (“IEP”) or 504 Plan. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 4).
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are employed at will, which means that the School or the Employee
may terminate employment at any time and for any reason.”
Id. at 2
(emphasis added). Termination may occur “with or without notice.”
Id. at 9.
• “Employees will practice self-discipline to meet performance goals
established by his/her supervisor. In the unlikely event that an
employee fails to meet those standards, the school will provide
coaching to assist the employee, counseling, and, in some cases,
disciplinary action to change behaviors or mitigate arising
circumstances.”
Id. at 95–96.
• Employees must “[l]earn from constructive criticism and accept
coaching positively.”
Id. at 96.
• “Progressive discipline” used by the School includes various “kinds of
actions, any of which are available for use at any starting point, alone
or in succession,” including termination.
Id. at 97.
• “For serious offenses by an employee, such as . . . insubordination
. . . , termination may be the first and only disciplinary step taken.”
Id. at 98.
• “Any step or steps of the disciplinary process may be skipped at the
discretion of Charlotte Secondary School after investigation and
analysis of the total situation, past practice, and circumstances.”
Id.
The Principal of the School during the relevant time was Keisha Rock, a black
female. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 2). As principal, Ms. Rock made all hiring and firing decisions
while keeping the Board informed of her decisions.
Id. ¶ 3. Ms. Rock had a goal to
maintain the School’s “C” grade it previously had achieved on the North Carolina
Report Card.
Id. ¶ 5.
Ms. Rock hired Plaintiff in October 2022 to teach seventh and eighth grade
English Language Arts (“ELA”).
Id. ¶ 6. Ms. Rock believed that Plaintiff “was
knowledgeable regarding his responsibilities in providing modifications to students’
work to comply with their [requirements] due to his previous experience teaching in
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the Charlotte Mecklenburg public school system.”
Id. ¶ 7.
B. Plaintiff’s Work at the School
On October 10, 2022, Plaintiff began teaching at the School. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 6).
Claudia Evanich, the Exceptional Children (“EC”) and English-as-a-Second-
Language (“ESL”) teacher at the School during the relevant time, co-taught with
Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 35-2; Evanich Decl. ¶¶ 3–4). From the outset, Ms. Evanich
observed that Plaintiff failed to provide the legally required accommodations or
modified assignments to his ESL or EC students.
Id. ¶ 6. Ms. Evanich attempted to
help Plaintiff by providing him with instructions and training on modifications and
accommodations, but Plaintiff failed to implement those recommendations.
Id. ¶ 7.
In November 2022, Ms. Evanich began sharing her concerns about Plaintiff
with Ms. Rock and her other supervisor, Ms. Miller, who also supervised Plaintiff.
Id.
¶¶ 8, 11–12; (Doc. No. 35-8; Miller Decl. ¶ 3). The parent of a student in Plaintiff’s
class also complained about Plaintiff, expressing concern that her son, an EC student,
was not receiving the appropriate modifications. (Doc. No. 35-3 ¶¶ 2,7);
see also (Doc.
No. 35-10).
To help the situation, Ms. Rock, alongside Ms. Miller, organized a professional
development training for the entire staff, at which two EC teachers provided training
on how to read IEP and 504 plans and provide accommodations based on the content
of the document. (Doc. Nos. 35-1 ¶ 8; 35-8 ¶ 4). The training also included sample
lessons to show staff how to modify assignments. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 8).
After that training, Ms. Rock learned that Plaintiff’s noncompliance continued.
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Id. ¶ 10. Accordingly, Ms. Rock developed a plan for Plaintiff to meet with Ms.
Evanich to go over his lesson plans so that Ms. Evanich could understand what he
planned to teach and assist him in making any modifications or accommodations.
Id.;
(Doc. No. 35-2 ¶ 9). Plaintiff, however, rarely shared lessons with Ms. Evanich or
would do fail to do so in a way that provided Ms. Evanich with sufficient time to
review and assist as necessary. (Doc. No. 35-2 ¶ 9). Ms. Miller also began meeting
with Plaintiff on a weekly basis to assist with his lesson plans as necessary. (Doc. No.
35-8 ¶ 5). Nevertheless, Plaintiff persisted in his noncompliance.
Id.
C. Plaintiff’s Lessons and Parental/Student/Teacher Complaints
Shortly thereafter, in November 2022, Ms. Rock learned that Plaintiff was
assigning students material inconsistent with their grade level. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 11).
One such book—The Hate U Give—is a high-school-level novel that Plaintiff assigned
to his seventh-grade students. (Doc. Nos. 35-1 ¶ 11; 39-1 at 144:25–145:17; 39-2 at
126:7-25). When Ms. Rock learned that Plaintiff was teaching this book, she
explained to Plaintiff why that book was inappropriate for his seventh graders and
encouraged Plaintiff to instead assign
Dear Martin to his seventh-grade students,
which Plaintiff began teaching that same month. (Doc. Nos. 35-1 ¶ 11; 39-2 at 59:7–
61:12 (describing
Dear Martin); 127:1–10 (choosing
Dear Martin); 129:10–17; 39-4 at
22:12–16 (Ms. Rock encouraging	
Dear Martin); 35-10). The state-education
department lists
Dear Martin as an approved novel. (Doc. No. 35-4 at 149:12–18).
Plaintiff began teaching
Dear Martin in late November. (Doc. No. 39-2 at 129:10–11).
