Solem v. ALPS Property & Casualty Insurance Co.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Scott T. Solem, d/b/a )
Solem Law Offices, )
) ORDER GRANTING
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
vs. )
)
ALPS Property & Casualty )
Insurance Company, ) Case No. 1:22-cv-212
)
Defendant. )
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment filed on September 6,
2023. See Doc. No. 17. The Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion and cross motion
for summary judgment on September 27, 2023. See Doc. Nos.19 and 20. The Defendant filed a
combined response and reply brief on October 19, 2023. See Doc. No. 23. For the reasons set forth
below, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a fraudulent check scheme perpetrated against the Solem Law Offices
and its sole proprietor, Scott Solem (collectively, “Solem”), and the refusal of his professional
liability insurer, ALPS Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“ALPS”), to cover the loss. The
facts are undisputed and show as follows.
On November 6, 2020, an associate with the Solem Law Offices, located in Beulah, North
Dakota, received an email in a work email account from an individual who identified himself as
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Stephen Kersey requesting legal assistance. On November 10, 2020, Kersey explained in another
email that he worked for Anthem Equipment, Inc. (“Anthem”) and needed assistance collecting a
debt owed by Ace Machine Inc. (“Ace”) to Anthem. On November 11, 2020, the associate, on
behalf of the Solem Law Offices executed a fee agreement with Anthem. On December 1, 2020, the
Solem Law Offices received a Citibank cashier’s check dated November 19, 2020, and made payable
to the Solem Law Offices in the amount of $198,850.00 (“Check”). On December 1, 2020, the
Solem Law Offices deposited the Check in the firm’s IOLTA account with First Security Bank-West
in Beulah, North Dakota (“First Security Bank-West”). On December 3, 2020, the Solem Law
Offices received wire instructions from Kersey directing the Solem Law Offices to wire $198,336.68
to a Bank of America account in Phoenix, Arizona, owned by ACE Telecom, Inc. On December 3,
2020, the Solem Law Offices instructed First Security Bank-West to wire $198,336.68 from the
Solem Firm’s IOLTA account to the Bank of America account owned by ACE Telecom. The funds
were wired as instructed. On December 5, 2020, the Solem Law Offices received a telephone call
from First Security Bank-West advising them the Check deposited by Solem on December 1, 2020,
had been flagged as possibly fraudulent. The Check was later confirmed to be counterfeit.
Solem contacted the Beulah Chief of Police, the FBI, and the North Dakota Attorney General,
among others, in an attempt to recover the funds wired to the ACE Telecom Bank of America
account in Phoenix. Solem transferred $98,850.00 from his general office account along with
$100,000 he borrowed from First Security Bank-West to the firm’s IOLTA account to cover the trust
account shortage caused by the fraud. Of the $198,336.68 wired on December 3, 2020, $15,969.07
was recovered, returned to First Security Bank-West on or around March 28, 2021, and applied to
a loan from First Security Bank-West to Solem. Attempts to contact Anthem or otherwise obtain
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return of the trust account funds from Anthem were unsuccessful. The result of the fraudulent
scheme perpetrated by unknown persons was a loss to the Solem Law Offices of $182,367.61. None
of the Solem Law Offices clients experienced any loss.
At all times relevant to this case, the Solem Law Offices were insured by ALPS Professional
Liability Insurance Policy No. ALPS19462-5 (“Policy”) issued by ALPS to the Solem Law Offices
for the policy period September 15, 2020, to September 15, 2021. Scott T. Solem is listed as an
individual attorney insured under the Policy, as is the associate who executed the fee agreement with
Anthem. The Policy provides legal professional liability insurance on a claims made and reported
basis.
On December 7, 2020, the Solem Law Office submitted a claim to ALPS related to the
fraudulent check scheme described above in the amount of $182,367.61. On December 8, 2020,
ALPS acknowledged the December 7, 2020, claim and provided Solem with ALPS’s preliminary
position denying coverage. On November 29, 2022, Solem filed suit against ALPS in state court in
North Dakota. On December 1, 2022, ALPS again denied coverage and demanded the state court
lawsuit be dismissed. On December 21, 2022, ALPS removed the action to federal court and filed
its answer. The jurisdictional basis for removal was diversity of citizenship. Solem is a citizen of
North Dakota. ALPS is a citizen of Montana. Both parties have now moved for summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, indicates that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Davison v. City of Minneapolis, 490 F.3d 648, 654 (8th
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Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not appropriate if there are factual
disputes that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence
would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. The purpose of
summary judgment is to assess the evidence and determine if a trial is genuinely necessary.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The Court must inquire whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
the submission of the case to a jury or whether the evidence is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law. Diesel Mach., Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir.
