Pajtas v. Lincoln Charter School et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00930-KDB-SCR
JASON R. PAJTAS,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
JONATHAN BRYANT, LINCOLN
CHARTER SCHOOL, AND
TRISHA AMOS,
Defendants.
On November 17, 2025, Plaintiff Jason Pajtas’ son received a five-day suspension
following what he characterizes as a “disciplinary incident.” Doc. No. 2-1 at 1. Pajtas alleges that
Defendant Bryant improperly denied his request for an “informal hearing” prior to the start of the
suspension—which he contends is required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-390.6(b). Doc. No. 2-1
at 3. He thereafter filed a Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order in Lincoln
County Superior Court. Doc. Nos. 2; 7 at 2. When the state court denied the motion, Pajtas initiated
this action on November 21, 2025, alleging violations of his son’s federal and state constitutional
rights. Doc. No. 1.
Now before the Court is Pajtas’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 2), filed
contemporaneously with the Complaint, in which he seeks the immediate reinstatement of his son
at school. Doc. No. 2. Defendants filed a timely opposition on December 4, 2025, asserting that
the Motion is moot because Pajtas’ son has already returned to school. See Doc. No. 7.
Before a Court may consider the merits of a motion for preliminary injunction, it must first
determine whether there is a “live” controversy between the parties. “‘[A] case is moot when the
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issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.’” Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220, 1222 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). Thus, a motion for preliminary injunction becomes moot when it is
impossible for a court to grant any “effectual relief” to the prevailing party. Knox v. Serv. Emps.
Int'l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307–08 (2012). Further, “the relief a plaintiff seeks in his
motion for preliminary injunction must be relief that a court could issue at the preliminary
injunction stage.” Pitcairn Franchise Dev., LLC v. JTH Tax, LLC, No. 2:21-CV-295-RAJ-LRL,
2022 WL 1093269, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2022) (citing Cunningham Energy, LLC v. Vesta O&G
Holdings, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00061, 2020 WL 6140463, at *4–5 (S.D.W. Va. May 21, 2020)).
Here, the record establishes that the suspension concluded on November 24, 2025, and that
Pajtas’ son has since resumed attending school. Doc. No. 7 at 4. Because the relief Pajtas seeks
has already happened, no live controversy remains with respect to Pajtas’ son’s attendance at
school. Additionally, Pajtas requests to expunge the suspension from his son’s record and to enjoin
Defendants from imposing future suspensions on his son without an informal hearing can be more
appropriately decided on the merits. Accordingly, Pajtas’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is
DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
Signed: December 29, 2025
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