Ms. Rock also received complaints from parents and students regarding the
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subject matter of Plaintiff’s teaching. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶¶ 13–15). The reports included
claims that Plaintiff’s lessons were offensive and divisive and that he singled out
white students to explain white privilege.
Id. ¶ 15; (Doc. No. 35-4; Rock Dep. at 24:24–
25:23);
see also (Doc. No. 35-11) (March 2023 letter from parent); 35-2 ¶ 11). Parents
and students of different racial backgrounds complained about the subject matter of
Plaintiff’s lessons. (Doc. No. 35-2 ¶ 11; 35-1 ¶ 13). A mother of one white student
testified that her son became withdrawn and silent after Plaintiff singled him out in
class for being white and having white privilege. (Doc. No. 35-5; Sutton Dep. 11:1–25,
62:2–23; 35-2 ¶ 11). Plaintiff disputes that he made any comments about the student’s
physical characteristics. (Doc. No. 35-6 at 15:2–9). According to Ms. Rock, none of the
complaints had to do with the book
Dear Martin. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 12). Instead, Ms.
Rock reported that the complaints concerned Plaintiff not teaching what Ms. Rock
hired him to teach.
Id.
Approximately twenty students, including white, black, and Hispanic
students, went to Ms. Evanich and “expressed concern and discomfort with
[Plaintiff’s] teaching methodology which was dividing the classmates based on race.”5
(Doc. Nos. 35-2 ¶ 11). Generally, throughout Plaintiff’s time teaching at the School,
the students in his class were failing, despite having made progress during the
previous school year. (Doc. Nos. 35-4; Ms. Rock. Dep. at 23:23–24:2; 35-1 ¶ 10).
A white teacher, Amanda Talbot, complained to Ms. Rock about Plaintiff
saying, “if it was a white man, you would’ve fired him already,” to which Ms. Rock
5 While what the students said might be hearsay, the fact that students of various
backgrounds complained to her is not.
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responded that she was “handling it” because she was “not getting ready to share
what’s going on with him with another teacher or vice versa.” (Doc. No. 39-1 at 29:14,
29:25–30:6). In fact, Ms. Rock testified that her thought at the time in relation to Ms.
Talbot’s comment was: “no, if it was a white man, I still wouldn’t have fired him by
now because I hadn’t done everything I could to help him.” (Doc. No. 39-1 at 30:9–11).
D. January Meeting and Subsequent Events
On January 19, 2023, Ms. Rock met with Plaintiff during a principal-teacher
conference to discuss the concerns raised by parents. (Doc. Nos. 39-1 at 173:7–174:3;
35-1 ¶ 17). Ms. Rock said the meeting was to “get [Plaintiff] to understand why it was
an issue for that particular content to be taught. Not necessarily saying the content
could not be taught, but being mindful of certain conversations that are triggering to
students who cannot wrap their minds around them.” (Doc. No. 39-1 at 173:14–19).
Ms. Rock instructed Plaintiff “that his conversations around race were being
misconstrued by the students because they are not mature enough to understand.
[She] explained that the conversation he was trying to have regarding race would be
more appropriate for older students.” (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 17; 35-4 at 25:1–26:1; 35-6
18:17–19:13). Ms. Rock instructed Plaintiff to focus his lessons on the ELA content
and standards. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 17; Doc. No. 35-6 at 23:8–15). Ms. Rock reiterated
that she “[did]n’t disagree with his views” but that the middle schoolers would not
“understand where you’re going with it [and] will take what you’re saying out of
context.” (Doc. No. 39-1 at 182:20–25).
During that time, Ms. Rock reached out to Mr. Sagoo, who was the board chair
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at the time, to inform him of all that was happening. (Doc. No. 35-4 at 29:9–24; 39-3;
Sagoo Dep. at 60:13–62:16). Ms. Talbot had separately informed Mr. Sagoo of some
of the issues. (Doc. No. 35-4 at 29:13–24). Mr. Sagoo advised Ms. Rock at the time “to
basically give [Plaintiff] a warning, advisement, document it and then just continue
to monitor and see if the situation approves.” (Doc. No. 39-3 at 64:17–21).
After that January meeting with Plaintiff, Ms. Rock learned the following.
Plaintiff had failed to attend weekly meetings. (Doc. No. 39-1 at 22:18–23). Plaintiff
was not providing students with appropriate grade-level assignments, or legally
required accommodations, causing EC students to continue to receive failing grades.
(Doc. Nos. 35-4 at 27:6–12, 268:14–271:20);
see also (Doc. No. 43-3 ¶ 18). Plaintiff
continued to ignore directives regarding the content of his classroom instruction and
lessons. (Doc. Nos. 35-1 ¶ 20; 35-8 ¶ 8).
On January 25, 2023, Ms. Rock received an email complaint from a parent of
one of Plaintiff’s students, expressing his concerns about the content of Plaintiff’s
lessons. (Doc. No. 39-1 at 159:21–160:5; 163:2–164:7). Ms. Rock also learned that
Plaintiff had taught a lesson on economic disparity, and she received a photo of
Plaintiff’s classroom board, which showed the focus of his lesson involved social
justice, economics, and racial issues unrelated to the ELA curriculum. (Doc. Nos. 35-
2 ¶ 13; 35-1 ¶ 20; 35-4 at 228:11–229:10). Despite Ms. Rock’s previous instruction not
to include racially charged content in his ELA classes, Plaintiff’s classroom board
contained words like “White World,” “Slavery,” “Red-Lining,” and “Black Codes,”
among others. A reproduction of the photo of Plaintiff’s classroom board is pictured
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below.