2005). The moving party bears the responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion
and identifying the portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The
non-moving party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its
response must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
If the record taken as a whole and viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial and
summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
ALPS contends in its motion for summary judgment that the Policy does not afford coverage
because (1) no “claim” was made against Solem; (2) Solem did not perform any “professional
services” as defined by the Policy; (3) the Policy contains an exclusion for losses occasioned by the
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conversion, misappropriation, or wrongful disbursement of trust account funds; (4) the Policy
contains a second exclusion for any claim related to funds controlled by the insured; and (5) the
recovery sought does not fall within the Policy’s definition of “damages.” Solem maintains the
Policy affords coverage.
It is undisputed that North Dakota law applies to this diversity action. See Guardian
Fiberglass, Inc. v. Whit Davis Lumber Co., 509 F.3d 512, 515 (8th Cir. 2007) (federal district court
sitting in diversity must apply the forum state’s substantive law). Under North Dakota law,
insurance policies are construed like any other contract. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Lagodinski,
683 N.W.2d 903, 907 (N.D. 2004). The goal is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.
The Court must first look to the language of the policy and, if it is clear, there is no room for
construction. Id. Undefined terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Insurance
policies are regarded as contracts of adhesion with ambiguity resolved in favor of the insured. Id.
The Court must not strain the definition of an undefined term or rewrite an unambiguous policy to
provide coverage. The policy must be construed as a whole, giving meaning and effect to each
clause, if possible. Id. at 907. Exclusions from coverage must be clear and explicit and are strictly
construed against the insurer. Id. The Court must not rewrite the contract to find coverage where
the exclusion unambiguously excludes coverage. Id. A court interpreting an insurance policy must
first examine the coverages provided by the policy before examining the policy’s exclusions. K &
L Homes, Inc. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 829 N.W.2d 724, 728 (N.D. 2013). Neither this Court nor
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the precise coverage issue presented by which an
insured seeks reimbursement under a third-party professional liability policy for the insured’s loss -
trust account funds lost to a criminal actor - even though no client or any other entity has made a
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claim against the insured.
A. Coverage
ALPS contends that because no client of Solem ever made a claim against the firm, no
professional services were rendered, and no damages were incurred related to the fraudulent check
scheme, there can be no recovery under the policy for the loss. Solem contends that when a lawyer
distributes trust account funds without client authorization the client has a claim for malpractice, and
the fact the attorney restored the funds before the claim was made does not negate coverage.
The Policy’s insuring agreement states, in relevant part:
Subject to the Limit of Liability, exclusions, conditions and other terms of this
Policy, the Company agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums (in excess of the
Deductible amount) that the Insured becomes legally obligated to pay as Damages,
arising from or in connection with A CLAIM FIRST MADE AGAINST THE
INSURED AND FIRST REPORTED TO THE COMPANY DURING THE POLICY
PERIOD...
See Doc. No. 3-1, p. 11. The Policy defines “claim” as “a demand for money or services including,
but not necessarily limited to, the service of suit or institution of arbitration or alternative dispute
resolution proceedings against the Insured.” See Doc. No. 3-1, p. 12. “Professional services” are
defined in the Policy as, in pertinent part, “services or activities . . . rendered solely to others as . .
. [a]n Attorney in an attorney-client relationship on behalf of one or more clients applying the
Attorney’s specialized education, knowledge, skill, labor, experience and/or training, including pro
bono services” and “[a]n administrator, conservator, guardian, executor, personal representative,
trustee or other fiduciary.” See Doc. No. 3-1, p. 16. “Damages” are defined in the Policy, in relevant
part, as any “[m]onetary award by way of judgment or final arbitration, or any settlement.” See Doc.
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No. 3-1, p. 14. The Policy excludes from the definition of “Damages,” in relevant part, [r]estitution,
reduction, disgorgement or set-off of any fees, costs, consideration or expenses paid to or charged
by an Insured, or any other funds or property of any person or entity presently or formerly held or
in any manner directly or indirectly controlled by an Insured or [i]njury or damage to, destruction
of, loss of, or loss of use of any funds or property[.] See Doc. No. 3-1, p. 14.
