Boggs v. New South Finance LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-00051-KDB-DCK
JESSICA LENNON BOGGS,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
NEW SOUTH FINANCE LLC,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(Doc. No. 2). Based on that examination, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s reasonable expected
expenses approximately equal her expected income, and she does not otherwise have sufficient
assets with which to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the Motion for the
limited purpose of conducting an initial review but DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint without
prejudice after conducting that review.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 342-43 (1948)). To achieve its goal, the IFP statute “allows a litigant to commence
a civil or criminal action in federal court in forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit
stating … that he is unable to pay the costs of a lawsuit.” Id. In her IFP motion, Plaintiff alleges
that she has no income or expenses and has been evicted from her residence. Doc. No. 2 at 4–5.
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Based on these representations, the Court will conditionally grant the motion and permit Plaintiff
to proceed IFP solely for the limited purposes of this initial review.
A. Frivolity Review
Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court must review the Complaint to determine
whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its frivolity review, this Court
must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded
upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327-28. Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district
court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in the Complaint which set forth a claim that is
cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). In
addition, the Court has an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (internal
citations omitted).
Plaintiff Jessica Boggs’ claims appear to arise from Defendant New South Finance LLC’s
repossession of her vehicle following her failure to remain current on her automobile loan
obligations, which included making regular payments on the loan and providing proof of full-
coverage insurance. See Doc. No. 1-2. According to the Complaint, beginning in early October
2025, Boggs received delinquency notices advising that she was behind on her loan payments and
instructing her either to bring the account current and provide proof of full-coverage insurance or
surrender the vehicle. See id. Rather than cure the delinquency, Boggs sent New South Finance a
document titled “Notice of Submission to the United States Department of the Treasury,” asserting
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that she had submitted the loan agreement to the Treasury for “review, settlement, and payment
under trust authority” pursuant to purported “principles of equitable setoff and discharge.” Doc.
No. 1-3 at 4. When, unsurprisingly, no payment was made by the Treasury—or by Boggs—the
delinquency notices continued, along with warnings that the vehicle could be lawfully repossessed.
Doc. No. 1 at 4.
On or about December 22, 2025, Boggs sent a second letter, titled “Conditional Settlement
and Discharge of Account,” which she claimed enclosed a “conditional settlement instrument.” Id.
The letter asserted that she was tendering a “negotiable instrument” containing “language to trigger
acceptance under UCC § 3-311,” and that upon acceptance, the loan obligation would be “fully
discharged and settled.” Doc. No. 1-3 at 8–9. New South Finance responded on December 25,
2025, stating that it did not agree to any settlement other than a full payoff of the account. Doc.
No. 1-4 at 2. When Boggs failed to make the required payments, New South Finance repossessed
the vehicle on January 9, 2026. Id. at 1.
Much of the language of the Complaint is familiar to this Court as it speaks of trusts, alleged
payments of the underlying debt through “tender of a negotiable instrument,” and how the lender
allegedly violated the UCC in proceeding with the repossession. Boggs erroneously believes that
she does not have to pay her valid automobile loan based on the widely discredited contention that
Article 3 of the UCC permits her to simply declare her debts discharged based on her “tender” of
a so-called “negotiable instrument.”
Although not explicitly stated, Boggs’ Complaint rests on theories commonly associated
with the “sovereign citizen” movement. Riccobono v. Barnum, No. CV-25-01851-PHX-DJH,
2025 WL 3088987, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2025). Courts have repeatedly rejected similar
arguments as legally baseless and routinely dismiss claims premised on these flawed theories. See,
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e.g., Aalaam v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 5:24-CV-00209-KDB-DCK, 2025 WL 492010, at
*2 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2025) (discussing the widely discredited “vapor money” theory and
plaintiff’s allegations that the UCC allowed him to discharge his debts based on the “tender” of a
“negotiable instrument” and dismissing the matter); Puente v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 2025 WL
408677, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (characterizing allegations that a plaintiff “tendered payment”
through pseudo-legal instruments as “legal-sounding but meaningless verbiage” typical of
sovereign citizen filings); Scott v. Westlake Fin., LLC, 2025 WL 2734569, at *1 (W.D.N.C. 2025)
(dismissing claims based on the plaintiff’s creation of a purported “Private Living Trust” to
extinguish a vehicle lien).
The same defects are present here. Boggs has submitted baseless documents concerning a
fictitious trust and asserting that she has satisfied her loan in full through her “tender” of a
“negotiable instrument.” Because Boggs’ claims rely entirely on meritless instruments and
irrational legal theories, dismissal is warranted.
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED for purposes of this Order;
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice;
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction (Doc. No. 3), Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (Doc. No. 5), Motion to Set Preliminary Injunction Hearing
(Doc. No. 6), and Emergency Motion to Compel Return of Vehicle (Doc. No. 7)
are all DENIED as moot; and
4. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED. Signed: February 4, 2026
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