(Doc. No. 35-9).
Plaintiff testified to the following regarding his lesson and what he had written
on the whiteboard that day:
• “[W]e had our literary text, Dear Martin. And then we had our informational
text, inequality.org. . . . All of these were just topics related to inequality.org.”
(Doc. No. 35-7 at 44:25–45:2).
• “[A]rt imitates life and I was just pretty much like, this is pretty much a game,
like the real estate industry, that’s a game, you know, basketball is a game,
NFL is a game, the music industry is a game. You have to learn how to play
the game properly. And you learn how to play the game properly by educating
yourself, you learn how to play the game properly by getting assets, you learn
how to play the game properly by having a high network or a really good
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network to increase your net worth. It’s pretty much just a game, it’s all a
game.”
Id. at 50:11–23.
• Plaintiff clarified all that he touched on that day: “assets”; “the benefits of
ownership, homeownership”; “owning real estate”; that “there are certain ZIP
codes better than other ZIP codes from an economic, social economic
standpoint”; “red lining”; “white flight”; “black codes”; “hip hop, rap”;
“slavery . . . it all kind of derives back to that”; “white world”; “poll taxes”; “post
construction”; “reconstruction”; “finances”; Plaintiff’s own “goals in business”;
etc.
Id. at 44:23, 45:4–6, 46:6–8, 46:24–47:6, 47:15–24, 48:6, 48:14–22, 49:6–15,
49:19–24; 52:18–25.
(Doc. No. 35-12).
Based on the above, Ms. Rock determined that Plaintiff was insubordinate by
continuing to teach the exact content that Ms. Rock had instructed him to stop
teaching. (Doc. No. 35-4 at 70:11–71:1; 35-1 ¶ 20).
E. Rock Terminates Plaintiff and Hires a Black Female to Replace Him
Ms. Rock ultimately made the decision to terminate Plaintiff but waited to do
so until Plaintiff returned from a trip. (Doc. Nos. 35-4 at 229:20–230:4; 39-1 at 30:13–
25; 35-1 ¶ 23). Defendants assert that Ms. Rock decided to terminate Plaintiff to keep
the growth the students made in the prior school year and ensure their score on the
North Carolina Report Card. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 25; 35-4 at 31:4–18, 227:23–228:17).
While Plaintiff was out, Ms. Rock worked with other teachers to print off Plaintiff’s
work, modify it, pull all the kids together, have them redo all the assignments,
regrade all the assignments, and reenter the grades. (Doc. No. 35-4 at 27:13–25). Ms.
Rock learned that upon Plaintiff’s return, he collected students’ cell phones and
locked them in a box so they could not take pictures of the board. (Doc. Nos. 35-4 at
28:23–29:7; 35-1 ¶ 23).
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On February 2, 2023, Ms. Rock texted Mr. Sagoo to inform him there had been
another incident, that she planned to let Plaintiff go, and that the Office of Charter
Schools supported the decision. (Doc. No. 39-3 at 62:18–24). Sagoo responded that he
also supported the decision.
Id. at 62:25. On or about that day, Ms. Rock met with
Plaintiff to terminate his employment. (Doc. No. 39-2 at 145:1–6). The parties dispute
what Ms. Rock said at that meeting. Ms. Rock says that based on her training, she
provided intentionally vague reasons for the termination. (Doc. No. 35-4 at 238:8–25).
Plaintiff disputes that, saying that Ms. Rock referenced parental complaints about
Dear Martin, and that Ms. Rock never mentioned Plaintiff’s attendance issues,
failure to comply with IEP or 504 Plan requirements, or any other performance
issues. (Doc. No. 39-2 at 145:14–146:17). Neither party provides any evidence of any
discussions about Plaintiff’s race except for the one comment Ms. Talbot made to Ms.
Rock.
Ms. Rock hired a black female, Marina Thomas, to replace Plaintiff as teacher
of the seventh and eighth grade ELA classes. (Doc. No. 35-1 ¶ 24). Ms. Rock
subsequently reported the termination to the Board in a quarterly update. (Doc. No.
43-4).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment
is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
United
States v. 8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington Cnty., Va., 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022)
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(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a));
see United States, f/u/b Mod. Mosaic, LTD v. Turner
Constr. Co., et al., 946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact
is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
8.929
Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting
Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d
308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the
record.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (when the nonmoving
party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] claim
with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof,” summary judgment is warranted);
see also United States ex rel. Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC, 36 F.4th
173, 178 (4th Cir. 2022) (same). “If the movant satisfies his initial burden to
demonstrate ‘an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case,’ the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to ‘present specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’”
8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting
Humphreys &
Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015)).
“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
Hixson v.
Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Anderson, 477
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U.S. at 247–48). Rather, the nonmoving party must establish that a material fact is
genuinely disputed by, inter alia, “citing to particular parts of the materials of
record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), and cannot rely only on “conclusory allegations,
mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence.”
8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252 (quoting
Dash v.
Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)).
Still, summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial of the
facts.
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. In determining if summary judgment is
appropriate, “courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[ing] the evidence or mak[ing] credibility
determinations.”
Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th
Cir. 2018) (citation modified). “Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because
the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.”
Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568–69 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller
et al., Federal Practice & Procedure §
2728 (3d ed. 1998)).
Overall, the relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–
52.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims. The
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Court addresses each in turn.
A. Count I: Plaintiff’s § 1981/1983 Claim against the Board
Under Section 1981, “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make
and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
“Although § 1981 does not itself use the word ‘race,’ the Court has construed the
section to forbid all ‘racial’ discrimination in the making of private as well as public
contracts.”
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987). “Thus, a
person who experiences intentional race discrimination in private employment may
pursue a ‘federal remedy’ under § 1981.”
Ali v. BC Architects Eng’rs, PLC, 832 F.
App’x 167, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2020),
as amended (Oct. 16, 2020).6
Section “1981 follows the usual rules, not any exception. To prevail, a plaintiff
must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered
the loss of a legally protected right.”
Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned
Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020). “Without direct evidence of intentional
discrimination, a plaintiff may use the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to develop an inferential case of
discriminatory intent.”
Lyons v. City of Alexandria, 35 F.4th 285, 289 (4th Cir. 2022);
see Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244, 255 n.4 (4th Cir. 2025)
(“While the
McDonnell Douglas framework was initially developed for Title VII
discrimination cases, it has since been held to also apply in discrimination cases
6 Section 1983 “provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the
rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.”
Jett v.
Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989).
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arising under Section 1981.”).
Having failed to present any direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff must
proceed through the
McDonnell Douglas framework, which comprises three steps:
“(1) the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination . . . ; (2) if the
plaintiff presents
a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show
a legitimate non-discriminatory . . . reason for the adverse employment action; and
(3) if the defendant shows such a reason, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
prove that the reason is pretextual.”
Sanders v. Tikras Tech. Sols. Corp., 725 F. App’x
228, 229 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04
and
Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016)).
“Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this
framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff.”
Lyons, 35 F.4th at 289.
The elements of a prima facie case of discrimination are: “(1) membership in a
protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and
(4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”
Cosby v. S.C. Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 93 F.4th 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence to create a
genuine dispute as to the second or fourth element.
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i. Satisfactory Job Performance
Plaintiff fails to meet his burden under the second prong. “[T]o create a triable
issue of fact as to satisfactory job performance, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he
‘was performing [his] job duties at a level that met [his] employer’s legitimate
expectations at the time of the adverse employment action.”
Giles v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 59 F.4th 696, 704 (4th Cir. 2023) (second and third alterations in
original). “Critically, under this element, ‘[i]t is the perception of the decision maker
which is relevant,’ not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.”
Id. (quoting
Evans v.
Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960–61 (4th Cir. 1996), and
Smith v.
Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1980)).
Here, Plaintiff does not present any evidence that he met the legitimate
expectations of his employer. Instead, Plaintiff appears to rely on the absence of
certain types of evidence to prove that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate
expectations. (Doc. No. 40 at 18). Plaintiff agrees that “insubordination and a failure
to comply with the subject content for his courses could be indicative of performance
issues,” but he argues that if he had those issues, Ms. Rock would have raised them
with Sagoo and followed the progressive discipline policy with proper documentation.
Id. at 17–18. But the School’s failure to follow its optional, discretionary disciplinary
policies or repeat certain phrases to Plaintiff does not show that Plaintiff met
Defendants’ expectations. Ms. Rock emailed and met with Plaintiff to discuss the
issues with the content of his teaching. And the evidence shows that Ms. Rock and
other teachers attempted to help Plaintiff get back on track. When he refused to get
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on track, Ms. Rock and those other teachers modified Plaintiff’s work, had students
redo their assignments based on the modifications, and then regraded his students.
Plaintiff offers no evidence to rebut that, and no reasonable jury would conclude that
Plaintiff met his employer’s legitimate expectations.
ii. Similarly Situated Comparators
Even if Plaintiff showed he had performed his job satisfactorily, he fails to meet
his burden under the fourth prong. “Courts frequently reframe the fourth element of
a race discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII as ‘similarly situated comparators.’”
Johnson v. Balt. City, Md., 163 F.4th 808, 815 (4th Cir. 2026). These are
“similarly-situated employees outside the protected class [who] received more
favorable treatment.”
Id. Under this prong, the Fourth Circuit has stated “that, as a
general rule, Title VII plaintiffs must show that they were replaced by someone
outside their protected class in order to make out a prima facie case.”
Miles v. Dell,
Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 486 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting “there may be exceptions to this rule
in limited situations”);
accord Robinson v. Priority Auto. Huntersville, Inc., 70 F.4th
776, 784 (4th Cir. 2023);
Kennedy v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 3d 512, 522
(E.D.N.C. 2023);
Pouncey v. Guilford Cnty., No. 1:18CV1022, 2021 WL 2649503, at
*5 n.4 (M.D.N.C. June 28, 2021) (“The employee hired in Plaintiff’s place was also
African American, undermining any circumstantial presumption that race
discrimination was a reason for her termination.”).7
7 At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that applying the Fourth Circuit’s well-established
law would be clear error in light of
Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303
(2025). In	
Ames, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require
majority-group plaintiffs to make a heightened showing of discrimination under the
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Such limited circumstances that allow Plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case
despite this well-established rule include: (1) when “a significant lapse of time occurs
between the adverse employment action and the decision to hire another person”; (2)
“the employer’s hiring of another person within the protected class is calculated to
disguise its act of discrimination”; or (3) when “the firing and hiring decisions were
made by different decisionmakers.”