The precise coverage issue in this case has never been addressed by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals or the North Dakota Supreme Court. Other courts have addressed the issue and come
to differing conclusions. See Nardella Chong, P.A. v. Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 941 (11th
Cir. 2011) (finding policy provided coverage); O’Brien & Wolf, L.L.P. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters,
Inc., No. CIV. 11-3748, 2012 WL 3156802 (D. Minn. Aug. 3, 2012) (finding policy provided
coverage); Bradford & Bradford, P.A. v. Att’ys Liab. Prot. Soc., Inc., No. 0:09-CV-02981, 2010 WL
4225907 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2010) (finding no coverage); Yadlon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No.
06-CV-05617, 2008 WL 11510298 (D.N.J. July 17, 2008) (finding no coverage). The Court has
carefully reviewed all of these cases and finds Nardella and O’Brien to be persuasive. The
management of client trust funds is undoubtedly a professional service regularly performed by
attorneys, and it would be unconscionable to interpret a professional liability policy to require an
attorney to breach his ethical duties in order to generate a claim so that coverage is available.
In Nardella, a client purported to hire the law firm to establish a U.S. subsidiary. Nardella
Chong, P.A., 642 F.3d at 942. The client provided the firm a cashier’s check in payment which was
deposited in the firm trust account. Id. The client then instructed that most of the funds from the
cashier’s check should be wired to an overseas business partner. Id. After the firm wired the funds,
it found out the cashier’s check had been forged. Id. The funds that were wired belonged to other
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clients. The professional liability insurer denied coverage. The district court agreed with the insurer
that there was no coverage because there had been no negligent acts or omissions and the other
client’s potential claims would be in the nature of restitution rather than damages. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and found there was coverage. The Eleventh Circuit explained
that the deposit of client funds into a trust account and the management of those funds is a
“professional service.” Id. Such services are traditionally performed by attorneys in a fiduciary
capacity and are governed by the rules of professional conduct. Id. at 943. The Eleventh Circuit
found that claims for negligent management of a trust account are covered, “including those that
could have been asserted.” The insurer gave its permission for the firm to replace the trust funds
fraudulently diverted in order to avoid the filing of any malpractice claims and no arguments were
presented as between actual and potential claims. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the idea that
such malpractice claims would be for restitution rather than damages because a malpractice case for
trust fund negligence gives rise to an action for damages, not restitution. Id.
In O’Brien, a law firm was contacted by a potential client seeking help to collect a debt.
O’Brien & Wolf, 2012 WL 3156802, at *1. The debtor agreed to a payment plan and sent the law
firm a check which was deposited in the firm’s trust account. Id. After the bank twice confirmed
the check had cleared, the firm distributed the funds as instructed by the client. The bank then
informed the firm the check was counterfeit and debited the firm’s trust account for the amount of
the check. Realizing it was in violation of Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15, the firm
immediately reimbursed the trust account. The firm then made a claim with its malpractice carrier
which took no action on the claim. The insurer maintained the firm had not provided any
“professional services” and no “claim” had been filed against the firm. Id. at *2. The policy defined
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a “claim” as “demand received.” Id. at *3. The court found the term “demand” to be ambiguous.
Id. The Court also found the rules of professional conduct required the firm to safeguard client funds
and make restitution to its clients immediately upon discovery of the loss. Id. at *3-4. Critically,
the Court found the rules of professional conduct operated as a “demand” for reimbursement of the
firm’s trust account under a broad reading of the malpractice policy. Id. at *4. The Court
emphasized that it “refuses to interpret the policy to require O’Brien & Wolf to breach its ethical
duties to its clients, and thereby subject itself to certain discipline, in order to ensure coverage under
its malpractice insurance.” Id. The Court explained that managing a client trust account creates a
fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client that constitutes the provision of “professional legal
services.” Id. at *5. The Court also found the firm had suffered a full and final amount of loss which
were recoverable damages under the policy. Id. at *4
This Court has no difficulty concluding that the management of client funds in a trust account
constitutes the provision of professional services. Nardella Chong, P.A., 642 F.3d at 942-43. Rule
1.15 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct makes it clear to any attorney that keeping
client funds creates a fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the client. N.D.R. Prof.
Conduct. 1.15. Comment 1 to Rule 1.15 states “[a] lawyer should hold property of others with the
care required of a professional fiduciary.” The Policy defines “professional services” to include
services rendered as a “trustee or other fiduciary.” See Doc. No. 3-1, p. 16. Thus, Solem did render
“professional services.”
The Policy contains the same ambiguous definition of “claim” as the policy in O’Brien. A
“claim” “means a demand for money or services including, but not necessarily limited to, the service
of suit or institution of arbitration or alternative dispute resolution proceedings against the insured.”
