Isbell v. Goodwin et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:25-CV-00103-MEO-DCK
JANET G. ISBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT GOODWIN,
ALEX LEE, INC.,
LOWE'S FOODS, AND
LOWE'S FOODS OF MOORESVILLE,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.
No. 9). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a former employee of Lowes Foods, alleges that on May 24, 2024, a
co-worker approached her from behind and “forcefully rammed her knee into
Plaintiff’s crotch.” (Doc. No. 1-1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 6). Plaintiff alleges that when she
reported the incident to her manager, Defendant Goodwin, he responded, “It’s
Memorial Day Weekend and I just don’t have time for this!”
Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff resigned
that same day.
Id. ¶ 10.
The Complaint asserted claims for discrimination, harassment, constructive
discharge, negligent supervision, and punitive damages against all Defendants. By
notice filed August 29, 2025, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed with prejudice the
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discrimination claim set forth at paragraphs 25 through 28 of the Complaint. (Doc.
No. 11; Doc. No. 14, at 1). Remaining before the Court are Plaintiff’s claims for
harassment, constructive discharge, negligent supervision, and punitive damages.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a
blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 n.3 (2007).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” tests whether the complaint is
legally and factually sufficient.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;
Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d
187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010),
aff’d sub nom. Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30
(2012). A court need not accept a complaint’s “legal conclusions, elements of a cause
of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”	
Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The
Court, however, accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.
See Conner v. Cleveland Cnty. N. Carolina, 22 F.4th
412, 416 (4th Cir. 2022);
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637
F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).
Construing the facts in this manner, a complaint must contain “sufficient
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factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 520 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). Thus, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
determines only whether a claim is stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding
the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Republican Party v.
Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against Defendants Goodwin, Alex Lee, Inc., and Lowes Foods of
Mooresville
Plaintiff’s Response addresses only her harassment and constructive discharge
claims against Defendant Lowes Foods, LLC. (Doc. No. 14). She offers no argument
opposing dismissal of any claim against Defendant Goodwin, Defendant Alex Lee,
Inc., or Lowes Foods of Mooresville. Arguments not defended in opposition to a motion
to dismiss are treated as abandoned.
Dismissal of these Defendants is independently warranted on two grounds.
First, Plaintiff did not name Goodwin, Alex Lee, Inc., or Lowes Foods of Mooresville
in her EEOC Charge, and the time to do so has passed. (Compl. ¶ 5; Ex. A). The
touchstone for exhaustion is whether the administrative and judicial claims are
“reasonably related,” not whether they are identical.
Sydnor v. Fairfax County, 681
F.3d 591, 595 (4th Cir. 2012). Because the Charge named only Lowes Foods,
Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants are unexhausted.
Second, as to Defendant Goodwin individually, Title VII and the ADEA restrict
liability to “employers” and do not reach individual supervisors.
See 42 U.S.C. §
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2000e-2(a);
Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180–81 (4th Cir. 1998) (Title
VII);
Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510–11 (4th Cir. 1994) ( ADEA).
All claims against Defendants Goodwin, Alex Lee, Inc., and Lowes Foods of
Mooresville require dismissal.
B. Harassment Claim (Against Defendant Lowes Foods, LLC)
To state a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that
(1) she experienced unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was based on a
protected characteristic, (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter
the conditions of employment, and (4) there is a basis to impose liability on the
employer.
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
Title VII “does not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace,” and
callous or rude conduct by a coworker or supervisor is not, standing alone, actionable.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citation omitted);
E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Complaint’s harassment allegations rest on Mr. Goodwin’s response to
Plaintiff’s report — that he was too busy to address it — and on the separate incident
involving her co-worker. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 15–16). Neither is tied by any pleaded fact
to Plaintiff’s sex or age. The Complaint alleges no animus, no differential treatment
of similarly situated employees, and no other circumstance from which a protected-
class nexus could reasonably be inferred; a plaintiff “cannot rely on her own
‘conjecture’ to impute a racial character” to otherwise neutral conduct, and the same
requirement of a pleaded nexus applies to Plaintiff’s sex- and age-based theories.
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McIver v. Bridgestone Ams., Inc., 42 F.4th 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2022).
Nor does the Complaint plead a basis for imputing the co-worker’s conduct to
the employer. An employer is liable for co-worker harassment only where it knew or
should have known of the conduct and “failed to take action reasonably calculated to
stop it.”
Bazemore v. Best Buy, 957 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
The Complaint contains no allegation that Lowes Foods had any notice of the co-
worker’s propensity for the alleged conduct before it occurred.
The Court is mindful that a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently
serious, may itself be “severe enough to engender a hostile work environment.”
Boyer-
Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc). But that
principle answers only the severity inquiry; it does not excuse the independent,
threshold requirement that the harassment be shown to relate to a protected
characteristic. Because the Complaint pleads no such nexus,
Boyer-Liberto does not
save Plaintiff’s claim.
The Complaint fails to plead a protected-class nexus or a basis for employer
liability, and the harassment claim must be dismissed.
C. Constructive Discharge Claim
A constructive discharge claim requires a plausible allegation that the plaintiff
was discriminated against by her employer to the point that “a reasonable person in
h[er] position would have felt compelled to resign,” and that she in fact resigned.
Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 211 (4th Cir. 2019). This standard requires
“something more” than the showing required for a hostile work environment claim.
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Id. Absent conditions beyond ordinary workplace discrimination, an employee is
“expected to remain on the job while seeking redress.”
Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004).
Because Plaintiff has not stated a hostile work environment claim, her
constructive discharge claim necessarily fails as well, for “it necessarily follows that
[she] cannot show constructive discharge.”
Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196,
212 (4th Cir. 2019). Independently, the Complaint alleges a single incident followed
by an immediate, same-day resignation, without any allegation that Lowes Foods was
afforded an opportunity to investigate or respond and without any allegation that
Defendants acted with intent to force Plaintiff’s resignation. A single, isolated
incident is generally insufficient to establish the requisite intolerability.	
See
Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 301 (4th Cir. 2022) (rejecting a claim premised
on “one episode of yelling and pounding the table”).
For these reasons, the constructive discharge claim fails.
D. Negligent Supervision Claim
Under North Carolina law, a negligent supervision claim requires: (1) a specific
negligent act; (2) incompetency of the employee, established by inherent unfitness or
prior specific acts of negligence; (3) actual or constructive notice of that incompetency
to the employer; and (4) injury proximately resulting from it.
Medlin v. Bass, 398
S.E.2d 460, 462 (N.C. 1990). The Complaint alleges no facts showing the co-worker
was inherently unfit or had a history of similar conduct, and no facts showing Lowes
Foods had actual or constructive notice of any such unfitness before the incident.
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Further, because North Carolina does not recognize harassment as a common-law
tort, harassment cannot serve as the underlying tortious act for a negligent
supervision claim.
McLean v. Patten Cmtys., Inc., 332 F.3d 714, 719 (4th Cir. 2003).
The negligent supervision claim fails as a matter of law.
E. Punitive Damages
Plaintiff pleads punitive damages as a freestanding cause of action. “North
Carolina does not recognize a ‘cause of action’ for punitive damages”; punitive
damages are a remedy incident to an underlying tort, not an independent claim.
Baldwin v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 3:12cv212, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116235, at *2
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2012). Because Plaintiff’s remaining substantive claims are
dismissed, and because North Carolina law does not in any event authorize a
standalone punitive damages claim, this claim also requires dismissal.
See, e.g.,
Combs & Assoc. v. Kennedy, 147 N.C. App. 362, 374 (2001).
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 9) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; and
3. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
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