Miles, 429 F.3d at 486, 489. There is no evidence
that any of these limited circumstances exists in this case.
Here, Ms. Rock, a black female, hired Plaintiff, a black male. Only four months
later, Ms. Rock terminated Plaintiff. Ms. Rock then replaced Plaintiff with a black
female, Marina Thomas. Absent “limited circumstances”—which Plaintiff fails to
address—such a factual scenario undermines Plaintiff’s	
prima facie case of
discrimination.
Nor does Plaintiff present sufficient comparator evidence. “[I]t is the plaintiff’s
task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not treated equally.”
Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981). “[T]o establish a valid
comparator, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the plaintiff and comparator
‘dealt with the same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards
and . . . engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of
them for it.”
Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2019)
first step of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
Id. at 313. That is not the issue here.
Rather, the Fourth Circuit law, which has not changed since
Ames, explains the
inference against discrimination that arises when an employee is replaced by a
person of the same race.
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(alterations in original). “[T]o focus on one piece of the record without considering the
whole would distort the permissible inferences to be drawn.”
Cook v. CSX Transp.
Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff’s “comparator evidence” relies on Valerie Roundtree’s affidavit that
provides only hearsay and rumors.
See (Doc. No. 39-4). Though she describes herself
as having “personal knowledge” of three white teachers whom Ms. Rock did not
terminate despite their alleged racially offensive remarks and actions or their failure
to provide necessary learning accommodations, Ms. Roundtree fails to establish how
she is “aware” of what happened. Nor does her affidavit say anything about how she
gained this “knowledge” of the happenings with other teachers.
“Rumors, conclusory allegations and a plaintiff’s subjective beliefs about the
conduct of allegedly ‘similarly situated’ individuals ‘are wholly insufficient evidence
to establish a claim of discrimination as a matter of law.’”
Mbadiwe v. Union Mem’l
Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 3:05CV49-MU, 2007 WL 1219953, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 24,
2007),
aff’d sub nom. Mbadiwe v. Union Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 F. App’x 147 (4th Cir.
2008);
see also Greensboro Pro. Fire Fighters Ass’n, Loc. 3157 v. City of Greensboro,
64 F.3d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[U]nattributed rumors . . . [are] neither admissible
at trial nor supportive of an opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”);
see also
Evans, 80 F.3d at 962 (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) specifically requires
that affidavits submitted on summary judgment contain admissible evidence and be
based on personal knowledge.”).
Ms. Roundtree’s affidavit fails to provide any admissible evidence of similarly
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situated comparators. Even if the Court considered these rumors, Plaintiff, through
Ms. Roundtree’s affidavit or otherwise, fails to put forth any admissible evidence
showing these white teachers engaged in similar conduct or involved similar
circumstances as Plaintiff. In fact, the evidence does not indicate that Ms. Rock had
any performance or insubordination issues with these teachers.8 Alternatively, Ms.
Rock received numerous complaints about Plaintiff from parents and teachers, and
Plaintiff failed to positively respond to Ms. Rock’s attempts to redirect him.
Defendants put forth comparator evidence establishing that Ms. Rock did not use the
Handbook’s progressive discipline process for any of the terminations she conducted
while teaching at the School. That three of the four teachers Ms. Rock terminated
were black, without more, does not change the Court’s analysis. (Doc. No. 39-1 at
113:7–117:22).
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to present a genuine dispute as to whether he
received different treatment from similarly situated comparators. He further fails to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination when the same person who hired him,
a member of his protected class, also fired him and then replaced him with a member
of the same protected class shortly thereafter. Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine
issue of material fact as to his Section 1981 claim, and summary judgment on that
8 The evidence shows that prior to this litigation, Ms. Rock knew of only one complaint
referenced in Roundtree’s affidavit—that is, a complaint that Roundtree made to Ms.
Rock about Mr. Rogers, a white social studies teacher. (Doc. No. 43-3 ¶¶ 4–6). Ms.
Rock received no complaints from any parents or teachers regarding Rogers or any of
the teachers Roundtree mentioned.
Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 14, 15.
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claim is warranted in favor of Defendants.9
B. Count II: Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim against the School
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Title VII”);
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354
(2024). “There are two traditional approaches to analyzing employment
discrimination claims, historically referred to as the ‘pretext’ and ‘mixed-motive’
frameworks.”
Worden v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 549 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff is proceeding under Title VII’s mixed-motive provision, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m), which states that “an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
At the outset, Plaintiff offered what his counsel described as a textualist,
“plain-language” interpretation of the mixed-motive provision of Title VII. Pointing
to the text of § 2000e-2(m), Plaintiff argued without citation to authority that he need
only show that the
subject of race, not
his own personal race, was a motivating factor
for his termination. But “statutes are not read as a collection of isolated phrases.”
SEC v. Pirate Inv. LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Abuelhawa v.
United States, 556 U.S. 816 (2009)). And as the pioneer of modern textualism, Justice
Scalia, once observed, “In textual interpretation, context is everything . . . .”
See
9 Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s arguments regarding pretext, no
reasonable jury would conclude that Plaintiff’s termination was pretextual for the
same reasons explained under the next claim, as those arguments are materially the
same as Plaintiff’s pretext arguments under Section 1981.