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See Doc. No. 3-1, p. 12. The term “demand” is not defined. See Doc. No. 3-1, p. 12. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines demand as “[t]he assertion of a legal or procedural right. Demand, Black’ Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The Court finds the undefined term “demand” to be ambiguous. See
O’Brien & Wolf, 2012 WL 3156802, at *3. “The duty to properly safeguard client funds is an
ongoing and preexisting demand on all licensed attorneys.” Id. at *4 (emphasis added). Violation
of Rule 1.15 may result in disbarment. In re Disciplinary Action Against Buresh, 726 N.W.2d 210,
214 (N.D. 2007). “Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client
property and causes injury or potential injury to a client” and “suspension is generally appropriate
when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes
injury or potential injury to a client.” In re Disciplinary Action Against McDonagh, 822 N.W.2d
468, 470 (N.D. 2012). Prompt voluntary restitution is an important mitigating factor is disciplinary
actions. Matter of Disciplinary Action Against Becker, 504 N.W.2d 303, 306 (N.D. 1993). The
Court concludes the Policy’s requirement of a “demand” encompasses Rule 1.15's standing
requirement to safeguard client funds held in a trust account, thus there was a “claim” which
triggered coverage. O’Brien & Wolf, 2012 WL 3156802, at *4.
As for damages, the amount in question was an undisputed sum certain. The immediate
reimbursement made by Solem amounted to a settlement and was required by Rule 1.15 of the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct. Again, the Court refuses to interpret any provision of the
Policy in a way which requires Solem to abandon his ethical duties. O’Brien & Wolf, 2012 WL
3156802, at *4. Solem was ethically and legally obligated to make immediate reimbursement to his
firm trust account. Clearly, there were damages. ALPS’ construction of the Policy requires Solem
to breach his ethical duties, allow an action against him for malpractice to go forward and be reduced
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to a judgment, before filing a claim. Such a construction would undermine the very purpose
disciplinary proceedings and the Rules of Professional Conduct upon which they are based, which
is to protect the public. See Matter of Reinstatement of Varriano, 909 N.W.2d 695, 700 (N.D. 2018).
“Public policy is a principle of law whereby contracts will not be enforced if they have a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” Cf. Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d 262,
267 (N.D. 2001). Professional liability insurance is a contract not just between a lawyer and his
insurer “but also a contract for the benefit of the public.” O’Brien & Wolf, 2012 WL 3156802, at
*8. The Court finds that Solem suffered damages covered by the Policy.
ALPS relies primarily on Yadlon, an unpublished opinion decided prior to Nardella and
O’Brien, in arguing there is no coverage because no claim was made against Solem. In Yadlon, an
attorney failed to reconcile his trust account for two years and upon doing so learned a substantial
amount of funds were missing and likely stolen using forged checks. Yadlon, 2008 WL 11510298
, at *1. The attorney made good the loss from his own funds and sought coverage under his
professional liability insurance policy. Id. The insurer denied coverage and the law firm filed a
lawsuit. Id. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer finding no claim or
demand had been filed against the lawyer by his clients. Id. at *2. The Court further explained that
the purpose of third-party insurance is to protect insureds from claims made against them as a result
of their own conduct. Id. at *3. The Court commended the lawyer for making good the loss but
pointed to his own negligence in permitting the loss to occur. Id. The Court did not address the
lawyers’ ethical obligations under the rules of professional conduct to make good the funds stolen
from his trust account.
The problem with the reasoning in Yadlon is there certainly was a viable claim against the
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attorney for malpractice based on the theft of client funds and that claim existed until the attorney
made good the loss. Had the attorney not done so there certainly would have been a claim against
him for malpractice. Yadlon requires the attorney to choose between performing his ethical duty
under the rules of professional conduct by making good the loss and forgoing coverage or ignoring
his ethical obligations and then being able to turn to his insurer for coverage. Yadlon was decided
before Nardella and O’Brien and the case does not address the lawyers’ ethical obligations under
the rules of professional conduct. Nardella and O’Brien do not require an ethical breach in order
to obtain coverage and the Court firmly believes these opinions offer the better rule. ALPS also cites
to Bradford & Bradford, P.A. v. Att’ys Liab. Prot. Soc., Inc., No. 09-CV-02981, 2010 WL 4225907
(D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2010), which the Court finds unpersuasive for the same reasons as Yadlon.
