Lucas v. McDowell Quail, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
EBONY SHERISSE LUCAS,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-
00832-KDB-DCK
v.
THE DWELL AT CARMEL
APARTMENTS ET AL.,
Defendants.
EBONY SHERISSE LUCAS,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-
00090-KDB-DCK
v.
REGIONAL ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
THESE MATTERS are before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (Doc. No. 24)
and Motion for Recusal and Motion to Disqualify Judge (Doc. No. 29) in Civil Action No. 3:25-
CV-00832-KDB-DCK (“Carmel Apartments”) and Motion for Recusal and Disqualification of
Judge in Civil Action No. 3:26-CV-00090 (“Regional Acceptance Corp.”) (Doc. No. 11). The
Court has carefully considered these motions, including Plaintiff’s briefs and supporting
submissions. The Court has consolidated its review and ruling on the motions based on the
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similarity of the motions, Plaintiff’s supporting arguments and the relief requested. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will DENY all the motions.
Plaintiff’s motions seek the recusal of the Honorable Kenneth D. Bell from both actions
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Together with her motions for recusal in Carmel
Apartments, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice in Support of Recusal and Affidavit
in Support of Motion for Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Doc. Nos. 24-1, 29-1. No affidavit has
been filed in Regional Acceptance Corp. Section 144 states in pertinent part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 144.
To serve as a basis for recusal under § 144, affidavits must be both “timely and sufficient.”
Sine v. Loc. No. 992 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 882 F.2d 913, 914–15 (4th Cir. 1989). To be
considered legally sufficient the affidavits must allege personal bias or prejudice caused by an
extrajudicial source other than what the judge has learned or experienced from his participation in
the case. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304,
308 (4th Cir. 1984). Further, a judge against whom an affidavit under § 144 is filed must pass upon
the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged. Sine, 882 F.2d at 914. In doing so, it is equally his duty,
however, to deny the relief claimed on account of the facts stated in the affidavit if they are legally
insufficient, as it is to grant relief if they are sufficient. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Section 144 affidavits are legally insufficient. They do not
allege that the challenged judge has a personal bias unrelated to his experience with Plaintiff’s
cases in this Court. Indeed, the affidavits do not allege that the judge has any connection to the
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Parties or claims that might establish personal bias other than through his rulings. Therefore, the
Court must deny the Motions for Recusal based on 28 U.S.C. § 144 in Carmel Apartments and in
Regional Acceptance Corp., where no § 144 affidavit has been filed.
Also, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455, a judge has “as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate
reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Tallant v. Tallant, No.
520CV00129KDBDCK, 2020 WL 6813227, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2020), citing Nicholas v.
Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995). Section 455(a) provides that disqualification is necessary
“in any proceeding in which [the judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a). Section 455(b)(1) provides that a judge “shall also disqualify himself ... [w]here he has
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
Section 455 does not demand recusal because of “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous
speculation” because that would result in litigants “exercise[ing] a negative veto over the
assignment of judges.” United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998). The standard
for disqualification under section 455 is “whether a reasonable person would have a reasonable
basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality, not whether the judge is in fact impartial.” United
States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003). As the Supreme Court has explained:
[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring
in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute
a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism
or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks
during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,
counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an
extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of
favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
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Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 573
(4th Cir. 2011) (“[J]udicial rulings and ‘opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings’
almost ‘never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.’” (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S.
at 555)).
Plaintiff has not alleged any grounds for recusal beyond her dissatisfaction with the Court’s
rulings in these or other matters that have come before the challenged judge. Again, Plaintiff does
not, and cannot, point to any extrajudicial source of disqualifying bias and prejudice, nor can she
point to any evidence that this Court has “such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to
make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that a
reasonable person, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about this
Court’s impartiality. Tallant, 2020 WL 6813227, at *3, citing United States v. Allen, 587 F.3d 246,
252-53 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motions for recusal will be denied.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (Doc. No. 24) and Motion for Recusal and Motion
to Disqualify Judge (Doc. No. 29) in Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-00832-KDB-DCK
are DENIED; and
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal and Disqualification of Judge in Civil Action No.
3:26-CV-00090 (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
Signed: April 30, 2026
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