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Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 37 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997). “Context also includes common sense, which is another thing that ‘goes
without saying.’ Case reporters and casebooks brim with illustrations of why
literalism—the antithesis of context-driven interpretation—falls short.”
Biden v.
Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 512 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring). Plaintiff’s literalist
interpretation, while creative, fails to consider the statutory and common-sense
context. In so doing, it conflicts with the governing interpretation of the law. A plain
reading of Title VII makes clear that an individual must show discrimination on the
basis of his race.
See, e.g.,
Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc., 95 F.4th 778, 788 (4th Cir.
2024) (a mixed-motive plaintiff must show that “his protected characteristic”
motivated the adverse employment decision). Any other interpretation would produce
absurd results.
Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s claim, the Court observes that “[r]egardless
of the type of evidence offered by a plaintiff as support for her discrimination claim
(direct, circumstantial, or evidence of pretext), or whether she proceeds under a
mixed-motive or single-motive theory, ‘[t]he ultimate question in every employment
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff
was the victim of intentional discrimination.’”
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc),
overruled in part on other
grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (first quoting
Reeves
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v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000), then citing
Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). “To demonstrate such an intent to
discriminate on the part of the employer, an individual alleging disparate treatment
based upon a protected trait must produce sufficient evidence upon which one could
find that ‘the protected trait . . .
actually motivated the employer’s decision.’”
Hill,
354 F. 3d at 186 (citation omitted). This means that “[t]he protected trait ‘must have
actually played a role in the employer’s decisionmaking process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.’”
Id.
By choosing to bring a mixed-motive claim, a plaintiff “faces ‘a lessened
causation standard’ than but-for causation. For he need only provide sufficient direct
or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that his protected characteristic was a
motivating factor in the defendant’s challenged employment practice. If he does so,
‘the employer cannot escape liability.’”
Duvall, 95 F.4th at 788 (first quoting
Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 349 (2013), then citing
Desert Palace, Inc.
v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003), then quoting
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2005)). Indeed, “the impermissible factor need
not have been the sole factor. As long as it motivated the adverse action, the plaintiff
can establish an unlawful employment practice.”
Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Overall, Plaintiff’s “evidence must both display a
‘discriminatory attitude’ and bear a causal relationship with the adverse employment
action.”
Ousley v. McDonald, 648 F. App’x 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
To show that Plaintiff’s race was a motivating factor for his termination,
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Plaintiff points to: (1) Ms. Talbot’s comment; (2) Ms. Roundtree’s declaration; (3) the
disciplinary steps Ms. Rock skipped before terminating Plaintiff; and (4) Ms. Rock’s
allegedly changing narrative for why she terminated Plaintiff. 10
For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, fails to provide “sufficient probative
force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact.”
Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 577. Accordingly,
because there is no genuine dispute of material fact whether Plaintiff’s race
motivated Defendants’ decision to terminate him, summary judgment is required.
i. Duvall v. Novant Health
Plaintiff cites
Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc. to support his interpretation of
Title VII. However,
Duvall does not help Plaintiff. In
Duvall, Novant abruptly
terminated the plaintiff, a white male with a successful record as a marketing leader
at Novant, after Novant had implemented a wide-scale Diversity and Inclusion (D&I)
strategic plan to increase D&I across its executive and senior leadership teams.
Duvall, 95 F.4th at 782–84. Novant continued to push its D&I initiative and discuss
its impact on Novant’s hiring practices even after terminating the plaintiff.
Id. at 783.
Novant promoted two females to replace the plaintiff, a white woman and a black
10 Plaintiff primarily argued that the subject of race motivated Ms. Rock’s decision to
terminate Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that he presented direct evidence
that racial factors motivated Ms. Rock’s termination decision, those being “[Ms.
Rock’s] statement to Board President Sagoo that the basis for firing Gray was his
teaching of Critical Race Theory and her narrative in the Board’s personnel briefing
that Gray’s lessons included ‘racially charged content.’” (Doc. No. 40 at 11). As
discussed, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s literalist interpretation of Title VII’s mixed-
motive provision, so it need not address those arguments. Even if considered, that
evidence does not change the Court’s analysis.
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woman, and then hired another black female for the position.
Id. at 786. Novant also
gave “shifting, conflicting, and unsubstantiated explanations” for terminating the
plaintiff.	
Id. at 790. The Fourth Circuit concluded that at trial, the plaintiff
“presented sufficient evidence (direct or circumstantial) for a reasonable jury to have
found that his race and/or sex played a motivating factor in Novant Health’s decision
to fire him.”
Id. at 788.
Here, there is no evidence that Defendants ever discussed Plaintiff’s race or
the race of any employee. Discussions and complaints regarding the content of
Plaintiff’s lessons never involved Plaintiff’s race, the race of any teacher, or D&I
initiatives. As discussed further below, Defendants did not present shifting and
conflicting reasons for terminating Plaintiff. And most notably, Plaintiff was fired by
Ms. Rock, a black female, and Ms. Rock hired a black female to fill his position. For
these reasons, this case is quite different from
Duvall. Further, the evidence in this
case shows that Defendants relied only on factors other than Plaintiff’s race—namely,
his poor work performance and insubordination—in choosing to terminate him.11
i. Talbot’s Statement
Plaintiff’s only purported “direct evidence” that Defendants discriminated
against him on the basis of his race is the statement of Ms. Talbot, a white teacher at
the school. The parties do not appear to dispute that Ms. Talbot complained to Ms.