ALPS would force Solem to make the same Hobson’s choice the courts rejected in Nardella
and O’Brien. To force a lawyer to violate his ethical duties and face certain discipline and possible
disbarment in order to obtain insurance coverage strikes the Court as unconscionable. “[C]ourts
prefer a reasonable and lawful interpretation of the contract over one that is unreasonable or
unlawful.” O’Brien & Wolf, 2012 WL 3156802, at *3. This Court, like the court in O’Brien,
refuses to read the Policy to require Solem to violate his ethical duties to his clients in order to obtain
coverage. Id. at *4. The Court finds the fraud visited upon Solem is expressly covered by the
Insuring Agreement in Section 1 of the Policy.
B. Exclusions
Having determined there is coverage under the Policy, the Court must next determine if either
of the exclusions cited by ALPS apply. In North Dakota, exclusions “must be clear and explicit and
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are strictly construed against the insurer.” Forsman v. Blues, Brews & Bar-B-Ques, Inc., 903
N.W.2d 524, 530 (N.D. 2017). “While exclusionary clauses are strictly construed, a contract will
not be rewritten to impose liability when the policy unambiguously precludes coverage.” Id. at 531.
The burden is on the insurer to establish the applicability of an exclusion. Id.
In this case, Section 3 of the Policy contains multiple exclusions. The two exclusions at issue
(H and I) provide as follows:
THIS POLICY DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY CLAIM ARISING FROM OR IN
CONNECTION WITH:
H. Any conversion, misappropriation, wrongful disbursement, improper
commingling or negligent supervision by any person of client or trust account
funds or property, or funds or property of any other person, held or controlled
at any time by an Insured in any capacity or under any authority, including
any loss or reduction in value of such funds or property;
I. Any dispute over fees or costs, or any Claim that seeks, whether directly or
indirectly, the return, reimbursement or disgorgement of fees, costs, or other
funds or property held or controlled at any time by an Insured;
ALPS contends these exclusions clearly and unambiguously preclude coverage of the claims
in this case. Solem contends the exclusions are void as against public policy. The loss in this case
undisputedly arose from the misappropriation and/or wrongful disbursement of funds held in the
Solem trust account. Thus, the funds were controlled by Solem. The funds were stolen by means
of a fraudulent check scam that, as the case law reveals, has become a frequent occurrence in the
legal community. The Court sees no ambiguity in the exclusions. Similar exclusions have been held
to be unambiguous and to exclude coverage in a number of cases involving fraudulent schemes. See
Att’ys Liab. Prot. Soc’y, Inc. v. Whittington Law Assocs., PLLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (D.N.H.
2013) (finding similar exclusion was “clear and unambiguous” and applied in the case of a check
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fraud scheme to the misappropriation of funds under the control of a law firm); ALPS Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 473 F. Supp. 3d 585, 592-593 (N.D. W. Va. 2020) (finding an identical
exclusion in an ALPS policy was “broad” and excluded coverage for settlement payment lost to a
third party who provided fraudulent wire instructions to law firm); Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y.
v. OHIC Ins. Co., 619 S.E.2d 704, 707 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a similar exclusion in a
professional liability policy applied to claims arising out of conversion, misappropriation, or
improper commingling of client funds held in a lawyer trust account were stolen by an employee);
Acct. Res., Inc. v. Hiscox, Inc., No. 15-cv-01764, 2016 WL 5844465 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2016)
(finding similar exclusion excluded a claim that arose from a theft of funds from an accounting firm
by computer hackers using fraudulent emails requesting payment for vendors). The Court finds no
ambiguity in the exclusions 3.H and 3.I.
Solem’s argument regarding public policy fails to persuade because the exclusions, unlike
the other Policy provisions cited by ALPS, do not incentivize a lawyer to violate his ethical
obligations in order maintain a claim under the Policy. The Court is not aware of, and Solem has
not drawn the Court’s attention to, any case law supporting the contention that an exclusion which
excludes certain negligent acts is a violation of public policy. An attorney cannot expect a
professional liability policy to cover that which a policy specifically and unambiguously excludes.
The Court finds exclusions 3.H and 3.I clearly apply to exclude coverage in this case. Because the
exclusions apply, Solem’s motion for summary judgment fails.1
1The Court is sympathetic to the dilemma faced by the Plaintiff in this case. One other possibility for
coverage is a claim under the firm’s CGL policy.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has carefully reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant case law.
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 17) is
GRANTED and the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 20) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of January, 2024.
/s/ Daniel L. Hovland
Daniel L. Hovland, District Judge
United States District Court
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