11 Similarly, this case is distinguishable from
Bandy v. City of Salem, which Plaintiff
also cites. 59 F.4th 705, 711 (4th Cir. 2023).
Bandy involves direct evidence of
discrimination under the ADEA, which employs a but-for standard.
Id. For that
reason, and because there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Defendants
made derogatory comments toward or about Plaintiff,
Bandy is inapplicable here.
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Rock about Plaintiff, saying “if it was a white man, you would’ve fired him already.”
(Doc. No. 39-1 at 29:14, 29:25–30:6). Ms. Rock responded that she was “handling it”
because she was “not getting ready to share what’s going on with [Plaintiff] with
another teacher or vice versa.” (Doc. No. 39-1 at 29:14, 29:25–30:6).
At the summary judgment hearing, Defendants argued Ms. Talbot’s statement
is hearsay, to which Plaintiff responded that he is not offering it for the truth of the
matter asserted. Rather, Plaintiff asks the Court to credit Ms. Talbot’s statement as
to its effect on Ms. Rock. That is, that Ms. Talbot’s statement led Ms. Rock to
terminate Plaintiff because of, at least in part, his race. This is the only allegedly
“direct evidence” that Plaintiff has put forth under the mixed-motive theory.
Ms. Talbot’s statement is not direct evidence. “Direct evidence must be
evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory
attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.”
Matias v. Elon
Univ., 780 Fed. App’x 28, 30 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). This includes “evidence that
the employer ‘announced, or admitted, or otherwise unmistakably indicated that
[race] was a determining factor’ in the particular employment action.”
Marlow v.
Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 749 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 2010) (quoting
Cline
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1982)). “The kind of statements
that suffice to show direct evidence of discrimination are those comments that do not
require ‘inference or presumption.’”
McLaughlin v. CSX Transp., Inc., 211 F. Supp.
3d 770, 779 (D.S.C. 2016) (quoting
Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581–82
(11th Cir. 1989)).
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Here, Ms. Rock did not make the statement at issue. Rather, Ms. Talbot said
it to Ms. Rock. Giving weight to Ms. Talbot’s comment requires the fact finder to
presume or infer that Ms. Talbot’s statement actually had an effect on Ms. Rock. This
is far from direct evidence of discrimination. Even still, sufficient circumstantial
evidence can establish a mixed-motive claim for discrimination. The problem with
Ms. Talbot’s statement is that it fails to provide even circumstantial evidence of
discrimination. That is so because it requires assuming that Ms. Rock took Ms.
Talbot’s comment and then terminated Plaintiff, at least in part, so that others would
not think she favors black teachers over white teachers. However, Ms. Rock denied
at deposition that Ms. Talbot’s statement had any impact on her decision to terminate
Plaintiff (and her denial of the statement’s purported impact on her is
uncontradicted). “Such unsupported speculation or argument by counsel is not
evidence to be considered at summary judgment and does not create issues of
material fact.”
Dean v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 1:02CV149, 2003 WL 21754998,
at *5 (M.D.N.C. July 29, 2003).
Therefore, Ms. Talbot’s statement, even in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
does not create a genuine dispute as to a material fact.
ii. After-the-fact and Varying Reasons for Termination
Plaintiff points to Ms. Rock’s reasons for terminating Plaintiff to show that she
had a discriminatory motive.12 An employer’s “shifting, conflicting, and
12 “Although cases in which the	
McDonnell Douglas framework is applied are
sometimes referred to as ‘pretext cases,’ and we have no wish to change a quarter
century of usage, it should be noted that questions of pretext may arise in any Title
VII case, regardless of whether it is analyzed under
McDonnell Douglas.”
Costa v.
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unsubstantiated explanations for [the plaintiff’s] termination . . . are indicative of
pretext for unlawful discrimination.”
Duvall, 95 F.4th at 790 (citing
Jacobs, 780 F.3d
at 576). “In order to show pretext, a plaintiff may show that an employer’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination are inconsistent over time, false, or
based on mistakes of fact.”
Haynes, 922 F.3d at 225. “While an employer is certainly
permitted to expand on its original reason for a termination, such evidence of
substantial changes to [the employer’s] proffered reason for the termination permits
an inference of pretext.”
Id. at 226;
accord Duvall, 95 F.4th at 791.
Plaintiff argues that Ms. Rock provided after-the-fact and varying reasons for
termination. Plaintiff also argues that Ms. Rock did not use the word insubordination
when she fired him nor did Ms. Rock ever discipline Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 40 at 20–21).
Plaintiff also points to Ms. Rock’s failure to reference the “ELA guidelines at three
separate intervals—her communications with Mr. Sagoo in late January 2023, the
Board briefing about personnel actions, or the meeting notifying [Plaintiff] of his
firing.” (Doc. No. 40 at 12).
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Rock attempted to correct
Plaintiff’s lessons and coach him on modifications after receiving numerous
complaints about the topics of his lessons, but Plaintiff continued to teach subjects
that Ms. Rock told him to avoid. Her choice to use words other than “insubordination”
when she terminated Plaintiff does not mean that her reason for termination
Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 857 (9th Cir. 2002),
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003);
see
also Duvall, 95 F.4th at 788–91 (analyzing pretext under the mixed-motive
framework).
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changed—that Plaintiff ignored her coaching and direction.
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that Ms. Rock gave “after-the-fact
rationales,” such as the fact that Plaintiff “taught outside the approved lines of his
approved curriculum or that his topics were inappropriate for the age of his students,”
the evidence shows that Ms. Rock brought up these issues to Plaintiff prior to his
termination. (Doc. No. 35-6 at 4:18–24, 18:17–25, 23:8–24);
see also (Doc. No. 39-3;
Sagoo Dep. at 61:13–62:1 (Ms. Rock mentioned same issues to Mr. Sagoo). Thus, Ms.
Rock’s reasons for terminating Plaintiff did not substantially change over time, and
to the extent that Ms. Rock discovered additional issues with Plaintiff as she
investigated the situation, those do not indicate pretext.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, does not create a genuine issue of material fact about whether Defendants
discriminated against him, nor does the evidence show how the reasons for his
termination are “inconsistent over time, false, or based on mistakes of fact.”
Haynes,
922 F.3d at 225.
iii. The Handbook
The parties do not dispute that Ms. Rock did not use progressive discipline as
outlined in the Handbook to terminate Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff argues that a jury
can infer a discriminatory motive from Ms. Rock’s failure to do so.
See (Doc. No. 40 at
13) (citing Doc. No. 36 at 6, 10). Plaintiff also argued at the hearing that the lack of a
paper trail, primarily from the lack of progressive discipline, leads to an inference
that Ms. Rock considered Plaintiff’s race when deciding to terminate him.
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“Evidence that a company failed to follow its own disciplinary policies in firing
an employee can also be probative of pretext.”
Wannamaker-Amos, 126 F.4th at 260
(citing
Cowgill v. First Data Tech., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2022), and
Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 728 (4th Cir. 2019)). “That is
because an employer’s ‘extreme overreaction’ to a minor infraction may suggest that
the relevant decisionmaker was ‘looking for a reason to get rid of [the plaintiff]’ on
discriminatory grounds.”
Wannamaker-Amos, 126 F.4th at 260. But “[t]he mere fact
that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily
suggest that the employer was motivated by illegal discriminatory intent.”
Russell v.
Harlow, 771 Fed. App’x 206, 207–08 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting
Vaughan
v. Metrahealth Cos., 145 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1998)). “Instead, ‘there must be some
evidence that the irregularity directly and uniquely disadvantaged a minority
employee.’”
Russell, 771 Fed. App’x at 208 (quoting
Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d
1202, 1213 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that failure of employer to follow policy as to
all applicants did not show pretext)).
Here, Ms. Rock testified, and Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to the
contrary, that she did not follow the formal progressive discipline policy for any of the
teachers she terminated during her time as head of school in accordance with her
training. (Doc. No. 35-4 at 259:25–261:20). Thus, Plaintiff fails to show how he was
uniquely disadvantaged. Further, the Handbook grants Ms. Rock discretion in
determining whether to use progressive discipline by allowing the employer to skip
any step and jump to termination for serious offenses—which may occur with or
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31
without notice. (Doc. No. 43-2 at 9, 98);
see, e.g.,
Ogedegbe v. Town of Leesburg, No.
1:24-CV-1897-MSN-LRV, 2026 WL 252518, at *10 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2026) (finding
failure to follow policy not pretextual because the “policy did not prohibit Plaintiff’s
termination or require progressive discipline, and Plaintiff does not show how his
termination is not proportional to the seriousness of his conduct”). Lastly, Ms. Rock
tried to coach and redirect Plaintiff before terminating him. Thus, Plaintiff fails to
present evidence to create an inference of discrimination regarding Ms. Rock’s failure
to utilize a discretionary progressive discipline policy.
iv. Roundtree Declaration
For the same reasons already discussed, Plaintiff fails to provide admissible
comparator evidence as to whether Plaintiff was treated differently from white
teachers.
Ms. Roundtree also describes in her affidavit that she expressed her concerns
to Ms. Rock after Plaintiff’s termination, and Ms. Rock said “that there were things
about the dismissal that [she] didn’t know, such as the fact that a white teacher at
CSS had gone to the state charter school board that oversees CSS and reported Gray’s
teaching content, and that state authorities had contacted her about [Plaintiff], and
that she believed she was going to be fired if something was not done about him.”
(Doc. No. 39-4 ¶ 11). While this statement involves a direct conversation Ms.
Roundtree says she had with Ms. Rock, which Ms. Rock disputes,
see (Doc. No. 43-3
¶ 17), it does not provide any evidence from which a reasonable jury would conclude
that Ms. Rock fired Plaintiff because of, in whole or in part, his race.
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Accordingly, Ms. Roundtree’s affidavit fails to establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis
of his race. Nor does any of the evidence, when viewed together and in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, show that Plaintiff’s race motivated Defendants’ decision to
terminate him. For these reasons, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is
warranted on Count II.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, “[r]egardless of the type of evidence offered by a plaintiff as support
for [a] discrimination claim (direct, circumstantial, or evidence of pretext), or whether
she proceeds under a mixed-motive or single-motive theory, ‘[t]he ultimate question
in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is
whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.’”
Hill, 354 F.3d at
286 (citations omitted).
In construing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact
such that a reasonable jury would conclude that Defendants discriminated against
Plaintiff because of his race under either Title VII or Section 1981. Accordingly, the
Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 34) is GRANTED and the Clerk is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: May 12, 2026
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